Cornelio Saavedra
Cornelio Judas Tadeo de Saavedra (Otuyo, corregimiento of Potosí, viceroyalty of Peru, current territory of Bolivia; September 15, 1759-Buenos Aires, United Provinces of the Río de la Plata; 29 of March 1829) was a merchant, chapter member and statesman Rioplatense. He participated in the second English invasion of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata as head of the Patricios Corps and intervened decisively in the May Revolution. He was the president of the First Government of the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata, officially called the government provision the big board in which that was transformed.
General in Chief of the Auxiliary Army of Alto Peru, his departure was used by opponents who replaced the Board of Big for the first triumvirate, dismissing it and studying arrest orders against him, being forced to remain away from Buenos Aires until that the charges were removed in 1818.
Biographical data
Cornelio Saavedra was born on September 15, 1759 in an agricultural hacienda called " La Fombera " On the shore of the Mataca River near the town of Otuyo. The hacienda was in the middle of the 180 km road that linked the imperial villa of Potosí with silver, both dependent on the viceroyalty of Peru. According to the archived baptism departure in the Casa de la Moneda de Potosí, she was baptized in the same place the next day by Dr. José del Barco y Oliva, Cura and Vicar of the Parish of Santa Ana de Mataca, La Vieja. It was her godmother, India Pascuala who officiated from midwife.
His parents were Santiago Felipe de Saavedra y Palma, a native of Buenos Aires, and Teresa Rodríguez de Güiraldes, from the Imperial Villa of Potosí. The family moved to Buenos Aires in 1767.
The Royal College of San Carlos opened its activity as such on February 24, 1773 with the dictation of the annual logic course by the presbyter Carlos José Montero. Among the first 18 students of that secondary level institution was Cornelio Saavedra, 14 years old. To enter, a previous Latin grammar exam should be approved, an indispensable condition for the study of philosophy. In successive years he approved the Physics and Metaphysics courses. After the philosophy course, in 1776, he appeared among the students of the first year of theology, receiving a degree in this knowledge in 1779. However, he could not continue with university studies because he had to devote himself to the administration of family assets.
His family belonged, for his economic capacity and prestige, to the elite that dominated the town hall of Buenos Aires. On April 17, 1788, Cornelio Saavedra married - with the corresponding ecclesiastical dispensation due to the impediment of the second lateral degree of consanguinity - with her cousin sister María Francisca Cabrera y Saavedra who had welcomed two years before inheriting the fortune of her husband Mateo Ramón ÁLZAGA AND SOBRADO PROSPERO MERCIANTE AND Lieutenant of the Make Make. This type of endogamic marriage was one of the forms of reproduction, reinforcement and maintenance of that capitular elite. In the marriage record that appears in the Cathedral of Buenos Aires, it states that the parents of both parties were councilors.
In 1798 his wife died with whom he had three children and in 1801 he married María Saturnina Bárbara Otárola del Ribero daughter of Colonel José Antonio Gregorio de Otárola y Larrazábal and Josefa del Ribero and Cossio. His was the councilor of the Cabildo of Buenos Aires and one of the richest merchants in the territory.
Capitular Functions
In 1797, a year before the death of his first wife, he began his career in the Cabildo de Buenos Aires, where he will assume different administrative positions. As a member of the important family of the AOIZ, the chronological sequence of the positions played shows the non -compliance with the current norms, typical of the strategy of that family (and others), in contrast, for example, with the Belgrano family that fulfilled them.
GUIDOR OF THE CABILDO DE BUENOS AIRES
in 1797 he was appointed fourth councilor of the Cabildo. The following year he was a third councilor with the Annex of General Defender of Minors. This function was linked to the promotion in all the causes of minors, which required the help of an agent and a lawyer who, according to the cases and the period, had to solve the councilor. In addition to this economic cost, the position demanded a lot of work and subjects were chosen " of distinction and probity ", and above all honesty, since they had to guard and maintain the assets of the rich minors. Normally the money of these lent itself to the Cabildo who paid an interest in the use of the funds. In July 1801, Saavedra intervened in a case of pedophilia, whose victims had been students of a school in the Cathedral area. The defendant, a natural Indian of the missions, was arrested when the clothes of a child who had escaped from his house were in his possession. Saavedra called to declare nine children who had been seen with the aforementioned Indian, who denounced the abuses.
<p Regarding the prohibition of the export of wheat proposed that year by the faithful executor he argued that trade, reduced only to local supply, limited the expansion of agricultural production. (AGN, IX, 20.32) In 1798, by order of the Cabildo, Saavedra had to temporarily replace the councilor Francisco Antonio Beláustegui.Trustee General
At the meeting of the Cabildo on January 1, 1799, Cornelio Saavedra was appointed general attorney, that is, defender of the rights of the inhabitants of the city.
In Buenos Aires, in the late -colonial era, the attempt to establish guilds had ancient background. In the last third of the century XVIII , pulperos, bakers, silversmiths and shoemakers tried to form union associations that could not be realized. At the end of July 1780, Virrey Vértíz ordered the aggression of mechanical artists and officers without success. In 1788, the shoemakers, based on the ruinous state of the trade due to the lack of suitable officers and foremen, which allowed " simple remendons " install workshops and offer the public " their engendros ", they proposed the constitution of a guild that controlled the training of apprentices for four years plus two years of practice as officers and only after a rigor exam grant them the range of Master in Art.
In 1793 the King did not approve the new ordinances that the Cabildo de Buenos Aires had sent in the matter. The brown and brunettes requested to constitute their own shoemaker guild with the aim of segmenting production and clientele separating from the Spaniards. In 1795, the King ordered that the viceroy be issued with the audience vote, which was favorable to the separate aggregation of the brunettes. After long procedures, the file passed in Vista to Cornelio Saavedra as a trustee of the Cabildo who on May 20, 1799 signed an extensive opinion where he justified his negative vote. The Opinion
We all know that the Author of Nature imposed on man the obligation to live with the sweat of his face; and thus this right to work, is the most sacred and imprescriptible title that knows the human race; to be persuaded that he needs the permission of a guild, not to be gracious to society, to be not idle, to gain food, is a delirium; to say that the Supreme Potestad, that is the PrinceCornelius Saavedra, DictamenMay 20, 1799 in (Levene, 1962, p. 361 et seq.)
The Cabildo adhered to the vote of the attorney general based on this new assumption of freedom of work and denied the request.
In his evaluation of the writing, the historian Ricardo Levene concluded that the Dictamen was an "admirable page" of "this illustrious patrician" [Saavedra] worthy of "figuring, due to the liberal inspiration of his ideas and democratic spirit that animates him, among the writings announcing the Revolution", praise that was widely accepted. Another historian, Enrique M. Barba, who specifically studied Saavedra's document, defined it as "the most brilliant and conceptual statement known in the Río de la Plata". For his part, Alfredo L. Palacios considered that Levene's statement was an "glaring exaggeration". However, subsequent exhaustive analyzes showed that the Opinion was not drafted by Saavedra but by Dr. Feliciano Antonio Chiclana, a fellow student at the Colegio de San Carlos and Saavedra's later employer at the prestigious law firm of his family where Saavedra worked as a clerk and whom he tried to exempt from military service, a privilege enjoyed by lawyers and their employees. It was also determined that Chiclana had been inspired by Jovellanos and had plagiarized the Basque intellectual Valentin de Foronda and that this, in turn, had had as a source the texts of the Edict of Louis XVI of France on the suppression of Guilds drawn up by Turgot in February 1776.
Grain Manager
In 1801 he was elected mayor by second vote. From 1803 to 1805, because the wheat harvests did not cover consumption, the price of flour in Buenos Aires tripled. It influenced not only the scarcity but the speculation of hoarders and contraband.
In 1804, the council prohibited the export of flour and wheat and created two markets for the sale of cereal and at the beginning of 1805 decided to buy and store wheat to create an intervention inventory to control the price of bread. By mid-March, not a pound of wheat had been purchased, so the council decided to create a Grain Administrator and appointed Cornelio Saavedra in that role. Saavedra analyzed the available inventories in the market and the prices. He requested information on the state of shortages in the provinces of Santiago del Estero, Córdoba, Mendoza and Montevideo. He searched for warehouses to keep the intervention inventory and requested a well-paid employee to take care of custody. He finally made the purchase from Benito de Olazábal, a tithe auctioneer, at nine pesos a fanega, rejecting more expensive offers. For its part, the council did not approve a proposal to import flour from Baltimore. To these measures were added others: the fines and confiscations of those who smuggled wheat from Rincón de Zárate towards the eastern side; the provision of grains to farmers for planting and the formation of a team of mayors and councilors to carry out these objectives. This mission ended in 1807 with the improvement of the crops.
First English Invasion
Saavedra's alleged loyalty oath
Produced the first of the English invasions of the Río de la Plata, during the brief English occupation of Buenos Aires, in 1806, the city councilors accepted that the English governor William Carr Beresford confirmed them in their posts. Belgrano did not agree and left Buenos Aires for the Mercedes Chapel, in the Banda Oriental.
Next, on July 10, 1806, Beresford proposed that the principal residents could voluntarily swear allegiance to His Britannic Majesty. For this purpose, he set up an office in charge of Captain Alexander Gillespie and a book to record the respective oath. Fifty-eight people signed the book. At the beginning of the XX century, lawyer, translator and diplomat Carlos A. Aldao traveled to the Foreign Office in London to access the aforementioned document and identify the signatories, but in the file from the period 1803-1811 referring to Buenos Aires and in relation to the subject he only found a receipt and two letters. The receipt, dated September 4, 1810, stated that Captain Gillespie had delivered a book "containing the oath of allegiance to His Britannic Majesty, signed in Buenos Aires in the course of July 1806 by 58 inhabitants of that city". In one of the letters to Spencer Perceval dated September 3, 1810, Captain Gillespie noted that three members of the new Buenos Aires junta were among the signatories who had joined H.M. British in 1806. Of them he mentioned the names of two: Juan José Castelli and Cornelio Saavedra, although only with respect to Castelli he explicitly states that he had signed, it is not clear if Saavedra had also signed. In the private letter he sent to Juan José Viamonte on June 27, 1811, Saavedra mentioned Castelli, Vieytes, French, Beruti and others of being "most affectionate towards English domination", and of wanting "the chains of Buenos Aires to be perpetuated in it". "Let us not doubt nor forget" that, he wrote he.
Gillespie clearly mentioned Juan José Castelli as an adherent, also affirming that among the signatories there were two other members of the Primera Junta and mentioning Saavedra in a confusing way. The textual quote, taken from a footnote of the translation made by Carlos Aldao himself of Gillespie's work, is the following:
Sir, I propose to serve you next Tuesday, at 12:30, with the book containing the loyalty signatures of many of the commercial inhabitants of Buenos Aires when they were under the British rule. With reference to these names, I observe in comparison with the list of those who make up the current government of that city: a knight Don Francisco Yose Castelli, who follows in order to Saavacha, the boss. My annotations added to your signature are the following: Very capable person, has visited Europe and North America, speaks English with ease and is very fond of this country. It is natural of Lima, and has very understanding views on politics and trade [...] Alex. GillespieLetter from Alexander Gillespie to Steven Perceval, September 3, 1810
As can be seen, Gillespie misses Saavedra's last name and Castelli's first name—as well as other information, such as his place of birth—but does not clearly state that Saavedra signed the document, instead saying that Castelli was following him in order. In the oath of the Primera Junta, Saavedra was sworn in first —as president— and then Castelli, as the first of the members; for this reason it is probable that he was referring to the fact that he "follows in order" Saavedra, and not that he had sworn allegiance to the king of the invading power after Saavedra, who on the date of the oath was no one's boss. This makes the accusations of an alleged loyalty oath that Saavedra swore to the British less certain, as historians of the stature of Bernardo Lozier Almazán have argued.
Commander of the Patrician Corps
The First English Invasion of Buenos Aires ended with the expulsion of the invaders in August 1806.
As the English fleet continued to block the Río de la Plata and a new invasion was foreseeable, on September 6, 1806 Santiago de Liniers and the Cabildo invited the residents to form militia battalions, according to weapon and origin of birth.
The new Cuerpo de Patricios, made up of infantry volunteers born mostly in Buenos Aires, was the most numerous, having three battalions. Each unit could elect "plurality of votes" to its commander and officers. In a letter to Sobremonte, Liniers explained that he used this method to "strengthen the enthusiasm more" in "extreme circumstances".
This "military democracy" —according to the expression of the historian Ricardo Zorraquin Becú— was not exempt from difficulties in the case of the election of Cornelio Saavedra convened at the headquarters of the Consulate. There were other applicants for the position of commander, who for Manuel Belgrano were "men of nothing" that they aspired to that position and that, thanks to his & # 34; timely & # 34; intervention in the vote count, prevented "two dark men" They were at the head of the regiment. Finally the choice fell on the landowners Saavedra and Esteban Romero, two men who for Belgrano had "some visage" for the charge. But even so, the opponents remained and it was necessary a second call the next day in the courtyard of the Fortress to "beat them", this time with the presence of Liniers himself who —accompanied again by Belgrano— went through the ranks of the soldiers verifying that they confirmed by acclamation the name of the two chosen ones. On this basis, Bartolomé Miter affirmed that thanks to the presence of Belgrano, who was joined in the second instance by Liniers, Saavedra was chosen as commander. In an official letter dated October 14, 1807, addressed to Bernardo de Velasco, governor of Paraguay and the Missions, who had come to Buenos Aires to act as deputy inspector general in the defense of the city, Saavedra told him that his appointment was due to acclamation of "his countrymen", not only in the consular house but also in the fortress in the presence of Liniers. In neither case did he mention the presence of Belgrano.
In this way, Cornelio Saavedra was chosen as commander despite the fact that he was not a soldier by profession, vocation or study. Gorriti described him as a "parade" soldier. His status as a member of the capitular elite prevailed, for being the grandson and great-grandson of captains, for family ties through his new father-in-law, the colonel of the Royal Armies and councilor José Antonio de Otárola y Larrazabal and their organizational capacity. On October 8, 1806, Sobremonte granted him the rank of lieutenant colonel.He was then 47 years old. It was common in the late colonial period for the members of the capitular elite to try to occupy other spaces of power such as the Consulate, the Court and the high militia hierarchies, in the latter case without complying with the requirement of being a professional soldier. In this sense, the comment that Viceroy Sobremonte made to the King in this regard must be understood: "for a few years now [the city council] aspires to extend [its powers] beyond what is normal with extraordinary animosity".
Second English Invasion
On January 23, 1807, the Buenos Aires council and audience decided to send a military force to the aid of Montevideo. The next day, an advanced column under the command of Colonel Pedro de Arce, accompanied by Antonio González Balcarce and Hilarión de la Quintana and about 500 men, were transported by Captain Juan Ángel Michelena to Colonia del Sacramento. This column entered Montevideo the day before the catastrophe and after the defeat Arze and Balcarce and all those who could not escape were captured.
Withdrawal from Cologne
On January 29, Santiago de Liniers set out in command of a second column with 1,500 men, 500 of whom were from the Patricios corps under the command of Cornelio Saavedra. These forces landed some 35 km from Colonia and were immobilized when they did not receive the logistical support promised by Viceroy Sobremonte. When Liniers found out what had happened with Arce's column, he left command of his troops to Prudencio Murguiondo, returned to Buenos Aires, appearing before the town hall late on February 4, 1807, and reported the fall of Montevideo and what happened to Arce. Saavedra, who had remained in Colonia, requested the sending of larger-capacity ships to re-embark his troops, artillery, and civilians and soldiers who had fled from Montevideo. On that occasion, the militiamen of the Patricios corps refused to load the artillery on the boats. Saavedra had to resort to a measure that was in no way consistent with a hierarchical military corps: he offered them 4 reales a day to "incite them"; to carry out the task, a sum that he would ask the War Board. The soldiers constantly reminded him of said payment, and even brought complaints to Saavedra, assuming that he had omitted it. Saavedra also observed the deterioration of the clothes when carrying out these tasks, clothes that he had paid for in large part out of his own pocket and that would later bring him personal economic and financial complications. On February 8, he left Colonia with all the weapons and supplies that were in said plaza and that could be used for the defense of Buenos Aires. This withdrawal motivated the only self-compliance that he noted in his Autograph Memory for his military performance "in the service of the country"; in this period. The English Lieutenant Colonel Denis Pack occupied Cologne on March 5, 1807.
Defense of Buenos Aires
In view of the advance towards Buenos Aires of the English troops from the Barragán cove, where they had disembarked on June 28, 1807, Liniers ordered the defense of the city placing his forces in the area of Barracas, on the right bank of the Creek.
The battalion of the Patricios corps, under the command of Saavedra, was part of the forces of Colonel César Balbiani (right flank, red flag) who later had to enter the city before the surrounding movement made by the English and who led to the Battle of Miserere.
Saavedra and his sergeant major Juan José Viamonte were ordered to defend with 400 men the Real Colegio de San Carlos, transformed into the headquarters of the Patricios corps, and the adjacent area. The school was a very important strategic point due to its proximity to the square and its solid construction and height, which allowed it to dominate the surrounding rooftops. When the English column under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Henry Cadogan unscrupulously attacked the school, it suddenly received intense fire from the roofs, windows and barricades placed in the street. The entire enemy vanguard was annihilated, including the servants of the artillery and the trailing mules. The survivors had to seek refuge in some houses from which they were expelled and captured. In his Autograph Memoria Saavedra recognized "the correct measures taken for his defense by the brave and experienced officer Juan José Viamonte".
Certification of services
On July 20, 1807, Saavedra went to Velasco to prove the behavior of his men and "just like me", for "this testimony" to be able to receive thanks from the King for defending these domains. On the same date, Velasco issued the following official letter:
Bernardo de Velasco y Huidobro, colonel of the real armies, Governor Intendente by His Majesty of the province of Paraguay and thirty towns of Misiones de Indios Guaranís y Tapes, Major General of infantry and cavalry of this capital [Buenos Aires] and Subinspector General in commission, etc.: Certifico, que el commander del primer batallón del Cor de patencia procy(Lobo and Malagamba, 1875, p. 415-416)
Saavedra also requested similar certifications from the second Chief of the army, César Balbiani, from the Royal Court, from the sergeant major of the capital, José María Cabrer, etc.
The mutiny of Álzaga
After the successful resistance against occupation, relations between the inhabitants of Buenos Aires were modified. Until then, the Creoles, the Spaniards born in America, had always been relegated in decision -making and power disputes. With the creation of Creole militias and the fact that victory was achieved in both cases without the military intervention of the metropolis, sectors began to manifest that, in different degrees, advocated modifying the established situation and having a greater presence and influence on The Government. Saavedra was one of the key figures of this situation, since it commanded the most numerous regiment and its position was then decisive in disputes. Since 1808 he participated in the meetings in the Jabonia de Hipólito Vieytes and in the house of Nicolás Rodríguez Peña, where the steps to follow to achieve their goals were discussed. Saavedra was characterized by a more prudent and calculating approach to the measures to carry out the revolution, which contrasted with the most radical ideas of the group, such as Mariano Moreno and Juan José Castelli.
On January 1, 1809, Mayor Martín de Álzaga went to the city's town hall in an attempt to depose the viceroy Liniers, using his French nationality as a pretext to accuse him of plotting with France. This country was at war with Spain at that time, in conflicts known as Napoleonic wars. Álzaga's movements were backed by the governor of Montevideo, Francisco Javier de Elío, who for the reasons cited had unknown the legitimacy of Liniers and formed a Government Board in that city. His idea was to depose the viceroy and that a Government Board assumed control of the viceroyalty, to imitation of the joints that replaced in Spain the authority of King Ferdinand VII, prisoner of Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte. The rebels took the council and demanded the resignation of Viceroy, also surrounding the current Plaza de Mayo. They achieved the resignation of the viceroy. But Saavedra reacted quickly and managed to disrupt the attempt.
This assonated had no independence motivations, and was mainly directed by peninsular Spaniards. His main drivers were banished to Carmen de Patagones. A few months later, to stop disputes, the Board of Seville resolved that Liniers were replaced by Baltasar Hidalgo de Cisneros.
After the failure of the Asonada de Álzaga, Saavedra was transformed into a referee of local politics. The revolutionaries looked for him to support his movements. Saavedra calculated as inevitable that Spain fell to the forces of Napoleon Bonaparte and considered that the most conducive moment to execute a revolutionary movement would be when the news of the Napoleonic victory arrived:
Several meetings were held, they were talking hotly about these projects and wanted to run over everything. I was always opposed to these ideas. All my decision or opinion was to say to them: "Paisanos y señores, aún no es tiempo; [...] let the brevas mature and then we will eat them.".Authograph report in (Saavedra, 1960, p. 1050)
During the crisis of mid -1809, for the replacement of the viceroy Liniers, he had some contacts with Carlotism, that is, the tendency that he intended to enthrone the River of La Plata to Princess Carlota Joaquina de Borbón as a previous step to The independence of Spain. However, the support of Elío and Liniers to the new viceroy, Baltasar Hidalgo de Cisneros, made it clear that " it was not yet time ". So, after a letter of support to the princess, who had no consequence, he refused to secondary to his supporters in that policy.
The May Revolution
In May 1810, the news of the fall of all Spain in French hands arrived in Buenos Aires, except in Cádiz, where a Regency Council had formed that replaced the Supreme Board of Seville. This news triggered the revolutionary process known as May Revolution. The process management was in the hands of a secret group composed of Manuel Belgrano, Juan José Paso, Juan José Castelli, Nicolás Rodríguez Peña, Mariano Moreno and Hipólito Vieytes, among others. These needed the support of Cornelio Saavedra and the other military leaders to act, since without them they would not have had the power to face the viceroy.
In a famous and extensive letter to Juan José Viamonte, Saavedra presented his previous participation:
It is true that Peña, Vieytes and others wanted in advance to make the revolution, that is, since January 1, 1809, and that I was opposed because I did not consider it timely. It is true that they and others, even Castelli, spoke of this before me, but it is also that to face in the public, even when I told them to do it, and that I assured them not to make opposition to anything. In their tertulias they treated, they drew up plans and had; but to become the same as they advised or wanted, who did it? Do you remember that my answers were always: It's not time, and what's done outside of him doesn't work well.?"Letter from Saavedra to Viamonte dated in Buenos Aires, June 27, 1811 in (Marfany, 1958, p. 41)
In his Memoirs Saavedra recalled those events in this way:
Cisneros, on May 18, 1810 announced to the public for his proclamation that only Cadiz and the island of León were free from the yoke of Napoleon. I found myself that day in the village of San Isidro; don Juan José Viamonte, a senior sergeant of my body, wrote to me saying it was necessary to return to the city without delay, because there were new things; therefore, I executed it. When I introduced myself to his house, I found in it a portion of officers and other plaintiffs, whose salutation was asking me: ‘Do you still say that it is not time? [...] Then they put the proclamation of that day into my hands. After I read it, I said to them, ‘Lords, now I say it is not only time, but it should not be lost one hour’.Autograph report in (Saavedra, 1960, p. 1050-51)
It is noteworthy that Saavedra made a mistake when writing the above, confusing Cisneros's Proclamation, which only became public on the 21st, with the publications also issued by the viceroy called Copia de the articles in the London Gazeta of February 16, 17 and 24, 1810 and the Notice to the public that contained two communiqués from the Cádiz Junta dated February 3 and 6. February 1810 and which were published in Buenos Aires on May 17 and 19 respectively.
Cisneros meeting with the military
In his report of June 22, 1810, Cisneros mentioned that the decision to summon the military commanders to the meeting of May 20 was due to what he called the "dangerous state of the town" and & # 34; disorder of his untimely claims & # 34;. In the report he did not clarify what one or the other consisted of, but evidently he was referring to the rumors that were circulating about his dismissal and the proposals that Juan José Lezica and Julián de Leyva had brought him on the same day, the 20th, at noon.
* The version according to Cisneros
Cisneros began the meeting by reminding the military of the repeated oaths they had taken to defend their authority and urged them to be faithful "in the service of H.M. [His Majesty of him] and of the Fatherland & # 34;. He said that it was Saavedra who spoke for all the military and explained "warmly" (sic) that:
- His inclination was favorable to the "newness" of what was happening.
- He disclaimed the army from all responsibility by saying that the commanders were not the perpetrators of division or agitation.
- He clarified, however, that they agreed and in conformity with those authors to which Cisneros defined as "factions".
* The version according to Saavedra
Ex post facto, that is, after 16 years, Saavedra recalled in his Memoirs that at that meeting he had taken the floor for his colleagues saying:
- "We have resolved to resume our rights and to keep [beware] ourselves."
- He deflected the "forces of his command" from the authority of the vice president Cisneros because "he who gave V.E. the authority no longer exists; therefore V.E. does not have it either."
This idea was not new and both the viceroy and the rest of the commanders knew it perfectly. It was the same argument that in September 1808, Juan José Castelli, Vieytes, Antonio Luis Beruti, Nicolás Rodríguez Peña and Manuel Belgrano had maintained regarding the validity of the authority of the Central Supreme Board. Saavedra had also commented on the illegality and illegitimacy of the authority of that Board on the occasion of the appointment he made of Cisneros as viceroy.
Cisneros summarized the meeting: "With this conference [with the military] concluded like this, my authority weakened, without respect for the [military] forces, the seditious being conceited with this, I no longer saw a resource effective or even apparent [to] disrupt the ruinous project and I had to resign myself to wait for the result of the congress".
* Other testimonials
- Four days before the meeting, there was already a rumor that things were "worst in worse, [say] that they want to remove the command from Mr.Virrey, form a board." Another rumor set in a statement made by Francisco Rodriguez to the Cabildo of Montevideo. This navy mentioned that on Sunday May 20 "it began to spread by the people [of Buenos Aires] [...] that it was about removing the cane" to Cisneros.
- Several private documents that mentioned the meeting between the viceroy and the military stated that in the absence of support the viceroy had decided to resign from his post to the lobby the following day.
- La Salem Gazeta, newspaper of the port of Salem in Massachusetts, published on August 24, 1810 the testimony of American Cook, overload of the ship Venus which was operating in the port of Buenos Aires between April 28 and June 19, 1810. The navy declared that at that meeting the virrey was asked for abdication in the act or promise to execute it in the morning of the following day threatening the use of force if not
- The same thing Juan Manuel Beruti picked up in his Curious memories where the military said "that the people would abdicate so and in that way avoid the tumult that was exposing the people and their people." And as the viceroy "had no remedy, he replied to the mayor that in order to answer his request [for waiver] it would be made known to him the most excelent lobby, which he would answer."
- Another important testimony was the report of the former Royal Audience of Buenos Aires of September 7, 1810 dated in the city of Las Palmas. There it is found that the "facciosos"(sic) having convinced the commanders and officers, presented themselves to the Cabildo [on May 19] to "promote for themselves the separation of the viceroy and the establishment of a new government that depended on the will of the people" threatening that, if not, "they themselves were willing to do it by force". The proposal was that the members of the Cabildo, in private session, should remove the viceroy and then, in an open lobby, constitute a new government.
*Marfany analysis
The historian Roberto Marfany, after an exhaustive analysis, determined that both the minutes of the town council of May 21 and Cisneros's report of June 22, 1810 concealed and/or distorted the truth of the events. The resignation agreed with the military on the night of the 20th and that the councilors Ocampo and Domínguez brought on the morning of the 21st for Cisneros to sign, later became a request for an open council and its corresponding authorization, which is what they ultimately wanted. the mayor Lezica and the viceroy.
According to Marfany, the congress or open council was then a desperate official resource for Cisneros to save, with the vote of "the good guys", "the "sensible neighborhood", "neighbors of distinction" or the "main neighbors" his authority about to succumb and concludes that it was not the junta members, civilian or military, who requested the open council.
It is accepted as truth that it was the Revolution that managed the open lobby [...]. The main historiography considers that in that assembly "the measures that the critical situation advised would be taken", an imprecise formula that does not define the motive of the Revolution nor has it been able to discover the true origin of that open lobby.(Marfany, 1981, p. 1)
Another of Saavedra's inadvertent inaccuracies, according to Marfany due to the time that had elapsed, was to say that Cisneros ended that meeting by accepting the holding of the open meeting "as requested".
Historiography admitted in fact that the text of the invitation to the congress was sent to the printer on the 21st, after Cisneros signed the respective authorization setting the date and time for the meeting. But Marfany discovered that he was sent on the 20th and for that reason, the date and time on the printed form were blank. If it had been sent on the 21st, these two details, which were already known, would have been printed on the invitation and it would not have been necessary to complete them by hand.
Open Town Hall
The following day an armed group, headed by Domingo French and Antonio Beruti, occupied the Plaza de la Victoria, demanding that the Cabildo Abierto be held, since they doubted that Cisneros would hold it. Saavedra distracted the crowd by assuring them that the Patricios Regiment supported his claims.
On May 22, an Open Town Hall was held, in which various positions were expressed regarding the legitimacy or not of the viceroy's authority and, in the latter case, whether he should remain in office. Saavedra was silent for the most part, while he waited for his turn to speak. Among others, the most important speakers were Bishop Benito Lué y Riega, Juan José Castelli, Pascual Ruiz Huidobro, Manuel Genaro Villota, Juan José Paso and Juan Nepomuceno Sola. Saavedra was the last to speak. He proposed that the command be delegated to the Cabildo until the formation of a government junta, in the manner and manner that the council deemed appropriate. He highlighted the phrase that
"(...) and there is no doubt that it is the people who confer authority or command."
When the vote was carried out, Castelli's position was coupled with his, and said joint position was the one that finally prevailed with 87 votes.
The council appointed a board chaired by Cisneros, with four members, two Spaniards and two Creoles. The latter were Castelli and Saavedra. At first they were sworn in, but under pressure from Belgrano and his group, and the agitation of the people and the militias, they resigned that same night. The maneuver of appointing a board chaired by Cisneros was considered contrary to the will of the open council. The following day, May 25, despite the energetic resistance of the syndic Julián de Leyva, the council was forced to accept a new list, formed by an agreement between supporters of Saavedra, Belgrano and Álzaga, in which each sector contributed three members. The president of the resulting First Board of government was Cornelio Saavedra. In the act of installation of the Board, only Cornelio Saavedra and Miguel de Azcuénaga expressed exceptions before taking the oath. Saavedra explained the reasons why he accepted the new position in this second Board:
[....] that the day before had made a formal resignation from the position of the first established Board [sic], and that only to contribute to the public safety and health of the people admitted the one who conferred him again; asking to sit in the record is his exhibition.(Angelis, 1836, p. 49)
Its official name was Provisional Government Board of the Río de la Plata Provinces in the name of Mr. D. Fernando VII.
Protocol treatment as viceroy
The different ways of participating and occupying a certain place in processions, in church, in public acts and the permitted use of certain clothes or uniforms, the use of special chairs, cushions, badges, etc. They occupied an important space in colonial society. These rituals and ceremonies were a means to preserve the "social order" and they established for each individual or corporation the place they occupied and the privileges they enjoyed in society and although they seemed immutable acts of theatricality they were the object of permanent dispute and modifications. Within this framework, the two protocol measures adopted by the Governing Council on May 24 and 25, 1810 must be understood:
- In relation to Cisneros, as the vocal president of the board formed on May 24, he determined that he should maintain the "preeminences of the office" and the "honours corresponding to his graduation and class" he had as viceroy.
- In relation to the Board chaired by Saavedra, the lobby took off the subject and let it define the ceremonial to be observed, that is, "the treatment, honors and distinctions of the body and its individuals."
For that reason, on May 28, the Board published an instruction on some aspects of the ceremonial. The rush he gave to this issue showed the relevance he had for the government and his concern to build a new " symbolic domination ", that is, the clear and different union between power and the public ceremonial. In the Instruction " which will serve as a rule in the dispatch method and ceremonial in public acts ", signed by the secretary Doctor Mariano Moreno, it was determined:
[...]VI. In representations and ex officio papers, the Board shall be given the treatment of Excellence; but the vowels shall have no particular treatment;VII. The weapons will do to the Board the same honors as to the Virreyes and in the functions of the board, the same ceremonial will be kept with it;
VIII. The President will receive in his person the treatment and honours of the Board as President of the Board, which will be taxed in every situation [...].(Blanco, 1875, p. 465-466)
Thus, Saavedra maintained the position of commander of the Patricians or military chief of the square; that of head of the "militia party" or armed support of the government and that of the president of the Junta, and also subrogated in his person the ceremonial treatment equivalent to that of the viceroys. A witness at the time stated:
[...] [The treatment of excellence and the other external signs of distinction that the virreys, such as cars, lackeys, edecans, escort, military honors in the guards and barracks and seats of preference in the concurrences and public functions were preserved] in their own person [... ](Nuñez, 1857, p. 173)
The First Meeting
The role of Cornelio Saavedra as president of the First Board was a mediator, rather than promoter of revolutionary policies. This last role was fulfilled by Juan José Castelli and the Secretary of Government Mariano Moreno.
Moreno and Saavedra became the main protagonists of an internal dispute that took place, on the different visions of the meaning of the May Revolution. The morenistas aspired to generate deep changes in society, while the Saavedristas sought only the arrival of the Creoles to power but maintaining the continuity of the social system of the viceroyalty, of which their heirs were considered.
Moreno thought of reducing the influence of Saavedra, and for this a new regiment of militias was created, whose officers were arrected to their revolutionary ideas: the América Regiment, directed by the Morenista Chiefs French and Beruti.
Shortly after the May Revolution, former Viceroy Santiago de Liniers began organizing a counterrevolutionary offensive from the city of Córdoba, which was quickly defeated by Francisco Ortiz de Ocampo and Hipólito Vieytes. These, however, did not want to execute Liniers since Ocampo had fought with him during the English invasions, and instead they sent prisoners to all leaders to Buenos Aires. Cornelio Saavedra signed the order to kill all of Arcabuz, as well as the entire First Board, with the exception of Manuel Alberti that excused himself for his status as a priest.
Honors Suppression Decree
At the end of the year 1810, the absence of Belgrano and Castelli due to the respective military missions to Paraguay and Alto Peru concentrated the driving conflict that existed within the Board essentially in Saavedra and Moreno. Saavedra
[...] suffered the vertiginous rhythm of the events that the energetic secretary absorbed without difficulty, seeing in fact reduced his prerogatives.(Horowicz, 2004, p. 207)
On December 5, 1810, at the Patricios barracks, a dinner was held to commemorate the victory in Suipacha. In it, and in accordance with the protocol, Colonel Juan Antonio Pereyra arranged a place of honor for Saavedra and his wife Saturnina Otárola. At one point, the officer Atanasio Duarte, in a drunken state, took a crown of sugar from the table and presented it to Saavedra's wife, asking at the same time for a toast to the "emperor[sic] of South America". Upon learning of this episode, the following day Moreno presented a decree known as the "Suppression of honors," which was signed the same day by Saavedra and the rest of the Board and published on Saturday, December 8 in the Extraordinary Gazette of Buenos Aires. The "regulation"[sic] consisted of 16 articles:
- The first annulled "in all its parts" Article 8. Instructions of May 28, 1810 that had given protocol treatment of virrey to the president of the Board.
- Article 5 provided that any decree, office and order of the Board should bring at least four signatures to which the respective secretary had to be added. In the following article, it was clarified that those who fulfilled orders without taking into account this requirement would be responsible for their execution. Both articles eroded the basis of the almost unparalleled power of Saavedra by establishing collective control over the militia.
- Four articles were dedicated to the theme of "brindis". In one of them he set the famous phrase "no inhabitant of Buenos Aires, neither drunk nor asleep, must have intentions against the freedom of his country" in allusion to Duarte who was spared his life for being drunk but who was banished from the life of the city.
- Other articles referred to certain privileges or "excesses" that should be limited: the conduct of soldiers who make guards, prerogatives of officials' wives and the use of preferential places in theatre, bullfighting, etc.
On the night of the party, the guards had prevented Moreno from entering the barracks. But the arrogance of some militiamen were not new. Neighbors, and even members of the council, had protested these excessive behaviors. On one occasion a sentinel insulted Martín de Álzaga. In his complaint, he described the act as "subversion of security". [AGN-IX-195-11, p=822-823]. In another episode certain officials occupied seats in the cathedral that did not correspond to them. As for the wives of officials, it was customary for them to be assigned preferential places in different public activities, keeping the hierarchical order of their husbands in mirror image. In bullfights, the council used to establish a specific box and decorate two chairs with their respective cushions and rugs for Saavedra, his wife, and the women who accompanied her. These were excesses over the honors that the Junta had granted only to the president of the Junta and that Moreno, in the recitals of the decree, now attributed to the
[...] venal and low men, who do not have other resources for their fortune, that those of the vile adulation, tempt in a thousand ways those who command, flatter all their passions and try to buy their favor at the expense of the rights and prerogatives of others.(Gaceta de Buenos Aires, 1910, p. 711)
According to Saavedra, the measure provoked an immediate reaction among the officers of Patricios' regiment who felt "offended" and "determined not to allow" the application of so "arbitrary and degrading" decree and that it did not "cost him little" I work to calm them down.
Saavedra could not hide his anger at the loss of those special honors. Proof of this was the letter he sent to his friend and confidant Feliciano Antonio Chiclana on January 15, 1811. He explained that the conflict with Moreno was due to personal issues: it was "emulation and envy" 3. 4; that he had for her, it was revenge for the "mockery"; that he had done to her on January 1, 1809 and it was the & # 34;jealousy and suspicions & # 34; de Moreno for the "benevolence" that all the "people" [he later clarified: & # 34; the sensible & # 34;] manifested to him. Saavedra said that for these reasons, Moreno managed to "raise tempers" of the members of the Board against him, attributing things to him that he had not said, naming him only by the & # 34; 2nd part of Liniers & # 34;, using the & # 34; brindis del Borrachón & # 34; as "supposed coronation and proclamation", take advantage of that episode to try to arrest him and even assassinate him the same night of December 5 and, finally, after resigning his position as secretary, "make a party" 3. 4; against him. He described Moreno's politics as a "Robesperrian system"; and defined him as a "man of low sphere, revolutionary [troublemaker] by temperament, arrogant and icy", "barbarian" "cruel and bloodthirsty" and "Demon from Hell". He defined Matheu and Manuel Alberti as & # 34; henchmen & # 34; de Moreno and Miguel de Azcuénaga as someone who "lets himself go". Regarding the signature that he had to put on the decree, he said: & # 34; and I agreed to make them [sic] see his lightness & # 34; thus pointing out to Chiclana that despite the fact that the other members agreed with the decree, he had not signed it due to their pressure". On August 3, 1814, in point 36 of the Instructions to his lawyer he insisted that the aforementioned decree was the consequence of a collusion "with most of the Vocals". In two subsequent letters to Chiclana, the one of January 27 and February 11, 1811, and in the one sent to Viamonte on June 27, 1811, he reiterated some of these concepts.
The Big Board
On May 27, 1810, a circular invited the viceroyalty cities to send deputies to join the Board. These were arriving at the end of the year, but the Saavedrismo tried that the representatives were related to their party line and add them to the Board, leaving morenism in frank minority.
The maneuver also aimed to postpone the formation of a Constituent Assembly that drafted a Constitution.
Moreno saw in the leaders of the provinces an obstacle to independence. On December 18, the deputies of the interior and the vowels of the First Board and the Cabildo voted in a joint meeting whether or not to incorporate them. The deputies voted for incorporation. Saavedra voted in favor, but clarifying that he did it for " public convenience " although " the incorporation was not according to law ".
Step and Moreno were the only ones to vote against, and lost. Moreno resigned and made a diplomatic representation in England, a path to which he died on the high seas due to receiving lethal doses of a powerful purgative from the captain. Some historians argue that it was a murder orchestrated by Saavedra. Others consider that Saavedra's goal was just away from Buenos Aires, and that death was simply due to a negligence of the captain. When he learned of Moreno's death In Altamar, Saavedra pronounced the phrase:
It took so much water to turn off so much fire....
With the incorporation of the deputies from the interior plus the members of the First Board, the Big Board was formed. Cornelio Saavedra maintained his position as president. Its members changed the style of government: they carefully deliberated each measure and lowered the extremist tone that had prevailed until then.
On February 21, 1811, the Gazeta de Buenos Aires wondered if, as a result of the incorporation of the deputies of the interior and the resignation of Moreno, doctor Castelli would give "a step back" and he would return with the army of Upper Peru to Buenos Aires. After a few months of relative internal calm, some deputies from the interior joined the Morenista currents, and the Patriotic Society emerged. It was directed by Bernardo de Monteagudo, of similar ideological tendencies. They planned to displace Saavedra and Dean Gregorio Funes by means of a revolution led by French's regiment, but were betrayed. In response, on April 5 and 6, a large demonstration by residents of the outskirts of the city, known as "orilleros," led by lawyer Joaquín Campana and mayor Tomás Grigera demanded a series of measures. As a consequence of the revolution of April 5 and 6, 1811, Vieytes, Rodríguez Peña, Miguel de Azcuénaga and Juan Larrea were forced to resign. In his place were incorporated: Campana as government secretary, Juan Alagón, Atanasio Gutiérrez and Feliciano Chiclana —although the latter resigned from office— and others. The deposed, along with French and Beruti, were expelled from the city. All power passed to Saavedra's party, but this did not improve the situation. The Patriotic Society continued to attack the government.
The military advance into the interior began to show its limits. The city of Montevideo, which refused to recognize the authority of the Junta, attacked Buenos Aires across the river and on March 2, 1811, destroyed a flotilla of the Junta in the battle of San Nicolás. The military expedition to Paraguay under the command of Belgrano was once again defeated in Tacuarí and after capitulating, he abandoned that province.
When the forces of Upper Peru learned what had happened on April 5 and 6 in Buenos Aires, with its sequel to the removal of officers, members of the Junta and supporters of Moreno, all kinds of rumors spread about the Saavedra's conduct. Some argued that he sought absolute power, others that he wanted to hand over the government to Princess Charlotte. On May 10, 1811, Viamonte, as a friend of Saavedra, sent him a letter in which he included these concerns as his own. He asserted that, if true, the army would return to Buenos Aires to restore the previous situation. In this state of affairs, on June 20 a military disaster occurred in the battle of Huaqui, which meant the loss of all of Upper Peru.
On June 27, Saavedra, without knowing what had happened in Huaqui, sent an extensive response. Regardless of his unfavorable opinion of Moreno, he made a lengthy justification for his own party. He denied any attempt to want to negotiate with Carlota or to have had anything to do with the revolt of April 5 and 6, although he acknowledged that he agreed with her. It also included considerations on the internal and external policy of the Big Board.
Although the letter was "personal," Saavedra authorized Viamonte to let "others" read it What was not foreseen was that, after Huaqui, the letter fell into the possession of Goyeneche who sent it to Lima. There they added some 20 explanatory notes, possibly written by Viceroy Abascal, and it was disseminated to discredit the government of Buenos Aires. When he arrived in Montevideo, the commander of the naval station, José María Salazar, added an additional comment and sent it to Madrid on November 20:
The enclosed letter from former President Saavedra to Viamonte will impose on his highness the plan of the revolutionaries.José María Zalazar to the secretary of state in (Biblioteca de Mayo, 1960, p. 1089)
At the residency trial, Saavedra told his lawyer that the letter was "personal," not official. He also asked that if they were going to use it as judicial evidence, it should be the "original"; since a copy could incorporate interpolations that could affect it negatively. It was evident that Saavedra knew of the existence of copies with additions that circulated everywhere.
That letter, which according to Commander Salazar contained the "plan of the revolutionaries," had other unsuspected uses. Many of Saavedra's paragraphs and phrases appeared interpolated in the text of the famous Plan of Operations attributed to Moreno to give it a greater degree of credibility in the eyes of Madrid and the Portuguese court. Historical criticism used these interpolations to modify the date of the Plan, supposedly from mid-1810 to a later date that could not be earlier than the second half of 1811, that is, months after Moreno's death..
To raise the morale of the Army of the North, Saavedra decided to take command of it. He moved to the "upper provinces", leaving Domingo Matheu as president of the Junta Grande, who negotiated with Montevideo and faced serious internal conflicts. The port of Buenos Aires was blockaded by forces from Montevideo, who unsuccessfully tried to bombard the city.
Fall and chase
In mid-July 1811, news about the unexpected defeat at Huaqui, the disappearance of the auxiliary army as an operational unit, and the acts of vandalism by deserters against the Upper Peruvian population began to arrive in Buenos Aires, a month late. cause of the growing hostility of these against "the porteños". Consequently, as of July 20, the Junta took a series of measures: it published an edict making the defeat public; he dismissed Castelli from his commission and ordered his return to Buenos Aires; He communicated to the provincial councils of Upper Peru that each one should assume "all the fullness of his authority" and ordered González Balcarce to unite his forces with Francisco de Rivero y Pueyrredón. On August 2, in an official letter to Viamonte, he informed him that Rivero had been named "general of all the troops" to replace Balcarce and attached a copy of that appointment so that he could deliver it to Rivero. The junta had placed all its hopes in the town of Chuquisaca and in Rivero to contain Goyeneche's advance without knowing that at that very moment the situation in Upper Peru was already different. Due to rumors about Castelli's possible attitude of not complying with what was ordered, on the 17th, the Junta sent a letter to the governor of Salta requesting his arrest along with Balcarce and that they be interned in Catamarca and La Rioja respectively.
Faced with the danger that a revolt against the government would break out in Buenos Aires, the Junta decided, to calm things down, to send a commission to the theater of operations made up of its own president and the vocal doctor Manuel Felipe de Molina, deputy from Tucuman. When these news became public, rumors arose that great "feelings" were observed in the town and the barracks against those who would exercise the interim position in the absence of the commissioners: Domingo Matheu as interim president and Francisco Antonio Ortiz de Ocampo, deputy of la Rioja, as weapons commander. It was argued that article fourteen of the April 1811 petition prohibited members of the Board from being removed from office to be sent to perform tasks unrelated to their duties. Despite everything, on August 26, Saavedra and Molina left Buenos Aires in their capacity as Commissioners of the Superior Government Board of the Río de la Plata. They carried instructions that established as objectives, in addition to the military, to correct the "badly arranged" behaviors that some chiefs and officials had observed in Upper Peru. Rules were specified that the commissioners had to observe: pay the expenses of the same house in which they had to eat at the same table with the officers who accompanied them, respect the uses and religious practices of the place, if it was possible to attend mass every day, and pay at the posts of the race all the expenses with prohibition of receiving anything for free.
In the second week of October 1811, while in Salta where they had arrived on September 30, Saavedra and Deputy Molina learned that an executive triumvirate had been constituted in Buenos Aires to replace the Junta whose president was Saavedra.
In both public and private conversations, both commissioners approved the change produced, thus extinguishing in its origin the possibility of creating a schism. This attitude of Saavedra was transmitted from Salta to the government by Eustoquio Díaz Vélez. In turn, Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, who had been appointed to take charge of what was left of the Army of the North, informed the government of Buenos Aires, in an official letter dated October 17, that the commissioners had complied with the mandate to put at his weapons, ammunition and officers that they brought with them. To certify the above, Saavedra, already relieved of his position, sent a note to Buenos Aires dated October 26, 1811, where he recognized the powerful reasons that led to the creation of the new government. After setting out other general considerations he approved that his president's salary had ceased to save money in a time of need. However, the new government maintained the extraordinary diet that had been assigned to him when marching north, which represented an additional 54% on his salary. Finally, Saavedra thanked "emotionally" the considerations of the government towards her family: & # 34; Without this benefit and protection, perhaps there would be no shortage of those who, flaunting her patriotism, would dare to insult her & # 34;.
The Regiment of Patricios rose up on December 6, 1811, demanding the return of Saavedra and the resignation of Belgrano, in the so-called Mutiny of the Braids. The barracks were surrounded and the attempts at negotiation were unsuccessful, since the Patricians did not abandon their demands. The protest degenerated into combat, in which the rebels were defeated; ten of them were executed, and the rest were forced to serve for ten years.
The First Triumvirate ordered Saavedra to move to the city of San Juan governed at that time by Saturnino Sarassa, from where he went to Mendoza. Several times arrest warrants were issued against him, but he was never imprisoned.
When the Supreme Director of the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata Gervasio Antonio de Posadas —one of those exiled in April 1811— ordered his arrest in June 1814, he fled to the Chilean city of La Serena and then to Santiago from Chile with his 10-year-old son Agustín.
Given the proximity of the royalist army, at the request of his wife Saturnina Otárola, the governor of Cuyo, José de San Martín, granted him political asylum in San Juan.
Trial of residency
In 1813, the Assembly of the Year XIII ordered the trial of residency to all those who had participated in the government of the United Provinces since 1810. It also sanctioned a Regulation of 16 articles that a commission of seven deputies had to observe. The Regulations made the commission an ambiguous combination of residence court and revolutionary court. The list of individuals put on trial was 36, including Saavedra. The strange thing was that many of them held functions in the government at the time or were members of the Assembly itself.
On September 1, 1813, from San Juan, Saavedra granted a power of attorney to Juan de la Rosa Alva to represent him in the residence trial. Rosa Alva was a public defender since it was not easy for Saavedra to find someone to represent him. An important point of the Instructions that he gave to his representative was to demand the reform of the regulations to which the Residence Commission was subjected for not having any appeal or recourse once the sentence had been pronounced. According to Saavedra, on many points he violated what was known as the "old constitution"; or Law of Nations.
On February 8, 1814, in a secret session of the Constituent General Assembly, Tomás Antonio Valle, on behalf of the Residence Commission, reported on the status of the cases and proposed amnesty or suspension of the same. He maintained, however, that the events of April 5 and 6, 1811 were the nucleus of the great process against the residents. In a certain way, it was thus discovered that everything pointed against the faction that responded to Saavedra and Joaquín Campana. Valle requested that those named be excluded from the amnesty that he proposed. On February 12, 1814, the Assembly ordered a general amnesty with the proposed exception. Saavedra and Campana were to be "missed outside the territory of the United Provinces". This unusual process thus ended without there having been a ruling from either the Residence Commission or the Permanent Commission that was its successor.
After his journey through San Juan, Chile and back to San Juan, Saavedra arrived in Buenos Aires in March 1815 called by the Supreme Director of the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata, Carlos María de Alvear, at the time in which it was planned to provoke his dismissal. The arrival surprised Alvear that he had sent a counter-order, so Saavedra immediately had to leave for his brother's ranch in Arrecifes. When Alvear's fall actually took place, the council ordered Saavedra to come to Buenos Aires, revoking his confinement orders and restoring his privileges and honors. However, thirty days later, there was an agitation led by Colonel Eusebio Valdenegro. The brand new director Álvarez Thomas revoked the proceedings and forced Saavedra to return to his brother's ranch in Arroyo de Luna. An extensive correspondence took place between the two where finally Álvarez Thomas said that he could not remedy the situation and that this task corresponded to Congress. On May 10, 1816, Saavedra opened an instance before Congress and on August 7 he addressed Juan Martín de Pueyrredón requesting recognition of his degrees and honors. Five days later, Pueyrredón forwarded the request to Congress stating that it was this body that should take charge of the matter since it was not authorized to revoke a decision issued by a previous assembly. This resolution by Pueyrredón was endorsed by the Minister of War Antonio Luis Beruti, an enemy of Saavedra.
On January 3 and May 25, 1817, Saavedra made new presentations. Finally, in May 1817, Congress ruled that the director or a commission he appointed ad-hoc should resolve the Saavedra case. During June 1817, Pueyrredón sent the information to a commission made up of the chambermaid Alejo Castex, the mayor of 2nd vote Ambrosio de Lezica and doctor Gabino Blanco. This commission had to impose itself on the decisions of the previous assembly but the first problem it had was the disappearance of all the antecedents against Saavedra. In turn, Castex apologized for having stated and anticipated "privately" his opinion on the case. Doctor Cossio took over in his place and in September 1817 he asked the Cabildo to send the records. The council immediately responded by saying that the old cars had been handed over to the government. These delays outraged Saavedra who requested a search for them and even asked the bishopric for help. Later, he demanded that the chambermaid Valle report which notary had acted in February 1814. The papers finally appeared in the possession of the Permanent Commission and this time it was Dr. Cossio who excused himself, saying that he had acted in the trial as attorney and party.. His replacement asked Valle to send another report because those witness statements in February 1814 were vague and insignificant. Valle reported that the report that he had read was based exclusively on those statements and that he was not the author but "another"; that he asked for it. Saavedra in his Memoirs accused the "evil" Bernardo Monteagudo to be that "other" which Valle failed to mention.
On April 6, 1818, the commission issued an order declaring null and void the procedures of the year 1814 and the corresponding estrangement of Saavedra. He also advised that it be replaced in his grades. However, on May 15, 1818, Pueyrredón appointed a new commission made up of the appellate judges Pedro Somellera, Bartolomé Tollo and José Francisco Acosta. This time it was Somellera who excused himself, being replaced by Juan Bautista Villegas. On July 1, 1818, this commission confirmed the previous sentence. When it seemed that Saavedra was finally going to be dismissed, an anonymous letter came into the hands of Pueyrredón where several deputies of the Congress of the year 1814 were cited. Pueyrredón quickly returned the case to the Constituent General Assembly on July 14. On October 3, Congress reported that of the deputies cited in the anonymous letter, one of them was not incorporated into the Assembly at that time, another declared that there were not and could not be "other orders" that were not those already known and two stated that they did not remember what the anonymous person stated. Again Saavedra presented a claim and finally on October 24, 1818 Pueyrredón, by decree, returned the brigadier's offices with the requested seniority.
Rehabilitation and last years
In 1819, Saavedra assumed the post of campaign commander, based in Luján. His mission was to serve as field police, defend the border against the Indians, and help the army that was invading Santa Fe. He managed to make some peace agreements with the Ranqueles, which were not long-lasting.
On September 6, 1819, Supreme Director José Rondeau sent an official letter to Congress warning about a supposed expedition of 20,000 men that would come from Spain towards the Río de la Plata. He also asked for a decrease in his salary as a contribution to the defense given the scarcity of resources. Days later he received a request from the military who wanted awards and honorary distinctions for the "first action of our weapons, the fundamental action that gave us a homeland." The note referred to the events of May 25, 1810 where there was no act of arms and brought up examples of great military events where a few had faced many thousands, such as the case of the Spartans at Thermopylae. applicants were: Martín Rodríguez, Juan Florencio Terrada, Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, Marcos and Juan Ramón Balcarce and Cornelio Saavedra. The author of this joint request is unknown, but the truth was that Saavedra had made a similar request to the King, before May 1810, asking with other colleagues for a reward for having prevented Álzaga's Junta movement on January 1, 1809..
In 1820 he supported the short-lived government of Juan Ramón Balcarce as Minister of War, and after his failure he went into exile in Montevideo as a consequence of the Anarchy of the Year XX.
He returned to Buenos Aires in October 1821 after the Chamber of Representatives of the province of Buenos Aires, at the proposal of the new governor, General Martín Rodríguez and his minister Bernardino Rivadavia, sanctioned, on September 27, 1821, the Law of Oblivion that authorized the return of those exiled for political reasons.
He settled in a ranch in the north of the province. There he wrote his autobiography Autograph Memory , dedicated to his children, in which he explained, from his point of view, some events in which he acted.
Saavedra continued to serve until the end of 1821.
In 1822, he accepted the Army Reform that led to the retirement of an important list of officers. The government fixed an amount of 17,700 pesos in paper money, which initially suffered a 75% haircut in the market and, although it later decreased, the haircut remained between 60% and 50%. As the salary taken as a base was that of "a simple infantry colonel", a position he was accidentally performing and not that of a brigadier, which he specifically owned, he requested that modification. Another judicial claim that Saavedra made was related to the military Monte Pío. It was about a fund that was formed by deducting 8% of the salary to later grant a pension to the widow and that Saavedra wanted to be awarded to her family or returned to her. Regarding the first claim, the designated commission rejected the request and in relation to the second, it referred it to where appropriate. On that basis, the Board of Representatives rejected the request. At the time of the vote, Luis Saavedra, a member of the same and Cornelio's brother, requested to be absent from the Chamber.
He offered his services when the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata faced the Empire of Brazil in the Brazilian War, which were kindly rejected by the Minister of War Marcos Balcarce due to his advanced age.
Death
Cornelio Saavedra died in Buenos Aires at eight o'clock at night on Sunday, March 29, 1829 at 69 years of age. Governor Juan José Viamonte ordered the transfer of his remains to the northern cemetery of the city of Buenos Aires.
On December 16, 1829, eight days after assuming the Government, Juan Manuel de Rosas together with Tomás Guido signed a decree by which a monument was created in said cemetery and the autograph memory was deposited in the public library. In the recitals of this decree it was expressed that:
The first commander of Patricios, the first president of a patriotic government, could only be forgotten in his death because of the calamitous circumstances in which the country was in; but after they have ended, it would be an ingratitude to deny the eminent citizen the tribute of honor due to his merit and to a life illustrated with so many virtues that he knew how to consecrate the service of the homeland.Decree Rosas-Guido en (Pacheco, 1984, p. 19)
Offspring
Among the historically relevant descendants of Cornelio Saavedra are his son, Mariano Saavedra, who was twice governor of the Province of Buenos Aires between 1862 and 1865, his grandson Cornelio Saavedra Rodríguez, Chilean soldier in charge of the Occupation of the Araucanía, and his great-grandson Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Argentine politician, diplomat and jurist, awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1936.
The Saavedra neighborhood is named in honor of his nephew Luis María Saavedra, a renowned rancher and former owner of the land in that part of the city.
A descendant of his brother Luis Gonzaga, Luis Ibáñez Saavedra, was the father of Matilde Ibáñez Tálice, first lady of Uruguay as wife of President Luis Batlle Berres (1947-1951) and grandfather of Jorge Batlle Ibáñez, President of Uruguay (2000-2005).
Tributes
In memory of Cornelio Saavedra, several administrative districts bear his name in Argentina and Bolivia. Among them are the Province of Cornelio Saavedra in the Department of Potosí, Bolivia, and the Barrio de Saavedra in the City of Buenos Aires and the Municipality of Saavedra in the Province of Buenos Aires, both in Argentina.
Similarly, in the city of Buenos Aires there is the Historical Museum of Buenos Aires Cornelio de Saavedra. It occupies the facilities of what was once the farm of Luis María Saavedra, Cornelio's nephew. It was inaugurated on October 6, 1921 and its rooms exhibit objects of daily life during the XIX century, such as musical instruments, weapons, silverware, glassware, clothing, etc.