Gunsmith Tragedy
The Armero tragedy was a natural disaster caused by the eruption of the Nevado del Ruiz volcano on Wednesday, November 13, 1985, which affected the departments of Caldas and Tolima, Colombia. After sixty-nine years of inactivity, the eruption took nearby towns by surprise, despite the fact that the Government had received warnings from multiple volcanological agencies since the first signs of volcanic activity appeared in September 1985.
Pyroclastic flows emitted from the volcano's crater melted about 10% of the mountain's glacier, sending four lahars—flows of mud, earth, and debris from volcanic activity—roaring down the slopes of Nevado 60 km /h. The lahars increased their speed in the nearby ravines and headed towards the beds of the six rivers that were born in the volcano. The town of Armero, located just under 50 km from the volcano, was destroyed by these lahars, killing more than 20,000 of its 29,000 inhabitants. The victims in other towns, particularly in the municipalities of Chinchiná and Villamaría, increased the death toll over &&&&&&&&&&023000.&&&&&023,000.
Rescue efforts were hampered by mud, which made it nearly impossible to move without becoming trapped. By the time rescuers reached Armero, twelve hours after the eruption, many of the seriously injured victims had already died. Around the world, video footage and photographs of Omayra Sánchez, a teenage victim of the tragedy, who was trapped for three days until she finally passed away, were published. Other photographs of the impact of the disaster caught the attention of public opinion and started a controversy about the degree of responsibility of the Colombian government in the catastrophe.
This was the second deadliest volcanic eruption of the 20th century, surpassed only by the eruption of Mount Pelée in 1902, and the fourth deadliest volcanic event since the 1500s. It was a foreseeable catastrophe, exacerbated by ignorance of the violent history of the volcano, as geologists and other experts had warned authorities and the media about the danger in the weeks and days leading up to the tragedy. Risk maps for the vicinity were prepared, but they were poorly disseminated. On the day of the eruption several evacuation attempts were made, but due to a storm communications were restricted. Many of the victims remained in their homes, as ordered, believing that the eruption had already ended. The noise from the storm may have prevented many from hearing the sound coming from the Ruiz.
Nevado del Ruiz has erupted several times since the disaster and continues to pose a threat to the more than 500,000 people who live along the Combeima, Chinchiná, Coello-Toche and Gualí river valleys. A lahar (or group of lahars) similar in size to the one in 1985 may be initiated by a relatively small eruption and could travel up to a hundred kilometers from the volcano. A large enough eruption can affect Bogotá, the country's capital, with ash fall. To combat this threat, the Colombian government created the Directorate for Disaster Prevention and Attention, a specialized entity in charge of raising awareness among the population about natural threats. The United States Geological Survey also created the Volcano Disaster Assistance Program and the Volcano Crisis Assistance Team, which evacuated nearly 75,000 people from the area near Mount Pinatubo prior to the 1991 eruption. Additionally, several Colombian cities have their own programs to raise awareness about natural disasters. In turn, the Colombian Geological Service (formerly INGEOMINAS) carries out the study of risks of geological origin in the country. Residents close to Nevado del Ruiz are wary of volcanic activity; when a new eruption occurred in 1989, more than 2,300 people living in the vicinity of the volcano were evacuated.
Background
Armero, located 48 km from Nevado del Ruiz and 169 km from Bogotá, was the third largest town in the department of Tolima, after Ibagué and El Espinal. An important agricultural center before the eruption, Armero produced about a fifth of Colombia's rice, in addition to cotton, sorghum and coffee. Much of this success can be attributed to Nevado del Ruiz, as the fertile volcanic soil had stimulated agricultural growth. Built on top of an alluvial fan that had witnessed other lahars, the town had previously been destroyed by an eruption in 1595. and by mudflows in 1845. In the 1595 eruption, three separate Plinian eruptions produced lahars that claimed the lives of 636 people. During the 1845 event, 1,000 people were killed near the Magdalena River by mudflows produced by earthquakes.
Nevado del Ruiz has experienced three different eruptive periods, the first occurring 1.8 million years ago. During the current period (beginning 11,000 years ago), it has erupted at least twelve times, producing ash fall, pyroclastic flows, and lahars. Recorded historical eruptions usually involve a central vent eruption followed by an explosive eruption, after which lahars form. The oldest eruption identified in the Ruiz during the Holocene occurred around the year 6660 BC. C., and more eruptions occurred in the years 1245 B.C. C., 850 B.C. C., 200 B.C. C., 350, 675, 1350, 1541 (possible), 1570, 1595, 1623, 1805, 1826, 1828 (possible), 1829, 1831, 1833 (possible), 1845, 1916, from December 1984 to March 1985, from 1987 to July 1991, and possibly in April 1994. Many of these eruptions presented an eruption of the central vent, one of the lateral vents, and a phreatic explosion. Nevado del Ruiz is the second most active volcano in Colombia, second only to Galeras.
1985 eruption
Precedents
In late 1984 geologists noted that seismic activity in the area had begun to increase. The appearance of fumaroles, sulfur deposition on the top of the volcano, and some phreatic eruptions alerted geologists to the possibility of an eruption. Phreatic events, produced by rising magma encountering water, continued until September 1985, shooting high jets of steam into the air. Activity began to decline in October, probably because the new magma had finished its ascent within the volcanic structure.
An Italian volcanological mission analyzed gas samples from the vents and the terrain around Arenas crater and found that these were a mixture of carbon dioxide and sulfur dioxide, indicating a direct release of magma at the surface. The scientists published, on October 22, 1985, a report to the authorities in which they determined that the risk of lahars was unusually high. To prepare for the eruption, the report suggested several simple preparation techniques to local authorities. Another team provided local authorities with seismographs, but gave them no instructions on how to operate them.
Volcanic activity increased again in November 1985 as magma neared the surface. Increasing amounts of gases rich in sulfur and sulfur dioxide began to appear at the volcano. The water content of the gases expelled by the fumaroles decreased, and the springs in the vicinity of the volcano became rich in magnesium, calcium, and potassium, a product of magma seepage. The thermodynamic equilibrium temperatures, corresponding to the chemical composition of The gases released ranged between 200 °C and 600 °C, measurements of the temperature at which the gases equilibrated inside the volcano. The extensive outgassing of the magma produced extremely high pressure inside the volcano, just in the space above the magma, which ultimately led to an explosive eruption.
Preparation and Evacuation Attempts
In September 1985, as earthquakes and groundwater eruptions rocked the area, local authorities began planning an evacuation. In October, a risk map for the area surrounding the snow-capped peak was completed, a map that highlighted the danger posed by falling materials such as ash and rocks in Murillo, Santa Isabel, and Líbano, as well as the risk of lahars in Mariquita, Guayabal, Chinchiná and Armero. However, the map had little distribution among the people located in the risk zone and many survivors never heard of it despite the fact that several of the country's most important newspapers published versions of it. Henry Villegas, from Ingeominas, stated that the risk maps clearly showed that Armero would be affected by the lahars, but that the map "was met with strong opposition from economic interests." He added that the map could not be reproduced or widely distributed due to the short time between its preparation and the eruption of the volcano.
At least one of the risk maps published in the widely circulated newspaper El Espectador included flagrant errors. Without proper scaling, it was unclear how large the risk zones really were, the lahars on the map had no definite end, and the greatest risk seemed to come from pyroclastic flows, not mudflows. Although the map was colored blue, green, red, and yellow, it did not contain any legends as to what each color represented, and Armero was in the green area (believed to be the safest area). Another map published by El Tiempo featured illustrations that "gave a perception of topography to a public unfamiliar with maps, allowing them to relate risk areas to the landscape." Despite this reader-oriented design, the map ended up more as a mere artistic representation than a scientific one.
On the day of the eruption, plumes of dark ash erupted from the volcano around 3:00 p.m. m., Colombian time. The local director of the Colombian Civil Defense, who was quickly informed of the situation, contacted Ingeominas, an organization that determined that the area should be evacuated; he was then told that he should contact the directors of the Civil Defense in Tolima and Bogotá. Between 5:00 and 7:00 p.m. m., the ash stopped falling and local authorities instructed people to "keep calm" and return home. Around 5:00 p.m. m. an emergency committee meeting was called, and when it ended at 7:00 p.m. m. several members contacted the regional Red Cross to agree details on possible evacuation efforts in Armero, Mariquita and Honda. The Ibagué Red Cross contacted the Armero authorities and ordered an evacuation that was not carried out due to electrical problems caused by a storm. Heavy rain and lightning from the storm were able to mask the noise of the volcano, and without any systematic warning effort, Armero residents were unaware of the activity taking place on Nevado del Ruiz. At 9:45 p.m. m., after the volcano erupted, Civil Defense officials from Ibagué and Murillo tried to warn the Armero authorities, but were unable to contact them. Later, they were able to listen to conversations between some Armero leaders and other people; In the most famous of these conversations, the mayor of Armero is heard through a homemade radio, shouting "the water came on us", shortly before being swept away by the lahar.
The eruption
At 9:09 p.m. m. On November 13, 1985, Nevado del Ruiz ejected dacitic tephra more than 30 km high in the atmosphere. The total mass of ejected material (including magma) was 35 million tons, only 3% of the total ejected by Mount Saint Helena in 1980. The eruption reached a Volcanic Explosivity Index 3. The mass of sulfur dioxide ejected in the eruption was approximately 700,000 tons, 2% of the total solid material, making this an unusually sulfur-rich eruption.
The eruption produced pyroclastic flows that melted the snow and glacier on the volcano's summit, generating four lahars that flowed down river valleys on the volcano's flanks, destroying a small lake that had been observed in the crater Arenas several months before the eruption. The water in such lakes is often extremely salty and may contain dissolved volcanic gases. The warm and acidic water of the lake accelerated the melting of the ice, an effect confirmed by the high concentration of sulfates and chlorides found in the lahar.
Lahars, made up of water, ice, pumice and other rocks, incorporated clay into their composition by eroding the terrain they passed through as they descended the slopes of the volcano at an average speed of 60 km/h, releasing rocks and destroying vegetation. After descending thousands of meters down the slopes, the lahars headed towards the valleys of the six rivers that originate in the volcano, where they increased to four times their original volume. In the Gualí river, a lahar reached a width of 50 meters.
Armero survivors remember the night as "quiet." Volcanic ash had fallen throughout the day, but villagers were told there was nothing to worry about. At the end of the afternoon, after a long period of calm, the ash fell again. Local radio stations were reporting that the ash should be ignored and residents should remain calm. One survivor claimed to have gone to the fire station and was told that the ash "was nothing".
At night the power supply was suddenly cut off and the radios turned off. Just before 11:30 a.m., a huge stream of water swept through Armero, powerful enough to overturn cars and sweep people away. A loud rumble was heard coming from the mountain, but the residents were more concerned about what they believed to be just flooding.
At 11:30 p.m. m., the first lahar reached the town, quickly followed by others. One of the lahars practically wiped out Armero; three-quarters of its 28,700 inhabitants were killed. Advancing in three great waves, this lahar was 30 meters deep, moving at 12 meters per second, and lasted for ten to twenty minutes. Traveling at approximately 6 meters per second, the second lahar lasted for half an hour and was followed by small eruptive pulses. A third large pulse allowed the lahar to last for about two hours. By that time, 85% of Armero was covered in mud. Survivors described how people held on to the rubble of their homes in an attempt to stay afloat in the mud. Buildings collapsed, crushing people and generating debris. The front of the lahar contained gigantic stones that crushed anyone in its path, while the slower parts of it were littered with small, sharp stones that caused cuts and lacerations. The mud was easily forced into open wounds and other bodily orifices—eyes, ears, and mouth—with enough pressure to induce traumatic asphyxiation in a minute or two in anyone buried in it. In their work Volcanoes and the Environment, Martí and Ernst state that many of those who survived the lahar died from their injuries while trapped, or succumbed to hypothermia, although this is unlikely given that the mud was described as hot by survivors.
A second lahar, which traveled down the Chinchiná river valley, killed about 1,800 people and destroyed 400 houses in Chinchiná, on the other side of the mountain range. In all, &&&&&&&&&&023000.&&&&&023000 and &&&&&&&&&&025000.&&&&&025,000 people, about 5,000 were injured and 5,000 homes in thirteen towns were destroyed. Approximately 230,000 people were affected, 20,000 were left homeless, and 110 km² of land was damaged. The Armero tragedy, as the event is known, was the second deadliest volcanic disaster in the world. 20th century, second only to the eruption of Mount Pelée in 1902, and the fourth deadliest recorded since 1500. It was also the deadliest lahar in history, and the worst natural tragedy in Colombian history.
Impact
The loss of life was exacerbated by the lack of a precise time frame for the eruption and by the reluctance of local authorities to take costly preventive measures without clear signs of imminent danger. a major eruption had occurred 140 years earlier, in 1845, it was difficult for many to accept the danger of the volcano; local people even called it the "Sleeping Lion". Risk maps showing that Armero would be seriously affected after an eruption were distributed more than a month before the event, but the Colombian Congress accused the Civil Defense and agencies alarmist scientists. The eruption occurred just a week after the seizure of the Palace of Justice by the M-19 guerrilla group in Bogotá, so both the government and the army were busy at the time of the disaster.
The lahars left behind a gray mass that covered the entire town. The area was littered with destroyed trees and disfigured corpses. The remains of houses and buildings protruded from the mud. Bags with cotton and coffee beans were found scattered in the mud, indicating the direction taken by the lahar. Rescue workers described the sour smell of the place as that of "rotting bodies, [...] wood smoke and rotting vegetables". To the horror of rescuers, who were scrambling to begin rescue efforts, survivors left escape moans of pain and agony. The damages were estimated at 7 billion dollars, a fifth of the Colombian gross domestic product of 1985.
As news of the catastrophe spread around the world, the presidential campaign, then underway, came to a halt, and guerrilla groups temporarily halted their activity "in view of the painful tragedy that has befallen our nation." A five-cent surcharge was added to the tickets for soccer matches in the Colombian league, intended to cover the rescue efforts.
Scientists who later analyzed the seismograph data found that multiple long-period earthquakes (starting off strong and slowly subsiding) had occurred in the hours before the eruption. Volcanologist Bernard Chouet claimed that "the volcano was screaming 'I'm going to explode,'" but the scientists monitoring the volcano at the time of the eruption did not have the expertise to identify the signs.
Rescue efforts
The eruption occurred two months after the 1985 Mexico earthquake, which limited the amount of food and supplies that could be sent to each of the disasters by other countries and international organizations. Relief efforts were coordinated from Ibagué and Bogotá to Armero, and from Cali to Chinchiná, places where the medical teams were concentrated. Improvised triage stations were established in Lérida, Guayabal and Mariquita, and they were soon overwhelmed by the high number of injured. The remaining victims were directed to hospitals in Ibagué, since those located in the region had been destroyed or were at risk of being buried by a new lahar.
The US government invested more than $1 million in aid, and US Ambassador to Colombia Charles S. Gillespie Jr. donated $25,000 to rescue institutions. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance of the United States Agency for International Development sent a member of the United States Geological Survey along with a disaster management expert and twelve helicopters with medical personnel from Panama. The United States also sent several additional aircraft along with supplies, including 500 tents, 2,250 blankets, and several tent repair kits. Another 24 nations also contributed to the rescue and assistance of the survivors. Ecuador provided a mobile hospital, while the Icelandic Red Cross donated US$4,650. The French government sent medical supplies and 1,300 tents. Japan, for its part, sent $1.25 million, doctors, nurses and engineers, and additionally allocated $50,000 to the United Nations for relief efforts. Another $50,000 was donated by the Lions Club.
Rescue efforts were hampered by mud, up to 15 feet deep, that covered Armero making it virtually impossible for anyone to traverse it without sinking. To make matters worse, the highway and several connecting bridges a Armero were destroyed by lahars. It took almost twelve hours to rescue the first survivors, so it is likely that many seriously injured who could be saved would have died hours before rescuers arrived. Because the Armero hospital had been destroyed, the victims were taken to nearby hospitals. Six nearby towns set up makeshift clinics divided into treatment areas and shelters for the victims. To help with hospital work, medical and rescue personnel from all over the country were present in Armero. Of the 1,244 patients distributed in the clinics, 150 died from infections or related complications. If antibiotics had been readily available and if all wounds had been cleaned properly, an unknown number of these people might have survived.
On November 20, 1985, a week after the eruption, rescue efforts began to wind down. Nearly 4,000 rescuers were still searching for survivors with little hope of finding any. By then, the official death toll was 22,540 victims, figures that also spoke of 3,300 missing, 4,000 injured and 20,000 homeless. Groups of looters broke into the ruins, while the survivors faced the risk of contracting typhus or yellow fever.
The eruption was used as an example of psychiatric recovery after a natural disaster by Robert Desjarlais and Leon Eisenberg in their work Mental health around the world: problems and priorities in low-income countries. The authors were concerned, as the survivors only received initial treatment for the trauma suffered. One study showed that victims of the eruption suffered from anxiety and depression, which could lead to alcohol, marital and social problems. Rafael Ruiz, an army major who briefly served as Armero's interim mayor after the tragedy, He stated that there were survivors who, due to the trauma suffered, were "nervous", experienced "nightmares" and suffered from "emotional problems". He added that the progress made by Christmas 1985 was considerable, but that there was still "a long way to go."
Repercussions
Lack of disaster preparedness contributed to the high death toll. Armero was situated on an alluvial fan that had been the site of previous lahar flows, and authorities ignored a hazard map showing the potential damage that lahars could cause to the town. Villagers stayed inside their homes to escape the falling ash, as local authorities had told them, not thinking that they might be buried by mudflows.
The disaster gained worldwide notoriety in part because of a photograph taken by Frank Fournier of a young woman named Omayra Sánchez, who was trapped in the rubble for three days before she died. After the eruption, rescue workers they gathered around the girl, conversing with her. Omayra caught the attention of the reporters at the scene because of her dignity and courage, and caused controversy when people wondered why the journalists did nothing to save her (which was impossible without tools). An appeal to the government to get a hydraulic pump to evacuate the water around her went unheeded, and she Omayra succumbed to gangrene and hypothermia after spending sixty hours trapped. Her death epitomized the tragic nature of what happened in Armero: she could have been saved if the government had acted promptly and heeded calls about the danger of the volcano. The photograph won the World Press Photo of the Year award for "capturing the most newsworthy event".
Two photographers from the Miami Herald won the Pulitzer Prize for photographing the effects of lahar. Dr. Stanley Williams of Louisiana State University said after the eruption, "with the possible exception of Mt. Saint Helena in Washington state, no other volcano in the Western Hemisphere has been observed in such detail." In response to the eruption, the United States Geological Survey formed the Volcano Disaster Assistance Program and Team in 1986. Assistance in Volcanic Crisis. The volcano erupted several more times between 1985 and 1994.
Alleged Negligence
Concerns over the alleged negligence of local authorities in the face of the volcano threat led to fierce controversy. The mayor of Armero, Ramón Rodríguez, and several local officials tried in vain to draw the attention of the Colombian government to the danger posed by the volcano. For months, Rodríguez made calls to various authorities, including several congressmen, the then governor of Tolima, Eduardo Alzate García, and the minister of mines Iván Duque Escobar. Rodríguez called the volcano a "ticking time bomb" and told reporters that he believed an eruption would breach a natural dam upstream, leading to flooding. Despite his insistence, only two congressmen, Hernando Arango Monedero and Guillermo Alfonso Jaramillo, took an interest in the situation, holding debates on the subject in Congress and warning the government about the possibility of a tragedy, a possibility that was also pointed out. by Ingeominas.
Reports from the ministries of mines, defense and public works, "affirmed that the government was aware of the risk of the volcano and that it was acting to protect the population." The lack of responsibility for the disaster led several legislators to request the resignation of the governor of Tolima, who in days prior to the disaster had refused both to attend the meetings of the departmental emergency committee and to speak with Rodríguez, and who after the Tragedy affirmed that he had ordered the evacuation of Armero and the provisioning of various hospitals in the department to be able to attend to any emergency, statements denied by the Red Cross and the Civil Defense. The issue was also hotly debated in the media. One of the most aggressive accusations came from a mass funeral held in Ibagué, where several banners stated that “the volcano did not kill 22,000 people. The government killed them."
Legacy
The volcano still poses a serious threat to nearby towns, even in the case of small eruptions, which can destabilize glaciers and produce lahars. Although much of the glacier has retreated, a significant volume of ice is still found on the tops of Nevado del Ruiz and other nearby volcanoes. Melting just 10% of the ice would produce lahars with a volume of up to 200 million cubic meters, similar to the lahars that swept through Armero in 1985. In a matter of a few hours, these lahars could travel up to 100 km per river valleys. Estimates show that 500,000 people living in the valleys of the Combeima, Chinchiná, Coello-Toche and Gualí rivers are at risk, and 100,000 of these are at high risk. Lahars constitute a serious threat to the towns of Honda, Mariquita, Ambalema, Herveo, Villahermosa, Puerto Salgar and La Dorada. Although a small eruption is more likely, the long eruptive history of the Ruiz-Tolima massif includes numerous large eruptions, indicating that the threat of a large eruption cannot be ignored. A large eruption would have far-reaching consequences, including a possible closure of the Bogotá airport due to ash fall.
Since the Armero tragedy was exacerbated by the lack of early warnings, the misuse of land, and the unpreparedness of nearby communities, the Colombian government created the National Office for Disaster Assistance, currently known as the Disaster Prevention and Attention Directorate, to prevent such incidents in the future. All Colombian cities were ordered to promote prevention plans against natural disasters to mitigate the consequences of these, and several evacuations, as a result of volcanic threat, have been carried out. About 2,300 people were evacuated from the banks of rivers near Nevado del Ruiz in 1989, when it erupted again. When another Colombian volcano, Nevado del Huila, erupted in 2008, thousands of people were evacuated as there was concern that another Gunsmith would be repeated.
Commemorations
A little less than a year after the tragedy, Pope John Paul II visited the disaster area together with Colombian President Belisario Betancur. There the pope spoke about the tragedy and declared Armero's location as holy field. Despite the fact that many of the victims of the tragedy were commemorated, Omayra Sánchez was, in particular, immortalized in poems, novels and musical pieces. A work called Adiós, Omayra, by Eduardo Santa, illustrated the last days of the young woman and the symbolism she represented in the catastrophe. The survivors were also recognized in the television special You will not die by Germán Santamaría, in which part of the cast was made up of victims of the tragedy, who appeared as extras in the play. In 2017 the film Armero was released, inspired by real events occurred during the disaster, as a tribute to the victims.
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