Juan Jose Castelli

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Juan José Antonio Castelli (Buenos Aires, July 19, 1764 - ibid, October 12, 1812) was a lawyer and official of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata. He actively participated in politics in the face of the crisis of the monarchy and in the junta movement that took place in Buenos Aires in May 1810. Due to his speech at the Open Town Hall on the 22nd, he is known as "the Speaker of May". The Governing Council appointed him as a member of the government boards that took office on May 24 and 25. He was appointed representative of the Junta in the Auxiliary Army and before the towns of the interior, with broad political, administrative and military powers. He was dismissed after the defeat in Huaqui and when he returned to Buenos Aires a residency trial was initiated that was interrupted when he died due to tongue cancer.

Family and education

Juan José Castelli was born in Buenos Aires on July 19, 1764, at that time an integral part of the Viceroyalty of Peru. He was the first of seven children born to the Venetian doctor Ángel Castelli Salomón and María Josefa Villarino, through his maternal grandmother he was related to Manuel Belgrano, to whom he was his second cousin.

On February 17, 1779, Castelli entered the prestigious Royal College of San Carlos, an institution that had begun its teaching activity six years earlier. He did it in the Logic course. Once approved, the following year, he entered the Physics course but at the end of the school year his name did not appear among the graduates [Registration Book Colegio San Carlos 1773-1818, BNBA, manusc. 2157, t. I] According to a family tradition, a wealthy relative had provided in his will a legacy or mandate for a son of the Castelli couple who wanted to be ordained as a priest. To take advantage of this opportunity, the parents decided that Juan José would study in Córdoba, at the famous Convictorio de Nuestra Señora de Monserrat Royal College, which depended on the Royal University of Córdoba del Tucumán and where students from different parts of the viceroyalty converged. As the name indicates, it was a school where students could live while they studied. To enter, Castelli met the requirements of being an old Christian, being clean of all blood of heretics and being the son of a legitimate marriage. His companions were: Pedro and Mariano Medrano, Manuel Alberti, Juan Ignacio and José Ignacio Gorriti, Nicolás Laguna, José Gaspar Francia. He also shared the school with Saturnino Rodríguez Peña and Antonio de Esquerrenea who will be his lifelong friends.

During the years 1781 and 1782 Castelli studied grammar and Latin. In February of this last year, the Monserrat school moved to the building where it will function from then until today. Castelli was one of the students who inaugurated this new headquarters. Once this cycle was completed, he went to university studying philosophy and theology for three years. After spending five years in Córdoba, in October 1785, he returned to Buenos Aires, with the decision not to follow the priestly career for which he felt no vocation.

For unknown reasons, Castelli did not follow in the footsteps of his cousin Manuel Belgrano who was sent to continue his studies at the University of Salamanca in Spain. In October 1786, Belgrano disembarked in La Coruña and the following month he tried to register in Salamanca. Two months earlier, in August 1786, Castelli arrived in Chuquisaca and, after passing the difficult entrance exam, he was sworn in as recipient before the minister director of the Royal Carolina Academy of Jurist Practitioners of Charcas and other authorities. One of the four promises he made was: & # 34; [...] defend the XV sanction of the Constantian Council in which regicide and tyrannicide are outlawed & # 34; which forced future doctors, not only to defend and preserve justice, but also fidelity to the King. For two years he studied and did an internship at the Royal Carolina Academy, a compulsory attendance university institution where, through the method of "case studies", the students carried out daily practices in which they performed various procedural functions. This institution had been founded in 1776 after the expulsion of the Jesuits and constituted "a space where the University and the political administration met and stressed" which constituted it in a space free from the ecclesiastical sphere. Castelli received an education that structured his legal-conceptual universe into three levels: the first was the scholastic, based on Spanish theological and political texts: Vitoria, Francisco Suárez, etc.; the second was a mixture of technical-legal knowledge with practice on real cases. The theoretical basis of this level did not abandon the traditional Justinian Code, the Compilation of Laws of the Indies, Juan de Solórzano Pereira, etc., what was new was the way and the objectives of how these contents were addressed. The third level was the Enlightenment. The Spanish illuminists, Feijoo, Campomanes or the Neapolitan Gaetano Filangieri were consulted by students and examiners. Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws was frequently cited in the pleadings, and his conception of a constitutional monarchy that could limit the despotism of ministers had many adherents. The Enlightenment was "undoubtedly in fashion [...] in its elitist version, as a sign, a code of recognition among cultivated people, among men of good company". All this knowledge allowed Castelli to perform with effectiveness in administrative and political positions.

In Córdoba, he shared the school with Domingo Belgrano, Manuel's brother. In Chuquisaca he was with another of the brothers who also studied there: José Gregorio Belgrano. In the letters that both Domingo and José Gregorio sent to his family, there is news about cousin Castelli, about his progress in his studies and the greetings that he sent to the Belgrano family. The money and other resources required by Juan José to pay for his stay and education in Chuquisaca were provided by merchants from that city related to Domingo Belgrano Peri and who were paid in Buenos Aires by Castelli's stepfather, José Joaquín Terreros. Between March and April 1788, at the age of 24, he returned to Buenos Aires passing through Potosí, a city where he was able to verify the enormous wealth of the azogueros and the great misery of thousands of Indians who were exploited in the mines. Back in Buenos Aires, he established himself as a lawyer, opening a studio in the family home. He represented the University of Córdoba in different causes, and his uncle Domingo Belgrano Peri. His relationship with Saturnino Rodríguez Peña extended to his brother, Nicolás Rodríguez Peña, and his partner, Hipólito Vieytes. Rodríguez Peña's house would later be the venue for frequent meetings of the revolutionary Creoles.

In 1794 he married María Rosa Lynch and they had Ángela, Pedro (the future colonel), Luciano, Alejandro, Francisco José and Juana as children. Through his brother-in-law, Justo Pastor Lynch, of considerable fortune, he was able to relate to high-ranking colonial officials and clergy.

His professional development allowed him to buy, in August and take possession on December 7, 1798, the 335-hectare farm that belonged to Bishop Azamor y Ramírez on the outskirts of the viceregal capital, in the current Núñez neighborhood on the who moved his home only at the beginning of 1808. His neighbors in the area were Cornelio Saavedra, Juan Larrea, Miguel de Azcuénaga and José Darregueira. In said farm he had crops and a brick factory.

Acting as a colonial official

Manuel Belgrano shared with his cousin Castelli the work in consulate and journalism.

Fifteen years before the creation of the consulate, the merchants of Buenos Aires managed to establish a Board that was formalized as a representative body or corporation on May 18, 1779. They constituted a heterogeneous group that differed:

a) by place of permanent residence (Spain, "golondrinas" and Buenos Aires) and,

b) for the most important activity they were engaged in.

To these characteristics, and as a variable dependent on them, was added the geographical hinterland where each group carried out its activity and which, obviously, directly affected their business decisions. This last factor also divided the merchants among themselves and all of them from the group of hacendados. On September 12, 1791, at the request of the landowners, Viceroy Arredondo published an edict that increased controls on the leather market to prevent hoarding practices, the sale of unbranded or stolen leather. He also imposed stiffer penalties on offenders. The merchants protested the possibility of losing a shipment that had a single hide out of order or that representatives of the landowners could inspect their deposits and, in general, the interference of the government and third parties, in an area that was exclusive to the corporation. which in turn claimed to represent the interests not only of the merchants but of the entire community and of the Crown itself. The conflict between the parties continued despite the fact that the viceroy attenuated some of the measures and a Royal Order that determined the intervention of the Royal Court in the matter.

In parallel, and independent of Viceroy Arredondo's side, the Crown sanctioned the Royal Decree of November 24, 1791 that authorized the importation of slaves and that when the ships returned they could be loaded with fruits from the country. This generated another claim from the mercantile corporation, where they argued that the hides could not be considered as fruits of the country. The reality was that this new activity affected the dominant position of the "shipping merchants or wholesalers" in the leather market because now they had to compete with the slave traders whose interests coincided and were better complemented with those of the leather producers.

The pressure exerted by the merchant shippers to create a Consulate to defend their interests and represent them directly before the Crown coincided with the central government's policy of controlling America through what has been called "corporate centralization" 3. 4;. This policy consisted of the institutionalization of individuals who had similar interests, who were given recognition and visibility in order to be able to negotiate with the Crown for the collection of taxes, the granting of loans and the collection of donations, at a time of permanent financial needs originating in the international war conflicts and the expansion ["take off"] of capitalism headed by England. In this way, the Crown established, in 1793, consulates in Caracas and Guatemala, in 1794 in Buenos Aires and Havana, and in 1795 in Veracruz, Chile, Guadalajara, and Cartagena de Indias.

In 1794 Manuel Belgrano returned from his studies in Europe, with the position of perpetual secretary of the Consulate of Commerce of Buenos Aires.

On October 15, 1795, citing health reasons, Belgrano asked the monarch to appoint Castelli as interim secretary of the consulate. On March 6 of the following year, a royal order communicated the acceptance of that request and appointed Castelli as Belgrano's exclusive substitute. This royal order arrived in Buenos Aires at the end of July 1796, almost simultaneously with the return of Belgrano from the Banda Oriental to where he had retired by medical prescription. This did not appease the crisis that had been taking place within the Consulate. In November 1796, two new royal warrants arrived. The first referred to the reduction in the salaries of the consulate officials except that of the secretary, which was maintained. The second order authorized Belgrano to take a year's leave with pay, to travel to Spain, determining the monarch that the position would remain in the hands of Dr. Castelli. The disparity of criteria and the internal fight within the Consulate tried to breach or modify this order. The counselor Antonio García López proposed to accept the provision but argued that Castelli should not receive "a prize or any allowance" for the task to be performed. Others proposed that Belgrano update the medical certificates on his state of health because, due to his “external appearance”, he did not appear to be sick and the medical reports he presented did not have the corresponding certification. Juan Esteban de Anchorena went even further. He argued that Castelli exercised his profession as a lawyer, with an open study, and was a relative of the secretary, guardian of his inheritance, general attorney of his father's executors and defender of the same in the trials that had been and/or were being substantiated, some of them at the Consulate itself. Anchorena proposed Juan Roxo, a clerk who had ordered the file, to fill in for that interim but the vote favored Castelli thus confirming that he would act as interim every time Belgrano was absent from his duties.

Two years later, a conflict took place between the Cabildo and the Consulate during the election of the members of the Cabildo de Buenos Aires for the year 1799. For some time, the Cabildo de Buenos Aires suffered from a lack of "subjects skillful and suitable" for council positions because the possible candidates, to avoid what they called "burden", took advantage of privileges and exemptions of all kinds to evade them. This was increased with the creation of the Consulate that demanded positions of prior, consuls, trustee, lieutenants and other employees. In addition, there were cases of residents who, using "false information, [...] had obtained from the Sovereign or the Royal Court [...] to be declared free to perform council offices", but who later agreed to perform consular jobs.

It was in this context that the mayor with the first vote, Antonio García López, proposed Castelli as the third alderman. Antonio de la Cajigas, owner of barracks in the port, and Tomás Antonio Romero, an important slave trader, were also proposed. All were interim officials of the Consulate. Quickly, this institution objected through a representation before Viceroy Avilés arguing that the three mentioned should remain "expedite" or free to immediately replace the respective holders. The viceroy referred the representation to the council.

The lawsuit lasted three months, until the viceroy finally accepted the opinion of the trustee of the Cabildo Cornelio Saavedra who said that the exoneration did not correspond when the consular position was not being carried out effectively, and rejected the claim of the Consulate. By royal order, in May 1800, the monarch confirmed what the viceroy had done. Long before, Castelli had excused himself from assuming said position, since the functions of the Consulate occupied all of his time. This was considered an insult by some members of the Cabildo, including Martín de Álzaga.

This was the general context at the time Belgrano and Castelli held their posts at the Consulate. The innovative ideas that both supported from the economic point of view found resistance and support in the different groups that made up that corporation. An important case occurred on March 4, 1797 when, at the request of the Count of Liniers, the Royal Order was granted that allowed fruit to be traded with foreign colonies. These should not be those that were exported to the metropolis or those that were imported from it, nor should they be similar to those that were produced in Spain. In addition, as an incentive, the Crown released them from paying customs duties. When two ships arrived from the island of Mauritius, some members of the consulate met in a meeting and requested the intervention of the Viceroy because they argued that they had brought products not authorized by the Royal Order of 1797. In a second meeting, which was to deal with the same matter, the adviser Francisco Antonio de Escalada, an important merchant with great practical knowledge of commerce in Buenos Aires, with the doctrinal support of Belgrano and Castelli, read a letter in defense of free trade and against the elite of merchants linked to the monopoly system. This presentation has been considered an antecedent of the Representación de los Hacendados written by Moreno in 1809. In his plea, Escalada rejected the interpretations out of context made by the defenders of the monopoly, which although they were "many do not constitute the majority" 34;, denounced those who had particular interests with the commerce of Lima, Havana and Cádiz and the general damage they did to the viceroyalty, both to the inhabitants and to the government and as a consequence to the Crown in terms of resources and prosperity. In the words of Climbing:

We are not taken from Cadiz, from Lima, or Havana, nor do we have representation to claim their fantastic rights. [They weigh] on us, before us and against ourselves. So whoever does it under this spicy veil passes [of side], and from now on I denounce it; that another particular and own interest is the one that encourages it and not the common [of this corporation] nor the other [of the people and the Crown]. (Bestene, 1985, p. 51)

On March 31, 1797, the King, following his policy of "administrative centralization," incorporated the landowners into the Consulate. This put an end to what some historians call the "exclusively mercantile stage" of the Consulate (1794-1797) and gave rise to the last stage called "transformation and decline" (1794-1809).

Another intervention by Castelli in economic matters occurred on October 4, 1809 when Viceroy Cisneros, taking advantage of the discussions generated by the request of two English merchants to disembark their merchandise, called a meeting at the fort " intelligently selected" to gain approval for free trade in general. The objective was to solve the serious deficit suffered by the Treasury, especially due to the junta movements in Upper Peru that cut off silver remittances to Buenos Aires and the cost of that "army" of militiamen, inherited from the English occupation of Buenos Aires. Cisneros went to Castelli, a lawyer for the Royal Court and who acted as his private adviser, to finish convincing "those who were already convinced." Castelli stated "with convincing reasons how useful it is It was up to the country to give free trade, not only to the English, but to all the nations that were not at war with us [...] in attention to the fact that [all of the junta] had complied with the opinion of said Castelli, the viceroy declared free trade [...]".

Acting in journalism

Exemplar of the Telégrafo Mercantil, where a sonnet is observed in honor of the newly appointed virrey Joaquín del Pino.

The ideas of the Enlightenment, especially practical and utilitarian knowledge to improve the quality of life, penetrated Spain late due to isolation, traditionalist ideas and the peninsular Inquisition. But it was the need to get Spain out of its growing backwardness in the development of the other European powers that made the royal ministers and advisers transform these ideas into "State policy". The economic, social changes "enlightened" they had to come from the top down: "Everything for the people but without the people". In this context, the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata was created in 1776; the Audiencia in 1785 and the Consulate of Buenos Aires, in 1794. The demographic, economic and bureaucratic growth of Buenos Aires gave rise to a heterodox elite both within the Church and in the secular sectors where lawyers and other lawyers abounded. Several Spanish Americans traveled to Spain to study: Manuel José de Lavardén (1770-1778), Dean Gregorio Funes (1775-1779) and Manuel Belgrano (1786-1793). In 1783, the Royal College of San Carlos was inaugurated at the initiative of Viceroy Vértiz and the leadership of the reformist canon Juan Baltazar Maciel, owner of a large and eclectic library that members of the elite could consult. All these changes not only aimed at increasing the fiscal resources of the Crown, they also improved the living conditions of the inhabitants: health through the institution of the Protomedicato in 1780, the lighting of the streets and the reuse of the printing press of the Jesuits abandoned in Córdoba which, at the beginning of 1780, was transferred by order of Viceroy Vértiz to Buenos Aires and given as property to the Casa de los Niños Expósitos for the printing of government documents or catons and primers used by the Catholic Enlightenment.

In this context, in September 1800 Francisco Antonio Cabello y Mesa arrived in Buenos Aires from Lima, en route to Spain. Under the pseudonym Jayme Bausate Mesa, he had published, in Lima, the Diario de Lima, curious, erudite, economic and commercial that appeared on October 1, 1790 but the competition of the Peruvian Mercury , which appeared two months later with the significant support of the Sociedad de Amantes del País in Lima, led to its decline and closure three years later. Due to difficulties in continuing his trip to Spain and health problems, on October 26, 1800, he asked Viceroy Avilés for a license to publish a newspaper in Buenos Aires. The entire procedure had a quick resolution by the viceroy, the Audiencia and the Consulate in charge of Castelli temporarily. At the same time, Cabello y Mesa proposed the foundation of a Patriotic-Literary and Economic Society or Royal Universal Society, inspired by those existing in Madrid, Oviedo, Vera and other Spanish cities. On March 30, 1801, the Consulate commissioned Belgrano to collaborate in the formation of said entity. Cabello y Mesa thought that:

Those who enter this Society must be Spaniards born in these realms or in those of Spain, old and clean Christians of all bad race because no foreigner, black, mulatto, Chinese, zambo, quarteron or mestizo must be admitted in it [...] because it is to be sought that this Sociedad Argentina(sic) is composed of men of honest births and good deeds [...] (Telegrafo Mercantil.

These "deeply learned members" they would be the source of knowledge that would pour into the newspaper. Cabello y Mesa turned to Miguel de Azcuénaga to help him draw up the list of candidates. In the board of directors of the future Society, in which Cabello y Mesa was awarded the position of director and founder, there were relevant officials of the colonial administration: Belgrano as secretary, Julián de Leyva and Castelli as censors, among others. In any case, the Society was never able to be constituted and, a year later, on April 12, 1802, the Crown, although it authorized the subscription of 19 copies made by the Consulate, ordered that they not provide any help. On April 1, 1801, the first issue of El Telégrafo Mercantil, Rural, Político, Económico e Historiógrafo del Río de la Plata was published. The newspaper's miscellaneous articles were largely based on publications from different sources selected according to local interests. The collaborators transcribed their readings without mentioning the sources or their names or hiding them behind acronyms, pseudonyms or anagrams. Thus Dean Funes appeared as Patricio Saliano, Eugenio del Portillo as Enio Tullio Grope, Domingo Azcuenaga as D.D.D.A., José Joaquín Araujo as the Patricio from Buenos Aires and the director of the newspaper as Narciso Fellobio Cantón. There is no reliable evidence that Castelli collaborated as editor of the newspaper.

The newspaper had a life of a year and a half, a period in which 110 copies, two supplements and thirteen "extraordinary" issues were published. The publication of certain articles of little interest or conflicting and of sicalptic poems influenced its evident decline. But the anonymous article that overwhelmed the government was, apparently, the one on October 8, 1802 entitled Politics. Circumstances in which the Province of Buenos Aires and the Malvinas Islands find themselves and a way to make amends that was considered an exaggerated social criticism of current events without warning readers that it was a text written four years earlier by Juan de la Piedra. Other historians attributed the closure to the lack of good taste in the poem signed by The medical poet of the piles or to the inconvenience caused, in a certain sector, by the publication, on May 2, 1802, of a letter from Spain questioning the value of a Spanish naval officer. Viceroy Loreto annulled the licenses, according to the Consulate, due to the "abuse of them and little expertise in the choice of materials for the performance of the services that he had offered to the public." The last number of the Telégrafo Mercantil, "Extraordinario", was published on October 17, 1802.

When the Mercantile Telegraph was dying, Vieytes founded the Agriculture, Industry and Commerce Weekly. Castelli, like the other members of the group that met at Rodríguez Peña's house, collaborated with the project. In said newspaper, ideas were proposed for the technical improvement of agriculture, the removal of trade restrictions, the development of manufacturing, among others. Biographies of the authors of the American Revolution, such as Benjamin Franklin, were also featured.

The English Invasions

Carlotism

The Infanta Carlota Joaquina de Borbón aspired to be Regent of the Crown in America.

Main article: Carlotism

At the end of 1807 an event took place that revolutionized Spanish politics: after invading Portugal, Napoleon Bonaparte also occupied Spain. On March 19, 1808, King Carlos IV of Spain abdicated in favor of his son Ferdinand VII, but Napoleon forced both to abdicate in his favor and later named his brother José Bonaparte as king, in a series of transfers of the crown. known as the Bayonne Abdications. The illegal abdications determined, to a large extent, the bankruptcy of the monarchy and the American emancipations.

There had never been such a case in the history of European monarchies. The doctrines that supported European regalism were always based on an indeclinable principle: a king could not voluntarily renounce his kingdom. In Bayonne, not only the pactum translationis was violated, but also the oath that the king took to preserve his kingdom at the time of being crowned. Spanish jurists and politicians had to resort to the figure of the "captive king" as the least harmful solution to weather this crisis. The Spanish people organized government juntas to resist the French occupation and within a few months the Central Junta of Seville claimed supreme authority over Spain and Latin America.

This solution allowed the acceptance of fidelity to Fernando VII and the recognition of the Central Board to be generalized, which produced various variants of how to implement the "depósito" of sovereignty in the biennium 1808-1809. The constitution of boards was one of the possible alternatives, both in the peninsula and in America. They relied on the principle of the retroversion of sovereignty to the peoples, a doctrine known before but with the novelty that the pactum translationis had never been theorized that it could be applied backwards, that is, transfer sovereignty from the king to the people even temporarily. Another possible alternative was to establish a regency. The Infanta Carlota Joaquina de Borbón, eldest daughter of Carlos IV and wife of the Prince Regent of Portugal Joao VI, claimed that possibility to "save from shipwreck and the tyranny of France the portion of my future patrimony in this part of the Atlantic" 3. 4; since neither Ferdinand nor the male line could occupy the vacant throne. On August 19, 1808, she published a Manifesto in which, first of all, she did not explicitly recognize Ferdinand as king; secondly, she also did not recognize the juntas constituted in Spain since they violated the laws of the kingdom and, thirdly, she presented herself as the only one possessing legitimacy and legal legality.

This claim was not accepted by the authorities of the American dominions. The arguments, not very convincing, were that they had already sworn allegiance to Fernando and, later, to the Central Board. They preferred the autonomy and freedom of management that the board granted them. In addition, in the event of the collapse of the peninsula before the Napoleonic invasion, the viceroys would be the only alternative to maintain the unity of the American domains. All this would be altered if Carlota took over as regent. The general suspicion was that this regency could lead America towards a Portuguese or English protectorate. In addition, the idea of installing it in Buenos Aires would increase jurisdictional disputes within the viceroyalty, as demonstrated in the first American juntas formed in the Río de la Plata viceroyalty in 1808 and 1809 where Carlota's proposal had a direct impact.

Of the few adhesions that Carlota had in America, despite the campaign of manifestos and personal letters to important people carried out from August 1808, the group of "illustrated" Spanish Americans from Buenos Aires: Belgrano, Castelli, the brothers Nicolás and Saturnino Rodríguez Peña, Vieytes, Beruti and others. In the Memoria of September 20, 1808 that they sent to Carlota, signed by most of them, supposedly written by Castelli although the content was agreed upon by all, they exposed the advantages of the project. In the first place They rejected the position of the American authorities and the Seville Supreme Council of not wanting to recognize Carlota as a legitimate representative of the House of Bourbon. The representation of those, they affirmed, could not be compared because it was "merely fact" but in no case "of recognized right". Secondly, they rejected the alleged pact of submission to that board given that America was part of the Crown of Castile and no legislation "requires that some kingdoms submit to others". Thirdly, they accepted that although the peninsular Juntism could be justified by resistance to the French army and the lack of the sovereign, this did not occur in America where the vacatio could be covered with Carlota. Finally, the Memoria proposed new reformist ties between Carlota and the American subjects to eliminate the corruption of the "bossy" that they ruled with arbitrariness, venality, embezzlement and impunity. This proposal competed with the Central Board on three issues related to sovereignty: 1) Where it should be located "in deposit"; 2) Who and how she had to represent her and 3) What were the limits to the abuse of power. The adherence of this group to Carlota's plans was initially supported by the English admiral Sidney Smith, but he was displaced by Lord Strangford, ambassador to the Court of Rio, for whom this project implied the union of two crowns that England could not accept in the strategic framework of the inter-imperial struggles of the moment.

In Rio de Janeiro, on November 6, 1808, moments before embarking for Buenos Aires, Saturnino Rodríguez Peña gave the doctor Diego Paroissien a "circular" in which he proposed that the regency of the Infanta Carlota Joaquina in the Río de la Plata was the only & # 34; party & # 34; to eliminate the corrupt and greedy bureaucracy that dominated the viceroyalty, achieve "happy independence" and face the unfavorable events that were occurring in the peninsula due to the advance of Napoleonic troops. He also delivered letters to his brother Nicolás Rodríguez Peña, Castelli, Martín de Alzaga and others. In some "Instructions reserved for Mister Paroissien" it clarified that the plan did not contain intentions of "causing revolutions or similar things" and that they would have the "declared protection of England". What Rodríguez Peña was unaware of was that Julián de Miguel was among the travelers with a confidential order signed by Carlota in which he denounced Paroissien as the bearer of "revolutionary and subversive" that they attempted against Fernando VII suggesting that he should be captured upon his arrival in Buenos Aires in order to discover the rest of the conspirators. Carlota's reasons for taking this measure are not clear: According to Biedma, Smith had received new instructions from his government and in order not to be exposed, he convinced Carlota to denounce her accomplices. Wasserman attributed it to an attempt by Carlota to to give a friendly signal to the authorities of Buenos Aires, to the suspicion of a double game by Rodríguez Peña but, fundamentally, to the refusal of the English government to any plan that would affect its relationship with the Spanish authorities.

However, the frigate docked in Montevideo on November 19 and Paroissien was detained with all his documentation. Governor Elío initiated a summary in which he was accused, along with Saturnino Rodríguez Peña, of "high treason". When Liniers was informed, he appointed the oidor Manuel de Velasco commissioned judge to lead the case. Velasco, with the file started by Elío, and without waiting for Paroissien to be sent to Buenos Aires, began the interrogation of those who appeared mentioned in the documents or were the recipients of the letters. Castelli was questioned on December 20 and 23, 1808 about personal or other relationships with the Rodríguez Peña brothers, Bork (sic) [Burke] and Paroissien but received no formal charges as a result. On the other hand, Nicolás Rodríguez Peña, Saturnino's brother, was interrogated three times and since his statements did not convince the judge, he was imprisoned, the soap shop on his property was seized, which was placed in the custody of his partner Vieytes. The dispute between Montevideo and Buenos Aires favored Paroissien, whom Elío retained in his custody, which prevented the process from advancing in Buenos Aires. With the arrival of Cisneros as the new viceroy, the situation of the defendant changed, and he was transferred to Buenos Aires at the beginning of October 1809. Only the following month, Antonio Caspe y Rodríguez, crime prosecutor of the Royal Court, raised the accusations of & #34;high treason or lèse majesté" against the brothers Rodríguez Peña and Paroissien.

On January 1, 1809, Álzaga brought together the Vizcaínos, Gallegos and Catalanes battalions and attempted a revolt to dismiss Liniers.

Paroissien Defense

On March 14, 1810, Paroissien presented a detailed "Memorial" of 18 pages, written on the front and back, signed by the defendant, his defense attorney, Dr. Castelli, and the attorney Andrés José de Acosta. Dr. Castelli's defense was based on demonstrating that there was no crime in the documentation that Rodríguez Peña had written and that Paroissien had brought to Buenos Aires, with which he tried to free the three defendants from guilt. First, he analyzed the accusation of & # 34; high treason & # 34; which was based on the word "independence" associated with changes in the constitution and in the integrity of the territories that ultimately implied crimes against the king. It showed that the semantic content of "independence", used by the prosecution, corresponded to the ideas that Rodríguez Peña had had in another era, before leaving for Rio de Janeiro, but now, in 1808, with all the political changes that had occurred since then meant something quite different. Under the hypothesis that Spain would fall under French rule, "independence" of America now implied that under the "regency" of Carlota Joaquina these territories would remain precisely within the domain of King Ferdinand and the Hispanic order, thus saving them, not only from falling under the French dynasty but from any other European domination. Secondly, he analyzed that the proposal to name Carlota Joaquina as regent, for which she had the corresponding rights, was not equivalent to naming her queen, so there was no question of uniting the American dominions to Portugal. Thirdly, Castelli analyzed the situation of headlessness that existed in the absence of the king. Since the king had not determined to whom he delegated power, the existing authorities no longer acted with the sovereign power behind them but on behalf of & # 34; thus making its legitimacy doubtful. And in this situation, not only were the authorities in America but all the Spanish boards. The representation they had assumed was "in fact" but not "de jure". At this point, the defense transcended the merely legal and entered the political field in favor of the figure of the "regency". If the king had not made any delegation, it was logical to presume that his sovereign decision was to maintain the validity of the law of succession. It was deduced then that the project to appoint Carlota Joaquina as regent was the best option compared to the vacatio regis which in this extraordinary case was accompanied by a vacatio legis for lack of legal background. Castelli argued that Rodríguez Peña's proposal isolated America from what was happening in Spain, prevented changes in governments, be they democratic, aristocratic, or juntas, which although the latter sought to legitimize themselves on the principle of the retroversion of sovereignty to the towns, an old Spanish legal tradition, had negative consequences by producing a multiplication of governments with autonomous intentions that affected the concentration of power and territory. Saturnino Rodríguez Peña had described these options as "impossible", "criminal", "bloody" and nothing "durable". Castelli also pointed out that the plan provided for a call to Cortes in which the rules "compatible with the dignity of one and the freedom of the others" would be established. At no time was the note of September 20, 1808 sent to Carlota mentioned, many of whose arguments were repeated in this Memorial.

Paroissien remained in prison until finally, without sentencing and by means of a decree signed by Saavedra and Moreno, he was released on July 14, 1810.

The May Revolution

Main article: May Revolution

Castelli and Martín Rodríguez encourage Cisneros to cease in the command of the Virreinate. Bajorrelieve by Gustavo Eberlein based on the Memories Martin Rodriguez. The original story card game is modified to a better seen chess game.

When news reached Buenos Aires on May 14, 1810 that Napoleonic troops had occupied Seville in January and that the Central Supreme Junta had been dissolved, Castelli, Belgrano and Saavedra were the most notorious leaders in those days. After several discussions, it was decided to demand the holding of an open town hall. Castelli and Belgrano negotiated with the first-vote mayor Juan Lezica and the attorney general, Julián de Leyva. Although they managed to convince them, they still needed the authorization of Cisneros himself. Before granting it, Cisneros summoned the military to see if they supported his government. At that meeting, Cornelio Saavedra denied Cisneros the support of the Patricios Regiment, under the premise that when the Seville Junta that had appointed him as viceroy disappeared, he no longer had the legitimacy to hold that position. The other officers did the same. After said interview they went to Rodríguez Peña's house to inform his supporters of what had happened.

The memories of the witnesses and protagonists of those days mentioned Castelli in a multitude of places and activities: negotiating with the men of the Cabildo, at the home of the Rodríguez Peña participating in the planning of the steps to follow, in the barracks haranguing to the militia. Cisneros himself, when describing the events to the Council of Regency, called Castelli "the main person interested in the novelty [...] who was to examine whether I should cease in the higher government and resume the council".

Open cabin (22 May 1810). Oil by Pedro Subercaseaux under the direction of Adolfo Carranza. It shows the moment that Paso is heading to a respectful audience. The presence of the church is important: Bishop Lué (with red carpet) and three orders. Behind Paso this Castelli. On the right, sitting in thinking attitude, Moreno appears as isolated from the rest.

The open town hall was held on May 22, 1810. In it, they discussed whether or not the viceroy should continue in his position and, if not, who should replace him. The first to comment was Bishop Benito Lué y Riega, who supported the principle of indivisibility that Cisneros had already proposed in his authorization to hold the open meeting. According to a witness, who wrote on May 25, his words were: "even if only one member of the Central Board had remained and arrived on our beaches, we should receive him as sovereignty [Fernando VII]." However, in his vote, he recognized the already probable non-existence of the Central Board, for which reason he proposed the continuity of the viceroy “with no further novelty than being associated [in his functions] […] with the “gentleman regent and [the] Lord Judge of the Royal Court Don Manuel Velazco". Castelli took the floor to respond to the bishop and based his argument on the doctrine of the retroversion of the sovereignty of the peoples that he had already used in the defense of Paroissien. He insisted on the idea that, in the absence of a legitimate authority, sovereignty returned to the people and they had to govern themselves. Later the idea of removing the viceroy was imposed, but since Buenos Aires did not have the authority to unilaterally decide the new form of government, a provisional government would be elected, while deputies were requested from the other cities to make the final decision. However, there were differences about who should exercise this provisional government: some argued that the council should do it, and others that a government junta should be elected. In his vote, Castelli agreed to Saavedra's proposal adding a motion, which at the time of issuing his vote, already had 38 adherents and would have more at the end of the scrutiny: "with the quality of having a decisive vote during the government, in His Excellency Cabildo, Mr. Trustee”. In the end he added that "the election of the Members of the Corporation [Board] be made by the people together, in the General Council, without delay." This last proposal, which excluded the Cabildo in the election of the members of the Board, did not have any support.

After the counting of the votes was completed on the 23rd, the result was that "plurality with excess" the viceroy had to cease in office and, provisionally, assume the council in his capacity as governor council. Also by majority, and to give the Cabildo more enforceability, the trustee attorney general had been granted the ability to have a "decisive vote" that is, to be able to break the tie if necessary in the votes of the ten members of the Cabildo. It was also established by majority that this institution "to the extent it deems appropriate", would appoint the members of the provisional Board that would govern until the deputies of the interior provinces met and determined the final form of government.

In the official letter addressed to Cisneros announcing the termination of his duties, etc. The Cabildo proposed that, in order to "reconcile respect for authority with public tranquility", he had deliberated, as the only means, the appointment of him in said provisional Board accompanied by fellow members. Cisneros responded that he accepted the proposal or agreed to not have any participation but that he considered, recalling what happened the day he met with the military, that they should be consulted because the proposal of the Cabildo did not "seem to be in accordance with the wishes of the people". The military were summoned and took notice of all of the above and said that the "people" he would calm down by publishing the cessation of the viceroy. The council then issued the proclamation of the 23rd.

In this way, on the 24th, the council determined who would be the members or members that would accompany Cisneros in his capacity as president member. The election followed the idea of corporate distribution enunciated in the vote of Dr. Bernardo de la Colina: a representative of the military state (Saavedra), another of the judicial (Castelli), another of the clergy (Juan Nepomuceno Solá) and another of commerce (José Santos of Inchaurregui). The Cabildo summoned for the second time the military (among whom was Saavedra) who gave their approval. The chosen ones were cited at three in the afternoon. At the "appointed hour" they swore before God and Fernando VII. The Cabildo ordered that the event be communicated in six handwritten proclamations that were placed at nightfall in the usual places.

The bulk of the criollos rejected the project: they did not accept that Cisneros would remain in power even under another title; They distrusted Saavedra's intentions and believed that Castelli, alone on the board, could achieve little or nothing.

Castelli and Saavedra were sworn in to the junta but resigned that same day, and the junta organized by Leyva did not manage to govern.

Mariano Moreno shared several views with Castelli.

That same night the Creole leaders ―among whom were Domingo French, Feliciano Antonio Chiclana and Eustoquio Díaz Vélez― met in the house of Rodríguez Peña, while French, Beruti, Donado and Aparicio occupied the square with armed people and its accesses. Lezica finally informed Cisneros that he had stopped commanding. In his place, a new Board was assumed, chaired by Cornelio Saavedra and made up of representatives of the different extractions of local politics.

Castelli led, together with Mariano Moreno, the most radical positions of the Junta. The two had become close friends and visited each other daily. Julio César Chaves described them as follows:

Passionate to the extreme, loyal to the sacrifice with the friend or the correspondent, and implacable in his opposition to the enemy; firm, holy decision, at the service of an imponderable and noble cause; moral value, conscience of responsibility; energy, tenacity and indeclinable resolution in service: Juan José Castelli and Mariano Moreno.
(Chaves, 1957, p. 158)

Since both shared Rousseauian ideals and a determination to take the most extreme measures in favor of the revolution, they were dubbed "Jacobins."

Castelli participated as a member of the government in the plan for the expulsion of Cisneros and the oidores and prosecutors of the Royal Court, which was carried out in total secrecy on June 23, 1810. Later, the oidores accused him, along with Matheu, of being ideologically responsible for the direct action against prosecutor Caspe y Rodríguez who was beaten by a group of "embozados" on June 10, as part of the plan to intimidate the members of the Royal Court and create a climate of insecurity that would justify the social control measures of the population that the government implemented the following day. Castelli was in charge of transmitting to them personally that, in order to protect their lives, the government had decided that they should leave immediately in a ship prepared for the purpose to the Canary Islands. The ship was the English cutter Dart, owned by privateer and smuggler Marcos Bayfield for whom Larrea was his commission agent and guarantor. In the contract signed between the Board and Bayfield, where Castelli's signature appears, the import of goods for 100,000 pesos and the export of fruits of the country for the same value were set as payment for the mission without paying customs duties. When Bayfield returned to Buenos Aires in March 1811, it was Larrea who was in charge of collecting the agreement, choosing the merchandise that would be exempt and presenting the receipts, which he never did.

The firing squad of Liniers

Santiago de Liniers, shot after organizing a counter-revolution against the First Board.

Main article: Counterrevolution of Córdoba

Upon hearing the news of the change of government in Buenos Aires by a Junta, former viceroy Santiago de Liniers prepared a counterrevolution in the city of Córdoba. The head of the Auxiliary Army of Peru, Francisco Ortiz de Ocampo, captured all the leaders. The order of July 17, 1810 was to bring them to Buenos Aires, but on July 28 it was decided to sentence them to death. Said decision was made in a resolution signed by all the members of the Board, except Manuel Alberti, who, because he was a priest, could not agree to the death penalty. This measure was not accepted in Córdoba. Francisco Ortiz de Ocampo decided to continue with the original orders and sent, on August 10, a note asking for the prisoners' forgiveness. By note dated August 17, Moreno ordered Balcarce to leave for Tupiza with 500 men and 4 cannons where he was to remain until "the arrival of the main body of the army [...] taking over the concerns and fortification that art teaches";. Balcarce left for the north on the first of September. On the other hand, Ortiz de Ocampo was ordered to go to Salta and Vieytes to Tucumán to "gather all the able-bodied men" from the area.

On August 18, the Junta ratified the order, although excluding the Bishop of Córdoba Rodrigo de Orellana who, instead, was sentenced to exile. Castelli was commissioned by the Junta to fulfill the execution that the general had not obeyed. Mariano Moreno told him: «Go, Castelli, and I hope you will not incur the same weakness as our general; If the determination still has not been met, Larrea will go, and finally I will go myself if necessary.

Among his collaborators for the mission, Castelli chose Nicolás Rodríguez Peña as secretary, his former client Diego Paroissien as field doctor, and Domingo French as head of a small escort of the Estrella regiment.

At dawn on Sunday, August 26, 1810, Commander Domingo French arrived at Esquina de Lobatón, on the border between Córdoba and Santa Fe, where the column that was transporting the prisoners was camping and replaced Captain Garayo in command.. At ten o'clock the prisoners arrived at a place called Cabeza de Tigre where they found the lieutenant colonel of hussars Juan Ramón Balcarce who separated the prisoners from their luggage and ordered them to go into a neighboring forest called Monte de los Papagayos. There were Castelli and Rodrguez Peña at the head of a company of hussars already formed. Castelli read the sentence, which excluded Bishop Rodrigo de Orellana, who was exiled to the Guardia del Luján (present-day Mercedes, Buenos Aires province), and granted them three hours to confess and write to their relatives, a period that was extended by another hour. At half past two in the afternoon, Balcarce carried out the sentence. French was in charge of finishing off those who were still alive. Castelli ordered that they be buried in a ditch next to the church of Cruz Alta.

The execution of Cruz Alta unleashed a strong campaign against the Provisional Board and especially against Castelli. Thirty-three years later, in 1843, his friend and relative, Nicolás Rodríguez Peña, in a letter addressed to the historian Vicente Fidel López, retrospectively justified those events.

Castelli was neither ferocious nor cruel. Castelli worked like this because we were all committed to working. Any other, obliging the homeland what we had committed to giving it, would have worked like it.[...] Let us know that you have not gone through the same needs nor had to work on the same ground. That we were cruel. Get in charge! In the meantime, you have a homeland that is no longer in the commitment to be. We saved her as we thought she had to be saved. Was there any other means? That would be so; we did not see them or believe that with other means we were able to do what we did [...] Let us blame our faces and enjoy the results... we will be the executioners, be you free men.(Chaves, 1944, p. 170)

Realistic by calling the First Board unknown.

After carrying out the order, Castelli briefly returned to Buenos Aires and met with Moreno. He congratulated him for his conduct and on September 6, 1810, the Provisional Government Board appointed him, in replacement of Vieytes, representative member, "by virtue of which the expedition commission board will recognize said doctor Castelli as representative of the Junta, will blindly obey their orders [...] And the interior towns will receive Dr. Juan José Castelli as a legitimate organ of the will and sentiments of this Junta". For this vast double function he gave him instructions, among them putting the administrations in patriotic hands, winning the favor of the Indians, and harquebusing the governor of Chuquisaca -Vicente Nieto-, the governor of Potosí -Francisco de Paula Sanz-, general José Manuel de Goyeneche and the bishop of La Peace -Remigio La Santa y Ortega-. He was also commissioned to add to the Auxiliary Army "all the patrician soldiers that he finds on the way fugitives from Peru", sent in 1809 by Viceroy Cisneros, under the command of Vicente Nieto, to repress the junta movements in Chuquisaca and La Paz.

The campaign to Upper Peru

Main article: First Aiding Expedition to Alto Peru

On September 22, 1810, Castelli left Buenos Aires to lead the Auxiliary Army of Peru whose vanguard, led by Balcarce, was already in Jujuy. The first stage of his rapid journey was the city of Córdoba. In his letter to the government on September 30, Castelli reported that he had learned about some general aspects of the public administration by interviewing important people and the provisional governor Pueyrredón without going into details so as not to delay the haste of his trip. He asked the Provisional Government Board to reinstate the whipping penalty to apply it to deserters; He asked that officers not be sent because he thought to replace the bad ones with sons from the provinces who would learn from the good officers and it would serve as recognition of the effort they made; he also requested the approval of the modifications that he had made along the way to improve the functioning of the posts, that is, of communications. Finally, he requested that vaccines be sent to the cities of the race and the army.On October 4, Castelli left for Santiago del Estero. On the way, he was surpassing forces of the army that were heading towards that same destination. On October 9, at dawn, he entered Santiago. There he met Ortiz de Ocampo and Vieytes who were organizing the complex logistics required for the transit of the army in an area with few resources.

Juan José Castelli was well received in San Miguel de Tucumán. In Salta, despite being well accepted, he had difficulties obtaining troops, mules, food, money, or artillery.

In Salta, he received news that Cochabamba had joined the patriotic movement, although facing royalist forces from La Paz. He also had in his possession a letter from Nieto to Gutiérrez de la Concha, already shot, where he reported that a royalist army led by Goyeneche was advancing on Jujuy.

Two important political events occurred in Upper Peru. On September 14, 1810, Francisco del Rivero deposed the governor of Chuquisaca and joined the Buenos Aires junta. The same thing happened in Oruro on October 6. On the 22nd of the same month, both municipalities joined forces to close all the help that Goyeneche could send to Nieto from the north. On October 27, 1810, Balcarce was repulsed by the forces of José Córdoba y Rojas in the so-called Combate de Cotagaita that Castelli defined as a "false attack". The vanguard returned to Tupiza and to get closer to the army that was advancing from the south it moved towards Nazareno. Castelli sent two hundred men and two guns on forced marches. On November 7, 1810, reinforced with those forces that had arrived the day before, Balcarce managed to defeat Córdoba and Rojas in the battle of Suipacha, the first triumph of the Auxiliary Army of Peru. "Suipacha was nothing more than a partial combat between two small vanguard divisions". A week after Suipacha, on November 14, the combined forces of Chuquisaca and Oruro, under the command of Esteban Arze, defeated Fermín Piérola's column on the Aroma plain. The accumulation of all these facts pulverized the domain of Viceroy Abascal over Upper Peru.

In Potosí, one of the most prosperous places in Upper Peru, an open council demanded that José Manuel Goyeneche withdraw from the territory, to which he had to agree since he did not have enough forces to impose himself. The Bishop of La Paz, Remigio de La Santa y Ortega, fled with him.

In their march towards Potosí, after the battle of Suipacha, the auxiliary army was incorporating officers and soldiers from the Patricios regiment that Nieto had taken to Upper Peru in 1809 and that in June 1810, suspecting their loyalty, had disbanded in other regiments with the exception of some 50 or 60 individuals, chosen by lot, who had been sent to work in the Potosí mines. Within a few months only two thirds had managed to survive the unhealthy work in the tunnels. This punishment caused great discomfort in Buenos Aires, which is why the Provisional Government Junta introduced a special clause in the instructions given to Castelli so that all these soldiers were incorporated into the auxiliary army as they appeared. In turn, the Gaceta of September 6, 1810, spared no insults against Nieto:

This unpublished vejamen has been a desahogo proper to the uncivil, the indecent old Nieto. This disgusting man [...].(Fitte, 1961, p. 464)

Balcarce considered "interesting" He asked the survivors of the mines to make amends for the damage suffered and with those who were in better conditions he organized a well-armed party with the best horses to go out in pursuit of Nieto. As complementary help, he separately sent baqueanos from the area who, along unknown paths, had to locate the fugitives. Near Oruro, in the village of San Antonio de Lipes, Nieto was captured and taken to Potosí.

Castelli was received in Potosí, where he demanded an oath of obedience from the Junta and the surrender of Francisco de Paula Sanz and General José de Córdoba, who were shot.

He installed his government in Chuquisaca, from where he presided over regime change throughout Upper Peru. He projected the reorganization of the Potosí Mint, planned the reform of the University of Charcas and proclaimed the end of indigenous servitude in Upper Peru, annulling tutelage and granting them the status of neighbors and political rights equal to those of the Creoles. He also forbade the establishment of new convents or parishes, to avoid the frequent practice that, under the excuse of spreading Christian doctrine, the Indians were subjected to servitude by religious orders.

He authorized free trade and distributed expropriated land among the former workers of the obrajes. The decree was published in Spanish, Guaraní, Quechua and Aymara; and several bilingual schools were also opened. He celebrated May 25, 1811 in Tiahuanaco with the Indian caciques, where he paid homage to the ancient Incas, inciting the inhabitants to rebel against the Spanish. However, despite the reception received, Castelli was aware that most of the aristocracy supported him due to their fear of the auxiliary army, rather than out of genuine support for the cause of May.

The orders received from the Junta were to occupy all important positions with Creoles and to break the alliance between the Creole and Spanish elite. Among other things, he was ordered to

There is not a single European, military or countryman who has taken the weapons against the capital.

From Potosí, on November 28, 1810, Castelli sent the Junta two official letters proposing to cross the Desaguadero River, the border between the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata and the Viceroyalty of Peru. The objective was to incorporate the Peruvian governments of Puno, Cuzco and Arequipa, which not only "desire and fear us" but because to a great extent they depended economically on the provinces of Upper Peru with which they bordered. The plan had the support of some members of the Junta but Moreno opposed it. His argument was that the army should be confined to the towns of the territory itself, arguing that: "the attempted aggression against the territory of different jurisdiction was not just or well thought out". The junta rejected the plan and ordered the Castelli "follow your instructions".

Support for Castelli began to decrease in the royalist and Creole population, mainly due to the good treatment given to the Indians and the hostile attitude that Castelli's secretary, Bernardo Monteagudo, had towards the Church for its position against independence, an attitude that Castelli also made manifest in Upper Peru. Both the royalists in Lima and the saavedristas in Buenos Aires compared them both to Maximilien Robespierre. Dean Funes considered them "minions of the Robesperrian system of the French Revolution".

In mid-January 1811, the Provisional Board warned Castelli that "given the change in circumstances" it had to suspend the executions, substituting them with pecuniary or other penalties. On January 15, Saavedra, in a personal letter to Chiclana, justified the changes in the political course after Moreno's expulsion. He affirmed that the meeting of the provinces of the Viceroyalty (sic) modified "the circumstances"; so "the rigors" in force up to now. In a clear allusion to Moreno, he stated that "The Robespierrian system (sic) that they wanted to adopt in this, the imitation of the French Revolution that he tried to have as a model, thank God they have disappeared." Almost at the end of the letter, he asked Chiclana that if he saw Castelli, he would inform him of what was happening in Buenos Aires & # 34; and that he try to come when circumstances allow & # 34;.

Concerned by these developments, Castelli decided to send his secretary, Nicolás Rodríguez Peña, to Buenos Aires to see what was happening. In his letter to Chiclana dated January 17, he explained that all the measures that he had taken of him were done in compliance with the orders of the Board and he expressed his disappointment at having to part with his secretary. On January 21, he informed the government of Rodríguez Peña's departure that he was "pretending to obey"; to health problems. The vacant position was filled by the war auditor Norberto del Signo but, because he was overworked, Castelli had to resort to Bernardo de Monteagudo who thus began his public performance.

The Board, at the proposal of Dean Funes, appointed the Spaniard Matías Bernal as president of the subordinate Board of Potosí. Bernal, a second-line official, was, according to Funes, an "escutcheon and this further credits the government with his integrity." This provoked the protest of the attorney general of the Cabildo de Buenos Aires: it is a mistake to send to Potosí & # 34; fully the key to Peru [Alto Perú] a chief who brings suspicion and distrust at his birth & # 34;. The Potosí city council did the same. Domingo Matheu described Bernal as a "very justified man and of very good manners".

At the end of January 1811, the government instructed Castelli to order the return of the fifty-three expelled from Potosí who in December 1810 had been transferred to Oran, Salta. The government justified the measure by saying that the families of those expelled would end up blessing "the same hand [de Castelli] that signed their separation." In the first instance, the Board had approved the measure that complied with the instructions given to Castelli on November 18, 1810, but by changing the political course, Domingo Matheu was able to interpose his influence to save two of them, Salvador Tulla and Pedro Casas, with whom he had business relations. In a letter to Chichana, dated January 28, he maintained that they were exiled just for being on "a list"; that they handed over to Castelli. He insisted on February 27 asking Chiclana to remember Castelli & # 34; as a friend & # 34; to carry out the measure. In another letter to Chiclana, Matheu justified that "for four drunkards it was a matter of breaking down a work as great as the one we have to crown". On the other hand, the doctor Juan Madera, a member of Castelli's army, did not share the Junta's criteria:

It happened that they were forgiven and sent back to Potosí by order of the Buenos Aires government against the feeling of all good patriots and with notable damage to the public cause; for in the month of May 1811 they formed these horrific conspiracy, in which they were caught in the place they call the Beaterío de Copacabana, having made fire and resistance and these individuals did not punish themselves and the same happened in Charcas
Juan Madera. Declaration of Residence initiated at Saavedra (1813) in (De Gandía, 1960, p. 328)

In the proclamation of January 5, published in Chuquisaca, in the name of the "Provisional Government Board for Mr. Fernando Séptimo" and, on behalf of her, by & # 34; his representative in the auxiliary army & # 34;, Castelli's concern for the actions of the opposition in the shadows was noted. In the recitals he stated that the & # 34; moderation and temperance & # 34; of the government in its first steps had been insufficient to "induce spirits towards reconciliation" and that, on the contrary, he had produced "stubbornness and harshness" in some. He affirmed that the recourse to other means provided for by the policy was necessary for those who, "hardened in arbitrariness and despotism", did not fulfill the duties of the position and only wanted to keep them to continue enriching themselves, exploiting to town. At the beginning of February, Castelli developed an intense campaign against external and internal enemies. In an open letter dated February 5, in Spanish and Quechua, addressed to the indigenous people, he outlined the objectives of the Provisional Board to discredit Abascal. The following day he communicated to Buenos Aires the critical political situation in which Upper Peru found itself. Another proclamation, that of February 8, repeated the same concepts as in the recitals of the previous one, but its central objective was to stop the rumors that were circulating against the government, foreseeing penalties for those responsible as "convicts of the highest crime" and threatening to proceed "against them militarily."

On February 11, and so that the annulment of the internal security measures carried out by the new provisional Board the previous month would not be repeated, Castelli appointed Monteagudo as investigating judge to give greater legality to the measures he planned to take. His mission was to investigate the authors who, led by Nieto, produced the dismemberment of Upper Peru in favor of the Viceroyalty of Lima. Monteagudo knew Chuquisaca society from having lived with it and having been in prison for up to three weeks before Castelli's arrival in Potosí. In just four days he identified the people involved and those who played the role of ringleaders. Among these were Lorenzo Córdoba and José Calvimonte, appointed by the government as oidores of the Audiencia a month ago. The list of the thirty suspects and the evidence that accused them were sent to Buenos Aires on February 28 with a copy to the governor of Salta.

Two days before, Castelli had sent a letter to Buenos Aires in which he warned that the resolutions adopted by the government did not stifle the opposition, clandestine correspondence with Goyeneche, or rumors, and that it was dangerous not to have the rear guard secured while the auxiliary army was advancing towards the Desaguadero. At the end he added & # 34; But your excellence, with better knowledge at the distance that I have at the presence, has resolved it; he remains obeyed and I irresponsibility (sic) [irresponsibility] of all results & # 34;.

The political crisis infiltrated the Auxiliary Army. On March 7, in Oruro, a group of officers appeared at the Montes de Oca lodgings, six of whose names are known plus the chaplain Fray Manuel Antonio Ascurra. As a guest at the meeting, Toribio de Luzuriaga appeared. The officers tried to convince Montes de Oca and Luzuriaga of the need to arrest Castelli and Balcarce and send them to Buenos Aires. The reason: complaints about the expulsions of important people made by Castelli. According to Montes de Oca, the proposal took him by surprise and he did not know if it was a joke or was serious but he reacted immediately and together with Luzuriaga, they warned them to stop with that idea, that the towns had means of claiming, that they were not authorized to such facts and that the supporting documents that showed nothing contained. After a discussion they agreed that Montes de Oca and Luzuriaga would take the representation of the officers to Viamonte, early the next day. Montes de Oca did it that same night. Viamonte stated that they had done well to calm down and get them out of that "madness" and that he would be in charge of transmitting these facts to Castelli and Balcarce. Some time later, Montes de Oca learned from Castelli that "Colonel Viamonte never gave them to understand" what happened on March 7. The attempted mutiny was reported within the army. Monteagudo mentioned it in his statement of December 10, 1811 and attributed it to Viamonte, through his agent Ascurra, & # 34; who spoke like a madman & # 34; in that meeting. He added that, from then on, everyone looked at Viamonte with suspicion knowing "his machinations of him"; with Saavedra and that Castelli and Balcarce were aware but that they had decided not to be informed so as not to set a bad example for the soldiers or scandalize the population. The doctor Diego Paroissien learned from Juan Antonio Argerich and other officers that the main "agent and orator" It was Father Ascurra. Balcarce, in defense of him, said that he did not receive any part of the episode and that he found out some time later in a friendly conversation. He justified himself by saying that due to the time that has elapsed and there is no "no upset"; He did not make inquiries or try to find out what happened so that the authors did not get into some misgivings, which could have dire consequences.

Five days later, on March 12, Castelli left Oruro for Cochabamba. He had to find out the reasons why Rivero had not complied with the order to come with his troops to Oruro. He found a addicted but disorganized province, without chiefs. With a loan he bought equipment, weapons and paid the soldiers' salaries. He appointed civil and military authorities. It was then that he received the letter of the Provisional Board on February 10 with the request that & # 34;in merit of having been granted the rank of brigadier & # 34; to Rivero, he had to come to Buenos Aires with his regiment. The idea of transferring Rivero and his cavalry to Buenos Aires was due to the government's fear of Buenos Aires military units favorable to the morenistas.

He wrote to Vieytes, Rodríguez Peña, Juan Larrea and Miguel de Azcuénaga asking them to travel to Upper Peru and that —after Goyeneche's defeat— they would march on Buenos Aires, but the letter —sent by the postal service— was intercepted by the Córdoba postmaster, José de Paz, who sent it to Saavedra.

The Battle of Huaqui

Portrait of General José Manuel de Goyeneche, painted by Federico Madrazo.

Main article: Battle of Huaqui

Goyeneche agreed to sign an armistice for 40 days, until Lima gave up, and he used that time to reinforce himself. On June 17, with the response of the Lima council that it refused to any negotiation and after the meeting with the division chiefs, Castelli declared the armistice broken.

On June 20, at 7 in the morning, Castelli received the first news of Goyeneche's attack: Captain Alejandro Heredia, in charge of advanced security at the north entrance of the Yuraicoragua ravine, reported that they were listening shots that came from the south side of said ravine. Castelli immediately left Huaqui to where Heredia was and some five kilometers away he met Lieutenant Alejandro Saravia, Viamonte's aide-de-camp, who confirmed that the divisions of Viamonte and Díaz Vélez were indeed being attacked. Minutes later he received another report from Heredia informing him that, having lifted the mist that covered the area, the advance of enemy forces was observed through the Azafranal pampa towards Huaqui.

When Castelli, accompanied by Bernardo de Monteagudo, Norberto del Signo and Máximo Zamudio, arrived at the position covered by the dragoons of Heredia, the enemy forces were already deploying their artillery, battalions and guerrillas in combat. At eight in the morning, Antonio González Balcarce, still in Huaqui, learned from Lieutenant Saravia and other messengers that Goyeneche's advance guards were beginning the attack at both ends of the ravine in order to isolate his forces from those of Viamonte. and Diaz Velez. Castelli and his companions, from a height located on the left side of the battle front, had a privileged view of how the first soldiers of the regiment No. 8 from La Paz were arriving under the command of Colonel José Bolaños. They did so exhausted by the forced 7-kilometre march, in a disorderly manner and, in many cases, without their officers. The only advantage was that they were occupying a tactically advantageous position to start the fight. However, in a very short time these forces began to refuse to fight under different pretexts. When terrified soldiers and the captain of the 6th Viamonte regiment, Bernardino Paz, arrived from the south side of the ravine, shouting that the divisions of Díaz Vélez and Viamonte, the backbone of the army, had been destroyed, all it took was a small number of soldiers ran to the rear so that the entire line would do the same. Both Castelli and Balcarce ordered their aides to quickly return to Huaqui to try to stop the flight of officers and soldiers there. Left alone, without any soldier escort and fearing that in a matter of minutes they could be taken prisoner by the enemy guerrillas advancing through the hills, they decided to withdraw, not towards Huaqui, but towards the southeast, towards Jesús de Machaca. According to Balcarce's statement, they were not looking for Viamonte, whom they supposed defeated, but for Rivero's cavalry and perhaps some residual forces of Viamonte that could have been saved. Balcarce did not clarify the reasons why Rivero could be in Jesús de Machaca since at that time and as planned, he should be more than 12 kilometers from that town, on the other side of the Desaguadero River. After traveling all afternoon, completely alone, through valleys and hills, mostly leading the horses by the reins, Castelli and Balcarce arrived, at sunset, at a hill from where they could see in the distance the town of Jesús de Machaca and all the surrounding pampa. However, they did not see the wounded in the town and especially the deserters who had fled from the combat on the south side of the ravine, nor the numerous forces of Viamonte and Rivero that were still formed facing the enemy to the west. Since they did not find a path to go down to the Machaca pampa, they decided to return to the Huaqui area, crossing valleys and hills again in the middle of a particularly dark night. At one in the morning they went out to the existing road between Tiahuanaco and Collocollo where they providentially found Luciano Montes de Oca and part of the staff. There they learned from Bolaños that the divisions under his command had practically ceased to exist because it was impossible to gather soldiers who had lost all subordination and had returned to their home towns. They also did not know conclusively what had happened to Viamonte, so they decided to continue towards Laja, where they arrived at three in the morning.

Out of an army of 6,000 men that he had at dawn on June 20, Castelli did not have a single soldier to escort him at dusk. “From the six months of effort organizing an army and a government, nothing remained; only a staff made up of a handful of […] River Plate residents who came, without being called, from the provinces below".

The retreat

Castelli arrived in Oruro on June 23 and found a city completely convulsed by the excesses committed by the retreating troops. Seeing his life in danger, he decided to retire the next day to Chuquisaca. On the way he was overtaken by a message from Díaz Vélez saying that he had occupied Oruro and that he could return. Back in Oruro, he realized that it was impossible to gather troops in that city, so he decided to go to Chuquisaca. On June 28, from Macha, halfway between Oruro and Chuquisaca, Castelli sent a memorandum to the government in which he blamed the La Paz forces, especially their officers, for the defeat at Huaqui. Already in Chuquisaca Castelli considered that by reorganizing the army and with the support of Cochabamba, Chuquisaca and Potosí he could face Goyeneche who, until then, was still in Cepita, on the other side of the Desaguadero River. The measures that Castelli adopted were not to allow the few forces assembled to go to the aid of the Cochabambinos or to incorporate Upper Peruvians into their ranks. At the request of Rivero and the Cochabamba government junta, he agreed that Eustaquio Díaz Vélez and a group of artillery officers would support Cochabamba. He also sent money, weapons and asked other provinces for help.

On August 4, Castelli and Balcarce left Chuquisaca for Potosí. The next day, at midnight, they received an emissary from President Pueyrredón on the road who from Potosí warned them that a popular revolt had broken out caused by Viamonte's troops who had entered the Villa. As he got closer to Potosí he found the Viamonte troops who had left the Villa for safety and new news of what had happened. At the request of Viamonte, he decided to divert those troops to Porco, some 50 km southwest of Potosí, informing the government of Villa "that in no way would he enter, nor would he allow the general in chief to enter an insurgent, bloodthirsty, and inhumane town& #34;.

On August 17, from Toropalca, 160 km southeast of Potosí, he sent a letter to the junta in which he informed that the events in the town were due to a “right hand” and not the troops, and that he asked for explanations from the authorities but that he assumes that they will misrepresent what happened by blaming the soldiers. In that letter, he suggested to the junta that, in order to control these provinces, especially Potosí, a permanent garrison of 500 men and a superior government should be established in Chuquisaca with direct dependence on the government of Buenos Aires. "This evaluation was exactly the opposite of the one made by the government, which in the face of the debacle bet even more on what the local powers could do". Rivero was appointed in this line, on August 2, 1811, replacing Balcarce.

He optimistically believed that Cochabamba would stop Goyeneche without knowing that four days earlier, on August 13, Goyeneche had easily managed to triumph in Sipe Sipe due to the total disbandment of the Cochabamba troops that neither Rivero nor Díaz Vélez could prevent.

Castelli arrived at the Quirbe post on August 17 and at night he received an official letter from the Buenos Aires government informing him that he had ceased as a representative and that he had to return to the capital to take over his duties as member of the board. From Tupiza, on the 26th, he informed the board that he had received that notification. Upon his arrival in Tucumán, on September 17, 1811, Castelli learned of a new order from the Junta. It provided for his arrest and transfer to Catamarca where he was to remain until further notice. On September 26, he sent two letters to the Board. In one of them he explained that he lacked the resources to survive because he had allocated what little he had to public expenses, had his luggage and money stolen, and had nothing to sell. He warned the junta that whatever his orders were, they should come with provisions to provide him with money on account of his unpaid salaries, both for subsistence and transfers. Only on October 30, the Tucumán Junta, at the request of the government of Buenos Aires, Aires, gave him 500 pesos to continue his trip to the capital.

On the same date that he sent the official letter asking for money, he dispatched another official letter in which he haughtily maintained that, just as he had to obey the government's orders, it had to guarantee him the rights that the law grants to a common citizen. This opinion was based on his double character as a member of the Board and a specially commissioned official. He subtly argued that his honor was tied to that of the government because it had appointed him. After affirming: "I do not flee the trial: Your Excellency knows first, I claim it", he asked that the impediments be suspended to continue his march to Buenos Aires and thus be able to appear at the trial until the charges are satisfied.

Trial and death

After Huaqui, Juan José Castelli was left in a situation of political solitude. The so-called "Triumvirate" and the newspaper La Gazeta de Buenos Aires accused him of the defeat and sought to carry out an exemplary punishment, while the old independence party found itself divided between those who had joined the currents of the new government and those who no longer enjoyed effective power..

Once Castelli arrived in Buenos Aires, on December 4 and 5, 1811, the Triumvirate took two measures to initiate the trial with special attention to the "unfortunate dispersion" occurred in Huaqui and everything related to it. The first was to order Castelli to appear in custody at the Patricios regiment barracks, compliance with which his commander, Manuel Belgrano, reported on December 5. The second was to appoint the co-judge of the Court, Dr. Vicente Anastasio Echevarría, and the government adviser, José Miguel Carvallo, as co-judges in the judicial process. The notary public Francisco Antonio Sayas was appointed to keep the record of all the actions and pertinent communications between the parties.

It was not until January 15 that the judges asked the government for a list of military and civilians in a position to testify and a cavalryman as an assistant for the proceedings. Two days later, the government reprimanded the judges as it had learned to "great pain and surprise" that Dr. Castelli appeared publicly on the streets despite the arrest warrant issued. On January 21, due to the notification received, Castelli sent a "representation" in which he clarified that no one had notified him that he should be arrested and he recounted that being in such a situation in the Patricios regiment, on December 7 at dawn, he was ordered to leave it and that he voluntarily went to the Fort from where, knowingly of the government retired to his home. He complained about the inaction of the process and mentioned that on January 16, in an informal conversation with Carvallo, he had told him that his case "was still about to start."

Three days later, he challenged Echevarría for having "in his relations with people and about incidents of my cause reasons to make me fear partiality". Historians assume that one of the reasons was that Echevarría had acted years before as Liniers' adviser and lawyer, although he was a friend of Belgrano's and had accompanied him on his recent diplomatic mission to Paraguay. De Carvallo only objected that his task as a government adviser could make it difficult to "activate the course of the matter". This recusal gave rise to a new delay. The government appointed Dr. Antonio Álvarez Jonte, who excused himself twice for lack of knowledge and time in a "cause that [...] is a problem that necessarily involves the opinion of Buenos Aires". On February 6, the government appointed "without any excuse being heard" Dr. Tomás Antonio Valle. Between the recusal and the appointment of Valle, Castelli presented three representations insisting on different procedural problems of which the main ones were the delay, not knowing the causes and the reason for the successive arrest warrants.

The investigation began on February 14. The judges prepared 19 questions that the witnesses had to answer. With this list they determined the possible crimes, when in a residence trial, it was usual for the accusations to be presented by officials and individuals. The questions covered a myriad of topics and were thematically unordered. Regarding the battle of Huaqui, they were asked about disagreements between officers, the state and discipline of the army, war meetings held, treatment given to officers and soldiers from Cochabamba, who had broken the truce, and about an alleged escape of the defendant and Balcarce from the camp. battle with abandonment of weapons and equipment. Another group of questions dealt with compliance with the instructions given by the government in September 1810, which was incorporated into the file. Two questions dealt with the political issue: first, loyalty to King Ferdinand VII; second, if it was intended to attack the government with the project of forming a "congress of the provinces of Upper Peru" in Potosí. Questions were asked about Castelli's behavior as a civil servant: whether he had received gifts or bribes; if he had had sexual intercourse and communication with women, had strong drink or gambling, if he had known of anti-religious ideas or conduct among the officers and if he had taken measures to punish them.

On February 15, the interrogation began, which lasted almost daily until March 18. 17 witnesses filed past: 13 officers, 2 doctors and 2 clergymen. Of all of them only one witness had been with Castelli in the battle. On April 2, the important written declaration of José Bolaños, commander of the two divisions that massively deserted in Huaqui, arrived from Mendoza. It was demonstrated that both Bolaños and Balcarce and Castelli were literally left alone against the enemy. The interrogations were suspended until April 27. Due to this new delay, the Provisional Superior Government requested by decree that the judges take statements from Balcarce, Viamonte and Monteagudo who were in Buenos Aires. Castelli had to present an "instructive memory of his operations"; so that the judges and the government formed "concept". On May 11, when the notary Sayas wanted to notify Castelli of this decree, he could not find him in Buenos Aires because he had withdrawn to his farm in San Isidro. Between June 1 and 6, Monteagudo declared. The novel part of his declaration was recognizing that the illegitimate power of the kings of Spain had been attacked and the system of equality and independence propagated. Without blaming Castelli, he acknowledged that after the events of April 5 and 6, he had proposed to form a congress in Charcas or Potosí and that Castelli was willing to march on Buenos Aires to replenish the expatriates. "His answers from him must have left the judges frozen." Perhaps there was an agreement between Castelli and Monteagudo due to the progression of his disease, since after a few days his tongue was amputated. Monteagudo also led the Patriotic Society, founded at the beginning of 1812 that opposed the government for its moderate policy. Days later Montes de Oca and Balcarce testified. The latter repeated his presentation on June 3, 1812 in the Desaguadero case in which he had already stated that he could not be accused of the result of Huaqui, because it depended entirely on Castelli's decisions. That presentation had previously been delivered to Castelli for his "knowledge and censorship" and he responded by note approving its content. On June 12, 1812, the last witness testified: Viamonte. As of that date, the file did not record any other movement. The trial prescribed with the death of Castelli since the cause required a "matter subject to being judged."

Affected by tongue cancer, Castelli died on October 12, 1812, with the trial still open. Moments before his death, he asked for pencil and paper, and wrote

If you see the future, tell him not to come.

He had a small and modest burial in the church of San Ignacio, in the city of Buenos Aires, without official honors.

After his death, the widow María Rosa Lynch had to sell her farm to pay debts and spent years demanding unpaid wages from her late husband. Said sum amounted to 3,378 pesos, which was completed 13 years later. The case opened against her was never sentenced.

Tributes

Monument to Juan José Castelli in Plaza Constitución, Buenos Aires.

One of the characteristics that is usually highlighted about Juan José Castelli is his oratory skills and he is often known as "the Speaker of May" or "the Speaker of the Revolution."

In the novel The Revolution is an Eternal Dream, by Andrés Rivera, a Castelli who remembers the days when he was named an "orator of the revolution", lives his last days with cancer that lacerates the tongue Castelli's character writes in his red-covered notebook his memories of the revolution, his discussions with revolutionaries and traitors, always from the sadness of seeing the revolution and the country project that he had gestated together with Moreno, Belgrano and Monteagudo endangered.

The following is a fragment that shows a particular way of approaching the history of Castelli and the May Revolution:

Castelli knows, now, that he spoke for those who did not listen to him, and for the others, that he did not know, and that they died for having heard him. Castelli knows, now, that power is not undone with an orillero flat. And that the dreams that omit the blood are of inassible beauty.

Three Argentine towns, located in the provinces of Chaco, Buenos Aires and La Rioja, remember the May speaker.

Many towns honor it with the name of their streets and squares. It should be noted that Castelli Street in Buenos Aires does not seem to be in proportion to the historical importance of the honoree, since it is only four blocks long. However, the porteños also honor his memory with a monument erected in the Plaza Constitución.

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