Luis Alberto Lacalle

Luis Alberto Ramón Lacalle de Herrera (Montevideo, July 13, 1941) is a Uruguayan lawyer, journalist and politician. He was the 36th President of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay between March 1, 1990 and March 1, 1995.

He was also a national representative and senator. He was president of the National Party Board on two occasions, the first between 1999 and 2004 and the second from August 2009 to June 2011.

He was a leader of the Herrerismo sector and of National Unity. He contested three presidential elections: 1989, 1999, 2009. In 2004 he lost his party's internal elections against Jorge Larrañaga. He is the father of Luis Lacalle Pou, president of Uruguay since 2020.

Biography

Luis Alberto Lacalle and his wife, Julia Pou.

Luis Alberto Ramón Lacalle de Herrera was born on July 13, 1941. He is the son of Carlos Pedro Lacalle Nuñez (1909-1971) and Hortensia de Herrera y Uriarte (1908-2007), and is the maternal grandson of famous politician and nationalist leader Luis Alberto de Herrera. He also has a sister, Inés Celestina. He is also a half-second uncle of the politician Luis Alberto Heber, since Margarita Uriarte Olascoaga (1871-1943), married Alberto Heber Jackson for the first time and Luis Alberto de Herrera for the second, which makes her Lacalle's grandmother on the one hand, and Heber's great-grandmother on the other.

In 1961 he began working as a journalist for the newspaper Clarín and in 1964 he finished his studies at the University of the Republic graduating as a Doctor of Law and Social Sciences.

In 1973, after the coup d'état, Luis Alberto was arrested and remained in jail for a few weeks.^{[citation needed]} He then participated, from hiding, in as an opponent of the dictatorial regime. In 1978 an attempt on his life took place.

In 1981 he worked as a columnist for the weeklies Correo de los Viernes and Opinar, until 1984 when he became director of the radio program Patria y Partido, a program that disseminated the ideas of Herrerismo after the upcoming elections.^{[citation required]}

He is married to María Julia Pou, with whom he had four children: Pilar, Luis Alberto, Juan José and Manuel; he has four grandchildren.

Lacalle, is an honorary member of the Club of Rome, also a member of the Club of Madrid and the Jerusalem Summit.

Political career

Beginnings

Lacalle began his political militancy at the age of seventeen, in 1958, in the Herrerista ranks of the National Party; he accompanied his grandfather Luis Alberto de Herrera in the campaign for the 1958 elections, which gave the National Party a historic victory after 93 years in opposition.

Since then, he has held various public positions: as a representative, as a senator and as president. He was one of the youngest Uruguayan presidents at the time of taking office. He was president of the Board of Directors of his party on two occasions.

Lacalle is, like his grandfather, Luis Alberto de Herrera, the leader of the Herrerista sector of the National Party. In 1971 he was elected deputy for this party. He held that position until the coup d'état carried out by the acting constitutional president Juan María Bordaberry on June 27, 1973.

During the civic-military dictatorship

At the end of 1973 he was arrested and spent two weeks in prison. Since then he was part of the semi-clandestine opposition that the National Party offered to the military dictatorship ^{[citation needed ]} . In August 1978, Lacalle received bottles of wine sent by an unknown person who only signed "M.D.N.", and who invited them to "toast to the Homeland in his new stage". Similar bottles were also sent to nationalist legislators Carlos Julio Pereyra and Mario Heber. The recipients related this to the rumors that an opening military coup was going to take place within the regime itself in the coming days. However, the reality was different, because the wine was mixed with a very powerful poison. Lacalle did not taste the wine alerted by his wife, Julia Pou, who found it suspicious. However, Heber's wife, Cecilia Fontana, died as soon as she tried it.

He founded the Herrerista National Council in 1981 for the internal elections of 1982, in which he obtained a respectable vote. He served as its secretary general. After the 1982 elections he became a member of the party's Board of Directors and in 1984 he began directing the nationalist radio program & # 34; Patria y Partido & # 34; , which spread Herrerista ideals..

Democratic restoration from now on

Given the imminent restoration of democracy, in 1984 he thought of presenting his candidacy for the presidency, but given the evident electoral favoritism of Wilsonism, he decided to support the presidential candidacy of Alberto Zumarán, with his own list for the Senate. Thus, in the 1984 elections he was elected senator, and later vice president of the Senate in 1987. From his public image in the 1980s, it is said that he "had a Kennedy profile";.

Presidential Candidacies

In 1989 he ran as a presidential candidate for Herrerismo, being elected president. In 1999, after defeating Juan Andrés Ramírez in the internal elections of the National Party, he repeated his candidacy for the presidency, but was defeated by Jorge Batlle.

In the 2004 internal elections, he was defeated by Jorge Larrañaga, who ran as the party's sole candidate. He thought of running for the Senate, but due to the actions of other well-known leaders, Lacalle remained in the shadows, limiting himself to assuming a seat on the Party Board.

In the long run, this strategy would prove fruitful: in 2008, Lacalle once again became a "presidential candidate" with notorious figuration in the polls.

On April 12, 2008, an extraordinary congress of Herrerismo elected him as a pre-candidate for the 2009 internal elections. A motion was also promoted to enable agreements with other political groups to form a new, broader space that would include people from different sectors and parties. He specifically received the support of Francisco Gallinal. In July they jointly launched the National Unity movement.

Candidature in 2009

Throughout 2009, the polls showed Lacalle as the favorite to win the internal elections, and presented him as a serious challenger for the October elections. A recurring theme in his political discourse was public insecurity, which is among the main concerns of Uruguayans, and the statements of the then Minister of the Interior Daisy Tourné about the & # 34; thermal sensation & # 3. 4; in this regard, as well as the establishment of the personal income tax tax by former minister Danilo Astori, which Lacalle strongly questioned.

On Sunday, June 28, 2009, the majority of white voters consecrated Luis Alberto Lacalle as the sole candidate of the National Party for the October presidential elections. That same night, Lacalle greeted the other pre-candidates and offered Jorge Larrañaga to complete the presidential formula.

According to the political scientist Luis Eduardo González, these internal elections marked a formidable change in the valuation of the politician Luis Alberto Lacalle by the citizens, comparable in a certain way to what happened ten years ago with Jorge Batlle Ibáñez.

Among his main advisors, it is worth mentioning Mario Sampedro (public security), Fanny Trilesinsky (economy), Sergio Abreu (foreign relations), Fernando Motta (health) and José Carlos Cardoso (education).

On October 25, Lacalle obtained a vote of 29.07%. Since the Broad Front did not obtain an absolute majority this time, it went to a second round on Sunday, November 29. Lacalle devoted himself to building bridges in the face of the second electoral round, He Appeals to "balance".

There was a lot of insistence on the possibility of a televised debate, which did not materialize. % of the votes, losing to the official formula headed by José Mujica.

On February 15, 2010, Lacalle took office as titular senator for National Unity.

Lacalle at the Miami International Book Fair 2011

Electoral history

1989 Presidential Election

Result of the 1989 elections for the presidency of the Republic.

1999 Presidential Election

Result of the first round of the 1999 elections for the presidency of the Republic.

2009 Presidential Election

Result of the first round of the 2009 elections for the presidency of the Republic.

Result of the second round of the 2009 elections for the presidency of the Republic.

Presidency (1990-1995)

Lacalle was elected president of Uruguay on November 26, 1989, a position he assumed on Thursday the 1st. March 1990 for the five-year period 1990-1995. His government program was titled & # 34; National Response & # 34;, it was very brief, made up of 16 measures; it had been prepared by technicians from the Manuel Oribe Institute.

Government program and its historical context

Upon assuming the presidency of the Republic, Lacalle announced a set of measures that implied the accentuation of transformations of the economy, giving priority to the reduction of the fiscal deficit through a shock policy. The new government set out to enact laws such as fiscal adjustment, the sale of banks managed by the State, the reform of the state apparatus, etc.

According to what the Government Program remarked, its application should “review and reform the industrial and commercial activities of the State”. The idea of reform included “the most convenient legal reforms: mixed economy companies, private companies and state property, total or partial exploitation concessions, passage to private oribta and possible demonopolizations”. Lacalle promised to “analyze each of the public companies on a case-by-case basis” and to promote their modification “by constitutional law”.

As a background, it is important to note that the 1990s were the time of the end of the Cold War, for which the so-called Washington Consensus was imposed worldwide, in which other Latin American presidents such as Carlos Saúl Menem also participated. in Argentina, Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil and Carlos Salinas de Gortari in Mexico. In fact, issues such as the "necessary shrinking of the State" and privatizations, were part of Lacalle's proposals in his presidential campaign. Lacalle was focused on reforms in the public sector, social security, education, the tax system, the decrease in import tariffs and the regulation of workers' right to strike. Thus, the Lacalle presidency would put on the table for discussion public the level of State intervention in the economy, its interference in social, labor and educational matters, the role of parastatal companies, and whether or not these companies should be privatized, and in what way.

The "National Coincidence"

The National Coincidence was a kind of coalition with the political partners of the government: the Movement for the Homeland, the National Movement of Rocha, Renovación and Victoria (led by Vice President Gonzalo Aguirre) and the colorado currents that had a presence in the cabinet: the Batllista Forum, List 15 and the Colorada and Batllista Union. Crusade 94 excluded itself from the Colorado Party.

This coalition was not really such, it soon became clear that the "National Coincidence" it would not be a permanent agreement, but essentially unstable. Lacalle had to laboriously negotiate with all the participating sectors to reach, sometimes with some and sometimes with others, tight parliamentary majorities to approve only some of the laws that he proposed to promote. It even happened that in the middle of a detailed vote on the articles of a law, one sector voted in favor of one article and another against it, and for the next article the vote was reversed. The "National Coincidence" did not have solid foundations, since the participating sectors themselves had serious reservations with an economic and social policy whose effects they sensed were going to be more and more unpopular. Jorge Batlle Ibáñez, an admirer of Carlos Menem and Domingo Cavallo, reproached Lacalle for being too gradualist, while Senator Carlos Julio Pereyra's Movimiento Nacional de Rocha demanded a more generous salary policy with workers.

The differences between the Colorado sectors were notorious, especially if one takes into account the deep and irreconcilable personal differences between Jorge Batlle Ibáñez and Julio María Sanguinetti. This resulted in a gradual withdrawal of his cabinet ministers; in the end, even Batlle himself came to cause the fall of the economy minister Braga "for being too gradualist".

Economic policy

His economic policy was characterized by being social democratic, by the desire to achieve economic development with minimal state intervention.^{[citation needed]} No interest was shown in implement wealth redistribution policies, which resulted in figures that reflected great inequality at the end of the management period in terms of the socioeconomic level of the population. An important fact was the elimination of the Wage Councils, eliminating the possibility of worker participation in the negotiation to fix them together with the employers, so that many who belonged to less unionized sectors were left in very vulnerable positions vis-à-vis the employers. There was also a will to privatize a large number of public entities, which ultimately could not be carried out with the same magnitude as in the Latin American context due to the rejection with which a large part of the population reacted.

Fiscal adjustment

On March 6, 1990, President Lacalle sent to the Legislative Branch the bill of “fiscal adjustment” that was approved, which revealed a celerity that will not be repeated during the entire period of government, on March 31. It had the votes of the National Party, the Batllista Forum, Pachequismo and List 15; they were opposed by the Broad Front, the New Space and the Crusade 94.

The “fiscal adjustment” law No. 16,107 meant:

• An increase in the VAT rate from 21 % to 22 %,
• An increase in the tax on personal remuneration and pensions according to the following scale:
  • A) 3.5 per cent (three and a half per cent), who received up to three national minimum monthly wages.
  • B) 5.5 % (five and a half percent), who received more than three and up to six national minimum monthly wages.
  • C) 7.5 % (sevent and a half percent), who received more than six minimum wages
• The creation of the Tax on Patrimonial Transmissions,
• An increase of 3.5% in the employer's contribution to the Social Security Bank,
• An increase to 40 per cent of the Imposition of the Income of Industry and Trade (IRIC), of the Tax on Agricultural Activities (IMAGRO) and of the Tax on Agricultural Income (IRA).

An additional element to consider was the result of the constitutional plebiscite, which indexed the increase in pensions. In the campaign ahead of the elections, Lacalle himself had implicitly supported this initiative, which was somewhat contradictory to his desire to reduce the size of the State.

The government was harshly criticized for the implementation of this tax adjustment, described as a "impuestazo", which caused a drop in the real wages of workers by 10 percentage points between March and May 1990.

At the same time, it set a precedent: during the second presidency of Julio María Sanguinetti from Colorado, a new fiscal adjustment would take place in 1995, and also another in the administration of Jorge Batlle Ibáñez. In his second year in office, the acts of corruption that occurred during his government were uncovered, among them the former presidential adviser to Lacalle Pou Daniel Cambón and the former minister and former BCU president Enrique Braga were prosecuted for irregularities in the privatization of Banco Pan de Azúcar.

Exchange rate policy: the floating band

Uruguay still kept fresh the memory of the "tablet" at the beginning of the 1980s and its disastrous consequences; However, in a country governed by a president convinced of the benefits of the free movement of capital and foreign currency, a mechanism was needed to make the price of strong currencies predictable. On the other hand, inflation did not cease due to the monetary issue to finance the deficit.

Thus, an exchange rate floating band system with sliding parity was implemented, whereby the price of the dollar was announced within a certain range. With the intention of using the exchange rate as a nominal anchor, a band was defined within which the peso floated freely against the dollar, with a continuous devaluation of this currency initially of 4% per month. As a background, it must be taken into account that the Washington Consensus indicated the need to maintain a real exchange rate, to ensure the reduction of customs barriers was accompanied by incentives for the export sector. But the commercial rate as an anchor produced exchange rate delay, particularly in the first 3 years of the Lacalle government. Exports did not grow until 1994 and the trade balance was reversed.

The Uruguayan version of an exchange rate-based stabilization program was made possible primarily by the inflow of foreign capital, on a scale sufficient to finance the current account deficit and contribute to reserves. It was not possible to implement a fixed exchange rate in the style of Argentina.

Foreign debt

The foreign debt was one of the priority issues of the electoral campaign. The slogan of the political left was not to pay the external debt, they insisted that Uruguay adopt a position of rupture with the creditors. On the contrary, Jorge Batlle from Colorado insisted on "selling the gold to pay the debt".

From the moment Lacalle assumed the presidency, the Undersecretary of Economy, Nicolás Herrera, and the director of the Central Bank of Uruguay, Agustín de Urtubey, traveled several times to New York to attend meetings with the committee of creditor banks, in order to renegotiate the debt under the Brady Plan. The result of the negotiations was formalized on January 21, 1991 in the Libertad Building, where President Lacalle signed the agreement, which entailed an exchange of part of the debt that Uruguay had with banks for debt in bonds, the so-called "Brady bonds", with a subtraction. The operation also involved a cash cancellation of part of the debt, for which international reserves of 633 million dollars were used. The act of formalizing the agreement was attended by delegates from 71 Uruguayan creditor institutions, headed by William Rhodes, president of the bank committee. A week later the acquisition of 250 million US dollars of debt with Brazil was added.

Public companies

Barely fifty days after assuming the Presidency and two weeks after the approval of the fiscal adjustment by the Executive Power, on September 13, 1990, the government presented to Parliament a project of the “Law of modifications of the regime of public companies of the industrial and commercial domain of the State”.

The different opinions ranged from the one expressed by Jorge Batlle, a total supporter of converting public companies into corporations, to those of Alberto Zumarán and Carlos Julio Pereyra, who advocated for the State to keep them under its majority control by opening them to receive foreign capitals. After feverish negotiations to obtain a consensus, the drafting of the final text was reached on September 13, 1990. It was approved unanimously by all the Ministers meeting in the Council. The Secretaries of State who responded directly to Batlle, Jorge Pacheco Areco, Julio María Sanguinetti, Pereyra and the President of the Republic raised their hands. The bill abolished various state monopolies (such as insurance and alcohol manufacturing) and authorized various agencies (such as Antel, Pluna and the National Ports Administration) to associate with private ones. It also included the liquidation of ILPE, the state agency dedicated to fishing.

In mid-1991, the Public Companies Law continued its slow process in the Senate Commission: after eight months of studies, it had been decided to remove from the project the reform of the Port and Stowage services on the understanding that the issue it deserved its own law, while some articles had been added on the destination of the money obtained in future privatization processes and the establishment of joint stock companies for commercial agreements entered into by entities with private companies.

On May 15, the issue entered the plenary session of the Senate, at which time Américo Ricaldoni, on behalf of the Batllista Forum, sent Senator Ignacio de Posadas the observations on the project, announcing that his group would not vote on five articles. He offered no alternative to those articles, but he also did not point out any substantial flaws in them. On June 25, 1991, twenty-one senators – all the representatives of the traditional parties with the exception of Zumarán – raised their hands in the Chamber of Senators to vote – in general – on the bill that began to reverse the role that the State had maintained for decades carrying out industrial and commercial activities. The majority bloc – heterogeneous in its composition and with dissimilar arguments – did not hold out when it came to voting on each of the articles that allowed the concession of all public services to individuals. The discussion had begun on May 28 and eight sessions were needed, in which thirty Senators spoke. The final vote was 21 in favor (six Herreristas, three from Renovación and Victoria, three from Movimiento de Rocha and nine from Colorado) and 10 against (seven from the Broad Front, two from Nuevo Espacio and Zumarán). The Batllista Forum (Sanguinetti) and Crusade 94 (Pablo Millor) did not vote on five of the articles, including the chapter on telecommunications. In the Chamber of Deputies, also after marathon sessions held on September 29 and 30, the law was approved.

When the bill was still in the Commission, the Broad Front made public its proposal to put into practice the referendum mechanism in case the initiative was approved, because "a good part of the patrimony is in danger national that liberalism irresponsibly prepares to deliver”. He added that the reform “will leave us an inoperative State” and would put “the very sovereignty of the country at stake”.

Twenty-four hours after the "Public Companies Law" was promulgated, the privatization plan began to allow those companies that, such as the "Gas Company", "AFE", "ILPE" and «Pluna», entered a very important official deficit. The government claimed that the country paid a lot of money to keep them in service. At the same time, information was known about the interest of private telephone companies in acquiring Antel, through official contacts made by «France Télécom», the Italian «Stet», «Telefónica de España» and the North American «Nymex», «Bell Atlantic”, “BellSouth” and “GTE”.

Within the framework of the law approved, Uruguay began the path of major reforms of the State, materializing the privatization of the “Compañía de Gas”, which was sold to the French group “Gaseba”; the liquidation of «ILPE» was carried out, leaving the State to fulfill the fishing tasks that passed into private hands as well as the ground services at the Carrasco Airport; the privatization of air transport within the country was addressed; the concession for potable water and sanitation services in areas of Maldonado was granted, and the cell phone system was awarded.

UTE began to acquire electricity generated by the private sector.^{[citation required]} The construction of the double via Montevideo - Punta del Este with a private investment estimated at around one hundred million dollars^{[citation required]}, built in large sections during the Lacalle presidency.

The concession was granted to private companies to operate various hotels and tourist inns, beginning with the radical transformation of the regulatory framework with Decree No. 681/991 of January 31, 1991, which declared investment activity to be of national interest in the category of Tourist Complexes, and establishing tax exemptions. In this way, the service was substantially improved through measures that facilitated the importation for recycling and refurbishment of the facilities, in some cases, and modern constructions in others, in more than one hundred complexes throughout the country for an estimated amount of 800 million dollars with a 40% increase in hotel capacity^{[citation required]}. Punta del Este changed its physiognomy with two transcendent works: the construction of the modern Laguna del Sauce airport, with a project by the architect Carlos Ott; and the installation of the Conrad Punta del Este Resort & Casino on the grounds of Parada 3 that were owned by AFE. After the land was sold, the second high school in Maldonado was built with the money obtained.

At the same time, under government decisions such as the sale of the land and facilities of the former Punta Carretas prison, the largest commercial transformation that for decades had taken place in the country's capital began in Montevideo with the construction and fitting out of the public of several shopping centers; in addition to the pre-existing Montevideo Shopping Center, Punta Carretas Shopping and the Portones Shopping Center were added.

Montevideo at that time did not have a bus terminal. Each company had its own location, and these locations were scattered throughout various parts of the city, making it difficult for passengers to purchase a ticket and take a bus to another city in Uruguay or a neighboring country. Although municipal jurisdiction, this problem was solved by the Lacalle government, building the Tres Cruces Terminal and, with it, the fourth shopping center with which the country's capital was endowed.

Meanwhile, in the Legislative Branch, the laws on the demonopolization of insurance and alcohol already had half a parliamentary sanction, while the Port and Stowage Reform Law was also on its way to approval. Months later, the enactment of Law No. 16426, which allowed the entry of private insurance companies to compete with the official Bank, made an initiative that Lacalle had raised in 1988 when he was a senator come true. The liberalization of the production of alcohols would be launched in the following period but, on the other hand, the effects of the Port Reform Law and stowage services were immediate: the average state time of ships in the port of Montevideo went from 78 hours to 34 hours and the tariff reduction reached 26% in terms of imports and 33% in terms of transshipment and transit.

Public opinion before the privatization process

The government was pleased that all these measures that allowed private investment and job creation, were added to the results of the imposed economic policy.

Criticism was not lacking, however. In a country long accustomed to times of protectionism and the welfare state, many felt the severity of the insecurity caused by the new rules of the game; the Lacalle government was seen as "a liquidator of the Batllista state." And this, added to an uncertain situation for various wage earners in the midst of an inflationary spiral that was still hard to stop, the growth of unemployment at the behest of liberalization that led to the bankruptcy of dozens of industries, the elimination of collective bargaining as a tool that offered opportunities for workers to put pressure on the business community to maintain or raise real wages and the inequality that all this would bring about (and that would already be evident at the end of the mandate), led to growing opposition. A situation easily comparable to that of other Latin American countries, characterized by strong state interventionism in its recent past and with notorious sociopolitical movements that took social and economic reform as their flag on the basis of a vigorously expanded State; The privatization process collided with a deeply rooted culture, where private companies had historically been marginalized as an actor in debates and in the collective imagination, that State was synonymous with good times.

On Tuesday, December 10, 1991, the Commission for the Defense of National Patrimony and State Reform, in a statement informed that there was an agreement to '''challenge articles 1, 2, 3, 10, and 32''' of the Law of public companies. The group that had the support of the PIT-CNT and the Broad Front announced that the launch of the campaign that would mark the beginning of the collection of signatures would take place on Thursday, December 19. For its part, in the Broad Front Plenary the positions were not unanimous. Even before a decision was adopted, General Líber Seregni held an interview with Sanguinetti to listen to his position on a possible campaign to collect signatures. The leader of the Batllista Forum responded in the negative, stating that he was opposed to supporting the referendum.

The Electoral Court reported that the number of those authorized to fly amounted to 2,359,291 citizens, so in order to launch the referendum appeal, 11,796 signatures (5% of those authorized) had to be submitted to the electoral body. After gathering the signatures, the Commission presented them to the Electoral Court; the consultation set for July 5, 1992 was authorized. That day, only 20.6% of the total number of authorized persons (489,067 people) turned out to vote. The adverse results generated a serious confrontation on the left, analyzing the decision to withdraw their delegates from the Commission and not to support the second call scheduled for October 1. But soon, the controversy turned into a polarization of opinions; the vote against the Public Companies Law was publicized as “a vote against the government's economic policy”. Thus, in October 1992, out of a total of 738,405 votes cast, 29.5% of voters enabled the call for the referendum.

The government stopped its actions and everyone, one and the other, those who were in favor of the law and those who promoted its partial repeal, got involved for more than two months in a virtual electoral campaign. The gangs were very clearly defined with only one exception: Sanguinetti's Foro Batllista, which, according to the expressions of its leader Ope Pasquet, was in a "diabolical bind". On October 6, 1992, President Lacalle phoned Sanguinetti to invite him to a meeting to discuss the issue of the referendum. He surprisingly heard in response, the information that the Batllista Forum was deliberating on the issue. The next day, urged by the need to establish a position, Sanguinetti dedicated himself to the preparation of a document that would express the official position of the Forum, which was read to the leadership. He maintained that "the country has been extremistly locked up by two currents, a reactionary one that nonsensely says that the Batllista State must be destroyed and another equally reactionary, although from the left, which tries to reject all investment that is not Uruguayan" 34;. The manifesto called on the government to "consider changing the law" and to its challengers "who also understand that the country cannot, without further ado, slam the door on the reform of the State and shake its shoulders as if it were free of charge in today's world". Finally, after the first surveys of "Factum" indicating that there was an inclination of 42% over 28% to support the repeal of the Law, the Batllista Forum decided to join the Broad Front and vote for the "Yes" to the repeal.

On Sunday, December 13, 1992, the "Yes" received 1,293,016 against 489,302 of the "No", with 22,327 blank ballots, 36,992 annulled and 100,191 observed, registering a total of 1,941,829 people who turned out to vote (in percentage: 66, 6% for "Yes"; 25.2% for "No"; 1.1% blank; 1.9% cancelled; and 5.2% observed). The first five articles of the Public Companies Law were repealed. This result surprised many outsiders, in the midst of a Latin America in full privatization fever.

President Lacalle appeared before the public and admitted his defeat on this law. However, his economic reformism was far from falling, as many had claimed; Lacalle continued with the execution of his program. There was a punitive vote against a government that was left more and more alone and, in particular, against his economic policy; The categorical result indicated the general resistance of the people to part with the national patrimony and their conviction that the reform of the State is, at the same time, much more and much less than the sale of public companies. But the citizenry also judged the management of the government and, especially, its economic policy; Not only the opponents, but also Lacalle's white associates asked him to make it more flexible. But in vain: the president announced that he would continue along the same lines, and came to attribute his defeat to a & # 34; majority psychosis against everything foreign & # 34; (something that was a historical characteristic of the discourse of Batlle y Ordóñez and Batllismo in general, main political enemies of Herrerismo).

Managed banks

During Sanguinetti's first government, the Uruguayan banking system had collapsed, and political leaders of all parties supported the idea of the state taking over the four bankrupt banking institutions: Banco Comercial, Banco Caja Obrera, the Pan de Azúcar Bank and the Bank of Italy. These institutions continued to operate at a loss. Only the Central Bank, in the five years of state management, accumulated a deficit of 180 million dollars.

Sale of the Commercial Bank

The Lacalle government reported that the sale of Banco Comercial was being made to three foreign institutions: Deutsch-Südamerikanische Bank of Federal Germany, the Chemical Bank and Credit Suisse, which together accounted for 74.3% of the package shareholding, while the remaining shares passed into the hands of the Argentine investment group headed by the brothers Carlos and José Röhm.

The buyers paid 30 million dollars in foreign debt securities (at their nominal value and not market value) on the condition that the State would keep the heavy portfolio that the institution had. The economy minister at the time, Enrique Braga, who was the one who carried out the operation on behalf of the government along with Uturbey and Rosario Medero, concluded his report to the press by stating that: "We do not believe that it is a reasonable act to continue managing a financial institution at a loss and with non-qualifiable future risks when this government is attempting to drastically reduce its deficit and has asked the entire population to make a great sacrifice”. Supporting the operation, that same day Ignacio de Posadas declared to the press that the sale of the Commercial was "a brilliant opportunity for the Uruguayan State".

Immediately, on July 11, in the Chamber of Deputies, the entire Broad Front raised the call for Minister Braga's Chamber on two occasions, with the support of Rocha's National Movement. Minister Braga was questioned five times on this issue in the different branches of Parliament. Moreover, on the fourth occasion that he went to the Sala to respond to Cr. Danilo Astori of the Broad Front, on August 22, 1991 (fourteen months after the sale) with the votes of the left added to those of the Batllista Forum, the Party for the People's Government, Crusade 94, the Movement of Rocha and Zumarán, the sale of Banco Comercial was declared “inconvenient for the country”. In these interpellations, Senator Astori affirmed that it was evidenced that it was never known how much Banco Comercial was sold to Röhm, that it was never known which partners were behind it. In those interpellations eighteen Senators concluded that it was a lousy deal for the country. The interventions, for example, by the then senator Millor, were the proofs for the writer Gustavo Bernini (current deputy of the Socialist Party - Broad Front), to make public the implications that existed between some government authorities and, precisely, those business groups to those who were sold to Banco Comercial.

After the sale of Banco Comercial, it was managed by brothers Carlos Röhm and José Röhm, who were members of the Board of Directors of Banco Comercial between 1990 and 2002.

The bank ceased to be managed by the Röhm brothers when, in 2002, an economic crisis occurred in Uruguay, having one of its epicenters in this same Commercial Bank. These brothers resigned after the financial debacle and the Uruguayan government began a judicial investigation when José Rohm denounced his brother and partner Carlos Rohm, who was executive vice president and general manager, for fraud. The Röhm Brothers are considered the architects of a financial scam and a bank emptying that triggered the run on depositors, and ultimately the banking crisis that plunged Uruguay into bankruptcy.

Sale of Pan de Azúcar Bank

The old Banco Pan de Azúcar had been managed as insolvent. The National Development Corporation had taken over the share package; and set about reprivatizing the bank. The president of the Central Bank of Uruguay, Enrique Braga, intervened in the negotiation.

For the purchase of BPA, an estimated sum between 90 and 95 million dollars was allocated from a total of 400 million spent on bailing out the entire financial system. It included capital contributions so that the banks could continue operating and the absorption of losses from some previous years. For these purchases, the Lacalle government used its own resources and resorted to international credits, thus increasing the external debt (specifically the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development). In the reprivatization process, the BCU received several concrete offers from different Argentine and Brazilian banks, as well as from the French Crédit Agricole, among others. In this process, Braga, as president of the BCU, finally ended up completing the sale to the Banknord Group, an Italian trust company with dubious backing from a pool of five Italian regional banks, closing the deal on March 22, 1994.

From the beginning, the negotiations aroused suspicion in the opposition parties and press, as well as in the Association of Bank Employees of Uruguay (AEBU). The accepted offer was for five million dollars, when shortly before offers of fifteen and up to thirty million dollars had been rejected, coming from more internationally recognized financial entities.

The strongest argument put forward by the BCU was that Banknord ensured the source of employment for the bank's four hundred employees and the "tacit" commitment to "promote national development". Banknord did not present the guarantees of the Italian regional banks that they had allegedly partnered to guarantee the purchase, which increased criticism of the operation. In September 1996, the BCU had to retake control of the bank due to the threat of bankruptcy and to preserve the stability of the financial market.

On October 16, 1996, criminal judge José Balcaldi, after 13 months of investigation and after hearing the prosecutor's accusation. Barrios, ordered the imprisonment of Cr. Braga for the crime of unnamed abuse of functions and of Daniel Cambón, Lacalle's former presidential adviser, for the crime of "conjunction of personal interest with the public."

Deindustrialization process and reduction of tariff rates

The Lacalle government promoted an increase in imports of consumer goods (through tariff reductions and exchange rate delays) that fundamentally affected the manufacturing industry. During the government period, the manufacturing industry went from representing 25% of GDP to 16% of it. Imports of consumer goods grew from 200 million in 1990 to 800 million in 1994. The closure of two emblematic companies (Onda and Funsa) marked the destruction of industrial and service jobs that reached the order of 90,000. A decree issued in 1992 reduced tariff rates, which in the case of imports of consumer goods went from 24% to 20%. Due to the list of products negotiated in the GATT, the rate finally remained at 11%. In January 1994, the Senate questioned Minister Ignacio de Posadas and Eduardo Ache, the Minister of Industry. The questioner, Hugo Batalla, emphasized the state of crisis in various industrial sectors (refrigerating, textiles, tanneries, clothing, metallurgy); he referred to the exchange rate delay and the imbalance in the trade balance. De Posadas not only did not answer any of the ten questions of the interpellant, but he went from defendant to accuser: “You are asked to invest in the industry. With what? Parliament approved the expenses and left the Executive Power without margin”.

National Debureaucratization Program

The new administration launched a National Debureaucratization Program that eliminated 1.7 million paperwork a year.

He declared war on the bureaucracy, establishing a program to combat it and invited the “taxpayer rebellion” that he said he wanted to lead. This action did not need support from Parliament. Hence the rapid implementation of the National Program for Debureaucratization (PRONADE) Alberto Sayagués and Laura Palma, working with the slogan of “Let's make it easier”, culminating in Decree 500/91. The Social Welfare Bank worked with 3,000 different forms, while there were 5,700 in all of France.

Relations with the labor movement

During the civil-military dictatorship, all union activity had been systematically repressed and prohibited, salaries had been depressed, and during the first years of the return to democracy, a hard path of salary recovery was attempted in the midst of numerous conflicts workers. But at the same time, the galloping inflation (it reached more than 100 percent during the first year of the Lacalle government) played against any attempt to recover wages. And to further complicate matters, labor deregulation policies were being implemented around the world (which, in turn, entailed a "voluntary" decrease in union activity).^{[citation required]} There are those who also see, behind Lacalle's economic program, the actions of numerous transnationals and some international organizations, which simply and simply wanted an unlimited opening of the Uruguayan market, which in the end would lead to the destruction of the productive apparatus of Uruguay.

The Lacalle administration dissolved the Wage Councils (state body for collective bargaining on wages and working conditions). As a consequence, it faced fierce opposition from the trade union movement, as well as an open confrontation with legal doctrine, particularly with ILO recommendations.

Before assuming the presidency, during the months of work in the Parque Hotel, the then president-elect had tried to put into practice another of the announcements of “The National Response” referring to the search for a “social coincidence” with the intermediary bodies of society (associations, unions, chambers and unions). While the leaders of the associations, unions, unions, etc., gave him a clear and emphatic answer: "to the new government, not one hour of truce...".

A n#34;honeymoon and#34; very brief

From threats they went directly and quickly to reality. The weekly “Búsqueda” of March 15, under the headline “The PIT-CNT began to prepare its militancy for the prospect of an upcoming confrontation with the government”, announced that the first mobilization would be on March 23. Add the article below: “The fiscal adjustment, and the salary situation of public and private employees, the announced regulation of the right to strike, the partial or total privatization of state companies and the approval of a new law on teaching, are identified by the PIT-CNT as the issues that will originate their mobilizations”.

According to Atilio Garrido, author of the book Lacalle with soul and life, a few days after Lacalle assumed the presidency, the union leaders were against "everything that the candidate for President had said he was going to do and that the majority of the people supported with their vote at the polls". Further on he expressed the article that “ the unions were asked to have prompt measures of force to apply in the event of the presentation of the bill to regulate the right to strike or the fiscal adjustment package […]. For these cases, a strike with concentration before Parliament is planned". In the same note, it is noted that the head of the union sector of the Communist Party and leader of the port union, Félix Díaz, maintained that the issues that are being raised “imply the survival of the union organizations since with the union regulations they take away their reaction speed (…) and that could be their castration”.

The agreed strike, with a rally in front of Parliament, took place on March 23 from 15 to 18 hours, with a rally at four in the afternoon in front of the Legislative Palace. Something unheard of in the history of Uruguay, because it was carried out twenty-three days after the new government took office. Although President Lacalle asked the PIT-CNT for cooperation, on April 21 the trade union center announced that there was no “possibility of any truce”. For its part, the MLN publication of April 25 called on the PIT-CNT to “give up the fight in the streets, mobilized, resisting the attacks of the government (…). These are times of resistance, of standing wide so as not to lose even more ground, of fighting back to back because the enemy is one, and even though they have not tried it with this pact, it serves as an instrument of domination”.

Attempt to regulate the right to strike

President Lacalle said that: “An adequate legislation is necessary for the institute of the strike”. While at the PIT-CNT Seminar sponsored by the ILO, Héctor Hugo Barbagelata highlighted the "non-legal nature of strikes" as a social phenomenon that cannot be regulated by law. Barbagelata pointed out that any initiative of this nature is a factor of disturbance of worker-employer relations. He admitted that the law should limit itself to regulating some of the consequences such as its effects on the employment contract, establishing that it is a suspension and not its rupture, or also in cases of collective misfortune, the minimum can be determined by law. of service whose maintenance must be ensured by the strikers. (which should be ensured by union self-regulation).

In turn, the Executive Secretariat of the PIT-CNT declared publicly that «the draft regulation of the right to strike conceals a desire to tie up, tame and tame the union movement. An obvious need when trying to apply a shock policy that reduces the weight of the tax burden on wage-earners and retirees (fiscal adjustment), regressively redistributes national income, reduces sources of work (reduction in investment) and delivers sovereignty (privatization of public companies). In short, prioritize good writing against the foreign creditor, against the needs of the country and its people.

Union conflict and "social dialogue"

On July 11, militants of the SUNTMA (Sole Union of Sea and Allied Workers), in conflict, waited for Lacalle at the exit of the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture and Fisheries, and in his presence began to chant profanity over the car presidential flyers titled “Fishing in struggle”. Throughout August, the trade unionists applied an enormous blocking action with strikes of all kinds with the platform of “resisting the government, demanding budget improvements, against hunger and unemployment”. In a pearly way, the workers of the public records were stopping their tasks, affecting customs procedures, operations with automobiles and real estate. The officials of the General Tax Directorate, the urban and interdepartmental transport services, halted their work, education activity was halted and on August 24 a 6-hour general strike began and a march towards the Libertad Building. This latest mobilization occurred eleven days after another meeting between the president and the PIT-CNT had been held. The violence was present. Three carriers who were carrying out an emergency service were injured.

Lacalle reacted during his visit to Treinta y Tres, affirming that the strikes "have less and less echo because there is a greater understanding of the worker in the sense that the union leadership is a little behind the times", and the next day, in Florida, referring to the attacks by emergency transport, he affirmed that "hatred, intolerance, violence, the spirit of sedition, nor the attack on the essence of the Homeland, because that is indeed an intangible heritage that we will defend”. The answer came soon. The Tupamaros called an act at the Peñarol Palace for September 22 with the slogan “Defend yourselves! The time has come to organize the fight (…). Faced with the current situation, there is no other way out than to propose the fight or emigration”. The communists affirmed that “the country has reached a crossroads”; For this reason, "popular mobilizations, political initiative and alternative projects should focus on avoiding conservative restructuring in Uruguay". The general secretary of the Communist Party, Jaime Pérez, explained that "the objective is twofold, on the one hand to hinder and fight for the neoliberal plan not to be fulfilled (...) and on the other to launch a claiming and democratic offensive because we can tell people to wait, that everything will be fixed in '94.”

After almost 7 months of permanent confrontations and public reproaches, the government and the union leadership entered into social dialogue: starting on October 24 when the Minister of Labor, Carlos Cat, announced the beginning of a new era in government relations with unions, opening the negotiating body the following day in a meeting that began to take shape at the end of August when Lacalle, warning that economic difficulties and growing conflict could make Unmanageable for all the situation in Uruguay, he accepted an offer from the deputy Rafael Michelini of the PGP, to act as a link between the Executive Branch and the PIT-CNT with the purpose of reaching some kind of understanding. Subsequent reserved conversations went to a political level (García Pintos, Michelini and the trade unionists, the socialist Eduardo Fernández and the communist Rubén Villaverde who affirmed that "if one does not find a path to consensus on important issues, the country will it can get out of hand”) and even a technician with the economists Javier de Haedo and Juan Manuel Rodríguez, in the United States, during his visit at the beginning of November where he met with President George Bush Sr., Lacalle said: “ The great national dialogue that was opened by the government with the unions and businessmen is positive because it turns the tense situation into a discussion between civilized people”.

One aspect to consider in all this was the need to coordinate wage policy with the evolution of inflation. There was a lot of discussion about whether to index or not, and whether it should be based on past inflation or expected inflation.

The social dialogue allowed a momentary trade union peace, since its development exposed and exposed before public opinion, the great differences that arose within the workers' union about the procedures to be launched against the Lacalle administration. The definition of hard and soft arose that historically began to take shape in the Uruguayan labor movement when the communists were retreating and losing dominance in the unions before the appearance of the tupamaros, who They took the trade union movement as the most appropriate field for the establishment of their fighting ideals. For this reason, the dam with which the government of President Lacalle tried to control union demands, after a few months began to be successively perforated by new mobilizations that began again in 1991 and continued during the following year (anesthetists, judges, teachers, transportation)., reaching its climax when the conflict broke out in a labor sector without a union: that of the police.

Police stoppage

On November 16, 1992, a property located in front of the Cuiraceros Guard, within sight of President Lacalle's office on the seventh floor of the Libertad Building, was chosen as the setting for the second police strike in history from Uruguay. A 28-year-old girl, Sandra Dodera, became a spokesperson for the mobilized agents. Dodera occupied the foreground of the media for several days, showing an unusual development. She is an official of the Río Negro Municipality, she officially joined the Broad Front. ^{[citation needed ]} After the strike she returned to anonymity. Then, in 1993, Dodera was prosecuted when her participation in “repeated crimes of abuse of functions” was considered proven, without ruling out that as the investigation progressed “other evidence might come to light, which would allow eventually expand the criminal accusation”.

The Executive Branch resorted to the army, which agreed to patrol the city without getting involved in any measure that would curtail the claims,^{[citation required]}, putting into practice what it called the "Plan Cuerda", a situation that generated the first disagreement between President Lacalle and the Commander-in-Chief, General Juan Rebollo. During the session of the Council of Ministers where the issue was analyzed, when asked about the possibility of counting on the Armed Forces to undertake other types of actions, the Commander-in-Chief was hesitant, an attitude that did not correspond to the position he held. During the development of the session there was a sabotage whose news was not widely spread.^{[citation required]}

They cut off the electric power to Edificio Libertad and annulled the emergency. The generators did not turn on, so the president and the ministers had to go down the stairs, in the dark, illuminated by the little light that projected a cigarette lit by the president.

It was then that Lacalle consulted General Fernández to find out if the army could evict the strikers from the property. The response was positive. “The action is carried out in an hour, but there could be 30 deaths…”. It was then that Lacalle gave up on this possibility.

This decision by the military determined that in the negotiation with the police – carried out by the Undersecretary of the Interior, Carlos Moreira – the Executive Power had to cede beyond what was foreseen, which immediately encouraged the multiplication of conflict the country lived and the predominance of the radicals (the hard ones) of the PIT-CNT. The teaching union proposed not to start classes in 1993 if their wage claims were not met; On November 23 and 24, transportation was paralyzed for 48 hours and public health employees did not work for 60 hours with the slogan: “the police have weapons, we have syringes…”.

Construction strike

In 1993 the longest strike in the history of construction in Uruguay took place, 83 days. The strike was motivated by the government's attempt to lower wages, imposing a wage guideline below the inflation rate. The strike was a test for the government, for the employers, for the SUNCA (United National Construction and Annexes Union), for the militants and for each worker. The union occupied all the workplaces in the country. He created strike committees at the works, and both in the departments of the interior and in Montevideo, he developed a very strong policy of alliances with other sectors of society, which achieved significant support for the strikers. It established a communication policy with society in general that allowed a direct relationship with it. The pickets of strikers established this communication, getting on public transport and explaining out loud what their problems were and handing out flyers that described and explained the situation.

The agreement ending the strike breaks with the salary guideline and establishes the creation of the Social Fund, with contributions from employers and workers.

Corollary

During the Lacalle government, in some cases the creation and implementation of instances with the participation of political and social actors was imposed.^{[citation required]} The most relevant cases were: The integration of the board of the Banco de Previsión Social with representatives of businessmen, workers (based on shortlists proposed by the PIT-CNT), retirees (the veteran leader of retirees Luis Colotuzzo); the creation of the National Employment Board (JUNAE) with the interaction of worker and business delegates, and the creation of the Mercosur Sectoral Commission (Comisec), where the public sector – through various ministries, the OPP and companies public – analyzed with businessmen, trade unionists and cooperative organizations the impacts of Mercosur for Uruguay and the country's strategies for better participation in the regional integration process. It is somewhat contradictory that precisely the government that promoted neoliberal measures and that had the harshest confrontations with social sectors, has also been the one that generated these instances of dialogue on substantial issues such as employment, security, regional integration, etc.^{[citation required]}. One possible explanation is that the nationalist government was less vertical in terms of ministries and their leaders. In light of these experiences, a new culture of linkage between business union organizations, companies and the government began to take shape, which marked a transformative turning point.

Public Health

In July 1991, the then Minister of Public Health of Lacalle, Carlos Delpiazzo, suspended the distribution of condoms in health centers, citing moral and religious reasons, generating rejection in sectors related to health in the country, and a good part of the political system. This decision was motivated by Delpiazzo's apparent belonging to Opus Dei.

Retirements

In a referendum held in conjunction with the 1989 election, the public approved a constitutional reform establishing that pension increases should be set at the average level of wages. This was problematic for Lacalle's intention to vigorously cut public spending; In addition to the much-discussed & # 34; Fiscal Adjustment & # 34;, he was forced to collect taxes all the time to comply with the popular mandate to increase pensions.

As a result, by 1994 the average retirement had increased by 40% in real terms, the standard of living for retirees was improving, but the need for social security reform was also accentuated.

International Policy

Lacalle traveled almost all of America, where he especially forged friendship ties with presidents Patricio Aylwin and Carlos Menem. He also traveled to China, Canada, Mexico, the United Kingdom and the European Community, with a large business delegation, seeking to expand trade. He also maintained very close ties with American authorities and institutions, where his speech, expressed in perfect English, was intended to attract a select audience. With President George Bush (Sr.), he cultivated a close friendship. At the last Presidential Summit that he attended (in Miami), after the elections, his speech focused on the need for the US to open its economy to Latin America, if it really wanted to collaborate with its development and take care of its stability.

Mercosur and regional integration

Negotiations on market integration between Argentina and Brazil had advanced a lot during the governments of Alfonsín in Argentina and José Sarney in Brazil, but they picked up speed with the arrival of Menem in Argentina and Fernando Collor de Melo to the presidential chair in Brazil. The date for the signing of the integration agreement was set for July 6, 1990. Until then Uruguay, which had developed two trade deepening agreements with Argentina and Brazil (known as PEC and CAUCE respectively) did not participate in the talks between the neighbors, in relation to greater integration. Thus, when Foreign Minister Héctor Gros Espiell found out about the aforementioned date, he informed Lacalle of the imminence of the Argentine-Brazilian agreement.

There was a circumstance that encouraged the Uruguayan government to quickly manage, before Brazil and Argentina, its inclusion in the integration project; there was a radical change in position of the Chamber of Industry (directed at that time by Pedro Nicolás Baridón and Helios Maderni) which, reluctantly, became a supporter of integration, which prompted the government to move in that direction. With this environment, Lacalle quickly decides not to miss the train and thus entrusts it to his Chancellor. After several meetings between him and the Minister of Economy with his counterparts from Argentina and Brazil, Uruguay is accepted as a full member of the future Mercosur.

Lacalle, considering that this step is a matter of state, summons the leaders of all political sectors represented in Parliament to the Libertad Building. He receives the unanimous and explicit support of all. The Uruguayan Foreign Ministry commanded by Minister Gros Espiell himself and the Director of Economic Affairs Miguel Berthet began, together with Braga and his advisors, the economists Gustavo Licandro and Isaac Alfie, to agree on the integration mechanisms that are already foreseen in the future Treaty of Asunción.

The issue of Mercosur was normally on the agenda of the government throughout the entire period. Not only were foreign ministers figures (in the Sergio Abreu stage, as the final deadlines approached, meetings and negotiations multiplied) or the Ministers of Economy and Finance. Other ministers also participated in this type of rounds, especially Eng. Álvaro Ramos, head of Livestock, Agriculture and Fisheries and together with all of them a group of select advisers (Berthet, Sienra, Cardoso, García Peluffo, Galdós Ugarte, etc.), those that had to absorb the advantage, in times, that had the numerous Argentine and Brazilian teams and had to multiply efforts to harmonize the interests and Uruguayan structures to the new reality that integration imposed. From the signing of the Treaty to the meeting in Ouro Preto, there were dozens of setbacks, frictions and imbalances that the Uruguayan negotiators had to endure, to make possible an equitable participation of the country in the common market that was announced.

Parallel to Mercosur, a clear geopolitical conception prompted the government to consolidate the Transportation agreement with Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia and Paraguay, called Hidrovía, a term coined by the president. For Lacalle it was the practical expression of the so-called "meridian policy" that Uruguay should promote to complement the links with the Mediterranean countries and facilitate their status as regional users of our port facilities. Mercosur and Hidrovía gave a lot of talk throughout the period.

The Waterway, which already came with the impetus given to it by former Colorado minister Jorge Sanguinetti, had a moment of initial brilliance when the procedures began to convene the call for the dredging of the Martín García canal and continued, with a presidential visit included, to what was called Puerto Quijarro, the work of the businessman Joaquín Aguirre Lavayén, in Bolivia and to what would be the fluvial corridor through which the rich regions of Mato Grosso do Sul and Rondonia would get their production. Physical (permeable) and bureaucratic problems hinder the development of the project; Jorge Sanguinetti's departure from the Cuenca del Plata Transportation Commission deprives it of the momentum of its experience and a warning from Caru by its member and expert González Lapeyre, that Argentina did not comply with its part to enable upstream navigation of the Salto Grande Dam and that the regulations in force in Uruguay privileged road transport over fluvial transport, turned on yellow lights when calibrating the real validity of the Hidrovia, in business times.

In relation to Mercosur, the public warnings, when the Treaty was approved, which had been made by the former ministerial director of the previous cabinet, Ambassador Gustavo Magariños, materialized. The refusal of Argentina and Brazil to give, from the beginning, differential treatment, as a partner, to Uruguay, due to its smaller economic size, the failure to agree on some common macroeconomic policies, the difficult fight with Brazil to reduce the common external tariff, the non-tariff barriers that were imposed on our exports and the massive importation of subsidized wheat that Brasuil carried out from the United States, all this already in the first months, indicated the difficulties of birth and start-up of the recently created Market.

The Mercosur in question meant an understanding with neighboring countries, with a view to creating a common market in commercial matters. This had its pros and cons; Many businessmen, still accustomed to the old days of import substitution and small markets, bet on Mercosur not working. The industries of Argentina and Brazil had much more capacity than any Uruguayan factory, which endangered the viability of the national industry.

But others saw an opportunity in Mercosur, thinking of complementation agreements, and also, of specializing the country in the provision of services. In fact, Uruguay had already been operating as an interesting regional financial center, aided by banking secrecy and the tradition of intervening in troubled banks; then, many projected a future image of a "small but efficient" country, dedicated to banking and tourism.

The truth is that Mercosur was a framework that served to consolidate the incipient democracies in South America, which emerged from dark militaristic periods.

Diplomatic relations with Spain

Part One of the Treaty on Cooperation and Friendship

Part II of the Treaty on Cooperation and Friendship

The Summit of Presidents in Madrid, in July 1992, marked a milestone in the performance of the Uruguayan president in those events. The 500 years of the discovery of America were commemorated. He would also take the opportunity to present himself, before his partners in the European community, as the natural spokesperson for the interests of his former colonies. One hundred years before, a Uruguayan, Don Juan Zorrilla de San Martín had been, in those ephemeris, the voice that represented Latin America.

Diplomatic relations with the United States: the Brady Plan

See External debt.

A headache: the Berríos case

Since the end of 1991, the Chilean Eugenio Berríos, a former DINA agent involved in the Orlando Letelier case, had been secretly in Uruguay. In 1993 it became clear that there was a joint operation by Chilean and Uruguayan military intelligence. This caused a police, political and diplomatic incident. Lacalle was in London and had to return urgently to deal with this scandal, which led to the summoning of Defense Ministers Mariano Brito (who would fall shortly after as a result of this incident), Foreign Affairs Ministers, Sergio Abreu and of the Interior, Juan Andrés Ramírez (who had to dismiss the police chief of Canelones).

End of management

Events of the Filter Hospital

When the electoral campaign was rising in tone, the most serious confrontation between the police and street protesters that has occurred in Uruguay since the 1970s broke out. Three alleged ETA guerrillas had been arrested, who the government wanted extradite, the left sided with them and called for a demonstration in front of the hospital. The action of the police, who followed orders from the Minister of the Interior Ángel María Gianola, was frontal. There were two deaths and several injuries. This episode, in addition to being serious, was extremely divisive at the political level and public opinion in general. Lacalle is, until today, the only president since the return to democracy under whose mandate there were deaths as a result of police repression. There are those who deplore this event as "repressive", others as "subversive"; and those who, like the ex-guerrilla Jorge Zabalza, claim it.

An aborted constitutional reform

Much was said and discussed about a possible constitutional reform that would allow modifying the presidential election mechanism; but the comings and goings of positions of the sectors did not make it possible. The opportunity to reform the atomized and dispersed Uruguayan political system was lost so that those who thought alike could vote together.

Finally, the political leaders agreed on a "mini-reform": enable cross-voting (that is, being able to vote for a candidate for the Presidency of a party and a candidate for the Intendancy from another party); however, this mini-reform was submitted to a plebiscite, which was widely unfavorable.

The "dolphin" presidential

In Uruguay there is no immediate presidential re-election, so Lacalle could not be a candidate again in the 1994 presidential elections. Therefore, it was necessary to choose a candidate for Herrerismo, the government sector. The process was laborious, not without controversy, and divisive. Since the beginning of the government period, possible candidates began to sound: Héctor Martín Sturla, Juan Carlos Raffo, Juan Andrés Ramírez, even Gonzalo Aguirre were mentioned. Sturla's untimely death put this process on hold. Carlos Cat and Ignacio de Posadas were also mentioned later.

Meanwhile, the veteran senator Walter Santoro had been systematically supporting Alberto Volonté, at the time president of UTE. And this candidacy was gathering more and more support. His adherents, meanwhile, awaited with suspicion the moment of the designation of the & # 34; dolphin & # 34; presidential, what they called the "dedazo" of the street.

Another controversy arose as a result of the presidential aspirations of Vice President Gonzalo Aguirre. His Renovación y Victoria movement had garnered a promising vote in 1989 that surpassed the votes of the once powerful Por la Patria movement, which had given Aguirre reason to think that he could head a great nationalist electoral column; This made him proclaim himself a candidate. But soon, the polls showed him how slim his chances of getting elected.

Finally, Ramírez was the Herrerismo candidate, accompanied by Juan Chiruchi on the formula, and supported by Aguirre with his own list for the Senate. Consequently, Volonté split, forming Manos a la Obra. He was accompanied by former minister Álvaro Ramos, who had previously separated from the government due to serious disagreements with Lacalle. While Juan Carlos Raffo, who had never lost his hopes of being a candidate, was relegated to a third level; he ran for deputy, supporting Volonté.

In any case, these two presidential candidacies, Ramírez and Volonté, energized a party that was weak in voting intentions; in fact, the difference in the voting result compared to the winning party, the colorados, was barely 20,000 votes.

Ministerial Cabinet

Acting after the presidency

Like several predecessors in the presidential chair, Lacalle continued to participate in politics at a high level; from 1995 onwards, every time he has been interviewed, without exception, his statements have provoked political events.

The "Baguala Onslaught"

During 1995, which some have called the "annus terribilis of the National Party," there were innumerable denunciations of corruption against hierarchs of his government, and even against him.

Denunciations of alleged irregularities in the privatization of Banco Pan de Azúcar, which began to emerge in 1995, gave rise to a judicial investigation and this, in turn, to the prosecution of two former senior officials of the Lacalle government, the former presidential adviser Daniel Cambón and the former minister and former president of the BCU Enrique Braga. Within said judicial investigation, the former secretary of Luis Alberto Lacalle, Martha De Fuentes, was considered a key figure in the investigation for corruption, De Fuentes declared that they were stolen important information about your residence, crucial for the investigation; extreme that could never be verified, consisting only of the sayings of that person.

In the face of all this wave of denunciations, Lacalle turned to a figure drawn from his grandfather's old political career, Luis Alberto de Herrera: he alleged that they were undertaking a "baguala onslaught" against him.

The "Focoex Case"

The “Focoex Case” became known in 1996 due to a complaint made by two legislators from the Broad Front, Leonardo Nicolini and Carlos Pita, denouncing a case of corruption during the Lacalle government that would involve senior officials of the government of that moment. The complaints were based on evidence of three faxes, which implied that men from the National Party were bribed in the business, said business linked the purchase of medical equipment from Spain for an amount close to US$ 100 million. The money came from a loan from the Development Aid Fund of the Government of Spain granted by the Spanish Government and managed by Focoex (Fomento de Comercio Exterior S.A.) through Eductrade. Said documents presented by deputy Nicolini, were according to the court ruling, false. The expert calligrapher Oscar Víctor Rachetti carried out an expertise in this regard. After that, Nicolini was submitted to the Ethics Tribunal of the Broad Front, and the white and red factions of Parliament initiated a political trial against him that ended with the suspension of his bench for six months as of March 20, 1997.

Meeting of “the nine” and interview with Daniel Figares

The meeting of "the nine" was a meeting that took place in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in the Recoleta neighborhood at the end of 1999, the still president Carlos Menem met for dinner with his already elected replacement Fernando de la Rúa, with the also elected Uruguayan president Jorge Batlle, with former US President George Bush (Senior) and former Uruguayan President Luis Alberto Lacalle, the meeting place was the residence of one of the Röhm brothers: the lunch agenda included the fight against money laundering and the host was José Röhm, fugitive from Argentine Justice, located in New York and justly wanted for financial rinsing. This level of contacts is explained by the brothers' friendship with people like Henry Kissinger, some Rockefellers, José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz and David Mulford. When Lacalle was asked about the purpose of the meeting in an interview conducted on April 4, 2005 by journalist Daniel Figares, the former president confessed: I am going to answer the truth, although it may not be complete, and listed minor items from the meeting, such as a talk about the hypothetical legalization of marijuana. Former President Menem, who was at the meeting, told him in another interview in the newspaper "El Clarín", that money laundering was discussed at the meeting.

Lacalle Herrera at the end of said note, would affirm "that one of the most unpleasant moments of (his) life had passed". The program would find an unexpected end after that edition. Figares, some time later, in an opinion column and as a result of another note in which the former president is reminded of the event, affirms that "as soon as he left the channel he told Vicky Scheck, one of the producers of the program (Ciudad Oculta), 'If your father lived this program would not go on the air', words that were repeated to me before all the technicians and employees of the channel present on the floor", in reference to the recently deceased Carlos Eugenio Scheck. "The program came out surreptitiously after almost a month and without promotion, no product of a fight that I played with intermediary people -channel employees- to the board, put between a rock and a hard place due to the pressure of the Cuqui and mine who had recorded it in MP3 and threatened to make it known by telling the truth of what happened. I admitted this censorship only for the sake of the general public interest to which we owe ourselves and submit to all journalists", concludes Figares.

Books authored by him

Awards

Shield attributed as a knight of the Order of Elizabeth the Catholic.

Doctor Honoris Causa

• 1992 - Complutense University of Madrid - Spain
• 1992 - Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Israel
• 1993 - Universidad Autónoma de Guadalajara - Mexico
• 1996 - National University of Asunción- Paraguay

International awards

• 1990 - Gran Collar de la Orden Nacional al Mérito de Ecuador
• 1991 - Gran Collar de la Orden al Mérito de Chile
• 1991 - Necklace of the Order of Liberator Gral. San Martín de Argentina
• 1991 - Gran Collar del Condor de los Andes de Bolivia
• 1991 - Gran Cruz de la Orden de la Cruz del Sur de Brasil

• 1992 - Necklace of the Order of Elizabeth the Catholic
• 1994 - Gold Medal of the Galician Board
• 2015 - Alberdi Award for the Valiente Defense of Freedom of the Federalism and Freedom Foundation.
• 1993 - Knight of the Grand Cross of the Order of San Miguel and San Jorge

National distinctions

• Medal to the Military Merit in the Official General Degree (Uruguay Uruguay, 2011)..