Jose Miaja
José Miaja Menant (Oviedo, April 20, 1878 - Mexico City, January 14, 1958) was a Spanish soldier, known for his role during the Spanish Civil War and, particularly, in the defense of Madrid.
He took part in the Rif War, during which he received several promotions and commanded several units. During the civil war Miaja was a key person in the defense of Madrid, between November and December 1936, holding the leadership of the Defense Board. Later he led the Army of the Center and took part in well-known battles such as Jarama, Guadalajara or Brunete, and later the Army Group of the Central Region (GERC), which made him the republican military chief of the Center-South zone. During the war he concentrated more military power than any other republican general, however, his attitude and his military performance in certain cases have raised doubts in historiography.
Critical of the outcome that the conflict took for the Second Republic, in March 1939 he supported the so-called Casado coup and agreed to preside over the National Defense Council that tried to negotiate, without success, the end of hostilities. In the last days of the civil war he left Spain and went into exile, first in France and then in Mexico.
Biography
Military career
The son of a master gunsmith in the arms industry in Asturias, he entered the Infantry Academy of Toledo in 1896. After graduating, his first destination was Asturias, from where he requested a transfer to Melilla, in 1900, when he had 22 year old. He intervened in the Moroccan war, during which he stood out reorganizing the defensive line in Sidi Musa and in the bayonet assault of Talusit Bajo; He was awarded the job of infantry commander for war merits.Although considered a man with little fond of culture, he stood out as a scholar of the Arabic language. During the Second Republic he continued his career. Promoted to brigadier general in August 1932, he was given command of the 2nd Infantry Brigade of the I Division, headquartered in Badajoz. Later, at the end of 1933 —during the government headed by Diego Martínez Barrio— he was given command of the 1st Infantry Brigade of the I Organic Division, garrisoned in Madrid.
He was considered a soldier of liberal ideology, although at this time Miaja joined the right-wing Spanish Military Union (UME). In 1935, during the ministry of Gil Robles, Miaja was dismissed and sent to Lleida, one of the destinations far from the capital that used to be given to soldiers who did not enjoy the full confidence of the government. The alleged reason was a poor presentation in the parade of his regiments. In February 1936, when Manuel Azaña formed the Government, he appointed General Masquelet Minister of War, but when he was absent, he called Miaja to take charge of such an important function., although for a short time. Miaja once again commanded the 1st Madrid Brigade and, later, accidentally took over the leadership of the I Organic Division, replacing its previous head, Virgilio Cabanellas.
In these years he also stood out for his activity within the youth organization Explorers of Spain. In 1933 he was elected one of the five general commissioners of the institution, as liaison with the Government, Ministries of Education and War, with 75 votes of the assembly. Despite the reluctance that certain republican sectors had regarding this organization —its link with the Bourbon monarchy was criticized—, the President of the Republic, Niceto Alcalá Zamora, accepted in 1933 the honorary presidency of Exploradores from Spain; According to Francisco Armada, the influence of General Miaja had a lot to do with that decision.
The Civil War
In July 1936, at the beginning of the military rebellion that would lead to the Spanish Civil War, José Miaja was in command of the 1st Infantry Brigade, garrisoned in Madrid. Many of his subordinates were part of the uprising and he himself, at first, did not adopt a decisive attitude, perhaps pretending to maintain good relations with both the coup leaders and the Republican government. Perhaps influenced by the disorganization of the conspirators in Madrid, Miaja decided to remain loyal to the Government, and was appointed Minister of War in the fleeting cabinet of Diego Martínez Barrio, in the early morning of July 18 to 19, 1936. When José Giral formed the Government, Miaja declined to continue as minister and resigned. On July 25, 1936, he was appointed head of Southern Operations; He left Albacete on July 28 at the command of a force of 5,000 men with which he arrived at the gates of Córdoba, but he hesitated and his indecision made him lose precious time that allowed the intervention of the insurgents' aviation, for which reason suffered a great defeat on August 22. Miaja's performance in Córdoba generated many doubts and suspicions in the Republican zone. After the failure, he was transferred to Valencia as military governor, where he temporarily took command of the III Organic Division.
At the end of October he returned to Madrid as head of the First Organic Division. In November 1936, when the government evacuated the capital before the imminent arrival of Franco's troops, he was appointed president of the Madrid Defense Board and chief of the defense of the capital. At that time there were many who thought that Miaja would not be able to defend the capital from the Moroccan legionnaires and regulars. However, with Lieutenant Colonel Rojo as chief of staff, the Republicans managed to reorganize your defenses and your main units in the capital. The Republican militias and brigades managed to stop the enemy in Manzanares after fierce fighting. A break in the front in Ciudad Universitaria —the later called the Battle of Ciudad Universitaria— endangered the situation, so that for a moment it seemed that the resistance was going to break. Miaja visited the front, in the sector threatened by the Moroccan regulars, and after taking out his pistol, she harangued his men: «Cowards, go back to your trenches. Die with your general!". Miaja's harangue managed to reverse the situation in that sector. Finally, the capital managed to save itself, for which Miaja achieved great popularity among the people of Madrid. Much of this popularity was the product of communist propaganda, which Miaja took advantage of. Some authors point to the presence of Miaja in the capital as the main reason why the Francoist army did not enter Madrid. Others, however, consider that the true organizer of the resistance was Vicente Rojo. The success of Madrid would be worth later (in 1938) the award of the Laureate Plaque of Madrid.
After the military success in Madrid, Miaja went on to maintain very good relations with the communists, and some believe that he became a member of the PCE.
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In February 1937 he was appointed commander of the Army of the Center, replacing General Pozas, at the head of which he took part in the battles of Jarama, Guadalajara and Brunete, for which he became one of the most outstanding soldiers from the Republican zone. However, Miaja's military performance would once again have several controversial aspects: during the fighting in Brunete he showed slowness in making decisions, especially when the Francoist counterattack took place. A few months earlier, during the battle of Jarama, Miaja had already He had serious differences with General Pozas regarding the direction of operations.
In April 1937, the Francoist press denied information that appeared in the United Press according to whichː
"Many Spaniards, even from the national territory, accept a military government under the presidency of the traitor Miaja. He added the newspaper that steps had been taken to reach this settlement and thus end the war. The correspondent United Press, Casares, says the English article was read and commented ironically by Generalísimo Franco, who said it was a tremendous nonsense.
On April 21, 1937, the Francoist press reported a news item on Radio CNT according to which Miaja had been the victim of an attack, in which he was seriously injured in the left arm.
His actions again generated numerous internal criticisms in the spring of 1938 —during the great Francoist offensive on the Aragon Front—, when Miaja rejected the sending of troops from his army to this front. However, these facts did not They prevented him from continuing to be one of the most famous Republican soldiers. In April 1938 he was appointed commander of the newly created Army Group of the Central Region, with which he became for practical purposes the military chief of the central-south zone that the Republic still retained after its territory was cut in two.. Although he officially remained a faithful military man, as the Republic's military situation worsened, Miaja took an increasingly obstructive stance. In December 1938, he opposed the implementation of Plan P and, as he had done in the past, he opposed providing troops for a planned amphibious landing that was part of said plan. Miaja's chief of staff, General Manuel Matallana was one of those who showed the most opposition to the implementation of this plan. The failure of the Valsequillo offensive and the fall of Catalonia further darkened the republican military situation.
The End of the Contest
On February 16, 1939, several high-ranking Republican commanders, including Generals Escobar, Matallana, Menéndez, Moriones, Casado and Miaja himself, met with the head of government, President Negrín, at the airfield of the plains During the meeting, some soldiers openly expressed the need to put an end to the conflict. To the surprise of those present, Miaja was one of those who argued the need to continue resisting at all costs.
This attitude, however, contrasted with the political whims of Miaja, who was aware of several military conspiracies against the government and did not report them. Negrín did not have full confidence in Miaja either, since at that time he was already considering the dissolution of the GERC and that the Armies of the central zone would become directly dependent on him. This did not prevent Miaja from being promoted by the government to lieutenant general at the end of February., despite the fact that that rank had been abolished by the Republic in 1931. Like other conservative soldiers, Miaja actually considered that Franco's refusal to accept negotiations was due to communist participation in the government, so he did not hesitate in supporting the coup against the Negrín government, headed by Colonel Casado. On March 5, Miaja accepted the offer to preside over the so-called National Defense Council that forcibly ousted the Negrín government, although de facto he did not become president. Despite the ongoing talks, after a few weeks it became clear that Franco was not going to accept a capitulation and demanded unconditional surrender. On March 25, the Francoists broke off negotiations and announced that they would launch an offensive against the Republican lines.
Exile
Before the collapse of the republic, Miaja went into exile. On March 29, he left Spain taking off from the Rabasa aerodrome (Alicante) accompanied by his field assistants, Lieutenant Colonel José Pérez Martínez and Aviation Major Mario Páramo Roldán, and his nephew and private secretary, Fernando Rodríguez Miaja, heading for Orán.. Later he went to France and, finally, to Mexico. During a previous stay in Cuba, he received a telegram from President Lázaro Cárdenas to invite him to Mexico with his family. On his departure from Spain he was accompanied by his wife and children. His son José had spent the entire war in the custody of the Francoists, although on March 9, 1939 he was exchanged for Miguel Primo de Rivera, brother of the founder of the Falange.
The Franco regime applied the Law of Political Responsibilities to Miaja and he received a severe sentence that included the confiscation of his properties in Spanish Morocco. The repression also affected his wife, who was sanctioned with a fine of one million euros. pesetas. After receiving facilities from the Mexican government, Miaja left France by boat, via La Rochela, on April 21, 1939. Upon her arrival in Mexico, she received a warm welcome from the Mexican authorities, which included officials and officials of the Army. During his Mexican exile he gave some talks and was part of the organization Acción Republicana Española (ARE), of which he was a member of its Central Board along with other former soldiers and Republican politicians. In 1943, accompanying Martínez Barrio, he toured several Latin American countries to spread the work of the ARE.Miaja died in Mexico City on January 14, 1958, at the age of seventy-nine.
Legacy
Although José Miaja continues to be one of the main military figures of the Civil War, over time his reputation has experienced some ups and downs. Considered on a personal level as a person of a jovial and easy-going character, for some At some time he adopted vegetarianism, something unusual among the officers of the Spanish Army at the time. For Helen Graham he constitutes a soldier of the old school, conservative and with certain political and military limitations. Michael Alpert indicates that he was a "geographical loyalist" —that is to say, that he remained loyal to the Second Republic because he was in a republican zone when he was surprised by the outbreak of the war—, while pointing out that his actions during the war were greatly influenced by the fact that his family was in prison in the Franco zone. Hugh Thomas describes him as a loquacious, friendly, calm and indolent person, although he is also vain and incompetent.
Among his contemporaries there are diverse opinions. Although in his time he was not considered a monarchist, after the proclamation of the Second Republic there were soldiers who heard him speak nostalgically of the "old days" under the monarchy. The leader of the military conspiracy against the Republic, General Emilio Mola, did not have a bad opinion of him and came to affirm before the war: "Despite what I say about Miaja, I do not have a bad opinion of him and therefore I am reluctant to believe the bad qualities that are generally attributed to him." Once the war began, the later president of the government Juan Negrín, although he recognized Miaja's charisma and his leadership capacity during the siege of Madrid, criticized his military capacity and went so far as to say of him: "he does not know where the front is going, He can't fit in his head more than four soldiers." Vicente Rojo, who was his assistant during the defense of Madrid, would later describe him as a mediocre commander, although he also remarked on his courage and tenacity. In the opposite camp, the generator he publicly despised Gonzalo Queipo de Llano and on one occasion came to describe him as a "poor old coward".
General Manuel Matallana describes him as a puppet of Franco's Fifth Column in the final phase of the war, as he stated in an affidavit before the victors on April 2, 1939:
The sweetenings made us completely ours. To paralyze the activity of the foreheads we pushed him to the distractions and celebrations. He drank a lot, and this also favored us. (...) The envy he felt by General Red was skillfully exploited to separate and confront them, not in the circle of friendly relations, but in the circle of military and self-love issues. General Miaja misled his former subordinate to give him orders. Getting a refusal to comply with them was easy business. In almost all the operations that were carried out in the central area since May 1937, except the last ones in Extremadura, General Rojo always had to come because of the difficulties they put him.
Awards
- Grand Cross Knight of the Order of San Hermenegildo
- Placa Laureada de Madrid