Coto War

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The Guerra de Coto was a war between Costa Rica and Panama that occurred between February 21 and March 5, 1921. An expeditionary force occupied Costa Rica on behalf of the town of Pueblo Nuevo de Coto, a hamlet on the banks of the homonymous river. The incursion was justified by the fact that since colonial times there had been no defined border between Costa Rica and Panama, and both nations considered the area around Reserve as part of its territory. The event ignited nationalism in both nations, where volunteer forces were organized to resolve the conflict militarily.

The development of the war occurred in two scenarios: the first was in Coto, where the Panamanian forces in a few days managed to reverse and reject the actions of Costa Rica in the area, culminating in a tactical victory for Panama; The second was in the province of Bocas del Toro, which began on March 4, where Costa Rican forces quickly occupied the towns of Guabito, Changuinola and Almirante, since Panamanian forces had strategically withdrawn towards the city of Bocas del Toro. Toro. The appearance of the American gunboat USS Sacramento on March 5 prevented confrontation in that area and forced the withdrawal of the Costa Rican forces beyond the Sixaola River.

Due to pressure from the United States, through the ultimatum of Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby, Panama had to accept under the White Ruling the cession of the Coto area; while Costa Rica had to renounce its territorial claims in Bocas del Toro. As the United States objected in defense of the interests of its banana companies, they took drastic measures to end the conflict, and conclude in the definition of the borders between both nations, that would arrive in 1941 with the Echandi-Fernández Treaty.

Background

Presidents during the Coto War
Julio Acosta García,
President of Costa Rica.
Belisario Porras,
President of Panama.

Colonial History

Extension of the province of Nueva Cartago and Costa Rica to 1540. To the east of the province is the Duke of Veragua.

The border between Panama and Costa Rica has not been well defined since colonial times. After the arrival of Christopher Columbus to the Bocas del Toro region in 1502, the governorship of Veragua was founded, but in 1537 it was divided into two territories: the duchy of Veragua, a lordship given to the descendants of Columbus; and the Veragua Real, whose territories extended to present-day Nicaragua, which came under the direct control of the Spanish crown. The duchy consisted of a square territory in the middle of the Isthmus of Panama, which separated the territories of Castilla de Oro and Veragua Real. Later, in 1540, Veragua Real was converted into the Province of Nueva Cartago and Costa Rica, whose territories extended from the Duchy of Veragua to eastern Honduras.

Attempts were made to found towns, but they did not last more than months. In 1540 the town of Badajoz was founded, on the banks of the Sixaola river, but it was destroyed. In 1560, the town of Castillo de Austria was founded in Almirante Bay, but it was abandoned the following year due to its inhospitable and unhealthy location. In 1577, the City of Artieda del Nuevo Reino de Navarra was founded on the banks of the Cricamola River, which came under the jurisdiction of the new province of Costa Rica, but was abandoned the following year for the same reasons.

In 1573, Philip II of Spain signed a contract with Captain Diego de Artieda y Chirinos. In this contract, he established that the border with Costa Rica to the south extended, "all that the land runs to the duchy of Veragua", however the limits of the duchy were never clearly defined at that time, apart from the fact that in 1556 the duke decided to return the territory to the Spanish crown.

In 1605 the ephemeral Santiago de Talamanca was founded on the southern bank of the Sixaola by the conquistador Diego de Sojo y Peñaranda, and had a certain prosperity, becoming the capital of the new province of Duy y Mexicanos in 1610, which extended from the Sixaola to the Escudo de Veraguas island, but in that same year an indigenous rebellion led by the cabécar that ended in a massacre, forced the abandonment of the city and the dissolution of Duy and Mexicanos.

The region of Bocas del Toro was considered since colonial times as part of the Mosquito Coast, which stretched from the Escudo de Veraguas island to Cape Gracias a Dios, and was finally included in the General Captaincy of Guatemala, dependent on the Viceroyalty of New Spain, although by the Royal Decree of 1803 its jurisdiction was transferred to the Viceroyalty of New Granada.

Dispute between Colombia and Costa Rica

Border claims made by Colombia, Costa Rica and the Federal Republic of Central America, according to the uti possidetis iuris of 1810.

With the independence of the Isthmus of Panama in 1821 (and its subsequent accession to Gran Colombia) and the emergence of the Federal Republic of Central America in 1824, the dispute over Bocas del Toro became more evident.

In 1836, fearing the growing English influence in the Caribbean, Central America proclaimed authority on the island of Bocas de Toro and appointed Juan Galindo to establish the district of Morazán. However, the Republic of New Granada it sent two ships and a detachment to expel the Central American forces, achieving it on December 18, without any military action. Costa Rica protested the action, considering it a "usurpation", but fearing the New Granadan military might refrained from taking action. until the Separation of Panama from Colombia in 1903, and it remained a border claim. Reaffirming the sovereignty of New Granada, on May 26, 1837, Bocas del Toro was named as a canton of the province of Veragua and in 1843 it was constituted as a national territory, with tax benefits and special sociopolitical attributions.

In 1840, with the brief independence of the Panamanian isthmus by Tomás Herrera under the name of State of the Isthmus, the border issue returned to the table. The new republic was seeking international recognition and set its sights on its immediate neighbor, Costa Rica. Herrera appointed the agent Pedro de Obarrio to meet with the Supreme Head of State of Costa Rica, Braulio Carrillo, on September 21, 1841. In said meeting, Carillo conditioned the recognition of Costa Rica and relations with the isthmus, in exchange for the transfer of the Bocas del Toro area. The Panamanian state did not object to the friendship treaty: it was approved by the Panamanian congress on December 9, 1841 and Tomás Herrera sanctioned it the next day. However, Costa Rica delayed in approving and sanctioning the treaty, since the State of the Isthmus rejoined New Granada on December 31, 1841, and it was not until January 28, 1842 when Carrillo sanctioned it, rendering the treaty null and void. treated for being extemporaneous.

Subsequently, various border treaties were made (Calvo-Herrán Treaty in 1856, Castro-Valenzuela Treaty in 1865 and Montúfar-Correoso Treaty in 1873), but they were not ratified by both governments. However, the border dispute changed the scene towards the southern zone, on the Golfo Dulce and the Burica Peninsula, where decades later the conflict would take place.

The eastern part of the Golfo Dulce was an area where the indigenous communities could take refuge during the colonial era, since it was little explored, but they disappeared. It was not until the 1830s that a group of people from Chiriquí (at that time part of Greater Colombia) began to populate it. Around 1844, the Costa Rican government was informed of the existence of a town on the site of a few families of "foreign" origin, but who recognized Costa Rican authority. In 1849, Costa Rica ceded land for a French agricultural colonization, but in 1852 it ended in failure. The presence of Chiricanos in the territory continued to be so important that in 1861 the governor of the province of Puntarenas, Carlos Moya, visited Golfo Dulce and confirmed that most of the 200 inhabitants were Chiricanos. However, the null presence of Costa Rican authorities made Colombia affirm its presence in the Golfo Dulce.

Colombia, through the assembly of the Sovereign State of Panama, ordered the lease of the cocales or coconut trees between Punta Burica and the Esquinas river, covering the towns of Coto, Pavón, Banco and Golfito. In 1870 and 1875 Costa Rica claimed that this zone was in its sovereignty and constantly complained that Colombian authorities were collecting taxes in the hamlets; but Colombia argued that this area belonged to the district of Alanje.

Historical-geographic map of Costa Rica and the Duke of Veragua (1892).
During the centuryXIX Costa Rica set its border with Colombia from the Chiriquí Viejo River, the Central Range and the Calovébora River to the Escudo Island of Veraguas (yellow line). With this, he sought to claim the Bocas del Toro area.
While Colombia set its border with Costa Rica from the Golfito River and extended to the Sixaola River valley. Colombia claimed the eastern part of the Gulf Dulce and Talamanca.

The situation escalated in August 1878 when Tomás Guardia, president of Costa Rica, visited the Golfo Dulce on the warship Irazú and ordered the regularization of the immigrant population from Colombia, and transferring them to another point. When Costa Rica It occupied the Burica cocales, installing a political chief, provoked the protest of the President of the Sovereign State of Panama, Gerardo Ortega, and an armed force had to be sent to protect the cocales. As there was no setback in the intentions of Costa Rica, the president of Colombia, Rafael Núñez, traveled to Panama together with the secretaries of War and Foreign Relations. Also in the skirmish was the presence of the American ship USS Adams, which arrived in Golfo Dulce on February 29, 1880 with the intention of establishing a coaling station with the approval of the political chief of Burica. Colombia, alarmed by the situation, expressed through the Senate a resolution issued on April 14, 1880 requesting Costa Rica's respect for the line of status quo between the two nations and requested that they meet in a friendly manner. resolve the dispute. At the end of the year, Costa Rica received the Plenipotentiary Minister of Colombia and the first arbitration convention between the two countries was signed, although for Costa Rica it assumed it as an assignment for fear of a threat of war by Colombia. On December 25, 1880, the representatives of Costa Rica and Colombia decided to submit the arbitration of this border demarcation to King Alfonso XII of Spain.

Despite the fact that the Costa Rican authorities acted intermittently on the border conflict, the high rate of resident Chiricanos was maintained. In 1884, the population of the Golfo Dulce continued to increase, where 377 inhabitants were registered, of which only 35 were Costa Ricans. In 1900, Father Vicente Krautwig attested to the lack of authorities in Golfo Dulce and the high population of Colombians in it, considering it a "border and transit population".

In 1896, a new convention was signed in Bogotá, which would be arbitrated by the then president of France, Émile Loubet. On September 11, 1900, the Loubet Ruling was issued, but it was not accepted by Costa Rica, since it harmed this country and granted Colombia more disputed territory, especially the Sixaola river basin.

Dispute between Costa Rica and Panama

Border according to Fallo Loubet (1900).
Frontier according to Fallo White (1914).

In 1905, after separating Panama from Colombian territory, an attempt was made to sign a treaty with the new Panamanian government, called the Pacheco-de la Guardia Treaty of March 6, 1905, ratified by Panama but not by Costa Rica, which considered expired. Costa Rica, taking advantage of the new situation, where Panama was seen as a weaker country than Colombia, made attempts to occupy the area designated to Panama according to the Loubet ruling in July 1904, in the town of Gandoca with a force of 15 to 20 men from the Costa Rican army. Again, on May 28, 1909, an armed detachment from Costa Rica took possession of the western area of the Sixaola River, provoking a protest from Panama.

Years later, in 1910, Panama and Costa Rica mutually accepted the mediation of the United States government, which established the Anderson-Porras arbitration convention and appointed Edward Douglass White as arbitrator in his capacity as president of the Supreme Court of Justice to determine the limit between Panama and Costa Rica. On September 12, 1914, Mr. White signed the arbitral ruling known as the White Ruling, where the Panamanian government was dissatisfied with the resolution, since said ruling benefited Costa Rica. Thus, the legal status quo was maintained for many years until the start of the war.

In 1914, the Costa Rican Minister of the Interior, Carlos María Jiménez, visited Golfo Dulce and confirmed that there were 800 people inhabiting it, most of them Chiricanos; and ordered the transfer of the town for sanitary reasons (today Puerto Jiménez), an action that materialized in 1917. Also in 1917, the secretary of war José Joaquín Tinoco Granados received a coca-growing concession in the area of the Golfo Dulce in his favor, made which caught the attention of the Panamanian authorities who began to reinforce the area with more police.

The first relevant mention of Pueblo Nuevo de Coto within the dispute occurred on December 16, 1917, when a group of opponents of the Costa Rican dictator Federico Tinoco arrived in Coto, fleeing to Panama. They found that the town of about 30-40 inhabitants was under Panamanian sovereignty and that there was a local authority, the corregidor. They also realized that Coto maintained communication with Panama through a boat that arrived every 15 days from the port of Pedregal, neighboring the capital of Chiriquí, David. At that time, Coto was one of the two corregimientos of the Alanje district, legally designated according to the Administrative Code of Panama, approved in 1916.

When the review of the opponents was published in 1920, the situation of Coto was taken with reproach in Costa Rica, which led to the rapid search for a resolution.

The fighting

Description of the Coto War in 1921.

The war was fought in two places. The first place was in Pueblo Nuevo de Coto and around the Coto River in the Pacific sector. In this area the Costa Rican forces suffered a series of defeats. The second scenario was in the Atlantic, to the west of the province of Bocas del Toro, although without confrontations, the Costa Ricans obtained a rapid advance on Panamanian territory.

Battles in Coto

Occupation of the region by Costa Rica

On February 21, 1921, the Costa Rican government, through Héctor Zúñiga Mora, military commander of the Golfo Dulce, sent a telegram to the governor of the province of Chiriquí, announcing that by complying with the ruling, White was empowered to take possession of the region de Coto, which at that time was under Panamanian jurisdiction and that would fly the Costa Rican flag in Pueblo Nuevo de Coto, in addition to annulling any lease and assignment that the region has with Panama, including that of coconut crops in the Burica region and that they were under a concession from the Alanje district. The governor of Chiriquí decided to protest this decision and urgently communicated to President Porras.

At 4 p.m. m. On February 21, a Costa Rican gasoline ship arrived at Pueblo Nuevo across the Coto River and disembarked a colonel, a lieutenant and a civil chief who would administer the region, meeting with the Panamanian police chief Manuel S. Pinzón where they demanded that he surrender since there were a hundred soldiers on board the ship. The police chief replied that he would not hand over anything since he had no orders from the Panamanian government, however he did not offer any resistance and the Costa Ricans raised his flag, keeping the troops on board the ship; while the police chief of Coto sent a telegram to the police chief of the province of Chiriquí, who replied that he would concentrate all the police officers in the province and would follow the orders of the governor.

On February 22, Porras called the secretaries of Foreign Relations, Narciso A. Garay; of Finance and Treasury, Eusebio A. Morales; of Public Instruction, Jeptha B. Duncan; of Development and Public Works, Manuel Quintero Villareal and Próspero Pinel as a special guest, to an extraordinary session to decide on the measures to face what they considered an invasion. The president himself arranged to send an expeditionary force with great reserve to surprise the Costa Rican forces led by himself; although Secretary Morales managed to persuade the president to delegate said work to someone else, preventing an apparent power vacuum in the Panamanian capital. Then General Quintero Villareal was appointed as head of the expedition, who was a veteran of the War of a Thousand Days at the end of the union with Colombia, and was a native of Chiriquí, so he knew the terrain.

However, one of the main difficulties for the mobilization of Panamanians was the lack of weapons. Panama had disbanded its army in 1904 for fear of a coup, and a US intervention in 1915 forced long-range weapons to be turned in and sold, leaving the Panamanian police virtually unarmed. But President Porras revealed that the expedition could be armed with carbines that were sold in two stores in the capital, added to the rifles of the police from the interior of the country that were in good condition and with 50 Remington rifles with 60,000 ammunition that the Porras himself had secretly hidden in the back room of the lower courtyard of the Palacio de Las Garzas, hidden during the disarmament era and which he hoped would be in good condition after several years. Lieutenant Ávila and the goalkeeper Olivier Herrera were entrusted with they served Porras in his first presidential term, for the ammunition test, where they confirmed that they were in good condition.

On the night of February 22, preparations were made for the contingent with 50 policemen under the command of Captain Tomás Armuelles, armed with rifles; and another 50 agents armed with carbines under the command of General Quintero as head of the expedition. To carry out the transport, it was decided to use the steamship Veraguas that would take the expedition to Chiriquí, and whose management was in charge of Mr. Próspero Pinel, who had objected that the ship could not leave that same night. for lack of coal. President Porras, urged by the national emergency, managed the purchase of coal through factories whose owners were friends of his: Mr. McGuines, manager of the Balboa Brewery, offered Pinel the necessary fuel to undertake the expedition at the time of finishing the session. At dawn on February 23, they left the English Dock in Panama City on the steamer Veraguas under the command of Quintero and in the company of the governor of the province of Panama, Rodolfo Estripeaut.

Also on February 22, Panamanian forces under the command of Captain Juan B. Grimaldo, Lieutenant Francisco Benítez and Second Lieutenant Joaquín Amaya, together with 50 or 60 police officers from David, left by train for La Concepción, to then continue to La Pita, Divalá and Progreso, to travel later on foot to Coto. The Panamanians organized in David the First Company of David Volunteers, which would leave once the train returned from La Concepción; under the command of Colonel Laureano Gazca, a contingent called "The 13 Bugaba Volunteers" left La Concepción.

Concentration of Panamanian forces

On February 24, the governor of Chiriquí sent a telegram to the president indicating that the troops stationed in Coto increased to 200 and that they were well armed, leaving a difficult situation for the Panamanian forces that were just concentrating in Chiriquí.

President Porras sent two telegrams to General Quintero giving instructions to go on the offensive and not to allow the reinforcement, regrouping or communication of the Costa Rican forces, even indicating to take the steamer Veraguas to the Golfo Dulce and prevent by force the arrival of any vessel. Porras also indicated that the ship David would leave Panama with 70 rifles and some long-range carbines, under the command of General Barrera. However, General Quintero barely reached the town of Progreso (about 45 km west of David) at 3 in the morning on February 24, after a 43-hour trip on the steamer disembarking at the port of Rabo de Puerco and moved to Progreso by train, ruling out complying with Porras' instructions in the telegrams, due to the increase in Costa Rican troops and because there were hardly any weapons for 100 men, leaving 150 people unarmed. Quintero then decided to make Progreso his base of operations, reinforcing espionage and would wait for David with the rest of the ammunition.

The war situation became known throughout the country and nationalist demonstrations began in Panama City. On February 24, a march was organized spontaneously with 6,000 people asking President Porras for more details on the border dispute, marching from the Plaza de Santa Ana towards the residence of President Porras in San Felipe. The march was organized by Harmodio Arias, Aurelio A. Dutary, Ricardo A. Morales, Luis Felipe Clement, Frank Morales, Antonio Alberto Valdés and Julio Poyló. A young speaker, Domingo H. Turner, was the one who on behalf of the march asked Porras for an explanation, and that the Panamanian people were going to defend what was necessary against the Costa Rican occupation. Porras, along with all of his secretaries of state, declared from the balcony of his residence that he felt "astonished"; for the action, despite the fact that three months earlier a representative of Costa Rica had gone to meet him in Panama expressing "manifestations of friendship and fraternity", and that despite the situation measures would be taken to defend Panamanian territory, for which reason he adhered to the sentiment of the protesters and urged citizens to register with the mayor's office to volunteer in the face of what was considered an invasion.

Before the change in strategy, Porras ordered the governor of Chiriquí to collect the weapons to arm the troops that were heading to Coto. He also ordered the formation of a security force made up of civilians. Meanwhile, President Porras promulgated Decree No. 49 of February 26, 1921 where he declared that Costa Rica had invaded Panama and that measures would be taken to expel the Costa Rican forces. He suspended the individual rights described in the Constitution and all male Panamanians between 18 and 40 years of age were called into compulsory military service, calling for service in the mayors' offices of all districts. The National Police would become a military body under the command of the Government and would be subject to military laws, while police work would be provided by the Meritorious Fire Department of Panama and by volunteers. Additionally, the National Assembly of Panama was summoned to extraordinary sessions.

On February 25, President Porras sent a telegram to General Quintero again asking him to position himself in front of Coto in order to prevent a reinforcement from the Costa Ricans and notified him that the David was still preparing heading for Chiriquí with a force of 150 troops already armed, and with 100 more rifles for those unarmed in Progreso, along with ammunition and backpacks. He also announced that there were 5,000 citizens listed as volunteers.

President Porras issued a new decree, No. 50 of February 26, 1921, indicating the creation of a military quartermaster, naming Colonel Rafael Neira A. as Quartermaster General. The administration would have the function of depositing, repairing, collecting and distributing weapons of war and military equipment. The general intendant would also have the function of ordering the governors of provinces and mayors of districts in military functions.

Panamanian Offensive

Manuel Quintero Villarreal would be in charge of concentrating and directing the Panamanian forces in Coto.

General Quintero received the telegram from Porras and agreed to establish an offensive plan on the Coto River using the steamer Veraguas to mobilize the troops. A combined attack would be made by 100 cavalry men who would enter by the royal road and 50 infantry men on the other side, together with the shots that would be fired from the steamer and with 50 men from the left led by Quintero himself, disembarking at short distance from the Costa Rican base.

The same day, General Quintero received a deserter from the Costa Rican troops, who revealed details of the contingent, indicating that they only have one ship stationed, the same one that was used for the occupation on the 21st. President Porras in A telegram, asked Quintero not to trust the deserters and to verify the data, also revealed that the United States had unofficially sent an observation flotilla, but that they would not intervene for the moment. Quintero ordered a group of 126 men of cavalry to advance by land in order to reconnoitre the terrain and station them on the Lagarto River, awaiting the arrival of the Veraguas through the Coto River. In that expeditionary force were Captain Armuelles and Antonio Alvarado. Additionally, 100 unarmed men remained in Rabo de Puerco waiting for David's weapons. Finally at 4 p.m. m. On February 25, the second expedition set sail from Panama with the steamer David with 200 police officers under the orders of Inspector Lamb, some 270 rifles with their ammunition, a Red Cross body commanded by Dr. Dutari.

The Veraguas would leave on the morning of February 26 with 75 men heading for Coto, according to a telegram from General Quintero, believing that the David would be nearby, but The delay in the departure of the David forced Quintero to postpone the departure of the Veraguas, leaving the cavalry expeditionary force with the decision of whether or not to take Coto. General Quintero sent a series of instructions to Captains Armuelles, Solís and Grimaldo, Colonel Gasca and Lieutenants Mejía, Colorado and Lagarto, leaving the actions at their discretion depending on the number of troops stationed in Coto.

The David continued to be delayed, making a stopover in Aguadulce and setting sail on the afternoon of the 26th, so General Quintero proposed sending the Veraguas to the port of Pedregal, near David, since the ship was used to transport cattle through Panama and there was a latent threat of shortage of cattle, and he preferred to use the David for river landings. Additionally, with 10 volunteers, a trail was made through the mountain that would shorten the path by about 15 km and a telegraph line was installed in the direction of Coto. While through Decree No. 51 of February 26, General Quintero is appointed as head of the Chiriquí division of the Panamanian army.

In a telegram dated February 27, General Quintero informed Porras of his frustration at the constant delay of the David and the delay of the Panamanian offensive action in Coto, leaving the cavalry alone. While in the province of Chiriquí, Costa Rican citizens began to be detained on suspicion that they could work as infiltrators.

However, Costa Rica's response was sent on the 26th, with popular demonstrations in San José and Cartago and there were attacks on the Panamanian consulates, according to a telegram from President Porras. Additionally, they would send two reinforcements of 300 men towards Coto and 25 men to the north on the Sixaola river.

The cavalry forces led by Colonel Gasca and David's policemen led by Captains Armuelles and Lieutenant Mejía met at the Lagarto River and advanced to Coto at dawn on February 27. While the Panamanians were organizing to carry out the offensive, two Costa Ricans who were touring the area were captured. To greater surprise, one of them turned out to be Colonel Zúñiga Mora, head of the Costa Rican expedition, and the other was Colonel Daniel González. Both assured that they were hunting. Lieutenant Mejía demanded that Zúñiga Mora surrender the detachment, so the Costa Ricans surrendered without resistance. The Panamanians had recaptured Coto without combat, and captured 30 Costa Ricans, loading themselves with more rifles and ammunition. Lieutenant Mejía feared the arrival of Costa Rican reinforcements from the Coto River, so he ordered them to explore the place, locate the sentinels, and take positions among the forests and mangroves.

At 5:30 in the afternoon of the 27th, the motor ship La Sultana approached with Costa Rican troops that were going to reinforce the camp in Coto, haranguing encouragement to their country and to President Julio Acosta García, confident that Zúñiga Mora's detachment was going to receive them. At the sound of the bugle, the Panamanians opened rifle fire, leaving the motor ship aground and its crew surrendered after an hour of combat with the result of four dead, nine wounded and 30 more Costa Rican prisoners, while the Panamanian side left two wounded. Among the significant deaths was the political chief of Golfo Dulce, Colonel Daniel Herrera.

The Sultana (with a capacity of 100 people and 70 horsepower) was also captured, a completely new machine gun with 6,000 shots, 25 Mauser-type rifles, two flags, some food and correspondence from the Ministry of War of Costa Rica. It was arranged that the 69 prisoners (including the wounded) be taken in La Sultana to Rabo de Puerco. A group of Panamanians under the command of Colonel Gasca had the mission of taking the ship and leaving on the morning of February 28 to navigate the Golfo Dulce until they reached their destination.

On February 28, the steamer David arrived at Rabo de Puerco and General Quintero ordered it mobilized to Coto to reinforce the Panamanian camp, while a cavalry would be sent by land commanded by Captain Zurita. General Quintero would initially go to Coto by sea to review the camp, but the absence of heavy artillery on the David and the latent threat of a reprisal from Costa Rica forced him to withdraw, concentrating on reinforcing by land. President Porras in two telegrams congratulated Quintero and those who participated in the two offensives.

In one of the letters seized by the Costa Rican troops, there was one from the Minister of War, Aquiles Acosta, dated February 25 warning of the movements of the Panamanians and that the shipment of the new machine gun was to repel any attempt. In addition, it was planned to take the town of Cañas Gordas (currently in the district of Renacimiento). Other valuable documents were also found that revealed that since December 1920 Costa Rica was preparing the occupation of the Coto area, and they had carefully studied the region including how many people resided. Quintero proposed to Porras the Panamanian occupation of the entire Golfo Dulce and put it as a bargaining chip before a possible peace negotiation, but Porras rebuked Quintero since it was not convenient to invade Costa Rican territory and that the The purpose of Panama was not to "conquer", and he ordered the placement of the machine gun on the David.

On the morning of March 1, the Costa Rican ship La Estrella arrived ignoring what had happened and had an outcome similar to that of La Sultana. In the fight there were 27 dead, numerous wounded and a large quantity of weapons fell into Panamanian hands, being distributed among the First Company of David's Volunteers.

At sunset of that day another ship arrived, La Esperanza with 56 soldiers and volunteers. They were also unaware that Zúñiga Mora's men were not waiting for them. prow of the ship put on a phonograph playing the notes of the Costa Rican national anthem; this started a shootout killing the one who put the phonograph on. Daniel Herrera, who commanded the ship, believed that it was a mistake but it was not so and the shooting continued, leaving 16 dead, including Herrera himself and numerous wounded and 46 prisoners.

On March 2, the Costa Rican prisoners were taken to Rabo de Puerco, some to David and others to the island of Taboga.

Many more Panamanians, coming from all over the country, came to Rabo de Puerco to go fight in Coto, but the fight was already over.

Progress in Bocas del Toro

In Bocas del Toro, the situation was completely different. With the help of the United Fruit Company railroad, about a thousand well-armed Costa Rican soldiers led by veteran officers occupied Guabito, Almirante, and Changuinola without a fight on March 4. The Panamanians from that area stayed waiting for reinforcements from the capital with their weapons. Outnumbered and outgunned they had no choice but to retreat.

End of the war and consequences

The Pennsylvania It was one of the American ships that appeared in the area in order to end the war.

Since March 4th, the war takes an unexpected turn. In the bay of Charco Azul, in Chiriquí, the battleship Pennsylvania appeared with orders to protect US citizens and interests in the area. The cruise ship Sacramento also appeared on the Atlantic coast on March 5. The United States demanded from both countries the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the belligerent forces. With no other options, the men of both commands abandoned their positions.

A few days later, on March 18, 1921, there was a railway accident near the port of Pedregal, where four people died and several were injured, all of them combatants from Coto who were returning from the conflict. Among them were Tomás Armuelles, Benjamín Zurita, Arcadio Porto and Francisco Durán, who drowned. After this tragedy, it was decided to rename the town of Rabo de Puerco as Puerto Armuelles.

In David, the Panamanian expedition members were received as heroes by the population and a similar tribute was received in the capital by General Quintero and his men from President Porras and the citizens.

Panama tried by its means in the months after the war to appeal the border dispute to the United States, however, this country did not change its opposition to the White ruling, so there was no other option for Panama to comply with it. On August 24, 1921, President Porras declared a month-long national mourning. It was learned from the US ambassador in Panama, William Jennings Price, that Costa Rica would definitively occupy the Coto area on September 5, so the national government ordered the closure of government offices and private businesses on that day. It was also proposed to hold a popular procession but it was discarded due to pressure from the US government that the demonstrations could generate anti-American sentiment in the population. The Panamanians limited themselves to meeting in the parks in silence, while in Costa Rica the situation was celebrated with merriment.

Despite the existence of the White ruling, the border problems between the two countries were definitively overcome with the signing of the Arias-Calderón Guardia treaty in 1941.

On January 31, 1962, the Panamanian government recognized the participants in the war as veterans, receiving social benefits. The last surviving Panamanian soldier, José María Peralta, died on June 26, 1996.

In 1961, Costa Rica erected two commemorative monuments to those who died in the war in Parque Morazán in San José, and one more in Pueblo Nuevo de Coto. The war remained invisible for many years, until in 2008 the date began to be commemorated locally and in 2015 it was included nationally in the school calendar.

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