Cro-Magnon tragedy

The Cromañón tragedy was a fire that occurred on the night of December 30, 2004 in República Cromañón, an establishment located in the Once neighborhood of the city of Buenos Aires in Argentina, within the framework of a recital by the rock band Callejeros, during the Government of President Néstor Kirchner and the Head of Government Aníbal Ibarra of the Frente Grande. This fire caused the worst world tragedy in the history of rock music and one of the greatest unnatural tragedies in Argentina, leaving a balance of 194 dead and at least 1,432 injured.

This tragedy also caused important political and cultural changes. The relatives of the deceased young people and the survivors of the fire formed a large group of public mobilization and demand for justice, for the deaths and the damages suffered. Politically, the Legislature of the City of Buenos Aires initiated a political trial to dismiss to the then head of government Aníbal Ibarra for considering him politically responsible for the tragedy. The prosecution ended with his removal from office, and he was replaced by the Deputy Head of Government, Jorge Telerman. In terms of culture, the tragedy raised awareness in society about the state of nightclubs and venues for musical shows, in addition to causing strong reconsiderations about common practices and soccer similes, such as the use of flares and the search to gather the maximum possible audience. The Government reviewed the state of discos and other dance venues, which resulted in the closure of a large number of them. The Cromañón tragedy was a highly impactful event in the history of Argentine rock; it closed a stage and gave way to the post-Cro-Magnon era of Argentine rock, where the trends of musical genres, recital spaces, organization and infrastructure reflected the changes that arose as a result of the accident.

The venue

Victims' shoes and mural asking for justice for them.

República Cromañón, also known as the Cromagnon Republic, was an establishment where concerts and events were held. It was located on Calle Bartolomé Miter 3060/3066/3070, in the Balvanera neighborhood of the City of Buenos Aires. The place was managed by Omar Chabán, and had been inaugurated on April 12, 2004 with a recital by the same band that would play on the day of the fire: Callejeros. Chabán was a very important figure for the development of Argentine rock at the end of the XX century, since two emblematic places of the underground At the time, Café Einstein (which operated during the first half of the eighties) and Cemento were owned by him.

In all these weeks of self-criticisms more or less reflective, the world of rock forgot to mention that the ants of Chaban represented, in fact, a kind of alternative to the circuit of civilized spaces that grew in the last three or four years: Works conceded by Pop Art, The Theatre, The Trastend, etc. This lack of control that prevailed in Cromañón and Cemento, in some way, allowed artists to impose their rules: for example, the hiring of pathovicas that did not mistreat people. "The bands felt comfortable in Cemento and Cromañón. We did not repair in other things," says Toti, of Young Pordioseros. "Before we had to go through Cemento to be someone in the under. And now you had to get strong in Cromañón, it's the truth. Why doesn't anyone say so? Because no one wants to get stuck."

Pablo Plotkin, magazine Rolling Stone

The property where República Cromañón was located did not belong to Chabán, but to a company called Nueva Zarelux S.A., based in the Uruguayan city of Montevideo. Due to an investigation by the General Inspection of Justice at the request of the judge in charge of the case, it was discovered that this company had bought this property, and the Central Park Hotel located at Jean Jaurés 51, and to whose parking lot two of the exits led of the premises, in 1998 for 708,000 dollars to the company National Uranums Corp. The latter, based in the Virgin Islands, had bought it in 1994 for $2.2 million.

Nueva Zarelux SRL was created on June 4, 1984, and the founding partners are Herry Luis Vivas San Martín and María Dora Velázquez. An investigation by the Uruguayan newspaper Brecha interviewed Vivas, who stated that the Cukier & Cukier, based in Montevideo, paid him to appear as a partner in the statute. Vivas was a Uruguayan retiree who did painting and maintenance work, while Velázquez was a housewife.

The company Lagarto SA was the tenant of the place, and transferred the exploitation to different people. This is how República Cromañón and, previously, another dance venue: El Reventón functioned. According to Rafael Levy's statement, Chabán had a rental contract. A witness pointed to Levy as the real owner of the place, for which he was summoned to testify and later prosecuted for the crime of intentional havoc followed by death, trial which would take place in 2010.

The fire

Located a few metres from Cromañón Republic, with photos of the numerous victims.

On December 30, 2004, the group Callejeros, who had already played at the venue months before at its inauguration, performed in República Cromañón. The fire started at approximately 10:50 p.m., while the band was playing the song musical Different, after one of the attendees of the show lit a pyrotechnic element, whose incandescent projectiles impacted a half shadow located on the ceiling —a kind of flammable plastic cloth—, in turn supported on wadding covered by polyurethane sheets.

Noticing the fire, onlookers began to evacuate the venue. However, this evacuation was not carried out normally for various reasons: one of the exits was closed with a padlock and wires, the toxic gases produced by the flammable materials quickly suffocated many people, and the power cut at the beginning of the fire.

Fatal victims and surviving victims

Almost all of the deaths were caused by the inhalation of different gases (mainly carbon monoxide and hydrocyanic acid), except for one caused by chest-abdominal compression.

Many of those who made it out of the building re-entered to rescue those still inside the building. Despite their efforts, 194 people died in the fire and in the days that followed, and at least 1,432 died. were injured; even relatives of members of the band. Several children died, and various media outlets declared that there was a nursery in the ladies' bathroom, which was denied by witnesses. They reported that on the day of the tragedy only the ladies' bathroom was enabled, and that their little ones dimensions made it impossible for the supposed nursery to function there.

During the relief operation, 46 ambulances participated, in charge of transferring the victims to one of the 24 public hospitals or 11 private clinics. The people hired by the organizers to provide first aid did not have the required preparation, since they professionals were not hired to reduce costs.

As a result of the tragedy, there were deaths of survivors from serious physical and psychological sequelae.

According to a survey carried out in a limited universe of family members and survivors in 2008, 31% were still receiving psychological treatment four years after the event. By 2009, around 30% of the survivors of the fire were still under treatment either medical, psychiatric or psychological. One in four of the patients under treatment was mainly medicated with antidepressants and antirecurrence drugs (mood stabilizers). According to official figures from 2009, in the public hospitals of the City of Buenos Aires there were 565 survivors under stable treatment. According to a study carried out on 800 survivors and relatives of the victims, presented by specialists from the Alvear Hospital at the IV World Congress on Post-Traumatic Stress, it revealed that the majority of the survivors of the fire suffered severe post-traumatic stress disorders with symptoms ranging from tachycardia, nausea, vomiting, feeling dizzy, and sleep disorders. From the collective demanding justice and public mobilization that they formed, the relatives of the deceased and the survivors of the fire repeatedly denounced this situation, receiving the support of specialists in the subject.

Several suicide attempts have also been reported. Between 2005 and 2007, three suicides were reported by survivors, mostly young people between the ages of 21 and 24.

Irregularities

Flammable materials

Polyurethane foam, when burned, generates hydrogen cyanide (hydrocyanic acid), carbon dioxide, and carbon monoxide, while cellulose insulation produces carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide. The half shade produced carbon dioxide and monoxide carbon and acrolein, increasing the amount of smoke and dripping on the attendees causing burns. According to a report from the INTI (National Institute of Industrial Technology), the volume of hydrocyanic acid, with the premises full, reached 255 ppm, the lethal level for laboratory rats 150 to 220 ppm.

The source of the fire started in an area of about 20 or 30 centimeters, but began to expand rapidly due to the presence of the wadding. The roofing material began to burn and release toxic gases, the temperature reached 400 °C and the combustion ended once all the material had been consumed. As the temperature decreased, the toxic smoke began to descend and began to be inhaled by the people who were in the place. Smoke at high temperatures causes pulmonary edema and covers the mucous membranes, forming a layer impermeable to oxygen, something that affected many of the victims of the fire. When a person inhales this smoke at 20%, he presents a headache and muscle weakness, when he reaches 30% he cannot stand up and begins to have symptoms of dizziness, and when he enters the percentage of 50% the person goes into a coma and it can cause death.

Local capacity and emergency exit

The venue was enabled for these shows with a capacity of up to 1031 people; however, the public count was much higher than that figure. According to the ruling:

In addition, it is evident that this overwhelming amount of proven concurrents had a decisive influence on the specific configuration of the alleged fact analyzed, since it attempted against the evacuation of the premises and allowed the attendees to be exposed to the harmful gases produced by the combustion, that is, to the common danger of a typical fire.

To make matters worse, the exits were irregular, making evacuation difficult. The premises had a main entrance consisting of two gates and an emergency exit located to the right of the main entrance. Both gave onto a hall where the ticket offices were located, and from there the main hall, where the stage was located, was accessed through six cinema-type doors. Towards the left side of the stage there was an alternative exit that connected the hall with the exit of the parking lot of a neighboring hotel, which belonged to the same owners of Cromañón.

The emergency exit was hampered by the presence of fences, something that made evacuation difficult. The main entrance also made it difficult to exit, due to its own structure:

Consequently, it is difficult to conclude that it was the very structure of the cinema doors, that is, the circumstance that the exit corridor was divided by six doors with their respective frames and leaves which hindered the departure of a number of considerable people who were desperately trying to do so simultaneously, beyond whether they were closed or opened.

This alternative exit consisted of a gate that had two leaves measuring 2.5 meters wide by 3.6 meters high. At the time of the fire, it was closed with a padlock and wire ties, despite the fact that it had a sign at the top indicating that it was an authorized exit. The door was opened by the firefighters once they arrived at the scene, minutes after the fire started. According to the authorization, that door should not be closed:

As it follows from the local empowerment plank – see fs. 350 of the lizard of Architecture-,...the local has an alternative output, which is activated exclusively in case of a sinister, allowing the evacuation of the concurrent audience by a corridor that serves in normal cases for the entry and exit of vehicles...

Enablement

The establishment was qualified as a class C dance venue in an autonomous way, not as an annex to another establishment. According to subsection "d" of article 10.2.3 of the Code of Authorizations and Verifications of the city, this type of premises is prohibited from communicating with other establishments, which did not happen since the door that was behind the scenes and the alternative door led to the parking lot from a hotel.

In addition, the Cromañón Republic Firefighters Certification had expired. one year period. Therefore, said authorization had expired and the premises should have been closed. Likewise, of the fifteen existing fire extinguishers in the place, ten were depressurized.

There was also the payment of a bribe to an officer of the Argentine Federal Police to provide security at the door of the place and so that violations would not be carried out due to existing irregularities in the premises. Among the existing violations included the exceeding the authorized capacity, the sale of alcohol, the obstruction of the exits and the omission of precautions during the organization and security (which allowed the entry of fireworks). During the recitals given by Callejeros Raúl Villarreal, by order of Chabán, he paid Deputy Commissioner Carlos Rubén Díaz 300 Argentine pesos per day.

Pyrotechnics

The use of flares and other types of fireworks, both in open spaces and (dangerously) in closed spaces, was common in recitals of the so-called neighborhood rock or rock chabón. Pyrotechnics became part of folklore and the aesthetics of that music, a ritual within the recital itself. These practices were fully encouraged by the artists. In the November 2005 issue of Rolling Stone Argentina magazine, in an interview with Indio Solari, one of the main references of Argentine rock, he commented explicitly declaring his delight at seeing sparklers lit in the recitals:

In reference to bengalas and so on, let's say that rock culture has that, too: it is not a progressive culture, of all prolijito. Now we recommend that you guys not go with pyrotecnia to the show (...) But, in short, it's hard for me to refuse the folklore of the bengalas and the rock flags. I think rock is that. I have the image of "Lost Toys" in River, entering to sing with all that and... Wow! It's not soup. I don't want to definitely refuse all that. Although, from now on, you have to give up respect and care. (...) [Pyrotecnia] He left an accent, an aesthetic mark on almost everything we call national rock, which for something is different from Belgian rock, Japanese rock or any other.

Solari Indian.

The members of Callejeros also delighted in the sparklers at recitals, and two interviews of them on Rock&Pop radio in the months prior to the tragedy have remained as testimonies:

- Juan di Natale: There is a rumor that they will not let the bengalas pass and that if any happens, they would put a fine on the band. This has to do with the security conditions of Works, and it is nothing against Callejeros or against this show.

- Patricio Fontanet: no, no, that's all the shows.
- Juan di Natale: Well, what do we do with the bengalas, Pato?

— Patricio Fontanet: The problem with the bengalas is that it brings you the security of Works. When we play, we try to get the bengalas through.

Interview on the radio Rock BroadwayPop, August 2004.

— Eduardo Vázquez: I live here, after three intense shows here in Cromañón. It was three days... yesterday we played with 4000 people.

- Juan di Natale: Wow, so much bengala, right?

— Eduardo Vázquez: very much bengala, was the fruit of the cake.

Interview on the radio Rock BroadwayPop, December 10, 2004.

Because of this, in the ruling of the oral trial it was expressed:

We have been able to draw a conclusion: that the band tolerated the use of pyrotechnics. This was the case, since their use in recitals was always a constant and nothing serious was done to prevent such practice from definitively ceased.

However, before the recital began on December 30, Chaban warned the public not to light sparklers, as pyrotechnics had been used during the performance of the supporting group, Ojos Locos. According to witnesses, Chaban stated:

Don't be cunning. Don't throw bengalas. There are 6000 people here and I don't want Paraguay to happen. If someone turns something on, we all die.

Omar Chaban.

The use of fireworks had already caused sources of fire in the premises. On May 1, 2004, during a Jóvenes Podioseros recital, a fire started causing the evacuation of all spectators and had to be extinguished by security personnel. On December 25, a few days before the tragedy, another outbreak occurred during a recital of La 25, which also managed to be suffocated.

The use of flares at rock concerts in Argentina was not only limited to Argentine bands, it was also done on visits by international bands: on May 8, 2004, at Motörhead's visit to the Hangar bowling alley, something ominously prophesying happened. A horde of violent entered beating the patovicas and then, already in the recital, one set off a flare, which took away the oxygen inside the bowling alley and caused the members of the band to begin to feel bad and decide to end the recital after only 50 minutes. This inflamed the anger of the public, who destroyed the bowling alley and the band's equipment.

Legal proceedings

Instruction stage

After the tragedy, the Justice issued the national and international arrest warrant for Omar Chabán, manager of República Cromañón. After several raids, Chabán was arrested in a house in the Buenos Aires neighborhood of Monserrat. During the first days, the Callejeros gang told the media, through their lawyer, that they had not signed any contract with Chabán, and that the only organizer of the recital was the businessman.

After questioning several witnesses, the investigating judge María Angélica Crotto ordered the prosecution of Omar Chabán, accusing him of the simple homicide with eventual intent of 192 people (they were the fatalities up to that moment). In addition, she resolved the seizure of assets for 57.6 million pesos.Due to health problems, the judge decided to take leave, and she was replaced by Investigating Judge No. 8 Julio Lucini.

At the end of February 2005, Diego Argañaraz, manager of Callejeros, Lorenzo Bussi, in charge of security, and Raúl Villarreal, mentioned as general coordinator of the venue, were arrested. Argañaraz and Bussi were released, since they were prosecuted for culpable homicide, a releaseable crime. Villarreal, on the other hand, was sentenced to pretrial detention since he was accused of eventual intentional homicide. In the case of Villarreal, the judge highlighted that "far from assuming the role of a simple employee or collaborator, he had an active participation in the 'business', to the point of having become the true 'right hand' #3. 4; de Chabán", the manager of the band expressed that "he acted recklessly and negligently, which facilitated the production of the incident that ended the lives of 193 people and caused hundreds of injuries" and in the case of Bussi he established that "if had acted correctly, maximizing the search of the assistants and verifying that none of them entered the place without first being exhaustively reviewed, the fire would not have occurred and the deaths would have been avoided". The three suffered an asset seizure, Villarreal of 57 million pesos, while Argañaraz and Bussi of 20 million.

In March, five members of the Argentine Federal Police were prosecuted. Commissioners Miguel Ángel Belay and Gabriel Sevald, and deputy commissioner Carlos Díaz were prosecuted for the crime of passive bribery, and were seized for the sum of 500 thousand pesos. In addition, the agents Oscar Sosa and Cristian Villegas were prosecuted for breach of the duties of a public official and were seized for 100,000 pesos. The accused expressed that they were innocent, while Chabán refused to testify for the alleged payment of bribes.

In May, Omar Chabán's lawyers asked Judge Lucini for his release. Lucini denied it, for which she was appealed before the Chamber of Crime of the City of Buenos Aires. There, the Fifth Chamber (made up of Gustavo Bruzzone, María Laura Garrigós de Rébori and Rodolfo Pociello Argerich) decided to release the businessman by paying a bond of 500,000 pesos. Chabán was transferred to Marcos Paz prison, and after bail was posted he was released on June 14.

The release unleashed a new controversy, not only in relation to the case but also in relation to the entire judicial system. The existence of an excessive "guarantee" was discussed, a current of criminal law that seeks to minimize the criminal system, the humanization of penalties and the unrestricted respect of fundamental Human Rights in the process. As a symbol of the "guarantors" was the judge of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Argentine Nation, Eugenio Raúl Zaffaroni, while the opponents were several politicians from the Argentine right and Mr. Juan Carlos Blumberg. The President of the Nation Néstor Kirchner expressed his rejection of the release, which led to several disputes with members of the Judiciary, who described the words of the president as interference by one Power of the Republic in another. To the two judges who voted in favor of Chabán's release, branded as "guarantors" by different means of communication, an attempt was made to initiate a political trial, but the Council of the Magistracy rejected that request, months later. Raúl Villereal was also released from prison.

After his release, Chabán decided to seclude himself in his mother's house, located in the Partido de General San Martín, in the Province of Buenos Aires. Relatives of the victims moved to the place to express their repudiation, which led to complaints from neighbors and local merchants. The different demonstrations against the release of the businessman affected the tranquility of the area. This is why the provincial government asked the judge to transfer Chabán, based on the large amount of resources that were necessary to maintain police custody in the place. Finally, the businessman moved to a house located in the Tigre delta, that one of his friends had rented, where he decided to meet with some relatives of the victims. However, because the protests moved to the place and because the owners of the house wanted to evict him, he decided to move to another house, also located in the Delta but further away. However, that did not stop the relatives, who managed to stone the new house. In the midst of these events there was a change of cover that benefited Chabán, since the judges leaned towards the figure intentional havoc followed by death (penalized with eight to twenty years in prison) instead of simple homicide (penalized with eight to twenty-five years in prison). Finally, the Chamber of Cassation granted the request to annul Chabán's release. Due to this decision, Judge Lucini ordered the arrest of the businessman and his transfer to the Marcos Paz prison on November 24.

In the midst of the controversy involving the manager of the venue, on June 3 the band was prosecuted for aggravated manslaughter, and an embargo of 10 million pesos was placed on each member.

In addition, three former officials of the government of the City of Buenos Aires were prosecuted: the former Secretary of Security Juan Carlos López was prosecuted for aggravated manslaughter, while the former Undersecretary of Security of the municipal government Enrique Careli and the former general director of Vicente Rizzo Private Security Services were prosecuted for breach of the duties of a public official. They were also prosecuted for aggravated culpable homicide Fabiana Fiszbin, former Undersecretary of Community Control, Ana María Fernández, former deputy general director of the Buenos Aires control body, Gustavo Torres, former director Inspection General, Rodrigo Cozzani, former operational coordinator of the same organization and Alfredo Ucar, Fiszbin's adviser; and Víctor Telias, operational coordinator of the control area, for breach of the duties of a public official. In October, the former official Roberto Calderini, head of the Qualifications area, was also prosecuted for the crime of negotiations incompatible with the public function.

However, by the end of 2005, only Juan Carlos López remained accused of aggravated manslaughter. Fiszbin, Fernández, and Torres were dismissed on that charge, while Ucar and Cozzani were found to lack merit to prosecute or dismiss.

On September 27, Room V of the Crime Chamber changed the name to negligent havoc, and, finally, on December 16, Judge Lucini charged the Callejeros group with malicious havoc followed by death. The change de carátula responds to the fact that the judge considered that irregularities in certain tasks that were in charge of the group (such as the security of the premises and the number of tickets sold) had a great influence on the fire.

During 2006 the case returned to the hands of Judge Crotto, and the Crime Chamber denied the request to change the cover from intentional havoc to culpable homicide, requested by the musical group. However, the court authorized them to make presentations, which would finally happen on July 6.

As for the former head of government, the judge in the case had refused to call Ibarra to testify, which had motivated the anger of the relatives, some of whom have been denounced for threatening the judge. Finally, Ibarra was dismissed from the case in which he had been denounced for intentional homicide and breach of the duties of a public official. In addition, in July the civil justice had revoked the inhibition of assets that weighed on the former president and in November the Chamber of Cassation rejected a request from relatives of the victims to reverse the dismissal.

In April, Chamber V of the Crime Chamber indicted the former official, Juan Carlos López, who was accused of intentional homicide. The judges determined that "just by looking at the diversity of functions of the Secretariat in charge de López, it can be seen how difficult it is for whoever is in charge of it, to have a deep knowledge of all the problems that exist in the City of Buenos Aires linked to their competence». In the same ruling, Enrique Carelli and Vicente Rizzo were dismissed, who were accused of breaching the duties of a public official. In the month of September, three other officials would be dismissed: Juan Carlos Loupías, Juan Carlos Sánchez, and Alfredo Ucar were also accused of the same charge as the previous two.

In August 2006, Judge María Angélica Crotto brought to trial the actions of Omar Chabán, Raúl Villarreal, five policemen and the Callejeros group (together with their manager and the set designer).

On October 10, 2006, former officials Fiszbin, Fernández, and Torres were accused of breaching the duties of a public official and their case was brought to an oral trial. In September, the members of Callejeros, their manager and the set designer were prosecuted for active bribery as secondary participants, which is added to the accusation of malicious damage.

In August 2007, Chamber III of the Criminal Cassation Chamber confirmed the dismissal of Ibarra, but revoked the dismissal of Juan Carlos López, who was prosecuted again in the case. at the hands of Judge Alberto Baños, after María Angélica Crotto decided to request a medical leave due to illness.

On November 22, Oral Court no. Finally, on December 7, Chabán left the Marcos Paz prison. In May 2008, Rafael Levy, suspected of being the owner of the premises, was prosecuted under the same charges as Chabán.

In December 2009, the judge ordered that the identikit of the person who had allegedly fired the fireworks that started the fire be compared with the photos of the members of a group of fans identified as El Fondo No Fisura.

Oral trial

Facade of the Palace of Justice.

Of all the people who were prosecuted during the investigation, only 15 people were initially brought to trial, accused of various crimes. Omar Chabán and Raúl Villareal were accused of intentional havoc followed by death and active bribery. The same accusation fell on the members of Callejeros (Patricio Fontanet, Elio Delgado, Maximiliano Djerfy, Eduardo Vázquez, Christián Torrejón and Juan Alberto Carbone), Daniel Cardell, the set designer, and his manager, Diego Argañaraz. Three officials of the Government of the City of Buenos Aires were accused of breaching the duties of a public official: Fabiana Gabriela Fiszbin, Gustavo Juan Torres and Ana María Fernández. And two officers of the Argentine Federal Police were accused, Carlos Rubén Díaz of malicious damage followed by death and passive bribery, and Miguel Ángel Belay, for breach of the duties of a public official and passive bribery.

The trial began on August 19, 2008, and was held in one of the rooms of the Palace of Justice of the Nation, located in Buenos Aires, the same one where the so-called Trial of the Juntas was held in 1985. After one year, on August 19, 2009, the Oral Criminal Court No. 24 of the City of Buenos Aires ruled by unanimous ruling to sentence Omar Chabán to 20 years in prison for the crimes of arson and active bribery, Diego Argañaraz to 18 years in prison for the crimes of arson and active bribery, Deputy Commissioner Carlos Díaz to 18 years in prison for the crimes of arson and passive bribery, Raúl Villarreal to 1 year in prison suspended for considering him a secondary participant in the crime of active bribery, Fabiana Fiszbin and Ana María Fernández to 2 years for breach of the duties of a public official. Both the members of Callejeros and the commissioner Miguel Belay and the official Gustavo Torres were acquitted.

The court determined that both Chabán and Argañaraz were in charge of organizing the recital, and therefore they were the only ones on whom the penalty of qualified intentional arson could fall:

The joint assessment of the evidence described, in accordance with the guidelines of sound rational criticism, leads us to conclude, on the basis, that the only persons who specifically addressed the organization of the recital of 30 December 2004, were Diego Marcelo Argañaraz and Emir Omar Chaban.

We do reiterate that only the organizers assume the duty to guard the source of danger that carries a spectacle and because the law so provides. These people are those who hold a position of guarantee from a material-formal point of view as proposed by the dominant doctrine, not the employees of the place where the event is held, no more hierarchized or independent that can be shown in the working structure.

According to the ruling, neither the musicians nor the set designer participated in the organization:

In addition, of the testimonies of all the persons who had left the trial, it is only possible to conclude with the absence of proof that proves the contrary that, as regards the specific organization of the recital that took place on December 30, 2004, none of the musicians of the band or the stage designer carried out any specific activity.

They also did not consider that the musicians encouraged the use of flares, but simply condoned their use:

However, such tolerance does not imply promotion or incentive as some accusers have proposed.

Raúl Villarreal was not included in the organization of the event either:

It is clear that Villarreal has not been charged with deciding the number of tickets or their marketing or distribution, he did not hire sound, lighting, security, or lifeguards, or advertising. This was done by the manager of the group "Callejeros" Diego Argañaraz and the operator of the local Omar Chaban.

Regarding the payment of bribes, it was shown that both Chabán, Argañaraz and Villarreal were involved in it. In the documentation provided to the court, the payments were included in the liquidation of expenses that those involved had informally.

The spurious agreement to which we referred was aimed at the functional omission by Carlos Rubén Díaz, in exchange for the agreed money, to provide security and to allow the existence of numerous contraventions in which the premises used in the jurisdiction of the 7th section of this city would incur.

This "protection" that Díaz granted allowed the conditions that unleashed this event to take place.

Then in the context of the situation we affirm that the removal of obstacles to the action of Omar Emir Chabán and Diego Marcelo Argañaraz in the opening and development of the recital of the Callejeros group on the night of the 30th of December of the year 2004 [...] contributed to increase the danger of the realization of the injury to the legal good protected by the figure of art. 186 sub-paragraph 5 and translated into a necessary contribution to the main event.

As for the officials of the City Government, it was determined that they did not comply with their obligations. The Ombudsman of the City of Buenos Aires had issued a resolution in which it recommended the immediate closure of the premises that did not they were properly enabled. The officials limited their actions to the simple intimidation of the premises, without taking measures against those who did not respond to them or presented documentation that clearly did not justify the development of the authorized activity.

the defendants Fiszbin and Fernandez, with functional aptitude and material and human means - which, even without being optimal, would have allowed them to deal with the due activity in a reasonable time - they were rude and, therefore, consciously, the fulfilment of essential obligations inherent in their positions and this will bring them criminal responsibility.

The sentence was not final, so none of the convicted remained in prison. It is estimated that the Court of Cassation would rule during 2010 and that that year the oral trial against Juan Carlos López and Rafael Levy would begin.

Ratification of sentences

The Federal Chamber of Criminal Cassation confirmed in September 2015 the convictions against former officials, members of the Callejeros gang and other defendants by rejecting their appeals. Despite this, the defendants remained free until said sentences became final.

Sala IV of the Chamber, after responding to the request of the Supreme Court of Justice to review the ruling, upheld the sentence.

The Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, at the beginning of March 2016, classified as “inadmissible” the extraordinary appeals that 11 defendants filed before the sentences; so the defendants had to return to serve their sentences in prison.

The sentences vary from 3 to 7 years, with Patricio Fontanet (leader of the gang) having the longest. The other musicians (Maximiliano Djerfy, Elio Delgado, Cristian Torrejón and Juan Carbone) received 5 years. Drummer Eduardo Vásquez is added 6 years to the life sentence obtained for the murder of his wife. Added to the prison measure are set designer Daniel Cardell with three years and Omar Chabán's assistant, Raúl Villarreal, with six.

Former Community Control official Fabiana Fiszbin and former Inspection director Gustavo Torres are also included among the eleven implicated.

Cause for irregular certificates

From the main investigation, a cause related to an illegal circuit of authorization certificates emerged. In September 2006, three firefighters, for passive bribery, and two businessmen, for active bribery, were also sent to oral and public trial. The accused firefighters were Alberto Corbellini, the former head of the Prevention Division of the Fire Department Federal Police, Marcelo Nodar and Marcelo Esnok; while the two businessmen, Rubén Fuertes and Luis Perucca, were accused by "co-authors." The trial for this fact began in November 2007, and the five were found guilty. Rubén Fuerte, Marcelo Nodar and Alberto Corbellini were sentenced to 4 years in prison, while the sentences were less for Luis Perucca (2 years and 9 months suspended) and Marcelo Esnok (2 years and 6 months suspended).

SAME cause

A case was also initiated due to an alleged misconduct during the organization and development of relief tasks during the fire. Aníbal Ibarra, Jorge Telerman and several officials of the Government of the City of Buenos Aires were investigated in this case. In December 2008, both Ibarra, Telerman and most of the officials were dismissed. The only ones charged for breach of the duties of a public official were Alejandro Cano and Martín Galmarini, General Director of Operations of the Federal Police and a doctor regulator on duty for SAME (Emergency Medical Care System), respectively. However, in March 2009 both were dismissed. And in June 2010 the dismissal was confirmed by the Third Chamber of the Criminal Cassation Chamber.

Political and social repercussions

Placa on Peru Street, next to the Municipal Legislative Palace, which recalls the dismissal of Aníbal Ibarra as Head of Government for being responsible for the deaths of the fire.

The then President of the Nation, Néstor Kirchner and his wife Cristina Fernández took refuge in Santa Cruz and did not make an appearance at the place. The criticism that arose after the episode led to the resignation of the Secretary of Security of the Government of the city of Buenos Aires, Juan Carlos López. The head of government of the city of Buenos Aires, Aníbal Ibarra, mainly blamed the manager from the premises, Omar Chabán, whom he accused of corporate irresponsibility.

After the tragedy, the Buenos Aires government prohibited concerts in nightclubs within the city. Likewise, it was established that all dance clubs should remain closed for 15 days, after which those who renew their authorization would be allowed to open, with new conditions.

Call for referendum

On January 31, the head of government Ibarra announced at a press conference his intention to call a mandatory and binding referendum, in which his continuity in office would be defined.

Article 67 of the Constitution of the City of Buenos Aires calls for the electorate to claim the revocation of the mandate, with 20% of the signatures on the electoral roll (approximately 520,000 signatures), notwithstanding what which Ibarra made a presentation before the Justice to obviate this step. Finally, the presentation was rejected, after which some pro-government groups began to collect the signatures so that the vote could take place. Finally, the signatures were not obtained and the consultation was never carried out.

Impeachment

Aníbal Ibarra was pointed out by the relatives of the victims as one of the greatest perpetrators of the tragedy.

The Legislature had to decide whether to impeach the Head of Government. The prosecution mechanism is as follows: every two years the Legislature is divided by lottery into an Accusing Chamber, whose function is to determine whether impeachment is carried out, and a Trial Chamber, which is in charge of determining whether impeachment is appropriate. dismissal of the official. The Accusing Chamber is made up of 75% of the legislators and the Trial Chamber for the remaining 25%, always respecting the proportionality of the parties. The accusing chamber must appoint a commission in the first session of the year investigator who analyzes the facts, guaranteeing the defense of the accused. If the favorable votes of two thirds of its members are obtained in the accusing chamber, the accusation is processed and the official is suspended from his duties without pay. Then the debate goes to the Court of Judgment, which, if it obtains the favorable vote of two thirds of its members, dismisses the official and can disqualify him from holding public office for 10 years.

Accusing Room

On November 14, 2005, the prosecution chamber of the Buenos Aires City Legislature voted to impeach Aníbal Ibarra. The vote had been attempted on November 10, but incidents caused by some relatives of the victims caused the legislators of the Front for Victory to withdraw from the session. Due to this, entry was limited to only 10 relatives, which it aroused the discomfort of the different groups. The accusing chamber that day was made up of 43 legislators, since two were absent. With 30 votes in favor, 7 against and 6 abstentions, the court approved the impeachment trial and Aníbal Ibarra was suspended from his position, being replaced by the Vice Head of Government Jorge Telerman.

Judgment Room

After the dismissal of Ibarra, Jorge Telerman assumed the Head of Government.

When the accusing chamber ruled, a debate began on the conformation of the trial chamber. On October 23, there were legislative elections in Buenos Aires, so the partisan makeup of the Legislature changed, as did the makeup of the courtroom. As the new legislators took office on December 10, the debate was whether the room should remain made up of the legislators leaving office or if they should be replaced by those who took office. A room made up of the former legislators was in favor of the suspended Head of Government, since his political allies had not obtained a good result in the last elections and with the change there would be more opponents. Like art. 93rd of the Constitution of the City of Buenos Aires establishes that every two years the rooms must be formed and art. 4th considers the acts of those who prolong functions null, the intention that the outgoing legislators remain did not prosper. The courtroom had four months to rule, and if it did not do so within that period, Ibarra would be acquitted.

The room was made up of 15 Legislators and chaired by the president of the Superior Court of Justice of the City of Buenos Aires, Julio Maier. In addition, three deputies, members of the Accusing Chamber and elected by their peers, acted as Prosecutors. These were Jorge San Martino, Jorge Enríquez and Rubén Devoto. The defense of the suspended Head of Government was in charge of Julio César Strassera, who was attacked by parents of the victims during a visual inspection of the burned premises.

On February 16, 2006, legislator Gerardo Romagnoli resigned from the Trial Chamber because, according to his statements, the Political Trial is distracting from the possibility of knowing the truth about political responsibilities, and he accused the Legislature of excluding itself from be investigated.

The departure of the Buenos Aires legislator was going to complicate the possibilities of removing the suspended Head of Government Aníbal Ibarra from office, since Romagnoli had expressed his intention to vote for his removal. For this reason, some Buenos Aires deputies and parents of the victims suspected a bribery by the resigning party, suspicion that was not proven. However, the Court did not accept the resignation and Gerardo Romagnoli continued in the Court until the completion of the trial.

On March 7, 2006, the Political Trial against Aníbal Ibarra ended. The Judicial Chamber of the Legislature removed him from his position, but there was no consensus to disqualify him for 10 years. The vote took place with 10 votes in favor, 4 against and one abstention; exactly the two-thirds necessary for the dismissal. The position of Head of Government was definitively held by Jorge Telerman.

Closure of Bartolomé Miter street (2004—2012)

A section of Mitre Street was converted into a sanctuary, called a "place of memory".

The hanging slippers became an icon of tragedy.

After the fire, Bartolomé Miter street, where the premises were located, was closed to vehicular traffic by court order. A monument was placed in one corner that commemorates the victims with photos and offerings, and in the land adjacent to the train station, a small square with plaques and other elements was inaugurated.

For several years the street remained closed. This measure affected not only automobile traffic but also several bus lines that passed through said street and had to make a detour of several blocks. The area, next to Plaza Miserere and close to the city center, attracts vehicular traffic very numerous. Between those affected and those that pass through the area, there are about 30 bus lines in the area.

Due to this situation, several local merchants demanded the reopening of said street to traffic, presenting complaints about the noise and vibrations caused by the buses that affect the old buildings. In December 2009, the Government of the City of Buenos Aires informed that there was a project for the opening of the street.

The reopening of the street was a sensitive issue because there were parents of victims of this disaster who opposed the return of vehicles to circulate there.

The Tragedy of Once on February 22, 2012 highlighted the need for Bartolomé Miter street to be reopened: firefighters and medical squads had to make detours that cost minutes of valuable time in the race against time to rescue the Victims trapped on the train. From that episode, talks to reopen Mitre accelerated.

On March 13, 2012, after the Government of the City of Buenos Aires reached an agreement with the families of Cromañón's victims, Bartolomé Miter street was reopened. The agreement consisted of keeping the street as pedestrian, build a parallel street where traffic can circulate while preserving a sanctuary and respecting the memory of the victims.

Impact on society

The Cromañón tragedy caused a strong impact throughout Argentine society, became the ubiquitous topic in the media, generated debates about the degree of guilt of those involved, focused on the infrastructure of events with assistance public, as well as irregularities and current corruption, and generated a deep self-criticism about the practices that until then were encouraged in rock (especially in neighborhood rock), such as the "culture of hold on", soccer, the search to gather as many people as possible and the use of fireworks.

In its February 2005 issue, Rolling Stone Argentina magazine dedicated an extensive note, titled "Pasión, Muerte y Rock&Roll", where he reflected on all the points that emerged over time in the Argentine rock scene, points that silently and slowly led to the Cromañón tragedy:

Suddenly our generation, which grew up in democracy and learned to expect almost nothing from governments—but almost all of rock and its common, festive and protective experience—shuddered to the abyss and discovered that there was no one above it. And the mixed feelings of misery and fury result in risky reactions: to resist the institutions and to remove them from us (and to choose as symbols to the groups that most criticize them) we first went to demand a care that (appeared) we had never wanted and, hence, to demand an almost police state. The utopia of the rock of living "on the side of the world" was set on fire: neither the rock that seemed best to represent those codes of solidarity and belonging, nor the rock entrepreneur who promised another way of conceiving the business (now it seems that Chaban is only a half shadow, when yesterday was the model of the countercultural producer), nor much less the government of the city with more progressive and inclusive discourse could interrupt this dramatic chain that begins with profits. We had to get here to understand that well implemented control is not a conservative principle, but a popular right. (...)

"I was in the sanctuary and I saw a sentence painted on the wall that struck me. He said, "Stop stealing the future." And I think that sums up everything," says Eli [guitarrist and singer of Los Gardelitos], who shares a lot of audience with Callejeros. "Because before they killed those pipes, they stole the illusion. Those pipes were looking for the future in the light of the bengalas. But, paradoxically, they died asphyxiated in the dark. I see them when they put bengalas on the shows of Los Gardelitos and, I tell you, their eyes look for faith there. Those kids know they don't have a future. They don't care if they all die, today, tomorrow or yesterday. That's why this catastrophe is generational. It's the first big blow we suffered." (...)

As Mario Wainfeld wrote in Page/12, Cromañón's catastrophe is a metaphor for Argentina. By predictable and, at the same time, inevitable. Inevitable because there were no signs left to foresee it and yet no one did anything (or at least enough) to stop it. We had her there, in front of our noses. Inspectors, rulers, entrepreneurs, musicians, chroniclers, followers who put the bengalas under the templates or between the hair then shine more than the rest. "We can't interpret that to have fun we have to violate foreign space... It's a fascist attitude," Ciro Pertusi wrote in an open letter shortly after the fire.

It is not one of those cases where it can be said: I hope these deaths will serve for something. They're useless. But suppose, for a moment, that we are able to learn something of horror. Suppose we come to understand that the problem does not end in the flare, in Chaban, or in Ibarra. Let's assume that this fatal symptom conjures decades of deterioration and we revert to certain things such as respect for one's own life and integrity and others. And suppose we demand the same treatment from our representatives. No one would put his hands on fire because something like that will happen; but the least we can do is try.

Rolling Stone ArgentinaFebruary 2005.

On February 13, 2005, the newspaper Página/12 published an article entitled "How the hand came" where it brought together writers and journalists from the Argentine rock in a deep debate about the factors that led to Cromañón:

The ritual: bengalas and flags

Plotkin: “The ritual begins with the massification of Los Redondos, although it is a joke of destiny, because it is a band that had no demagogy. But there was something in the speech of the Solari Indian that talked about disintegrating that barrier between audience and artist. The journeys to the interior were a consecration of that very strong liturgy, there it was all seen, the sacrifice, the sacrificial of the rock show, were pilgrimages, with pipes going hungry, cold, in the open. And the moment of reward was the show and the notion that you were going to have a place of prominence in that kind of ceremony.”

D’Addario: “All the things that we now see as dangerous made the rock party. We saw them as natural and Chaban was a nice blackmailer. No one questioned the bengalas. You weren't approaching, but you didn't write it. And the bands didn't say it either. It was an added value, he made the stage of the show, he gave it colorful. (...)

Sanchez: “The bengalas began with the Redondos, but I don’t remember them in closed places with them. I never saw it wrong, except when I went to see Bersuit to Works and thought it should be a dangerous medium. In the magazine we put in the technical tab quantity of bengalas and saw it as a picturesque thing. It was naturalized. And no one said it in the media either: no one said ‘what danger’. I never thought of it past a burner or it would cost you to breathe. It was part of the show. It's also annoying that they say it's wrong for the show to move from top to bottom, as if that was bad in itself. (...)

Rock pyme: the business of doing all alone

Plotkin: “The recitals that are made without advertising pay are very significant for the mass rock audience. If they fill a stadium, the feeling is they're real, it's on the street. The Renga filled Hurricane last year without an inch of notice anywhere. I don't know if there's such a case in the world. Many assume the speech of pyme, an independent company. Taking care of security at one point is the idea of ‘we manage ourselves’. Or: ‘We prefer our uncontrollableness before the repressive control of institutions and in that uncontrollable we are safer’. That idea that went to hell with Cromañón. (...) Perhaps what was left now is the idea of omnipotent independence. Neither Cromañón was the most container nor Callejeros was the group that could control everything. But there is also a generational difference. La Renga took growth for many years and was building its own control and a very large and strong business structure. Streetrs started playing for 2000 and ended for 15,000 in a year. In that upward vertigo there were obviously things that escaped from their hands.”

Sanchez: “The Redondos are the ones who have the idea of moving out of business... and doing business outside as well. Because business has to be. They partnered with companies to control the situation; La Renga also does. But there is a confusion of how production is conceived. You have to negotiate to keep growing, and with people you know, with professionals, not with volunteer friends. What happened to Callejeros might have to do with a bad conception of understanding the business. If I get a son of a bitch, I'd say the blame is for the Redondos. They didn't write the manual on how to handle their company. I wish they had.”

Page 1213 February 2005.

The flare problem would prove difficult to completely eradicate, and it would continue for years to come in the Argentine rock scene.

Very shortly after Cromañón, on February 6, 2005, at the Las Pelotas concert at Cosquín Rock, a fan lit a flare, which caused the band to stop the show and forced the fan to turn it off.

A few months later, on July 9, 2005, at the La Renga recital at the Vélez Stadium, flares were seen, which prompted the singer, Chizzo, to say "out of respect to Cro-Magnon, no more flares to be lit".

On January 19, 2007, at the Divididos recital at the Fiesta Provincial del Mar y del Acampante in El Cóndor (Río Negro), a fan lit a flare, which caused the band's singer, Ricardo Mollo, stop the recital. Once the flare was extinguished, the show continued.

The band would have the same episode again on April 4, 2009, at Quilmes Rock.

However, years later, on April 30, 2011, La Renga was giving a recital at the Roberto Mouras Autodrome in La Plata when one of the followers, Iván Fontán, launched a naval flare that embedded itself in the neck of another follower, Miguel Ramírez, which caused Ramírez to be removed from the recital and sent to the Melchor Romero hospital, where he died on May 9, 2011. The case had several repercussions. La Renga canceled his show scheduled for the following weekend in Chaco and published a black set on his website as a sign of mourning. The racetrack manager canceled the Indio Solari show scheduled for September, which caused the singer to released a statement declaring his rejection of the flares. The Indio show finally took place on September 3 in Junín, with an explicit anti-flares message in the reports, advertisements, and recital screens. As for the case of Miguel Ramírez's death was defined on May 27, 2015, when Iván Fontán was sentenced to 9 and a half years in prison.

The case of the death of Miguel Ramírez generated great controversy in the environment. On May 12, 2011 Página/12 published an article entitled " cerebral del rock", where he recounted and analyzed the case, and published the visions of different musicians from the scene regarding the case, who agreed to defend La Renga. Different was the vision of the magazine La Vaca, who in her article ""The stamina" can't take it anymore" harshly criticized La Renga, the organization of the recital and all those who in the Argentine rock scene they continued making irregularities:

And every reflection must begin with a self-criticism: journalists are part of the blame for fostering «the party». It was a topic of debate just this week (...) in the presentation of Dale Magazine: for a long time, the media reflected what happened below the stage, as if it were more important than the above. And to a large extent, we keep doing it. (...)

It's time to cut it. To think what we did, what we do. To argue. To keep thinking and decide what to do. We have the right not to demand artistic quality anymore, but at least a level of show. With the right conditions in place to house the amount of people that corresponds. (...)

The Renga has her responsibility in the bad organization of the recital. A dead fan and another 59,999, who lived an inexplicable, unusual and dangerous odyssey for seeing them. They had to walk 5 kilometres through the mud and under the rain to enter or leave the Atodrome. They had to wait for hours so they could go home. That's not it. "have a hold": is to tolerate any vejamen on the part of our idols, of those who claim to worry about us and take care of us. And above, we defend them blindly.

Understand well: I'm not mixing La Renga with the flare. But if La Renga (or any other) keeps organizing the shows this way, we shouldn't go any longer. At some point we have to say That's enough.. We, journalists and spectators. We can't keep up with anything. in the name of rock. Just as we are outraged that TBA treats us like horses to travel by train we should also let these producers know of mass events that we are not satisfied.

On April 15, 2014, when the 10th anniversary of the Cromañón fire was months away, the memory of the tragedy was still very present, and the newspaper Alfil gave its opinion about the practices that the organizers of the recitals should take, as they go from being for a few attendees to being for gigantic crowds:

With backgrounds such as those mentioned above, any increase in the number of spectators in a show should merit precautions in direct proportion. Not only on the part of the producers of spectacles, but especially on the part of the authorities responsible for ensuring the well-being of that public, who, often obscured by their fanaticism, are banking unacceptable situations in order to see their idols live.

Historical importance in Argentine rock

Cromañón was a highly significant event in the history of Argentine rock, it was the type of event that marked a before and after in its evolution. After the fire, the post-Cro-Magnon era of Argentine rock began, in which the weight of the tragedy influenced the new measures, trends and musical evolution of the scene.

It was called the "Cro-Magnon effect" to the massive closure of nightclubs and cultural spaces, after the fire, which failed to comply with safety regulations. This massive closure did not occur only in the City of Buenos Aires, but also in various parts of the country. After Cromañón, new infrastructure, security, control and capacity standards were established that at first, since there were almost no that managed to qualify for those standards, caused the massive closures. Even the shock wave of Cromañón moved to the field of massive political acts, and for this reason during the first post-Cromañón years there were controls so that no more protesters attended than the space allowed.

However, the intention of the authorities to improve the security of spectators affected the independent artistic circuits. This produced the claim of various artists' associations, which ranged from the opening of new places to work to the elaboration of new regulations for considering the current one obsolete.

The massive closure of bars and nightclubs in the city of Buenos Aires was a trend that literally took years to reverse: it was only in 2007 that a new law was enacted that established new rules for the activity of venues with band presentations, under the legal figure of "culture club".

Years later, singer Walas from Massacre voiced his complaints about the way the post-Cro-Magnon mass closures were handled, and the state the scene was left in:

Before Cromañón, rock was a space of art and culture, the heritage of the artists themselves and their people. The day after the tragedy, Argentine rock became a mere entertainment for the middle class, in a hyperregulated, controlled and monopolized business by entrepreneurs and shift officials. Double tragedy.

Walas, 12 May 2011.

The scene was adapted in different ways to get around the obstacle of not being able to play in the capital. Some resorted to playing in nearby towns, where the legal regulations were different from those in the capital; An example was the case of the Konex Foundation, which in February 2005 moved its usual summer recitals to the town of Carlos Keen, from the Luján party. Most of the girl and emerging bands also used resources of this type, playing on the circuit of stores in the Buenos Aires suburbs.

Faced with the closure of small venues, the use of outdoor festivals was strengthened, a trend that had already been growing since the first Cosquín Rock in 2001 and that accelerated even more after Cromañón. In the following years, a program of festivals throughout the year established itself on the Argentine scene: Cosquín Rock, Quilmes Rock, Pepsi Music and Personal Fest.

Regarding the musical evolution of Argentine rock, after Cromañón there was a setback in support for the neighborhood rock genre, which began to suffer demonization in the media, delegitimization of its causes, and a certain rejection in part of society. According to the newspaper Página 12 about the state of neighborhood rock at the end of the 2000s:

Cromañón ripped off innocence and exposed all its dangerous potential. It made him a malefic factor, a cradle-profaner on which those parents who own a pain in eternal procession cry.

Page 1231 December 2009

However, the fall of neighborhood rock was not abrupt but rather slow and gradual in the years following Cromañón. Perhaps due to the inertia with which neighborhood rock bands had been recording and playing for years, perhaps due to prior commitments from the record market, perhaps due to the fidelity and soccer-like passion of the followers of neighborhood rock bands, perhaps Once due to the slowness in changing pre-existing habits that had already existed in society for a long time, the truth is that in the first years after Cromañón, neighborhood rock bands continued to have good activity, participating in festivals, releasing albums, counting on good public adherence and good support from the record market. Towards the end of the 2000s, neighborhood rock bands were still relevant participants in the scene, the newspaper Página 12 said: & #34;a neighborhood rock that continues in force despite the ravages of time, although under increasingly severe and exclusive conditions".

In fact, Callejeros had an increase in its airplay on the radio after the tragedy (their songs "Una nueva noche fría" and "Prohibido" rotated heavily in the following months), they continued doing shows (although with more and more obstacles) and even on May 11, 2006 they released their album Señales at a price equivalent to 15 dollars, 29% more expensive than usual, and yet the album sold out quickly.

Thus, the fall of neighborhood rock took place slowly, with different events that followed one another in the years following Cromañón, especially the separations of the late 2000s and early 2010s (Jóvenes Pordioseros in 2008, Los Piojos and Bersuit Vergarabat in 2009, Callejeros in 2010, Ratones Paranoicos in 2011).

As a counterpart to the decline of neighborhood rock, the other genres on the Argentine scene were revitalized: pop rock (with bands like Babasónicos, Miranda!, Airbag, Nermkids, Azafata and Los Látigos, plus soloists like Gustavo Cerati, Fito Páez and Coti), alternative rock (with bands like Catupecu Machu, Árbol, Massacre, El Otro Yo, and Él Mató a un Policía Motorizado), reggae and ska (with bands like Los Pericos, Los Cafres, Los Auténticos Decadentes, Nonpalidece, Karamelo Santo and Los Caligaris more soloists like Fidel Nadal and Dread Mar-I), punk (with bands like Attaque 77, Dos Minutos, Expulsados, Cadena Perpetua and Smitten), and heavy metal (with bands like Rata Blanca, Almafuerte, D-mente and Carajo).

The intensification of visits by international artists influenced the revitalization of these genres, a trend that actually predated Cromañón. For example, they had already been resumed in January 2004, when Iron Maiden played on the Vélez stadium with Horcas and O'Connor as opening acts. International visits were always a weighty factor for the growth of Argentine rock, since its beginnings in the '50s, when Bill Haley & His Comets played at the Metropolitan Theater on May 7, 1958, since apart from the opportunity to see international artists, they gave local bands the opportunity to spread through being opening acts: for example, in the aforementioned recital by Bill Haley, Eddie Pequenino's band, Mr. Roll y sus Rockers, played as opening act.

Both the increase in popularity of the genres and the increase in visits by international artists influenced the fact that, in the years following Cromañón, in the field of urban tribes other tribes apart from the Rolingas increased in popularity, such as the floggers, metalheads, punks, skinheads, rastafarians, emos, darks, rockabillies, reggaeton, chetos and cumbieros.

The neighborhood rock bands that survived the decline of the genre did so by staying together, continuing to tour and record, and appealing to political, social, and countercultural messages that found a good response from supporters of Kirchnerism. This is how in the post-Cromañón era neighborhood rock bands such as La Renga, La Mancha de Rolando, Las Pastillas del Abuelo, Los Gardelitos, La 25, El Bordo, Salta La Banca and La Beriso survived, and solo projects had a good response. del Indio Solari, Gustavo Cordera, Ciro Martínez and Juanse.

Memory Space

In October 2022, the Argentine government expropriated the complex where the bowling alley was located on fire on December 30, 2004 during the Callejeros show that caused the death of 194 people to transform it into a Memory Space.

Tributes

In 2015, station Eleven on Subway line H was renamed "Once-30 de Diciembre" in tribute to the victims