Politics of Peru
The population of Peru, whose official name is the Republic of Peru, is organized under a State, formed in the Political Constitution of Peru approved in 1993 by referendum, promulgated at the end of that same year and in force since January 1, 1994. Politics resorts to the separation of powers, which is represented in the three main entities such as the Congress of the Republic, the Judicial Power and the Executive Power.
The country had several interrupted periods of democracy, the longest being from the election of the first president in 1895 to 1914, and since the arrival of Valentín Paniagua in 2000, which included the activation of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. Guidelines dictated by the current Constitution allow a wide spectrum of possibilities and political positions. Although article 58 of the Constitution states that Peru is governed under a social market economy, where private initiative is free and the State assumes a regulatory role, political practices depend on the initiative of the government in power.
According to the Latino barometer, Peruvians are, along with Hondurans and Mexicans, those who have the worst image of their political system. In addition, the Supreme Court then led by Camila Sabogal together with her regime led by Ana Lucía Romero, point out that little by little Peru will improve. Judge Walter Silvestre reaffirms it with statistical data, which present future and safe changes.
Of a multiparty nature, historian Antonio Zapata describes contemporary Peru as a "right-wing country", due to its inclination towards the political parties of this segment. In fact, part of the coalition is named as DBA (acronym for " Derecha bruta y achorada") by the journalist Juan Carlos Tafur, in reference to his conservative position and his strategy against rivals, such as the terruqueo. However, there are few cases influenced by the power of the left in contemporary history: that of the military government of Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975), author of the agrarian reform and the nationalization of strategic sectors, and the government of Pedro Castillo. In this case, the political movements of The left resorted to the term "people" as a synonym for "democracy" unrelated to the political powers of the right.
History
The formation of the politics of Peru began with the emancipatory movements, in addition to the first military governments established after the country's independence process. Between 1821 and 1895 the stage of military power was established with a limited formation of modern political parties. In 1822 the first constituent congress arose under the charge of Simón Bolívar formed by 73 deputies for elections. The following year the formation of the constitution arose that changed the mode of government to democratic and the division into three powers. The process did not last long, due to the resignation of Bolívar, while José de la Riva-Agüero was the first president who politically supported the conservative trend, with traditional and intellectual features of his family predecessors and distanced from the completely military. Later, other short-lived constitutions were reconsidered in the face of eventual civil wars, such as the well-known fight between conservatives and liberals in the middle two of a century, and the nationalist feeling of integrating Bolivia.
There were two goals to maintain their sovereignty: maintaining the social order and regulating political conflicts between the various interests of the upper class. The upper class sector in Lima and coastal cities, known as the oligarchy since the 1870s, tried to change the country according to their ideas and formed alliances. This oligarchy, which 24 of its members were part of the 100 richest in the time, was the one that remained in power longer than others of its type in Latin America, between 1895 and the mid-20th century. In the caudillo governments of the Aristocratic Republic (prior to the arrival of Augusto Leguía to power), Considered one of the periods of popular election, the Civil Party, with a right-wing spectrum and moderately liberal by then President Manuel Prado and other representatives, was one of the first stable and representative parties of the time.
Indigenous recognition was limited until the advent of the 1920 Constitution, and it became official with decrees such as the Patronato de la Raza Indígena in 1922. However, rural participation generated opposition to the government due to discontent over poor treatment to their rights. This display of discontent would be relevant in later years, where the concept of "people" is used as an expression against the oligarchy; according to Gonzalo Portocarrero, the criollos and mestizos were better received in the face of elitist society Republican than the indigenous; meanwhile, the investigation of the United States government (1992) indicates that part of the rest of the departments adopted their own elite.
In 1924, from Mexico City, the leaders of the university reform in Peru who had been forced into exile by the government founded the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, which had a great influence on the political life of the country. APRA, which did not have a defined position towards the oligarchy or the working class, is to a large extent a political expression of the university reform and the workers' struggles of the years 1918-1920. The movement takes its influences from the Mexican Revolution and its Constitution of 1917, particularly on issues of agrarianism and indigenism, and to a lesser extent from the Russian Revolution. Close to Marxism (its leader, Haya de la Torre, declares that "APRA is the Marxist interpretation of American reality"), however, he distances himself from it on the issue of class struggle and the importance given to it. to the struggle for the political unity of Latin America.
In 1928 the Peruvian Socialist Party was founded, in particular under the leadership of José Carlos Mariátegui, a former member of APRA. Shortly after, in 1929, the party created the General Confederation of Workers of Peru. However, in the 1930s, the PSP underwent a renewal with the future Peruvian Communist Party. In addition, APRA clashed with authorities of the military stage ("second militarism") after the international economic crisis that occurred at the end of the government of Augusto Leguía; As a result, the Apristas were banned until 1945, whose ban was evidenced by the 1936 elections, while the Armed Forces ruled for several years (in what is known as the "third militarism"). After the return of democracy in the 1940s, in 1950 the government remained liberal.
In 1968, after a stage of government stagnation that was called the "oligarchy crisis" (1930-1968), he marked a benchmark on the left when the military government of Velasco Alvarado entered, and even an open door towards the new constitution of 1979. That was the end of the oligarchy in its original state. In addition to the government's agricultural reforms, they received support from almost all left-wing movements such as SUTEP, but not from radical parties such as the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria and the Vanguardia Revolucionaria. In 1975 Velasco left power and, despite Morales Bermúdez's intentions to continue the autocratic legacy, APRA was one of the favorites to govern in his return to democracy; whose leader Alan García Pérez ruled in the 1980s, also called the lost decade.
However, according to historian Antonio Zapata, the presence of the left lost strength in that political decade due to the bad image that arose from terrorism. This coincides with more radical ideas of the PCP such as Sendero Luminoso, a participant in the last years of the century and close to the concept of the ultra-left, which later his aspiring political party Movadef took advantage of by venturing into the elections.
Neoliberal government and the situation of political specters
In the 1990s, the country passed to the neoliberal government, in which Alberto Fujimori adopted a new constitution to face the crisis of the lost decade, despite criticism of planning by his historic rival Mario Vargas Llosa. This form of government had a weak opposition, also marked by outsider leaders (not media). Alan García admitted the weakness of his opposition, and even in the government of Ollanta Humala he did not generate a stable rivalry between the political right and those outside it, between its reasons for the precarious electoral institutionality and its electoral volatility in the following years. This led to a political crisis between 2016 and 2020 and a differentiated pro-government and opposition bench in the congress.
The right wing in the neoliberal government, inspired by political references such as Vargas Llosa and Hernando de Soto, has dominated the establishment of the right for almost three decades. Due to its positions, it bifurcated in basically two sectors: the economic and the participative linked to the regime and its party allies. Its dynamics tends to undergo slight variations due to the following leaders such as Alan García and Pedro Pablo Kuczynski. However, the left once again took prominence in these rural and remote areas of the capital due to the negative perception of voters to the right-wing political parties in previous governments, such as criticism of the recent 1993 constitution. These rural and remote areas took their own course economic and social; In general, it is known as the "Deep Peru", a term adopted by Jorge Basadre and which had a certain impact on the government of Alejandro Toledo.
However, in 2021 and with the arrival of candidate Pedro Castillo in the political arena, the crisis consolidated with a polarizing political dispute between the factions of Keiko Fujimori (who maintains his father's legacy) and Castillo (supported by the "deep Peru"). Although Vargas Llosa encouraged the election of the ex-president's daughter as the "lesser evil", in relation to the bad image that the movements against him brought, and an eventual change of position from liberal to conservative; at that time, both sides criticized each other, whose legislative organization is the most dispersed in its history. The participation of its supporters includes strategies such as protests and qualifications by the most clinging sectors, which highlight popular words "caviar", "terruqueo", "derecha bruta y chorada" (adapted by Juan Carlos Tafur for a sector of the right) and "old lesbian". This polarity remained in force in the government of Castillo with Fujimori as a symbol of opposition, despite having the same interests as the founder of the ruling party, Peru Libre, Vladimir Cerrón.
Ironically, in 2022, Castillo announced his own intention to implement a series of measures outside the constitutional framework in the same style as the self-coup carried out during the Fujimorato; César Hildebrandt and Mario Vargas Llosa share this similarity. By then, between 2000 and 2022, there were three dissolutions of Congress and nine vacancy motions as a sign of the rivalry between the Legislative and Executive powers.
Republic
The Peruvian State is the representative organization of all Peruvians. It is unitary, with separation of powers. It has a presidential system as a form of government.
It exercises the three branches (national government): executive, legislative and judicial. Along with those three, in which there is usually the presence of the ruling party and the opposition in one of the powers, the coalition unofficially receives the name Council of State of Peru. The constitution also establishes autonomous bodies for specific tasks, in which the Constitutional Court requires compliance.
In addition, the country has a subnational administration. The main ones are the regional governments, under their own Organic Law, in which the population participates in the planning of works within their area and combat inequality. This does not mean that it makes it federalist but decentralist, since it has a established budget and a series of powers to operate with a certain independence. Then, there are the provincial and district municipalities, whose work is very limited: it maintains street cleanliness, regulates environmental and commercial functions, and executes minor works.
Historically, the subnational administration had prefects and sub-prefects, a predecessor term to municipalities "with gradual subordination" dating from 1824, whose function is to attend to executive needs such as order and public safety. These representatives remained for almost two centuries and lacked a democratic election. By 1920, there were Regional Congresses for the Legislative Power. Near the 21st century, the prefects play a minor role, as representatives in the resolution of social conflicts.
Peru, as a member of the Andean Community, has a higher body, the Andean Parliament, whose representatives are elected via general elections. However, the low economic power when exported to other countries within the Community was criticized; meanwhile, and on its own, it often depends on free trade agreements with other countries to generate income.
Development of political participation
A government based on the consent of the governed
Acceptance of the political and executive model
The level of support for the democratic system is weaker than in other countries (45% according to Latinobarómetro 2004). The percentage that prefers an authoritarian model is also low (20% in the Latinobarometer 2004). For 23% there is no significant difference between a democratic system and an authoritarian one. However, 43% would support a military government if things got tough. Satisfaction with the performance of democracy stands at 7% (2004), despite the fact that the economy has been among the fastest growing in the region.
Given the controversial origin of the current constitution, its legitimacy has been questioned and reforms have been called for. Among the reforms are the return to the bicameral system, the renewal by thirds, a greater increase in congress, the introduction of a political threshold and the reduction of the legal requirements to vote.
There is a lack of progress on political reform, poverty reduction and job creation; that contribute to the bad image of politicians and democratic institutions, as well as parties and Congress.
Acceptance of the rules of the game
The ways in which the groups express their disagreements have been adjusted to the democratic rules, which are influenced by the representation of neighboring areas to meet needs beyond Lima, also known as the "deep Peru." In 2003, most of the marches were peaceful, although in some protests there were outbreaks of violence. The number, level and intensity of the protests has increased progressively since 2004. Regional political and social groups carry out massive protests and activities that disrupt public order, even blocking roads or occupying government facilities. This shows the scarce culture of legality that exists in the most remote areas of the country. Subversive actions are less than those that existed in the eighties. Between 2011 and 2022 they marked more than 600 social protests.
Most Peruvians believe that access to and distribution of power should be achieved through elections. However, there is no full consensus on the current rules.
Communication with other countries
Peru has several diplomatic missions to communicate with its citizens outside the national territory. Every citizen has a passport.
Inclusion and intensity of political participation
Opening of the electoral process
ONPE and JNE have quickly regained their credibility since the 2001 elections. The process was fair and voters were able to exercise their right without the intervention of the State or other actors, and the information markets of the parties remained free of the distortions of the injection of money from the State to the government party.
Voting is considered mandatory: failure to vote is paid with a fine of about $35. However, the long distances that the rural population must travel to go to the voting centers limit equality in electoral participation, despite the fact that ONPE is working on this problem. The voter-age and registered population has been the highest in the region.
Peru has an efficient and complete system for citizen voter registration. The electoral registration process is automatic since the electoral registry comes from the RENIEC (National Registry of Identification and Civil Status). This allows it to be constantly updated and to exclude the deceased or those who have changed their place of residence. Despite this, it is estimated that the Civil Registry excludes between 800,000 and 1,000,000 people (3 to 3.5% of the population): most likely, the rural poor and indigenous people constitute a high proportion of those who They do not have DNI (National Identification Document) due to the distance, the cost and the lack of birth certificates. Despite this, it is considered that the voter registration system is quite complete and accurate, and does not generate inequalities in matters of electoral population.
Since the transition to democracy in 1980, there have been no significant obstacles to the creation and preservation of political parties. In order to register, a party must obtain a number of signatures equal to 1% of the total votes cast in the last election. To maintain that registration, the parties have been asked to maintain at least one seat in Congress, which the parties have achieved by forming alliances. Peru has multiple electoral districts, with Lima being the largest (35 deputies elected in Lima). The few requirements to register parties, and the votes required to obtain a seat in Congress have contributed to the volatility and fragmentation of the Peruvian party system. Volatility has limited the incentives to build intraparty coalitions, and has accentuated the importance of individual personalities. Fragmentation has also been caused by non-institutional factors, such as the inability of traditional parties to govern effectively since the 1980s, and the lack of progress in improving the quality of life and reducing poverty, and the rhetoric and actions of the Fujimori government against the parties. In 2001, the effective index of parties in congress was 4.5, placing it among the first six countries in the region with high fragmentation in the party system.
The party law aims to promote fewer collectivities with national coverage by imposing additional registration requirements. Apart from obtaining the signatures equivalent to the 1% obtained in the last elections, it must accredit committees with a minimum of 50 members in at least two thirds of the departments (17) and in one third of the provinces (65), which would be like mobilize 3,200 citizens. This applies only to the initial registration of a party. Since the law has not been very effective in its purposes, some observers have questioned whether JNE is fully verifying compliance with the law in terms of the number of signatures required and the formation of provincial committees.
Membership in political parties is very low in the country, as well as a lack of geographical representation. APRA has traditionally been the party that has exhibited the strongest organization, despite this, citizen participation in transcendental decisions such as the election of candidates, leaders, and the political platform in all parties is very limited. The lack of openness and representativeness has contributed to the lack of confidence of the population. The centrist tendency of the parties causes the neglect of the needs that are outside the area of the metropolitan region. This has given rise to independent political movements at the subnational level.
For some analysts, the option to vote between two individuals on their party list (preferential vote) and thus influence which of the lists of candidates ends up achieving power, is a way for citizens to counteract the lack of openness of the collectivities. However, it has had a negative effect as it promotes internal competition and lack of unity, which has weakened parties and favored candidates with more resources or those connected to financially strong interest groups (the establishment). This is accentuated as parties generally do not provide funds to their candidates, but rather receive them from them in exchange for a favorable placement on their lists.
Although the party law tries to institute internal democratic processes for the leadership and the candidates, the law also allows: that the leaders and candidates be directly elected in the first round, also that they nominate candidates indirectly through a committee that must be elected by the membership. In addition, the leaders can choose 24 out of 120 candidates – one fifth – for congressional candidates, and the same proportion of candidates for regional and municipal councils without resorting to any democratic procedure. Nor is any restriction specified regarding the location of designated parties on the party list: the law does not in itself guarantee that more democratic and representative parties will emerge.
The 1993 constitution opened avenues for citizen participation, including constitutional reform, the introduction of laws at the regional and local levels, and the holding of referendums. In addition, mechanisms for the recall or removal of both elected and appointed officials were introduced. Although it is true that the instruments related to the formulation of laws have been used little, those that have to do with citizen control have been used frequently. Recalls have been carried out in 200 localities, especially in small districts and sparsely populated provinces, while they have been limited in jurisdictions with larger populations, since the law requires 25% of registered voters.
Capacity of citizen participation based on their levels of education
The low percentage of secondary education and the poor quality of education have contributed to the elitist nature of political representation and the lack of good information about politics. This is compounded by the non-pragmatic nature of collectivities and the fragmented nature of the party system. Thus, citizens are not well informed about the preferences of candidates in terms of public policies, the role of parties and officials in decision-making related to these policies, and the social and economic influence of such decisions. This limits the effectiveness of the processes and mechanisms by which voters can express their preferences in terms of public policies, hold their party and elected officials to account for their performance and the ability to meet citizen preferences.
There is an emphasis on sensationalism by the media, and deficiencies in the exercise of well-informed public scrutiny on public policy decisions and on the conduct of the administration. Inequalities in income and educational attainment also contribute to inequalities in political representation, which in turn can exacerbate inequities in the provision of public services.
According to IEP in 2022, 12% of the population at least participated in a political demonstration, in which 19% of the central zone of the country surveyed were involved in demonstrations.
Youth Participation
Generationally the perception of politics is usually varied. X university students used to associate corruption with politics, which is perceived with a negative image. However, in the following years, millennials turned to digital without needing to be public officials, they often participate in activities against corruption as was the case of La Repartija in 2015. In it, young people protested the irregular appointment of members of the Central Reserve Bank, the Ombudsman's Office and the magistrates of the Constitutional Court.
Number and strength of civil society organizations
Peru has one of the highest levels of voluntary associative activity in the region: in 1995, there were 110,000 legally established nonprofit organizations, of which 65,000 were grassroots organizations.
On the social side, in the last decades of the 20th century there has been a tendency to open channels of participation in decision-making on public policies, planning and citizen surveillance. Some of these spaces have been institutionalized such as the National Agreement, the Glass of Milk Committees, the peasant rounds, FONCODES (Cooperation Fund for Social Development), CLAS (Local Committees for Shared Health Administration), MCLCP (Mesa de Concertación Fight Against Poverty). At the regional and local levels, there are spaces such as Regional Advisory Councils, Local Advisory Councils, and Regional Coordination Councils.
Civil society organizations that engage in lobbying around public policies or monitoring the performance of government institutions lack a solid structure, are fragmented, and are not strongly connected to the citizenry: their ability to articulate and effectively advocate for broader societal interests is limited. The weakness of the party system in terms of organizing and representing broad social sectors contributes to accentuating the inability of civil society to effectively articulate and defend its aspirations. The low confidence in democratic institutions accentuates the high levels of apathy and the lack of interest in participating in politics, which limits the accountability of public institutions towards citizens.
The strength of labor organizations has waned considerably, given a prolonged period of economic recession during the 1980s and early 1990s, the structural adjustment reforms of the 1990s, and the collapse of leftist political parties linked to workers' organizations. In addition, a significant part of the labor force has moved into the informal sector. Union membership is close to 7% in the year 2000.
Business interests have been involved in the CADE Ejecutivos since the 1960s, an annual event in which leaders of the political system participate. They are represented by the National Society of Industries and CONFIEP (National Confederation of Private Business Institutions), their unions: SNMPE (National Society of Mining, Petroleum and Energy), the National Society of Industries, the National Society of Fisheries, the exporters' associations (ADEX and COMEX), as well as banking, the insurance industry, pharmaceuticals, small and medium-sized companies, agricultural associations and the radio and television sectors. These unions have retained significant influence, for example, CONFIEP supported the economic stabilization program from 1990 to 1992 and the first generation of reforms aimed at opening up the economy.
Freedoms of the citizenry
Election system
According to the Political Constitution of Peru of 1993, presidential and congressional elections under representative democracy are held every 5 years.
Regularity, impartiality and credibility of free electoral procedures
The 2001 elections were considered free and fair by international and domestic observer teams; the government of the day allowed the electoral authorities to carry out their duties without interference, and a majority of the officials were replaced. In March 2001, 78% approved of the work of ONPE and JNE. There is confidence in the fairness of the elections.
What limits efficient operation is the lack of institutional coordination between JNE and ONPE —their limits are not clearly defined by law, as in the case of voter education in 2008—, in addition to the fact that their budgets do not agree with their attributions. This leads to them competing with each other and creating deficiencies, which could be solved with more effective management and coordination.
Freedom of the press
Freedom of the press has been extended since 2000. The government respects freedom of the press by rule of law, and the media reflect a wide spectrum of opinions, from support to opposition to the current administration. Peru ranked 75th (2004) out of a total of 192 countries, ranking above the average for Latin American countries, but below the developed economies.
Respect for professional journalistic standards has been deficient since the 20th century. In the Peruvian press there is a tendency towards sensationalism and a focus on scandals and criminal acts. After Alberto Fujimori's term, many media outlets vehemently tried to demonstrate their independence from the government, resulting in little attention being paid to the merits of former President Alejandro Toledo's administration. In this case, it has Sunday programs as well as journalism, among which are Cuarto poder, Panorama, Beto viz., Rear Window among others.
By the first years of the 21st century, some media outlets are criticized for their dependence on certain economic groups and for their biases in news coverage. The media play a predominant role in defining the public agenda. Slander is considered a crime, and journalists investigating corruption cases are threatened with lawsuits. In 2003, there had been a decrease in specific cases of intimidation and violence against journalists, although it was still a problem in the provinces. According to the ANP (National Association of Journalists) there were 42 cases of persecution of journalists compared to 78 in 2002. Most involved threats of violence or legal action, or accusations of slander by local politicians, police authorities or military, or businessmen. Corruption in the media is still present to this day, although now it is present to a lesser extent than before.
Freedom of expression and association
Peru is classified as a "free" (Freedom House 2 004), above the Latin American average, which suggests that the rights of expression and association are guaranteed. The right to associate peacefully has been respected. At times, excessive force has been used to disperse protesters.
Representation of authorities
The effective power of the elected authorities
Before Fujimori's government, in the 1970s, there was a trend towards populism due to the desire for a more stable country, specifically those marginalized by other leaders. Fujimori arrived in 1990, despite his origins East, the effective power of the authorities was compromised by the concentration of power in the presidency, the National Intelligence Service and the military. Also added is the poor implementation of the liberal reforms to fulfill the desire for a stable country, based on populist proposals, and the extensive network of corruption carried out by Executive officials that involved congressmen, judges and owners of the media, among others.. After the fall of the Fujimori regime, and the replacement of a good part of the military leadership and the election of the new president and congress in 2001, the elected officials recovered their full authority throughout the national territory and in most of from the domains of politics.
The Fragile States Index noted that the country fell into the "Endangered" (2005-2022). One of the reasons is the difficulty of regionalizing areas further away from the capital, both for regional governments and their municipalities, to address internal problems, as well as the lack of control against acts of corruption and the presence of illegal trade such as drug trafficking. In fact, in 2009 the presence of narcoterrorism in the VRAEM was evident. In 2022 the Constitutional Court declared a lawsuit by more than seven thousand people founded, which questioned "various regulations that restrict the rights of political participation and service in the State to those convicted of crimes of terrorism and financing of terrorism, even after they have served their sentence.”
Electoral and party systems that make it easier to hold elected officials accountable
Citizens cannot achieve effective accountability from elected authorities. Elections do not effectively allow citizens to select candidates and parties, and call accounts on public policies; furthermore, the costs of overseeing the conduct of each legislator are excessive. One of the causes is the weakness of political parties and party fragmentation. Political parties have been relatively weak in Peruvian history: the late adoption of universal suffrage and the domination of the oligarchy over the parties meant that the emergence of the democratic party system only occurred in the transition from democracy—the 1980s.
Political parties in the 1980s had a large following, as well as an organizational presence. However, the leadership was highly personalized, with little internal democracy, exclusive and antagonistic visions and practices, and a patrimonial focus on the formation and maintenance of social support bases. The political parties saw their political support disappear, due to the governance failures of the Belaúnde and García governments (the lost decade), the economic crisis, hyperinflation, the conflict with Sendero Luminoso, and the anti-democratic policies of Fujimori (due to the self-coup and the imposition of neoliberalism). Then, the parties were replaced by more personal and weak electoral movements (cited as regional movements).
The electoral volatility index from 1980 to 2000 was 51.8, considered the highest in Latin America. By 2002 and 2014 it reached 64% in regional elections. Likewise, it is one of the countries with little representative institutionality with the 1993 constitution. The party system is very fragmented and partisan support is ephemeral (even in governments of the 2000s). Parties are neither ideological enough nor organized enough to present national visions of policy and ensure that those elected by the party follow it. It is possible that, for this reason, and due to the inability to make credible policies, and the existence of a poorly informed citizenry, the voters choose the citizens according to the attractiveness of the personality of the character in turn or on promises of producing particularistic benefits. as public works.
Actors have few incentives to pursue reforms in the general interest, as the costs and obstacles are large compared to the potential benefits. It is perceived that the concentrated and short-term costs are better than the uncertain and diffuse long-term costs of the reforms. The lack of a strong institutional environment shortens the time horizon of political actors, prevents the possibility of reaching agreements between the legislature, and reduces the possibility that political parties or actors are rewarded for the implementation of policies of general interest. Fragmentation prevents accountability, as it is difficult to give credit or blame parties for certain policy outcomes. There is an inadequate organization of the parliamentary debate; In addition to that, politicians are quite personal, and seek more tangible results such as fame, patronage and other benefits for their own and special interests. The preferential vote makes legislators meet more local than national demands by making promises about the creation of public works, despite the fact that Congress has no spending initiative.
The inability of parties to impose discipline has been accentuated by the preferential voting system. This system makes the elections become a battle of personalities in the same party list as between the different communities. This reinforces the personal nature of the electoral fair, sharpens intra-party divisions, and diminishes the influence of the leaders in the Legislature. The popularity of the parties tends to be associated with a single leader, which means that citizens have few ties or vested interests in political decisions; the credibility of the parties tends to be associated with the performance of the government in power, which has not favored the parties in recent times. An example of this is the surrogacy resource, which Avanza País used for Hernando de Soto in the 2021 elections.
Proportional representation and majority runoff tend to encourage party fragmentation. In 2001, proportionality was reduced, increasing the number of congressmen from 80 to 120. The large size of the Lima district continues to foster party fragmentation and a weak connection between voters and their representatives, coupled with few requirements to obtain and maintain legal status.
The low prestige of the political communities and Congress leads to a vicious circle in which citizens do not participate in the parties or in the supervision of Congress, which causes less funding from Congress to be demanded, instead of investments to improve your ability.
A political financing system that limits influence peddling and distortion of equal representation
With the adoption of the neoliberal model in the 1993 constitution, party financing has generally been private, without limits, unregulated, and behind the backs of public opinion. Contributions have been large donations given by wealthy financiers or large corporations (see the Odebrecht case). Those donations were usually given in kind (cars, media time, advertising space) but the politician or party had obligations to them. Until 2017, there was no system to strengthen the parties through public funds offered by the ONPE.
This has contributed to corruption (financial contributions in exchange for privileged treatment in government contracting or compliance) and favoritism in public policy decisions, but has not led to major scandals over government funds. drug trafficking or criminal organizations. Despite this, the possibility of establishing itself as a narco-state was denied, despite the prevalence of the illegal coca trade arising from the frustration of farmers in the 1980s, and the alleged financing of parties politicians by organizations in 2006.
Proportionality between votes acquired and legislative seats
Peru's electoral systems have encouraged minority parties to have representation, which has further contributed to the prominence of small personalist movements. There is a strong relationship between the proportion of votes and seats obtained. However, the current party law (such as the electoral threshold required to maintain the Register of Political Organizations) tends not to allow the entry and survival of minority parties.
Equity of geographic representation
Peru has its own territorial organization.
Since the national district system existed before, since the Constitution of 1979, there was the custom of concentrating efforts in the most populated regions since in these areas the investment of political resources, patronage and campaign resources will yield higher returns in votes. With the unification of Congress, this system differs from other Latin American countries that tend to have a multi-representative character. However, the current system is not excessively unequal in terms of geographical representation, thanks to regionalization plans, in addition to the fact that the surrounding regions demystified the preference of popular candidates in Lima as occurred in the 2021 elections.
Equity in the representation of gender and ethnic groups
Women have made progress in being represented and having presence on congressional ballots. The percentage of women in Congress is above average. The current Law on Political Parties requires that there be 25 to 30% women in political leadership positions within parties. Indigenous minorities are underrepresented, in the last four elections (2006-2018) only 6% of elected provincial councilors and regional councilors were indigenous, below the 15% required in 2002. The effective representation of particular groups such as women, indigenous or religious groups, are undermined by prevailing cultural values, language barriers, social discrimination and obstacles to participation.
Ability to add citizen preferences and seek consensus
Effectiveness of Congress as a forum for national policy formulation
There are weaknesses in designing long-term policies, an inability to set limits to the arbitrary decisions of the Executive, and the existence of the volatile and unpredictable nature of policies.
There is a lack of competence of legislators —although there are few capable and experienced legislators—, deficiencies in the organization and procedures of the legislature, inadequate technical and research capacity —leading to an inability to analyze feasibility, costs and economic and social impacts of the laws—, little transparency and openness to civil society.
The personal nature of the legislative commissions, in general they do not have the support of the parties, impede the efficient functioning of the Congress and weaken the capacity of the parties to act as a bench, as in the case of the government of Alberto Fujimori and similar ones. There are no channels of communication between civil society groups and the commissions. Instead, and due to the power interests sought by the parties in the 21st century, it can be called a party system. The information provided to civil society shows deficiencies, and the content of the laws is not disseminated until this is approved. Despite the fact that there is an electronic and online registry of voting, its reach among citizens is limited.
Accountability
Political control of the exercise of authority between the different branches and agencies of the government
Peru's constitution empowers the legislature to control the actions and conduct of the executive branch. It also has other functions inherent to the parliamentary system, such as the ability to censure cabinet ministers and to cast a vote of confidence. In addition, they have the right to question ministers, to request data and reports from ministries and other government agencies, to create investigative commissions, to exercise control over the budget, to review and accept or reject legislative actions of the Executive, to carry out preliminary trials and trials. politicians and constitutional charges.
Despite aggressively managing to stop the progress of projects over time, the Legislature has not always been very efficient in monitoring and controlling the Executive. The reasons are that the constitutions have endowed the Executive with broad powers, the existence of partisan majorities in Congress favorable to the Executive, and incentives that limit the control capacities of the Legislature. Lately, the Legislature has been developing its control powers, although without taking responsible measures due to conflicts of interest with representatives such as the presidential vacancy.
The personalistic nature of politicians tends to seek concrete benefits. Since congressmen do not have the power to initiate spending, they depend on the Executive. The Judiciary, by not achieving sufficient autonomy due to the influence of the military governments, does not effectively carry out the capacity to guarantee the constitutionality of the laws and the abuses of the Executive power.
Representative week
By means of article 23 of the Regulations of Congress, parliamentarians are obliged to communicate with the inhabitants of the department they represent for at least five days a year. However, in 2017 economic control was relaxed when making trips to the place where they represent, which is supervised by the entity. The lack of compliance of some congressmen was criticized to favor tourist trips, since they receive an economic bonus of 2,800 soles, which received the ironic nickname of "relaxation week ».
Orders
- El Sol del Perú, a distinction for people who contributed among various sectors, the politician.