Pacific War

The Pacific War (also known as the Saltpeter War or Guano War) was an armed conflict that took place between 1879 and 1884 that pitted Chile against allies Bolivia and Peru. It was developed in the Pacific Ocean, in the Atacama desert and in the Peruvian mountains and valleys.

In February 1878, Bolivia imposed a new tax on the Chilean company Compañía de Salitres y Ferrocarril de Antofagasta (CSFA), violating the 1874 boundary treaty that prohibited new taxes or increased taxes. Chile protested and requested that the dispute be submitted to arbitration, but the Bolivian government, headed by Hilarión Daza, considered the matter internal and subject to the jurisdiction of the Bolivian courts. Chile insisted and warned him that it would not consider itself bound to the border treaty of 1874 if Bolivia did not suspend the tax. On the contrary, Daza rescinded the license of the Chilean company, seized its assets and put them up for auction. On the day of the auction, February 14, 1879, the Chilean military forces occupied the Bolivian city of Antofagasta, mostly inhabited by Chileans, and advanced in a few days to the 23°S parallel. The area between the Loa river and the 23°S parallel remained under Bolivian sovereignty.

Peru, which had signed a secret Defensive Alliance Treaty with Bolivia in 1873, ordered the preparation of its military forces and simultaneously sent a diplomat to Chile to mediate. Faced with the Chilean advance into disputed territory, Bolivia declared a state of war against Chile on March 1, 1879. Following Peru's refusal to remain neutral, Chile declared war on both allies on April 5. On April 6 In April, Peru declared the casus foederis, that is, the entry into force of the secret alliance with Bolivia.

Although the dime tax and the 1873 treaty appear at first glance to be the triggers for the conflict, the root causes of the war were deep and complex. Among them, historians point out the vagueness of the colonial borders, the interest in the nitrate business and the tension produced by the differences between the progress of Chile and the political and economic instability of the allies.

The disputed territories, as well as the surrounding areas, are located in the Atacama desert, and at that time they had easy access only by sea. In the first six months, Chile achieved naval supremacy, essential to conquer the desert coastal areas. Before the end of 1879, it occupied the Peruvian province of Tarapacá and, at the beginning of 1880, the area of Tacna and Arica, after which Bolivia abandoned the war militarily. Then, in January 1881, after defeating the Peruvian army in the battles of San Juan and Chorrillos and Miraflores, the Chilean forces occupied Lima. After these campaigns, the war between Chile and Peru continued for two more years between the remnants of the Peruvian army, guerrillas and montoneros against the Chilean occupation forces, until the signing of the Treaty of Ancón in 1883, in which Peru, among others things, he ceded the department of Tarapacá perpetually and the provinces of Arica and Tacna were temporarily retained.

The following year the Truce Pact was signed between Bolivia and Chile in 1884, which put an end to the state of war between the two countries. Due to its omission in the treaty, Bolivia accepted the Chilean annexation of the 23°S-24°S strip. Bolivia accepted the Chilean military occupation of the area between the Loa River and the 23rd parallel S, but its sovereignty remained in dispute and was resolved in favor of Chile in the 1904 Treaty between Chile and Bolivia. Through the Treaty of Lima of 1929, Tacna was returned to Peru and Arica was ceded to Chile.

Background

Bolivian-Chilean border conflict

Disputa limítrofe del Desert de Atacama entre Bolivia y Chile (1825-1879).

At the beginning of the republican era, Bolivia and Chile accepted that their borders should be the same as those of the Hispanic administration, a rule known as Uti possidetis iuris. However, the Spanish administration had never been interested in strictly defining precise limits between regions that belonged to it, so these tended to be diffuse, contradictory and often over unknown, uninhabited or uninhabitable territories due to their climate or remoteness. Due to pressing internal conflicts, the first limits stated in their constitutions were imprecise: in 1822 Chile designated the depopulated area of Atacama as its northern limit and since 1825 Bolivia considered the coast in question as belonging to the province of Potosí.

At the beginning of the 1840s, large accumulations of guano and saltpeter were discovered in Tarapacá and Antofagasta, fertilizers that were beginning to be highly valued on the world market. Incidents and claims between Bolivia and Chile followed one another in the following years, while the diplomacies of both countries argued respectively about the rights they had in the region, exhibiting colonial documents on the jurisdiction of the Audiencia de Charcas or the General Captaincy of Chile.

Tensions increased to such an extent that on June 25, 1863, the Bolivian Legislative Assembly authorized the executive to declare war on Chile, although only after all diplomatic resources had been exhausted that would give a favorable result to Bolivia. But the Defensive and Offensive Alliance Treaty between Peru and Chile (1865), to which Bolivia and Ecuador adhered shortly after to face Spain in the Spanish-South American War, put a parenthesis on the matter, considering any other dispute that was secondary. it was not facing the common enemy.

Boundary Treaties of 1866 and 1874

After the war against Spain, Bolivia and Chile resumed negotiations and signed their first border treaty on August 10, 1866, which set the 24°S parallel as the limit (north-south) and had to share half the rights export of minerals extracted between parallels 23°S and 25°S. In 1871, Bolivian ruler Mariano Melgarejo, under whose government the agreement was signed, was overthrown and replaced by Agustín Morales, who, following the current of Bolivian public opinion, considered null and void all the acts of the previous government. But since an international agreement could not be abrogated unilaterally, it opened negotiations with Chile to revise the 1866 treaty. Various aspects of the application of the 1866 treaty were discussed, such as the definition of "minerals", the inclusion (or exclusion) of the rich mineral de Caracoles silver deposit in (of) the zone of mutual benefits, and the difficulties in Bolivia to transfer 50% of the tax collected in the zone to Chile. On December 5, 1872, the so-called Corral-Lindsay agreement was signed, which was approved in Chile, but, due to the influence of Peru, which wanted a better arrangement for Bolivia, or, in any case, to intervene as a mediator together with Argentina, it was not approved in Bolivia.

Finally, Bolivia and Chile signed a new boundary treaty on August 6, 1874, whereby Chile waived 50% of taxes on the 23°S-24°S territory in exchange for Bolivia's promise to not increase taxes on Chilean capitals and businesses for 25 years. The border remained at parallel 24°S. On that occasion, Chile forgave Bolivian debts arising from the non-transfer of 50% of the tax collected by Bolivia in the zone of mutual benefits. In an additional protocol signed in 1875, both countries agreed, among others, to submit possible differences in the application of the treaty to arbitration.

Secret treaty of alliance between Peru and Bolivia of 1873

Caricature published in November 1879 in the Chilean magazine The Barbero. Daza (on the left), Prado, and Argentinian President Avellaneda (with the high-cup hat) unite to counter, unsuccessfully, the Chilean military supremacy during the war, represented by an immense cannonball that the Chilean Santa Maria has put.

Faced with the impetus of Chilean investment and work in Tarapacá and Antofagasta, Peru felt its supremacy on the Pacific coast threatened and signed a secret treaty on February 6, 1873 whose intentions were, according to what was made public, six years then, protect the integrity and sovereignty of the signatory countries. Argentina was invited to sign the pact, its government agreed and requested parliamentary approval. Indeed, the Chamber of Deputies in Buenos Aires approved the adherence to the pact and added an item of 6,000,000 strong pesos to the budget for the war. But Bolivia and Argentina disputed the area of Tarija and did not reach an agreement. Argentina then proposed to Peru a Peru-Argentina treaty (without Bolivia), but Peru rejected the offer. This is how the year 1873 passed, and at the end of 1874 the armored frigate Blanco Encalada arrived in Chile, which gave the naval supremacy to Chile. Both Peru and Argentina did not want to commit to a treaty against Chile. However, when border tensions over Patagonia surfaced again, in 1875 and 1878, Argentina sought to enter the pact, but Peru diplomatically rejected the initiative. Also, at the beginning of the war, Peru and Bolivia planned to offer the Chilean territories from 24°S to 27°S to Argentina in exchange for its entry into the war against Chile.

Historians consider that the true objective of the treaty was to impose on Chile the borders convenient to Peru, Bolivia and Argentina by means of forced arbitration by the alliance while Chile was militarily weak, that is, before the arrival of the armored frigates Cochrane and Whitewashed. Gonzalo Bulnes summarizes it by maintaining that «The synthesis of the secret treaty is: opportunity: the unarmed condition of Chile; the pretext to produce the conflict: Bolivia; the profit of the business: Patagonia and the nitrate»; in the words of Jorge Basadre, «Peru defending Bolivia, itself and the Law, had to preside over the coalition of all interested States to reduce Chile to the limit that it wanted to exceed »; Pedro Yrigoyen explains it by pointing out that «perfect Argentina's adherence to the Peru-Bolivian Alliance Treaty, before Chile received its armored vehicles, in order to be able to peacefully demand that this country submit its territorial claims to arbitration».

Peruvian historian Jorge Basadre points out that one of Peru's reasons for signing the treaty, in addition to protecting its nitrate mines, was the fear in Lima that Bolivia would be attracted by Chile to an alliance against Peru that would occupy Tacna and Arica for hand them over to Bolivia in exchange for handing over Antofagasta to Chile.

The treaty is highly controversial. Some historians consider it legitimate, defensive and circumstantial, as well as known for spying on Chile. Other historians, on the contrary, consider him aggressive, the cause of war, and unknown to Chile. The reasons for his secrecy, the invitation to Argentina, and the reason why Peru did not remain neutral in circumstances that Bolivia had not complied with the 1873 agreement by signing the 1874 treaty without informing it, are disputed to this day.

Peruvian saltpeter monopoly

The income from the export of guano, which in previous decades had been the mainstay of the Peruvian economic boom, began to fall in the 1870s. Aware of this, the government of Manuel Pardo y Lavalle created by law in 1873 a nitrate tobacconist, for which the producing companies had to regulate their production and prices according to government policies in order to prevent guano and nitrate, Peruvian, from competing. But even before the law came into force, the government had to withdraw it because its costs would be greater than the profits obtained. In 1875 the same government decided to nationalize all the nitrate companies and thus control the price of nitrate.

The project of the Peruvian government had to confront the Compañía de Salitres y Ferrocarriles de Antofagasta (CSFA), a Chilean company, based in Valparaíso, with a minority of 34% British capital (Gibbs House of London) that after the vicissitudes of Bolivian internal politics had obtained on November 27, 1873 a license from the Bolivian government to exploit the nitrate deposits of Salar del Carmen and Las Salinas in Antofagasta free of taxes for 15 years, in addition to the right to build a railway from Antofagasta in the interior.

The nitrate works operated by the CSFA in Bolivia prevented Peru from controlling the international price of nitrate, for which the Peruvian government tried to assert its influence over Bolivia to prevent this competition. Through a front man, Henry Meiggs, Peru bought the Bolivian exploitation licenses for the recently discovered "Toco" deposits, south of the Loa river, prevented the signing of the Corral-Lindsay agreement and wanted to prevent the signing of the boundary treaty of 1874 (which exempted Chilean saltpeter companies from taxes) and imposing a mediation by Peru and Argentina to define the borders of Chile. In 1878 the British partner of the CSFA, which was also in charge of sell Peruvian nitrate in Europe, Casa Gibbs, pressured CSFA management to limit its production and warned management that they would have administrative difficulties in Bolivia on behalf of a "bordering" (the interest of a neighboring Government) if they did not lower their expectations. At the height of the crisis, on February 14, 1879, it was expected that the Peruvian consul in Antofagasta would be the highest bidder in the CSFA auction.

Crisis

10-cent tax

The municipality of Antofagasta had previously tried to tax the CFSA. The first, in 1875, was 3 cents per quintal exported and was rejected by the Bolivian Council of State chaired by Serapio Reyes Ortiz. The second, in 1878, and prior to the 10 cents, was for public lighting and was, during the crisis, suspended after the deposit of (200 bolivian pesos.).

In 1878, the Bolivian assembly studied the CSFA license of November 1873, based on an interpretation of the law of December 22 (which gave rise to the 1873 license) which understood that all renegotiations had to be approved by congress. The company maintained that only in case of disagreement between the government and the company. Finally, the Bolivian National Constituent Assembly, through a law of February 14, 1878, approved the license on the condition that the company paid a minimum tax of 10 cents per quintal of exported nitrate, in open violation of the 1874 boundary treaty and the license. of 1873 in which Bolivia had promised not to raise or create new taxes in 25 years to Chilean companies.

The CSFA refused to pay the tax, requested and obtained the representation of the Chilean government, unleashing a diplomatic conflict, as well as an internal conflict in the Chilean government between some of its members who were shareholders in the CSFA and others who had interests invested in Bolivia that they feared losing if the conflict escalated.

Over the following months, the Bolivian government, which considered the matter relevant only to Bolivian courts, refrained from implementing the law while objections raised by the Chilean government were discussed. On November 8, the Chilean foreign minister sent a note to the Bolivian government indicating that the 1874 Treaty could be declared void if they insisted on collecting the tax, reviving Chile's rights prior to 1866. Although both parties proposed resolving the conflict through arbitration, as contemplated in the Protocol of 1875, this was not carried out since while the Chilean government demanded that the execution of said law be suspended until its legality was determined by an arbitrator, the Bolivian government demanded that the armored Blanco Encalada and its naval forces will withdraw from the bay of Antofagasta.

Termination of contract, collection of taxes and Chilean occupation of Antofagasta

On February 6, arguing that the CSFA had not accepted the new law, the Bolivian government rescinded the contract with the CSFA and ordered their assets to be seized and auctioned off to collect the taxes generated since February 1878. Faced with this situation, Chilean President Aníbal Pinto ordered the occupation of Antofagasta, which was carried out without resistance on February 14, 1879 by 200 Chilean soldiers to the applause of the mostly Chilean population. The Bolivian garrison of the place, unable to resist, withdrew inside.

Mediation by Peru, declarations of war and casus foederis

The Chilean government's measure of force initiated diplomatic efforts in the three foreign ministries. However, mutual distrust increased with the war preparations in the three countries, and the "patriotic" in the streets they prevented a rapprochement of the positions. In all three countries there were strong public currents that proclaimed the war and made the leaders fear that if they did not go to war they would be deposed by the supporters of the war. Furthermore, Hilarión Daza, the Bolivian dictator, despite being the worst prepared for war, decreed a series of measures against Chilean residents in Bolivia and their properties.

Recorded that shows the wait of the Chileans to try to leave Peru.

On February 16, Bolivian minister Serapio Reyes arrived in Lima to demand that the Peruvian government comply with the defensive alliance treaty of 1873. News of the occupation of Antofagasta reached La Paz on February 22, by a letter sent by the Bolivian consul in Tacna. On February 26, Daza declared a state of siege in Bolivia.

Peru tried to persuade the government of La Paz to submit to arbitration with the mission of José Luis Quiñones, and ordered to prepare its navy and enlist its army while trying to get Argentina to join the alliance or at least warships as a loan or for purchase. To mediate in the conflict, he sent his minister plenipotentiary José Antonio de Lavalle to Chile with an offer of mediation under the condition that Chile withdraw from Antofagasta, but with no guarantee that Bolivia would lift the seizure of the property or he would suspend the tax. signed with Bolivia in 1873. Lavalle, who had known him since the beginning of his trip at the latest, dodged the question and told him that the diplomatic commission of the congress to which he had belonged had not touched on this issue.

On March 1, the Bolivian government issued a decree declaring a state of war, the interruption of trade and communications with Chile, the expulsion of Chilean residents, the seizure of their assets, property and investments, and reversal of any transfer of Chilean interests made after November 8, when the Chilean government had warned of the consequences of not suspending the tax in question.

On March 17, the Chilean Minister Plenipotentiary in Lima demanded a declaration of neutrality from the Peruvian government. Three days later, the Peruvian president acknowledged before the Chilean representative that the secret treaty existed and that he would convene the Peruvian congress for April 24 to evaluate what attitude to take before Chile and Bolivia. Both measures, mediation and the convocation to the congress, were understood in Chile as a Peruvian ruse to gain time.

On the other hand, after the occupation of Antofagasta, the Chilean forces had consolidated the occupation of the territories between the parallels 23°S and 24°S that Chile considered its own after the violation of the treaty. Then, as a result of Bolivia's declaration of war, the advance on the Bolivian coast continued until the mouth of the Loa River, the southern border of Peru. On March 21, the ports of Cobija and Tocopilla were simultaneously occupied, both without resistance. On March 23, the Calama battle took place, in which Chilean soldiers defeated a group of Bolivian militiamen organized in the sector, and occupied said town. The Chilean government considered this advance only temporary due to military necessity and offered the Bolivian civil authorities to continue in their functions, which was rejected.

On April 5, Chile declared war on Bolivia and Peru. The first for the impossibility of reaching an agreement with the Bolivian authorities and the second for not declaring his neutrality and considering waiting for the resolution of the Peruvian congress as a mere ruse to prepare militarily for a confrontation. On April 6, Peru declared the casus foederis in accordance with the alliance treaty with Bolivia.

In the other Latin American countries, the situation was limited to observing. In Argentina, then President Nicolás Avellaneda expressed sympathy for the cause of the allies, but maintained a formal neutrality. Much of the Brazilian public opinion, including Emperor Pedro II and his court, sympathized with Chile, to the point that the Chilean government found out about the Secret Treaty of 1873 thanks to the efforts of Ambassador Juan do Ponte Ribeyro, who sent a copy of the agreement to the government. The Chilean government also sent a mission to Ecuador, where while the Guayaquileños sympathized with Peru, the Quiteños adhered to the Chilean position. The government of that country, in the hands of General Ignacio de Ventimilla, prevented the conflict from spreading to his country and promised before a Chilean embassy to maintain strict neutrality. Another Chilean mission was sent to Colombia to stop the sale of arms to Peru by that country through the Isthmus of Panama, but the effort was a resounding failure.

Development

Forces at war

It is the opinion among neutral historians that neither belligerent was prepared for war, financially or militarily. Neither country had a General Staff, nor enough ambulances, nor supply service. Their warships were they were in a terrible state. In the case of Chile, for example, the effective military strength had been continuously reduced from 3,776 to 2,400 soldiers from 1867 to 1879. And none of the units were stationed north of Valparaíso, more than 1,700 km from Iquique and represented only 0.1% of the population. In the Chilean navy at the end of the war, 53% of first engineers, 20% of second engineers, and 8% of apprentices were foreigners. The Peruvian government had defaulted on foreign debt and in Bolivia there were epidemics and famine.

According to W. Sater, Chile and Peru came to temporarily enlist 2% of their male population and Bolivia only 1%. It should be considered that both professional allied armies at the beginning of the war were disbanded after the battle of Tacna and they had to be regrouped or formed again.

The allies had, at first glance, some advantages over the southern country. Its population and its troops doubled the Chileans in number and the Peruvian port of Callao was with its artillery defenses almost impregnable for the Chilean fleet and offered a safe haven for Peruvian ships. In Callao, an English firm offered the services of a floating dock for ships of up to 3,000 t, which allowed for complicated repairs to their ships, which they used to repair their ships before the war. Perhaps these were the reasons why the international press at first took Chile's defeat for granted. The ambivalent Argentine attitude and the permanent Araucanian conflict clouded Chilean expectations. As Basadre affirms about public opinion in his country: "The true power of Chile and the frightful consequences of the war were then unknown, and it was believed, by the uninformed people, that, as a whole, the allied countries were more extensive than Chile, they would finally achieve victory." Other observers made a deeper analysis, which showed Chilean advantages both political and military. Chile had had a stable political regime since 1833 that had allowed it to develop and strengthen its institutions. Among them, its army and its navy had a command formed in an officers' school, troops trained in the Arauco war and uniformity in their weapons (almost all Chilean infantry rifles, Comblain and Gras, used 11 mm ammunition with a metal sheath and had a bayonet). The Chilean navy had 2 armored vehicles that were, due to the thickness of their armor, almost unbeatable for the Peruvian navy. Although there were disputes between the military and civilians in Chile over the direction of the strategy, there was always a primacy of the political over the military. Its supply from Europe could be carried out through the Strait of Magellan, which was only once threatened by the Navy From Peru.

In the allied armies, the lack of dedication to their professional functions led to a situation in which they had several types of rifles with different ammunition for each one and sometimes without a bayonet, making it more difficult to train recruits, maintain of equipment and ammunition during the war. (W. Sater lists eleven different types of allied rifles and only five Chilean ones). Before the war, the Peruvian Navy had a good part of its crews made up of Chileans and after their expulsion they could only be replaced by other foreigners. The allies also did not possess an artillery or cavalry comparable to the Chilean one. Unlike the Chilean supply, allied supplies passed through third countries, subject to the influence of Chilean diplomacy and the navy.

To this we must add that once in possession of the guano and saltpeter resources of Tarapacá, Chile received income that allowed it to finance the war, which Peru lacked and that after the occupation of Tacna and Arica, Bolivian trade to and from the Pacific was controlled by Chile.

Naval Campaign

At the beginning of the war it was evident that before any military operation in a terrain as difficult as the Atacama desert, control of the seas had to be won. In this campaign, only the naval forces of Chile and Peru faced each other, since Bolivia did not have one, and although the government of this country tried to resort to privateering to replace it, this did not prosper.

The power of the Chilean squadron was based on the twin armored frigates, Cochrane and Blanco Encalada. The rest of the squadron was made up of the corvettes Chacabuco, O'Higgins, Esmeralda and Abtao, the gunboat Magallanes and the schooner Covadonga, all of them made of wood.

The capital ships of the Peruvian squadron were the armored frigate Independencia and the armored monitor Huáscar. The Peruvian squadron was completed by the fluvial monitors Atahualpa and Manco Cápac, the wooden corvette Unión and the wooden gunboat Pilcomayo.

With the aim of suffocating the Peruvian export economy and forcing the Peruvian fleet to leave Callao to fight a battle on the high seas, the Chilean fleet blocked the Peruvian port of Iquique on April 5 and also bombarded the weakly defended ports of Pabellón de Pica, Huanillos, Mollendo and Pisagua. However, the Peruvian fleet avoided combat with Chilean units that were superior and used the given space and time for a bolder strategy to attack the transportation lines and the unguarded Chilean ports, among others. During these operations, the naval combat of Chipana occurred on April 12, without a clear winner.

On May 16, the bulk of the Chilean fleet left Iquique in the direction of Callao with the aim of beating the Peruvian fleet, leaving its two less powerful ships to maintain the blockade of the port. The same day, the two capital ships of Peru left Callao for Arica. During the navigation, both forces crossed without seeing each other and when the Peruvian naval high command learned that only weak ships were blockading Iquique, they immediately seized the opportunity and sent their ships to break the blockade.

On May 21, in the naval combat of Iquique, the armored monitor Huáscar managed to sink the corvette Esmeralda. On the same day, the armored frigate Independencia clashed with the schooner Covadonga, which cunningly directed her adversary, in her desire to ram her, run aground in the naval combat of Punta Gruesa and that ended up suffering the bombardment of it. The result of that day in Iquique and Punta Gruesa was profound in both countries: patriotic fervor increased in Chile and Peru, although the blockade of Iquique was temporarily lifted, cost it the loss of the most powerful unit of its navy. On June 1, the bulk of the Chilean squadron returned from its unsuccessful expedition to Callao, learning of the facts and reestablishing the blockade of Iquique until August 2.

Despite the technical inferiority in which the Peruvian navy now found itself, the armored monitor Huáscar managed with its raids to keep the Chilean squadron in check for 4 and a half months in which it made surprise attacks Chilean transports, harassed their lines of communication, bombarded military installations in the ports and avoided the Chilean armored vehicles with its speed, even on one occasion trying to torpedo them, but without success. The culminating point of the raids of the armored monitor Huáscar was the capture of the steamer Rímac with the Carabineros de Yungay cavalry regiment on board, on July 23. The capture caused a crisis in the Chilean government that led to the resignation of the cabinet and the head of the Chilean navy. The corvette Unión, which also participated in these forays to harass the Chilean forces, was sent to Punta Arenas to capture the transports with weapons that had to pass through that port. She sailed from Arica on July 31, in the middle of winter, and arrived at the remote place on August 16. Although she did not achieve her goal, it was a demonstration of decision and capacity of the Peruvian sailors.

After the boiler and hull repairs of the Chilean capital ships, the Chilean fleet was organized into 2 divisions dedicated only to the elimination of the Huáscar. On October 8, the Huáscar was captured in the decisive naval battle at Angamos. The corvette Unión , for its part, managed to escape from the other Chilean ships thanks to its greater speed.

From the fight at Angamos, the Chilean squadron was able to convoy and support the army in its operations on land, as well as to harass the Peruvian coasts and block its ports to prevent the Peruvian army from supplying or the arrival of reinforcements. Technically and numerically diminished, the Peruvian squadron limited itself to supplying its land forces as much as possible, avoiding clashes with the enemy fleet. Attempts by government agents to acquire major new naval units abroad failed. During this period some actions take place such as the capture of the Pilcomayo gunboat on November 18, the naval combat of Arica on February 27, 1880 and the double breaking of the blockade of said port on March 17.

In the final stage of the naval campaign, the Chilean fleet held a blockade in Callao that began on April 10, 1880. During these operations there were several minor confrontations between Chilean and Peruvian units, and the Chilean fleet also carried out bombardments to the harbor defenses. In these actions, the Peruvians managed to sink the schooner Covadonga, the artillery transport Loa and the torpedo boat Janequeo with the use of explosive devices and torpedoes.. Despite these small Peruvian victories, the Chilean squadron maintained the blockade firmly and later, after the defeats of the Peruvian army in Chorrillos and Miraflores, which occurred on January 13 and 15, 1881 respectively, where in addition some ships of the squadron supported the Chilean army attacking the Peruvian positions near the coast, the Peruvian naval authority in Callao executed on January 17 the destruction of the batteries and the ships that still remained from the Peruvian navy, among them the corvette Unión, to avoid its capture by the Chileans.

During the La Breña campaign, Chilean ships transported detachments and war material along the Peruvian coast. In the final phase of that campaign, in 1883, the torpedo boat Colo Colo was transported by rail from the port of Ilo to Puno, and from there launched into the waters of Lake Titicaca to patrol the area and avoid the possible military use of this route by Peruvian or Bolivian forces.

Ground campaigns

Photo that shows the miner of Copiapó Tránsito Díaz, Corporal 2.o of the Chilean Army, mutilated in the Land of Pisagua. The photo belongs to the Pacific War Invalid Album, a series of 130 photographic records ordered by the government of Domingo Santa María to demonstrate the granting of pensions and prosthesis to the war wounded. 4081 Chilean soldiers returned invalid, 10% of the total mobilization. In 2008, 280 women received state pension in Chile for being daughters or widows of war veterans.

With the long Peruvian coast without naval protection since October, except occasionally for its powerful coastal artillery, the Chilean forces could choose the place where to continue the war. According to Carlos Dellepiane, there were three alternatives, the area of Lima, Arica-Tacna and Pisagua-Iquique. Lima was the political center of Peru, but its occupation did not guarantee surrender. Arica-Tacna was a center of communications with the southern zone, a port used by Bolivia and gave access to the Arequipa zone. Tarapacá, that is to say Pisagua-Iquique, was the source of Peruvian wealth, from where guano and saltpeter were extracted and where the allies had concentrated their military forces. The areas of Arica and Iquique were each watertight compartments with no expedited land access to the rest of Peru. J. Basadre cites the possibility of a Chilean landing near Lima as early as 1879 and points to the Chilean historian Wilhelm Ekdahl that he would have advised abandon southern Peru and strengthen themselves in Lima until the naval balance is restored or new allies are found. But, Basadre contradicts, it would have been "tremendous and humiliating" to surrender those regions, in addition to an enormous and otherwise useless economic loss, since Chile was interested in the nitrate revenues from Tarapacá, and their occupation without resistance would probably have meant the end. of the war. It should be added, on the Chilean side, that at the beginning of the war, organization, knowledge and experience were still far from the level reached in 1881.

The land war can be divided into four campaigns, where the first three successively led to the Chilean occupation of the regions of Tarapacá, Arica-Tacna, and Lima and the fourth, the Breña campaign, dismantled the last Peruvian resistance. However, there are other military events of the land war that are not necessarily included in these four campaigns, such as the Bolivian resistance on the coast, Lynch's expedition to the northern coast of Peru, and the occupation of Arequipa, which some consider separate..

Concentration of allied forces in Tarapacá and Arica

On March 7, at the beginning of Lavalle's mediation, the first Peruvian battalions left Callao (some from Ayacucho) towards Arica, Iquique, Pisagua and Molle. Some were formed with volunteers, Peruvians and Bolivians, from the area. In total, according to Dellapiane, 4,452 soldiers were stationed in Tarapacá and 4,000 in Arica. On April 30, 4,500 (6,000 according to Dellepiane) arrived in Tacna from La Paz after a 13-day march under the command of Hilarión Daza to join the the Peruvian forces commanded by General Juan Buendía y Noriega and take command of the allied army. The allied forces were distributed around the places where a Chilean landing could be expected: Iquique-Pisagua (Buendía) and Arica-Tacna (Daza). There were also reinforcements, in Arequipa under the command of Lizardo Montero and in southern Bolivia under the command of Narciso Campero, who had to converge on the coast once the landing site was known. However, Montero's military forces were not mobilized in time. The last reinforcements, about 1,500 men, arrived in Iquique on October 1.

Bolivian resistance on the coast and the wandering division of Campero

After the resistance in Calama, the most important confrontation on the coast was the battle of Río Grande on September 10, 1879.

On October 11, the 5th Division of the Bolivian army under the command of Narciso Campero left Cotagaita in a painful march lacking supplies and ammunition with orders and counter-orders across the altiplano. (see displacements in Map of displacements of the 5th division) A detachment of this division advanced to the west and faced some enemy pickets in Chiu-Chiu (December 2) and in the battle of Tambillo (December 6).

Tarapacá Campaign

Allied and Chilean troops disembarked and marched during the Tarapacá campaign in November 1879.

The Chilean army began its invasion of Peru on November 2, 1879, landing 9,900 men and 880 animals at Pisagua, 550 km north of Antofagasta, in one of the first amphibious landings of the modern era. the neutralization of the coastal batteries by naval artillery the attackers landed from flat-bottomed boats (specially built) and defeated the Bolivian and Peruvian forces defending the port. After the occupation of the port and the surrounding area, a cavalry advance was sent into the interior to obtain information from the enemy. On the way, he faced and defeated an allied cavalry advance on November 6 in the battle of Pampa Germania (or Agua Santa). The allied forces were deployed to attack the Chileans from Iquique to the south, and from Arica to the north. However, Daza, who led the forces that had come from Arica, inexplicably returned to the north without engaging in battle. The Chilean forces camped in Dolores defeated the allies coming from Iquique on November 19 in the Battle of Dolores (or San Francisco) after which the port of Iquique, now blockaded by land and sea, surrendered without resistance on November 23. November. Subsequently, a Chilean division that advanced in pursuit of the allies was defeated on November 27 in the battle of Tarapacá, a small town located in the interior of the region. Despite the triumph, the allies without reinforcements or logistical support to hold the position and repel new attacks withdrew to Arica in a painful march. With this fact, the campaign ended and Chile became the owner of the region that had housed 10% of the population of Peru and gave them an annual income of ₤ 28 million from the production of nitrate.

Internal situation in the belligerent countries until the fall of Iquique

Chile had an elected and stable government, but the disasters of the naval campaign showed that the strategists of its fleet were not prepared for war and during the land campaigns the army would also have problems with supplies, ambulances and command. The mistakes unleashed popular anger and had forced the government to change the "sclerotic" commander-in-chief of the army Williams Rebolledo for Galvarino Riveros and the "aged" commander-in-chief of the army Justo Arteaga for Erasmo Escala, who would later resign for disagreements with the Minister of War Rafael Sotomayor, leaving Manuel Baquedano in command of the army. At the level of alliances, Chile sought to segregate Bolivia from the pact with Peru. G. Bulnes writes: «The object of Bolivian politics was now the same as before: to conquer Tacna and Arica for Bolivia, to place it as an intermediary State between Chile and Peru, believing that in this way Lima and all of Peru would submit to the conditions of peace that were imposed on them. This was called in the conventional language of the initiates "settling with Bolivia". Bolivia. On the technical level, the Chilean government reorganized the army into divisions, units that can live and fight in isolation, for which it is necessary that they have all the weapons (infantry, artillery, cavalry) and the required services (intendance, health, state major, etc), thus preventing the commander-in-chief from having to address each of the corps chiefs for any operation.

After the occupation of the Iquique nitrate zone, the Chilean government privatized the offices that had been nationalized by the Peruvian state, returning them to Peruvian bondholders. The alternative of creating a state company that would manage the production and sale of nitrate was rejected as onerous given that the Chilean state had to finance the war and mobilize an important part of its workforce to the war front, in addition to the fact that the European creditors of the Peruvian bonds required prompt payment of their debts. In 1879 the Chilean state began charging a tax of $0.40 per quintal (100 kg) of exported saltpeter and in 1880 the tax increased to $1.60 per qm.

Peru and Bolivia had agreed in the Subsidies Protocol that Bolivia should pay the costs of the war, which caused resentment and fears in Bolivia since it mortgaged Bolivian tax revenues in circumstances that saw the sending of the army to Tacna as an aid from Bolivia to Peru, even more so when it was learned that he would not be sent to expel the Chileans from Antofagasta but would remain in Tacna to protect the Peruvian province of Tarapacá. When Daza and his officers arrived in Tacna, they were able to ascertain that the Peruvian military capacity was not as imagined by them and that their permanence in power was at stake if the allied army was defeated. Querejazu suggests that Daza used the Chilean offer of an outlet to the sea through Tacna and Arica to pressure Peru to revise the Subsidies Protocol, which he succeeded in doing.

One can only speculate about the real reasons that led Daza to withdraw to Bolivia before the battle of Dolores, some say to keep intact his regiment of the Colorados, the base of his political power in Bolivia. However, his embarrassing withdrawal only hastened his downfall and he was replaced by Campero. Querejazu considers that his "mistakes" in the conduction of his troops as well as those of Campero and his wandering division are proof that Daza had been bought by Chile.

Within the Campero government, the currents in favor of breaking the alliance with Peru and accepting the Chilean offer of Tacna and Arica were accentuated. Although this option was never totally ruled out, the alliance with Peru remained and even, after the fall of Tacna and Arica, the creation of the United States Peru-Bolivianos was approved, which never had a practical application. Bolivia cooperated with Peru with arms and money, but its forces in Oruro never attempted to recapture Antofagasta.

The internal situation in Peru was complicated. Prado, apparently against his will, declared war on Chile forced by the alliance treaty of 1873 and by internal pressures despite having no funds to finance the war and without international credit due to the continuous cessations in the payment of the debt. To assume command of the army and direct the military strategy, Prado relegated the management of the government to Vice President Luis La Puerta de Mendoza. Due to the Chilean blockade of the main Peruvian export ports, Peruvian tax revenue in 1879 (8,078,555 soles) decreased by half of what was calculated for that year (15,257,698 soles) and, on the contrary, fiscal expenditures in war increased more than triple (55,050,000 soles). In the absence of an effective tax system, Prado had to finance the war with patriotic donations, loans, default on debts, issuance of more coins and also with an increase in taxes. The political disaster of the government can be measured in the amount of finance ministers that his government had only in 1879: Izcue, Quimper, Pazos, Arias, (Piérola refused an offer), Arenas, again Quimper, Denegri. In the political-military aspect, the captain of the ship More Ruiz was prosecuted for the loss of the ship Independencia and General Buendía for the defeats in Tarapacá. On December 19, 1879, after the fall of Iquique and Pisagua was known, Prado left Peru to, according to him, speed up the purchase of war material in the US. USA and Europe. History has condemned his departure as a desertion.

After Prado's departure, Nicolás de Piérola Villena carried out a coup in December and took over as dictator of Peru. Pierola created the Inti (currency), renegotiated the foreign debt, recognized a controversial Peruvian debt to the Dreyfus firm and divided the southern army in two: the first under the command of Lizardo Montero made up of units in Tacna and Arica, the second It was made up of the troops stationed in Arequipa (plus others that would arrive) under the command of Pedro A. del Solar. Many historians see political reasons in a partition that definitely weakened the defense of the region. Piérola has been criticized for the dictatorial way of exercising power, for his fearful sectarianism of possible opponents, for his frivolity in the wardrobe and his pompous and the lack of control over expenses, but it must also be said that he made an enormous effort to obtain new sources of financing, modernize the state, give equality to the indigenous people and renegotiated (unsuccessfully) the debt and the consignment of Peruvian guano. J Basadre criticizes him but in turn considers his work "an act of self-sacrifice and even heroism, since he established his dictatorship in a country that was territorially invaded, politically disturbed, navally disappeared, militarily battered, economically drained and against which they were preparing to give their decisive blows the powerful and arrogant victors in the maritime campaign and in the Tarapacá campaign".

Tacna and Arica Campaign

Desembarkation and march of allied and Chilean troops during the Tacna and Arica campaign from January to June 1880.

Immediately after the battle of Dolores, the campaigning minister of war proposed to the Chilean government to go ahead with a landing near Lima to shorten the war. But within the government they insisted on carrying out the so-called "Bolivian policy" that would ensure future peace. For this reason, the government finally decided to occupy the region that is Bolivia's natural outlet to the ocean.

After a reconnaissance landing on December 31, 1879 near Tacna and which extended to Moquegua, 11,000 Chilean soldiers were disembarked on February 26, 1880 and for several days at Punta Coles, near Ilo, without be attacked by allies. Parallel to this, an expedition of 2,148 soldiers was sent to Mollendo, with the objective of destroying the port infrastructure and preventing the supply of the Arequipa garrison that was made from this place. The operations in Mollendo were between the 9th and the March 12, ending with the success of its objectives but with great excesses in the port caused by some Chilean soldiers.

In the Chilean advance, after the disembarkation of their forces, there were several confrontations:

• On 22 March the battle of Los Angeles was waged, where the Chilean troops defeated a Peruvian division positioned in a strong natural defense, and cut off the communications of Tacna and Arica with Arequipa, that is to say the rest of Peru.
• On May 26, the Chilean army defeated allied troops in the battle of Tacna (or Del Campo de la Alianza).
• On June 7 the last allied troops were defeated in the battle of Arica. After this campaign, the professional armies of Peru and Bolivia ceased to exist. Peru had to form a new army and Bolivia did not continue its military participation in the war although it supported Peru with weapons and money. No Bolivian government accepted, during the war, the Chilean offers to occupy Tacna and Arica.

Lynch's Expedition

Lynch Expedition to Chimbote, Supe, Paita, Eten and Lobos Islands from September to October 1880.

After the occupation of Tacna and Arica, the Chilean government believed that Peru and Bolivia would accept the cession of Tarapacá and Antofagasta or that Bolivia would at least seek to secure an outlet to the sea and would leave the alliance with Peru. However, a current of Chilean public opinion maintained that the only way to achieve peace was the occupation of Lima. With the intention of avoiding the continuation of the war with an invasion of the Peruvian capital, the Chilean government prepared an expedition to the north of Peru that had to demonstrate to the Piérola government its own inability to continue the war against Chile. The expedition to Mollendo carried out between March 9 and 12 had the same end.

On September 4, an expedition of 2,200 men under the command of ship captain Patricio Lynch set sail from Arica with the aim of imposing war quotas on the cities and wealthy landowners of northern Peru, damaging fiscal assets and finally preventing the disembarkation and transit of arms.

The government of Piérola declared the payment to Lynch as treason in such a way that the owners in Chimbote, Paita, Chiclayo and Lambayeque, were left between two fires to choose: the destruction of their assets by Lynch or later by Pierola. Some paid, some didn't. As a result of the war contributions, 29,050 pounds sterling, 11,428 pesos of silver, 5,000 pesos in paper money, some gold and silver bars, and a large quantity of merchandise and products from those regions had been collected. Lynch also captured a maritime shipment for the Peruvian government, consisting of 7.5 million printed pesos (bills and stamps) from the United States. During the expedition, Chilean forces found hundreds of Chinese coolie workers in semi-slavery conditions on Peruvian haciendas, some of whom, upon their release, voluntarily joined Lynch's forces as logistical support, and also in the subsequent Lima campaign.. The expedition lasted 2 months and was unopposed by Peruvian forces.

Although Chilean historians consider that the activity carried out by Lynch was based on international law, for example, Diego Barros Arana cites article 544 of the Le droit international codifié de Johann Caspar Bluntschli and Sergio Villalobos invoke Andrés Bello's Principles of International Law, they also consider it harmful to Chile's image; Gonzalo Bulnes writes: "the glorious army of Chile appeared before the civilized world as a demolisher of sugar mills, and as a destroyer of farm buildings."

Arica Peace Conference

On October 22, 1880, delegates from the three countries at war met aboard the USS Lackawanna (1862) warship, anchored off Arica, for a peace conference managed by by US representatives in belligerent countries. Chile demanded the cession of the provinces of Antofagasta and Tarapacá (from the Camarones ravine to the south), an indemnity of 20 million gold pesos, the demilitarization of Arica, the abrogation of the secret treaty and the return of the Rímac as well as the properties seized from Chilean citizens. The allies refused to make territorial cessions and the conference failed.

Historians have concluded that the US managers had relayed the belligerents' demands in a watered-down, unrealistic way to achieve the meeting, but this caused disappointment among the participants. US Minister Plenipotentiary in Bolivia Charles Adams had assured the allies that if the belligerents did not reach an agreement, the US would impose on Chile an arbitration favorable to the allies. For this reason, for the Campero and Piérola governments, it was better not to hand over the occupied territories and let the US impose peace without ceding territories.

After the alliance countries refused to accept the surrender of Antofagasta and Tarapacá, the debate continued in Chile on the way forward to obtain from the allies a lasting peace treaty that recognized the surrender of Antofagasta and Tarapacá: wait in Tacna for a change of opinion in Lima or La Paz or occupy Lima. Ultimately it was decided that the occupation of Lima was the only viable alternative.

Lima Campaign

Desembarkation and march of Chilean troops during the Lima campaign, from November 1880 to January 1881. The long journey from Pisco to Chilca was made only by the Lynch Brigade.

Warm and melted walls of Chorrillos, another sumptuous spa of the Limous aristocracy, after the battle of Chorrillos. The Peruvian defense line during the battle ended at the spa, which was naughty, burned and at the end of the battle was fought home by house. Then he was looted by some Chilean detachments.

For the Lima campaign, the Chilean army was increased by 20,000 troops and came to enlist a total of 41,000 men, distributed from the forts of the war in Araucanía, in the south of Chile, to Lurín. On the 19th On November 1880, the expeditionary army of the north began to land in Pisco, Paracas, Lurín (artillery) and Curayaco (December 22) until completing 27,000 soldiers, who were concentrated in Lurin, 36 km south of Lima before continuing to Lima.

Piérola, who initially expected a Chilean landing north of Lima, after the landings between Pisco and Lurín (south of Lima), ordered the preparation of two successive lines of defense south of Lima: the line army was to stop the invasion in Chorrillos. In case of failure, a second line of defense made up of a reserve army made up of Lima recruits organized by guilds, others brought from the provinces plus the remnants of the first line and the Callao garrison, was to defeat the supposedly weakened Chilean army in Miraflores.

The main line was that of San Juan, approximately 15 km long, made up of artillery batteries, machine guns, personal mines, fortifications and trenches for the defenders, located on natural elevations in the area (280 m on Morro Solar and Monterrico, 170 m in Sta. Teresa and San Juan) steep and sandy that go from Chorrillos through the Morro Solar, Santa Teresa, San Juan, through the hills of Pamplona to Monterrico Chico. Near Santa Teresa and San Juan passed the roads that went from Lurín to Lima and would therefore be important targets of the attack.

The second line of defense was less strong and consisted of seven fortified redoubts, but isolated, that every 800 m had to prevent the entry of Chilean troops to the capital.

In the Chilean general staff there were two alternative plans to overcome the Peruvian defense lines established along the coast. The first was a frontal attack. According to Manuel Baquedano, head of the invading forces, the attack would be carried out on known terrain and wide paths without great demands on the discipline and training of the troops, a safe place would be maintained in case of withdrawal (the Tablada de Lurín), it was counted with the support of the army on the left and finally the possibility of breaking the Peruvian lines due to their extension. The other plan, by José Francisco Vergara, Chile's new war minister in the campaign, was an enveloping attack from the right, following the bed of the Lurín river, along the Manchay road to the northeast as far as Ate, thereby allowing Lima to be taken. without firing a shot and then falling from behind to the Peruvian defenses. Both plans had advantages and disadvantages. Vergara's plan avoided the bloody frontal attack of the first, rendered the Peruvian entrenchments and forts useless, would generate a negative morale effect on the Peruvians, and cut the line of Peruvian retreat into the sierra, but he lost naval support and needed a long march down the hill. a narrow terrain of gorges and gorges susceptible to surprises, a difficult terrain to carry the baggage and drag artillery, march in a terrain without water to supply the army and in case of defeat they could cut off their retreat to Lurín. Finally, Baquedano and his staff imposed the plan for a frontal attack against the Peruvian defense lines.

Battle of San Juan and Chorrillos

Martiniano Urriola (in uniform), who in 1883 commanded the occupation of Ayacucho, and Marcos Maturana (with poncho), head of the General Staff of the Expeditionary Army in the campaign of Lima, observe the bodies of the servants of a Peruvian cannon after the battle of Chorrillos.

At 4:00 p.m. on January 12, 1881, the three divisions that made up the Chilean army began to leave the Lurín camp by different roads towards the defenses of Chorrillos to face the following day at 5:00 a.m. the bodies of the Peruvian army commanded by Iglesias (Morro Solar-Santa Teresa), Cáceres (Santa Teresa-San Juan) and Dávila (San Juan-Monterrico Chico). Before the Chilean push, the Peruvian forces had to leave San Juan and Santa Teresa at 9:00 a.m. to reorganize, some in Chorrillos, others in Morro Solar, where Lynch had been rejected early in the attempt to evict Iglesias from that position.. With the reinforcements that arrived from the center, the Chileans managed to defeat the Peruvian defenses of Morro Solar around 12:00 that day. The battle continued in the Chorrillos spa where the Peruvians evicted from Morro Solar, Villa entrenched themselves in houses and rooftops., Santa Teresa and San Juan, supported among others by an armored train sent from Lima. At 2:00 p.m., the Chileans had defeated Piérola's first line of defense.

Battle of Miraflores

After the Peruvian defeat at Chorrillos, a truce was agreed upon in the San Juan Armistice to establish conditions that would re-establish peace, but due to unexplained reasons, on January 15th the fight began in the second line of defense of Miraflores, which began when the Chilean forces had not yet lined up against the Peruvian defense. The Peruvian forces initially put considerable pressure on one of the Chilean divisions in the battle, but with the reorganization and Chilean counterattack they found themselves overwhelmed and defeated.

Criticism

The division of Peruvian forces into two lines has been criticized. The military analyst and writer Francisco Machuca quotes Napoleon Bonaparte: "The general who keeps part of his forces to use them the next day is lost." After the battles, there was looting in Chorrillos by some Chilean detachments and also in Lima. by scattered Peruvian soldiers who were later controlled by the organization of foreign residents.

The battles of Chorrillos and Miraflores have been the largest battles in the history of South America, considering the number of combatants: 45,000 in Chorrillos and 25,000 in Miraflores. The number of soldiers killed is estimated at 11,000 and 14,500 and the wounded at 10,144.

Occupation of Lima and Callao

Palacio de Gobierno del Perú con una Flag de Chile en la parte superior, el 18 de enero.

The occupation of Lima by the Chilean army began on January 17, that same day the forts of Callao were destroyed and the remaining Peruvian ships of its navy were beached, set on fire or sunk by order of the naval authority to prevent their destruction. capture by Chilean forces that occupied the port the next day. Order was restored in the capital, in the occupation zones, and activities resumed. After General Baquedano returned to Chile with part of the army, he briefly took over as head of the occupation army, Cornelio Saavedra, and was later replaced, also briefly, by Pedro Lagos. Finally, Patricio Lynch was in charge of the plaza and the occupied territories, from north to south of the Peruvian coast, until the end of the war in 1883. The Chilean army contingent that would maintain the occupation of part of the Peruvian territory, from this moment until the end of the war, it would vary between 9,997 to 12,769 men distributed in different points.

Internal situation in the belligerent countries after the occupation of Lima

On June 15, 1881, Domingo Santa María was elected president of Chile, a position he assumed on September 18, and the new congress was elected in 1882, as provided by law.

On the other hand, Chile and Argentina were going through tense moments, since despite the fact that the latter country had declared itself neutral at the beginning of the war, it was threatening to enter the fray to obtain advantages in its border negotiations with Chile and was known that allowed the transport of arms for the allies in its territory, exercised influence in Europe and the US to stop the Chilean advance in the war and defended a monetary compensation for Chile instead of the cession of territories. In addition, there was a strong current of support for the allied cause in its population, which encouraged hopes among the allies that it could enter the war against Chile. On July 23, 1881, Chile and Argentina signed a boundary treaty in which, among others, Eastern Patagonia was traded through Western Patagonia and the Strait of Magellan, putting an end to the possibilities for Argentina to intervene in the war.

In Bolivia, the vice president of the nation, Aniceto Arce, was exiled for supporting a peace with Chile and the government continued its support for Peru. In Peru, Nicolás de Piérola, who abandoned Lima in the face of military disasters in defense of the capital and the subsequent Chilean occupation, transferred his government to the central highlands, refusing to negotiate peace with territorial cession and determined to continue the fight. Parallel to these events, in Lima a board of notable neighbors met on March 12, 1881 and elected Francisco García Calderón as Provisional President of the Republic establishing a civil government in Peru, also called government of La Magdalena, which at first was implicitly tolerated by Chile in opposition to the authority of Piérola. García Calderón tried to unify the country, so his government, with the approval of the Chilean authorities, organized military forces that were sent to the mountains in search of recognition of his authority, generating some military confrontations between supporters of Garcia Calderon and Pierola.

The Chilean government tried to make peace with García Calderón expecting him to accept, among other things, the demands for territorial cession, but he rejected that particular condition to end the war, preferring instead pecuniary compensation. The factor that most influenced the Peruvian refusal to cede was the US mediation policy during the administration of US President James A. Garfield (March to September 1881) and his Secretary of State (Minister of RR. EE.) James G. Blaine, carried out by his representative in Lima Stephen A. Hurlbut, who encouraged Peruvian politicians not to subscribe to the handover of Tarapacá, suggesting that the United States of America would support Peru and Bolivia and would not allow the territorial dismemberment of the first. In addition, Hurlbut convinced Lizardo Montero and Andrés Cáceres, two soldiers who would be of great importance during this period of the war, to abandon Piérola and support García Calderón to achieve a united front, which actually happened later: Montero was appointed vice president and Cáceres Calderón's second vice president, while Piérola, seeing himself politically isolated, moved away (temporarily) from the country. US interventionism in the war was due in part to private business conducted by its diplomats and pressure from some of Peru's creditors. With the death of President Garfield in September, the inauguration of Chester A. Arthur and his new secretary of state, Frederick T. Frelinghuysen and the subsequent accusation in the US Senate against Blaine for influence peddling led the US to sign the Viña del Mar Protocol with Chile in which the US, among others, it accepts Chile's right to annex Tarapacá as a war indemnity. Hurlbut died in Lima and William H. Trescot took over as minister in Lima. Ultimately, peace would later be achieved without US mediation, and US attempts to end the war had only served to prolong it by raising expectations among the allies.

On September 28, Lynch prohibited the exercise of authorities not established by the occupation. García Calderón was arrested on November 6 and deported to Chile, but before that, on September 29, he named Lizardo Montero, head of the northern army in Cajamarca, as his successor. Montero installed his government in that city, although he would later move to Huaraz, leaving Miguel Iglesias as the political and military chief of the north, and at the beginning of 1882 he established his seat of government in Arequipa. Chile did not recognize Montero's authority over Peru, but the Bolivian government led by Campero did, with whom he worked to prosecute the war, acquiring weapons in Europe and the United States, organizing an army in Arequipa, and collaborating to some extent with the armed forces. organized by Cáceres in the central highlands.

Breña Campaign

The Peruvian resistance based on a guerrilla war was organized with regular and irregular troops by Andrés A. Cáceres (center), L. Montero and M. Iglesias (north) and P. del Solar (south) although Dellepiane he names the relationship between them as torturous due to their infighting. The area of the Central Andes presents a suitable topography for the guerrillas, and in addition there were human elements, although without training and with scant weapons for a prolonged fight. For the invading army, the region was unhealthy (piques and dysentery), unknown, difficult to access and the supply had to be made by the long and dangerous road to Lima, whose railway line only reached Chicla, buying it at high prices from the locals or requisition it, which further exacerbated Peruvian resistance.

The information factor also played against the Chilean troops: while Cáceres was informed by the population of any movement, number or even intention of the Chileans, they often did not know which direction to follow in pursuit of the Peruvian forces. The guerrillas forced the invaders to disperse their forces, making them vulnerable to mass attacks by these irregular forces. The cities and towns of the region were occupied and vacated by the rebels depending on whether or not there were Chilean military forces in them, thus avoiding a frontal combat between regular armies. In fact, the first battle of Pucará and the final battle in Huamachuco were the only confrontations directed by Cáceres, since the creation of his army. Combats, skirmishes, persecutions and ambushes were the norm of confrontation.

Although in the La Breña campaign there were several pockets of resistance led by different Peruvian caudillos, the main operations of this stage of the war were the expeditions sent to the central highlands of Peru, the majority to combat the forces organized by Cáceres, and the expedition to Arequipa to dismantle the last major Peruvian force organized by Montero in that city.

Letelier's Expedition

The first important Chilean expedition to the mountains to combat the Peruvian resistance was sent by Colonel Lagos, head of the occupation army at the time, and entrusted to 700 men under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ambrosio Letelier who carried it out on April 15, 1881, that is, barely three months of occupied Lima. His forces marched from that capital and successively occupied from Cerro de Pasco (north) to Huancayo (south) and from Chicla (west), the last railway station in Lima, to Tarma (east). No organized resistance had yet formed, so a small force was able to occupy such a vast region and easily disperse the few armed groups. Its results were devastating due to the outrages that Letelier committed against the population of the area, provoking the rebellion of the peasants and the claim of the citizens of neutral countries. Rear Admiral Lynch, who replaced Lagos in his charge in May, ordered the immediate return of the expedition upon learning of Letelier's outrages in the area.

When Letelier undertook his return to Lima, in mid-June, several clashes occurred between Chilean detachments and organized armed groups. With his arrival in Lima on July 4, Letelier was court-martialed for misappropriation of money and sent to Chile.

Expedition of 1882

Combates in the Sierra during 1882 (except that of St.Paul that occurred in the north).

Chilean soldier Luis Sanjurjo with abundant "mulares" warts, or Carrion disease, probably infected in one of the temperate ravines of the Rímac River basin during the Breña campaign.

The military resistance led by Cáceres in the southern and central Andean regions intensified after the first Chilean expedition to the area.

The second year of the occupation, 1882, the government in Santiago ordered Lynch to send an expedition of 5,000 men to the mountains to finish off the army of Cáceres that was concentrating in Chosica, at the gates of Lima. On January 1, the Chilean forces began to mobilize from Lima, divided into two columns, under the command of Lynch, executing a movement of pincers and pursuit. Later, Colonel José Francisco Gana Castro took command to be succeeded later by Colonel Estanislao del Canto Arteaga, who continued military operations with 2,300 men in pursuit of Cáceres, who was retreating into the interior. On February 5, he managed to reach him and give him battle in the First Combat of Pucará, although without conclusive results. Cáceres continued his withdrawal towards Ayacucho in order to reorganize his scattered forces there and then launch a counteroffensive. Colonel Del Canto on his part occupied the Mantaro valley, distributing his troops throughout the area.

The Chilean troops, with the express order to win the goodwill of the population through correct behavior, had successively occupied Tarma, Jauja, Huancayo and even Izcuchaca. But the Cáceres counteroffensive in conjunction with the attacks by the irregular peasant forces, inflamed by the Letelier expedition the previous year, prevented any type of fraternization between the Chileans and the inhabitants of the valley. On July 9 and 10, the Chilean garrison in Concepción was annihilated by a joint force of Peruvian regulars and montoneros. Due to the harassment of the enemy, the lack of provisions and diseases, the Chilean expeditionary force had to withdraw from the area, descending to Lima in the first days of August. The Chilean forces during the expedition suffered the loss of 534 men: 154 in combat, 277 due to illness and 103 due to desertion (20% approx.). For its part, Cáceres suffered heavy losses among deaths in combat and disease and also desertions, so he had to increase his forces with new recruits for future military actions.

Montan's Cry

Meanwhile, Miguel Iglesias, Piérola's former defense minister before the fall of Lima, and who had been named political and military chief of northern Peru after the occupation of Lima, had organized the forces of that sector to confront the Chilean expeditions. But Iglesias, after the fight in San Pablo on July 13 and the subsequent Chilean occupation of various towns in the area, including Cajamarca on August 8, came to the conviction that the war had to be ended or that it would destroy Peru. From his point of view, it was inconceivable that the bleeding would continue when it was evident that the Peruvian defeat was irreversible. Many neutral observers were also of the same opinion. In Europe and the rest of America it was seen with scandal that the war would continue indefinitely.

On August 31, Iglesias launched the Grito de Montán demanding peace, even with territorial cessions, and proclaimed his authority over seven departments in northern Peru: Piura, Cajamarca, Amazonas, Loreto, Lambayeque, La Libertad and Ancash. On January 1, 1883, an Assembly appointed Iglesias as Regenerating President of Peru. Lynch, although initially skeptical of this event, after his unfortunate experience with García Calderón and later with Montero, supported him by order of the Chilean government. Montero and Cáceres did not recognize the authority of Iglesias, on the contrary, they maintained the idea of continuing the fight against the Chilean forces until reaching a peace without territorial cession. Due to the position taken by Iglesias regarding the war with Chile, there were several clashes in northern Peru between troops organized by the Iglesias government and opposition forces.

On May 3, the Iglesias government agreed with Chile, after a previous discussion initiated by their respective representatives, the bases of the definitive peace. Iglesias signed this agreement later in Cajamarca.

Expeditions in 1883

Operations in 1883

April-July

September-November

Map to the left, Arriagada pursues Cáceres to Yungay and Cáceres pursues González to Huamachuco. Map to the right, occupation of Arequipa and Puno by Velásquez. The occupation of Ayacucho by Urriola does not appear on the maps.

At the beginning of the third year of the occupation, and with the expectation of signing peace, the government in Santiago ordered Lynch to send a new expedition to disrupt the forces led by Cáceres, who still opposed the agreement between the Chilean government and that of Iglesias to end the war. Politically, the expedition would also have the mission of publicizing, explaining, and demanding support for the Iglesias government, for which reason it was also ordered to treat the civilian population correctly and pay for the products received to support the troops, although they had to be executed. to all regular or irregular Peruvians of the resistance taken prisoner and also to the officers who led them, several of whom had previously been prisoners in the last campaign and upon being released had broken their promise not to take up arms against the occupation government.

Lynch's plan was to pursue, encircle and defeat Cáceres's forces, who at that time was in Canta, with two divisions, and if he escaped, carry out a sustained pursuit pushing the Peruvian general through the Callejón de Huaylas towards the north where another minor division would thus force him to give the decisive battle, if he was not defeated before. On April 7, Colonel Juan León García left Lima with 1,800 men to attack the Cáceres forces that were in Canta, but he, aware of the Chilean advance, withdrew towards Tarma, producing only a few clashes between the small detachments deployed by both forces during the pursuit. Almost parallel to León García's division, Colonel Del Canto left Lima for Lurín in the middle of that month with a force of 1,500 men who had the order to go to Chicla to support the deployment of the detachments commanded by Colonel Martiniano Urriola. that they were clearing the sector of the montoneros that were around. In Chicla the three Chilean columns met on May 3, and J. León G. took some troops from Del Canto and Urriola, to continue the pursuit of Cáceres towards Tarma but the Peruvian chief had withdrawn from that place heading towards the north on May 21. On May 26, Del Canto arrived in that town, taking command of all the forces, which were 3,334 men, by order of Lynch, and continued the pursuit of Cáceres passing through Palcamayo, Junín, Carhuamayo, San Rafael, Salapampa, Chavinillo and Aguamiro.. In this last place, Colonel Marco Aurelio Arriagada arrived on June 12, who took command of the division and continued the march north following the army of Cáceres.

For Arriagada and Cáceres, the journey meant serious losses. Chilean forces reached Yungay on June 23 only to find that Cáceres had abandoned the city. With no reliable information available, the Chilean division marched back south, mistakenly believing that it was pursuing the Peruvian general. Arriagada, not finding him, abandoned the pursuit and returned to Lima on August 5 accounting for a total of 732 casualties (21%) of which there were 130 dead from fatigue, 28 missing and 574 sick, without deaths in combat. For his On the other hand, Cáceres had been joined by the forces of Colonel Isaac Recavarren in Yungay, and believing that Arriagada was still pursuing him, they continued the march north to avoid the elevation of Miguel Iglesias. Anticipating this development, Lynch, who had placed a division in the north under the command of Colonel Alejandro Gorostiaga with 1,000 men, ordered this chief to block the way from Cáceres to Cajamarca in Huamachuco, also reinforcing his forces, which came to count 1,736 men.

On July 10, Gorostiaga's forces defeated those of Cáceres in the battle of Huamachuco, with heavy casualties in Cáceres' army, and disappointment among those who opposed the ceding of territories. All this consolidated the government of Iglesias, when his detractors were convinced of the futility of continuing the war. With this triumph, the last significant Peruvian force was Montero's army in Arequipa of 5,500 men, for which reason the Chilean command sent a force of 6,400 men to that city in September under the command of Colonel José Velásquez Bórquez to defeat them. and, simultaneously, an expedition of 1,554 men under the command of Colonel Urriola was sent to pass through Jauja and Huancayo, occupy Ayacucho and prevent Montero from occupying it and uniting his forces in the central sierra with the reduced forces of Cáceres. On October 1, after several minor confrontations with montoneras that were dispersed, Urriola entered Ayacucho where Cáceres had settled behind Huamachuco. Cáceres was forced to withdraw towards Andahuaylas. On the other hand, on October 29, the city of Arequipa, where Montero concentrated the last hopes of resistance, capitulated and was occupied without resistance by the forces of Colonel Velásquez after an uprising in that city that forced Montero and his entourage to flee. towards Bolivia, this Peruvian chief moving away definitively from the events of the war and transferring his power to Cáceres. The Chilean command completed the military occupation of the Mollendo-Arequipa line with the occupation of Puno, which was, from Peru, the gateway to Bolivia. As for Urriola, informed of the occupation of Arequipa and due to the lack of supplies, he withdrew from Ayacucho on November 12, and after some minor combat with the montoneras during his return, he arrived in Lima on the 12th of the following month. Some towns in the central highlands were guarded by Chilean detachments until the consolidation of peace with Peru in mid-1884.

The success of the Chilean military operations ended the Peruvian resistance, strengthened the government of Iglesias to obtain the definitive peace with Peru and exerted military pressure on the Bolivian government to move it in the same direction.

Final Phase

Treaty of Ancón and Peruvian Civil War

On October 18, 1883, Chile officially recognized the government of Iglesias over Peru and on October 20 the Treaty of Ancón was signed, which was later approved by the Constituent Assembly of Peru. This agreement established, among other things, the definitive cession of the Tarapacá region to Chile and the occupation of the provinces of Arica and Tacna for a period of 10 years, after which a plebiscite would decide if they remained under the sovereignty of Chile, or if they returned to Peru. On October 23, Lynch withdrew from Lima, which was occupied by the forces of Miguel Iglesias, to assume the government of Peru. On August 4, 1884, the last Chilean expeditionary forces left the port of Callao and the rest of the occupied territories north of the line of the Sama River.

The base of the resistance in Cáceres, which until then had been the rebellion of peasants and indigenous people against the Chileans, had changed and the montoneras were now fighting against "the whites," either Chilean or Peruvian. In June 1884, Cáceres accepted the Treaty of Ancón, as a "fait accompli".

Florencia Mallon considers that the real reasons for Cáceres were that:

Long before the civil war ended, Cáceres convinced himself that in order to build an alliance that would lead him to the presidential palace, he had to join forces with the people who had worked with the Chileans as a class. The only way to do so was to give the farmers what they asked and repress the guerrillas who had made the Breña campaign possible.

After the war, the differences between Cáceres and Iglesias gave rise to a civil war between the supporters of both leaders, which ended after several military actions in 1885 with the triumph of the former.

Truce agreement between Bolivia and Chile

Since its withdrawal from the war, Bolivia had taken an attitude of expectation, but after the Peru-Chile agreement of 1883 (Treaty of Ancón) and the mobilization of Chilean troops to its border, it signed the Truce Pact on April 4 between Bolivia and Chile of 1884, by which, among others, he accepted the occupation of Antofagasta by Chile and put an end to hostilities, which could only be resumed with a year's notice in advance. The 1884 treaty does not mention the 24°S-23°S strip, an omission that in diplomatic terms means acceptance of the status quo, that is, the Chilean claim to the strip that Chile had ceded in 1866 and in 1874. the area between 23°S and the Loa river, Bolivia only accepted the de facto military occupation, there was no cession, which would occur in the peace treaty of 1904.

Analysis

Military strategy, means and technology

Damage caused by a shooting Huáscar in the tie Abtao during the second naval combat of Antofagasta. The war occurred during a phase of rapid technical advances and the participating vessels had armour, machine guns, steam propulsion and retroload cannons but also sail and sprinkle. In fact the Emerald was sunk by the spur of the Huáscar and Prat died trying to capture the Peruvian armor for boarding.

Control of the sea was essential for the occupation of a desert region accessible almost only by the coast: the supply of water, food, ammunition, fodder, reinforcements and weapons was faster and easier by sea than through the desert or from the mountains. But while the Chilean navy tried to blockade Peruvian ports, the Peruvian navy pursued a more daring strategy, acting aggressively and proactively against Chilean ports and shipping lines, delaying the start of Chilean military deployments by 6 months, despite superiority number of the Chilean naval forces. After the elimination of the capital ships of Peru, it was impossible to stop the Chilean landings and the defenders were hundreds of kilometers from the supply cities while the Chilean troops had supply ships only a few kilometers from the coast.

Chilean troops used an early form of amphibious warfare, combining naval forces, army forces, specialized units, and specially built flat-bottomed landing craft.

Chilean military strategy emphasized preemptive and offensive attack and combination of arms, mobilizing and deploying its forces before its opponents and taking the war to the Bolivian and Peruvian territories. The Chilean army landed troops in determined places to separate allied groups and isolate them from their supplier cities.

Peru and Bolivia presented, on land, with few exceptions, a defensive war, relying as much as possible on fortifications with artillery and mines.

After the occupation of Lima, the war took another turn, the theater of war was the Peruvian sierra with a considerable population density that gave support, shelter and supplies to the guerrillas and montoneras. On the other hand, the Chilean troops were far from their sources of supply, whether they were the occupied Peruvian coastal cities or their ships. Furthermore, the geography was unknown to them, difficult to navigate, and exposed to ambushes.

Both sides used modern military technology, such as artillery and breech-loading rifles, machine guns, torpedoes, torpedo boats, and armored ships. Peru used land mines and Chile landing craft. During the war, Peru developed the Toro submarine, which was not used and was self-sunk. In addition, a hot air balloon was designed in Peru as an observation weapon and as an instrument for firing projectiles from the air, but the lack of time and money did not make it possible to carry out the project.

For the mobilization of troops to the battle fronts, in addition to the use of the naval route in transport ships and marches on foot, rail transport was used, a technology that was already incorporated at least in Chile and Peru since the middle of the XIX century, thus making it possible to mobilize supplies and troops more quickly and with greater comfort, although the railway line did not always reach all the areas where military actions took place. In the case of Peru, it also used armored trains.

William F. Sater argues that the advantages of new technologies such as the breech-loading, rifled, metal-cased rifle, torpedoes, railways, and telegraphs were not consistently used by belligerents, partly due to lack of infrastructure., knowledge, adequate personnel or for lack of military strategy.

In the search for the reasons for the outcome, the American historian W. Sater postulates that Chile defeated the allies thanks to its control over the Strait of Magellan that allowed it expedited supplies, contrary to the allies that depended on third countries for transit its materials, its civil infrastructure and its political institutions, and most importantly, thanks to the intellectual qualities and practical experience of its officer corps. Political stability had made it possible to train generations of officers with, at least, basic knowledge of their trade.

Sater highlights the courage and tenacity of allied military units that resisted beyond their duty and the intelligence of officers such as Grau and Cáceres. He is also extraordinarily severe in describing Chilean strategists: J. Arteaga as "senescent ", E. Escala as "obsessive retrograde", Baquedano as "primitive", W. Rebolledo as "hypochondriac" and Simpson as "alcoholic".

During the war, the American ship USS Wachusett (1861) was stationed in the port of Callao under the orders of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan to protect the interests of his fellow citizens. Later he wrote The Influence of Sea Power upon History a work that highlights the importance of sea power in history.

The war was a dramatic milestone in South American history and is one of the major ones of the late 19th century, for which it has attracted considerable scholarly attention.

Foreign intervention

The commercial and financial interests in the area agreed that the war was not favorable to them because on the one hand it affected the routes of commerce and navigation, and on the other hand it made it difficult to pay the debts of the belligerent countries. For that reason they always sought to end the war.

Following the Chilean occupation of Tarapacá, the governments of Peru and Bolivia tried to involve the United States of America in their favor to prevent the cession of territories to Chile. The Bolivian representative in the US offered concessions of guano and nitrate to US investors in exchange for protection against Chile. Peru's creditor interest groups, "Credit Industriel" and "Peruvian Company", offered Peruvian President García Calderón to pay the Peruvian foreign debt and war reparations to Chile in exchange for the rights to exploit and trade Peruvian guano and nitrate. With the acquiescence of García Calderón, they began to lobby in the US to prevent the cession of territories, being supported by US Secretary of State James G. Blaine.

For their part, US diplomats feared an intervention by European powers contrary to their Monroe Doctrine that would diminish their expectations of economic expansion in Latin America. However, there were also vested economic interests in the matter: the US representative in Lima, Stephen A. Hurlbut, accepted a Peruvian proposal to hand over Chimbote as a naval base to the US plus coal concessions, in which these the latter would remain in his name. At that time, Hurlbut sent a letter to Patricio Lynch warning him that the United States of America would not allow the cession of Peruvian territories. In September 1881, Chester A. Arthur assumed power in the United States, who was not willing to interfere. in such a way in South American affairs.

American historian Kenneth D. Lehmann comments on his country's policy in the following words: "Washington had entered a controversy without a realistic proposition: the moralizing urge of the United States had an air of hypocrisy about it." in the light of their own history, and the veiled threats were not plausible."

Regarding Britain's intervention in the war, the British Marxist historian Victor Kiernan, after a detailed analysis of the documents of the Foreign Office of Great Britain (Foreign Office) emphasizes that this ministry never contemplated intervening nor did it intervene actively in the conflict, but instead was extremely concerned not to favor any belligerent since after the Civil War, the US obtained British compensation through the Alabama Claims for the secret construction and sale of British ships to the confederates.

During the war the belligerents were able to buy arms in Europe and the US as much as they could afford (though not in Britain) and firms such as the international Baring Brothers had no scruples in dealing with both sides. For example the Between 1879 and 1880, Peru acquired weapons in the US, Europe, Costa Rica and Panama, which were unloaded in the Panamanian Caribbean, transported by land to the Pacific and from there to Peru on the ships Talisman, Chalaco, Limeña, Estrella, Enriqueta, and Guadiana.

In a message to the Congress of his country, the Venezuelan dictator Antonio Guzmán Blanco in 1881 denounced the Chilean aggression in the War of the Pacific expressing that «the people Peruvian has fought and still fights heroically, with honor for the patriotism of South America”.^{[citation required]}

Treatment of combatants

Artillery Lieutenant Solo Zaldívar, with two soldiers, buried a group of three Bolivian soldiers killed in the battle of Tacna. The promontory behind the group is formed by the land that already covers another larger group of dead.

The three belligerents adhered to the International Convention of the Red Cross that protected the wounded, prisoners, refugees, civilians and other non-combatants.

At the beginning of the war, 30,000 Chilean citizens were expelled from Peru and Bolivia and their properties confiscated; most of them ended up in Peruvian ports, boats and pontoons waiting for some opportunity to be transported to Chile by ship. An estimated 7,000 of them enlisted in the Chilean battalions heading north and their resentment would have an impact on the war. In Chile, Peruvian and Bolivian citizens were not expelled.

The three belligerent armies are accused of committing looting, Peruvians and Chileans accuse each other of having finished off wounded enemy soldiers after the fighting. The Peruvian historian Hugo Pereyra Plasencia believes that:

It must be very clear that the conflict was not a confrontation between demons and angels, but (which is very different) between invaders and invaders. The excesses occurred on both sides. The atrocities committed by the Chilean forces, in addition to being objectively more numerous, had their origin and physiognomy in a war of aggression and invasion, which undoubtedly made them passable from a more compelling conviction. However, women killed during the extermination of the Chilean garrison of Concepción, in July 1882, recall that there is no war that is not cruel or inhuman, for more explanations that are given to the facts.

Since international law did not allow attacks by civilians against occupation forces, the leader of the Peruvian resistance in the Sierra, Andrés Avelino Cáceres, justified the Peruvian crimes against Chilean prisoners and patients with the argument: "Declared out of the law, anathema that excludes them even from the bosom of humanity, did not believe themselves obliged to recognize in their oppressive rights that were denied them."

After the battle of Chorrillos, the staff officer Baldomero Dublé Almeyda died, who was wounded when he and other officers tried to contain the excesses of some Chilean insubordinates. The outrages of Colonel Ambrosio Letelier in 1881 were condemned by the Chilean military courts.

Beyond the carnage in the irregular war in La Breña, in which the Chilean army did not consider the montoneros and guerrillas as regular soldiers who were subjected to punishment and cruel reprisals, and in which Chilean troops sometimes they committed abuses against their inhabitants that unleashed revenge after revenge, in Peru an ethnic and social conflict was developing between its indigenous population, the Chinese workers enslaved in Peru and the whites and Creoles of the ruling class. On July 2, 1884, the guerrilla fighter Tomás Laymes and three of his men were executed in Huancayo by the forces of Cáceres due to the atrocities committed by the guerrillas against the Peruvian towns and cities. In Ayacucho, the indigenous population rebelled. against "the whites" and in Chincha the black population organized in bands against the owners of the haciendas of "Larán", "San José" and "Round Blade". Only the Peruvian army managed to suppress the revolt. But there were also ethnic tensions between blacks and Chinese. In Cañete, 2,000 Chinese were massacred by blacks on the "Montalbán" and "Juan de Arona".

Looting and requisitions

Caricature published in the Chilean magazine Father Cobos in 1882. Minister Balmaceda washes his hands in innocence and orders the mayor of Santiago, Mackenna, to get rid of the heavy Peruvian lion. The elite of Santiago observes with pleasure the arrival of the statue. Father Cobos and a child play around the scene.

Looting and war contributions during the conflict have been forgotten in Chile but are a source of resentment in Peru. The Chilean historian Milton Godoy Orellana distinguishes four cases: 1) looting in Chorrillos and Miraflores 2) looting in Lima committed by Peruvians before the entry of Chilean troops into the city 3) confiscation of locomotives, rails, printing presses, weapons, etc., carried out by the occupying army. These expropriations were permitted by the laws of war of the 19th century. The Chilean government directed them through the "Oficina Recaudadora de las Contribuciones de Guerra" whose tasks were to take inventory, confiscate, register and confirm the shipment to Chile as both the recipient and the sender. The purpose of the confiscation was to obtain peace. There is no general list of confiscated goods, but many of the shipments were recorded in official and private letters, newspaper articles, shipping cargo lists, etc. 4) the requisition of Peruvian cultural property. The development of international standards related to the protection of objects of great cultural value took place in the xviii and xix, but the idea of protecting cultural property arose in Europe in the xviii.

The Lieber Code of 1863, which unconditionally protected art objects in armed conflict (Art. 35), expressly consented to the use of cultural property as war reparation (Art. 36). Chilean historian Sergio Villalobos points out that the United States of America accepted in 1871 the confiscation of works of art, but that the project of an international declaration concerning the laws and customs of war of 1874 considered that art objects should be protected. In March 1881 the The Occupation Government requisitioned 45,000 books from the National Library of Peru, but in fact many of them were sold by Peruvians in Lima, so it is disputed how many of the books remained in Chilean hands.

When the books began to appear in March 1881, public opinion in Chile began to discuss the legitimacy of the confiscation of books, oil paintings, statues, etc., or “international theft” as a journalist from the newspaper described it The Time. On February 4, 1883, in a session of the Chilean Chamber of Deputies, Deputy Augusto Matte Pérez questioned Interior Minister José Manuel Balmaceda about the "disgraceful and humiliating" shipments of Peruvian cultural property. Deputy Montt demanded the return of the assets and was supported by his colleagues McClure and Puelma. The minister promised to prevent future exactions and to repatriate the objects mentioned in the discussion. Likewise, in 1884, Ricardo Palma, once appointed director of the National Library of Peru, requested and obtained from President Domingo Santa María the return of 10,000 stolen books. Sergio Villalobos considers that there was no justification for the theft.

Consequences

Human remains of Bolivian, Peruvian and Chilean soldiers exhumed from temporary graves to be permanently buried in the Mausoleum of Tacna in 1910.

The Pacific War had a series of economic, political, territorial and social consequences among the belligerents. There were definitive cessions of territory and other temporary ones, the loss of or access to new natural resources, a certain degree of resentment in the defeated countries, and also caused a series of disputes and future claims between those involved that would be resolved with new international agreements.

Chile, after its victory, took possession not only of an important territorial extension, but also of enormous nitrate, guano and copper deposits that greatly benefited the construction of new public works, such as ports and railways and social works that modernized the country, as well as served to strengthen the armed forces, becoming one of the strongest on the continent. On the other hand, Chile also with the victory in the war increased its political influence in the region and that was later reflected in some events such as the Panama crisis in 1885 with a demonstration of power. During the following years, Chile would have to deal with a series of disputes with Bolivia and Peru, but also with Argentina.

Saltpeter was Chile's main source of wealth until the discovery of synthetic nitrate by the Germans, during World War I, and the Great Depression in 1930, which would put an end to the nitrate boom.

For Peru, the war, in addition to the loss of territory of the coastal province of Tarapacá and the province of Arica, also lost its valuable natural resources, it meant the destruction of part of its infrastructure, a decrease in production and trade, and the ruin of its economy in many aspects, such as the depreciation of the fiscal bill and the disappearance of the metallic currency. The subsequent period is known as the National Reconstruction during which recovery work was carried out, but also political and social changes. The country also had to go through great social divisions as a result of the war, on one side were the indigenous peasants of the Sierra, and on the other, the landowners. The Peruvian authorities on duty had to subdue these peasants to avoid a generalized rebellion. Subsequently, Peru had to settle with Chile the pending issues of the Treaty of Ancón, among them, the fate of Tacna and Arica with the planned plebiscite, which for various reasons could not be put into practice, causing tensions between both countries. Finally, only in 1929 was the signing of the Treaty of Lima achieved, which resolved the pending issues.

With respect to Bolivia, with the Chilean annexation of its coastline, it lost its only sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, being relegated to the status of a landlocked State, and also losing the natural resources of the place. The negotiations for the signing of a peace treaty lasted until 1904. Parallel to the issue of the coastline, there was the issue of the Puna de Atacama of 75,000 km². At the end of the war, Chile considered that area its own according to the Truce Pact. The Puna de Atacama Litigation was a boundary dispute between Chile, Bolivia, and Argentina, which was resolved in 1899 by an American arbitration that ruled that a minor part of the Puna de Atacama remained for Chile and the rest for Argentina.

After the war ended, claims arose for damage caused by the war to the national property of neutral countries. In 1884, the Arbitral Tribunals were established, each with three judges, one appointed by Chile, another appointed by the claimant's country and the last judge appointed by Brazil, in order to judge on claims by citizens. from Great Britain (118), Italy (440), France (89) and Germany. The Italian court accepted claims from Belgian citizens and the German court from Austrian and Swiss citizens. Spanish citizens agreed directly with the State of Chile and the Americans did not take advantage of the measure at that time. In accordance with the international norms in force at that time, cases were neglected in which: the foreigners had habitual residence in the belligerent countries, the place in question had been a combat zone (the case of Chorrillos, Arica, Miraflores, Pisagua and Tacna) and the damage had been caused by soldiers outside the hierarchy (deserters, lost). Only 3.6% of the amount claimed was awarded by the courts.

Postwar

Peace treaty between Chile and Bolivia

The definitive peace between Chile and Bolivia was sealed with the "Treaty of 1904 between Chile and Bolivia", by which Bolivia definitively recognized the permanent Chilean sovereignty over the Department of the Coast, with which it renounced a sovereign outlet to the Pacific. Chile, in turn, guaranteed free transit of Bolivian goods, exempt from taxes, between Chilean ports and Bolivia, in addition to the construction of the Arica-La Paz railway.

However, the Bolivian desire for an outlet to the sea has been the constant source of diplomatic tensions between the two countries, lawsuits before international courts and its inclusion in the 2009 Constitution.

Treaty of Lima

The war between Peru and Chile concluded with the signing of the Treaty of Ancón, through which the Tarapacá region was ceded to Chile and the provinces of Arica and Tacna were placed under Chilean administration for a period of 10 years, after which a plebiscite would decide if they remained under the sovereignty of Chile, or if they returned to Peru.

However, this could never be carried out and it was not until 1929 that the Treaty of Lima was signed, with the mediation of the United States, which decided that a large part of the province of Tacna should be returned to Peru while Arica and the rest will definitely remain in the hands of Chile.