Concentration camps for Japanese in the United States

Manzanar Field, California.

The concentration camps for Japanese in the United States housed about 120,000 people, mostly ethnic Japanese, more than half of whom were American citizens and Japanese from Latin America, mainly from Brazil and Peru, who were deported under pressure from the US government to facilities designed for that purpose in the interior of the country between 1942 and 1946.

The goal was to move them from their habitual residence, mostly on the west coast, to facilities built under extreme security measures. The camps were closed with barbed wire, guarded by armed guards, and located in places far from any population center. Attempts to leave the camp sometimes resulted in despondency for the inmates.

There were also internments in American concentration camps for citizens of German and Italian origin, since these two countries also declared war on the United States, but the number of citizens affected was minimal compared to those of Japanese origin.

Origins

Internment camps and other institutions of the War Relocation Authority in the west of the United States.

The move was taken in reaction to the attack on Pearl Harbor during World War II, where the United States belatedly joined the Allies fighting the Axis Forces, but it was the mainly ethnic Japanese people living on the coast of the Pacific those who were subjected to this internment.

Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, commander of the US Defense West, was commissioned to intern the ethnic Japanese. Although DeWitt ordered the forced evacuation, he initially expressed his annoyance at this order to a superior, claiming that:

An American citizen is, after all, an American citizen.

De Witt also assured that it was possible to differentiate foreigners loyal to the United States from non-loyal ones.

Secretary of War Henry Stimson agreed with DeWitt, but anti-Japanese hysteria soon spilled over into the military and government arenas.

On December 10, 1941, a rumor spread that 20,000 Nisei were preparing to launch an armed uprising in San Francisco. Nisei (Japanese for "second generation") is the name Americans gave to all ethnic Japanese living in the Americas, although originally it included only the first generation of Japanese born. in the country. DeWitt planned to immediately arrest all ethnic Japanese, but the local FBI chief managed to convince him that the information was false.

Some American organizations called for the imprisonment of all Nisei, notably the American Legion and the Native Sons of the Golden West. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox added more gunpowder to the anti-Japanese hysteria by declaring that effective fifth column work had been carried out in Hawaii, and by recommending the evacuation of all persons of Japanese blood from Oahu. However, Knox's statement was denied, in confidence, by people close to President Roosevelt.

Congressman Leland Ford wrote a letter in mid-January recommending that all Japanese "be put in concentration camps in the interior," ensuring that naturalized ethnic Japanese who really wanted to demonstrate their patriotism should be willing to accept this sacrifice. Oregon Governor Charles A. Sprague called for more protection against foreign activities, emphasizing Japanese residents of the coast. For his part, Seattle Mayor Earl Millikin claimed that while the vast majority of ethnic Japanese were not a threat, others were capable of "burning down the town" for their part. and facilitate a Japanese air attack. California Governor Culbert Olson also joined in the hysteria by saying that some Japanese residents were communicating with the enemy or preparing to form a fifth column.

In early February, the Los Angeles Times helped fuel the anti-Japanese hysteria:

A snake is a snake, no matter where the egg is opened. Similarly, a Japanese-American, born of Japanese parents, becomes a Japanese, not an American.

DeWitt then ordered searches of the homes of ethnic Japanese with the goal of seizing "subversive" cameras and weapons. When Attorney General Francis Biddle argued that a possible cause for arrest needed to be presented, DeWitt asserted that being of Japanese descent was one. However, after carrying out several searches without search warrants, including in the homes of US citizens, the FBI reported that no weapons had been found that could be used to help the enemy, nor cameras that were being used in espionage work.

On January 25, 1942, Biddle was convinced by Stimson, who in turn had been convinced by DeWitt, to establish no-go zones, for foreigners from enemy countries, and no-go zones, where foreigners could be but under guard. Later, Biddle explained that he had agreed because he believed that only foreigners would be affected, not naturalized foreigners or citizens of foreign descent.

On February 9, DeWitt petitioned Biddle to put Portland, Seattle and Tacoma on the no-go list, which meant the evacuation of thousands of people. Biddle refused, claiming that he had not received a justification for agreeing. However, Biddle added that if this evacuation was a "military necessity," the decision should be made by the War Department, not the Justice Department.

Almost immediately, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was pressured by Stimson to agree to DeWitt's plan. A congressional delegation then sent a resolution to Roosevelt requesting the immediate evacuation of ethnic Japanese, without distinguishing between foreigners or citizens.

On February 14, DeWitt formally recommended the "evacuation of Japanese and other subversives from the Pacific coast. DeWitt assured:

The fact that no sabotage has occurred to date is a disturbing indication that such action will occur.

On February 17, Biddle urged the president for the last time not to take this action, arguing that there was no evidence of an imminent attack and that the FBI had no evidence of possible sabotage. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover also advised Roosevelt not to evacuate the Japanese, but to no avail.

On February 19, Roosevelt signed executive order No. 9066, authorizing the War Department to delimit military areas where the permanence of persons would be decided by Secretary of War Henry Stimson. The latter made it clear to DeWitt that Italian descendants should not be harassed, and that only some German refugees should be considered.

An appeal filed by human rights organizations attempted to challenge the government's right to lock up people for ethnic reasons, but the US Supreme Court denied the petition.

On February 23, the Japanese submarine I-17 fired on a fuel warehouse in Santa Barbara, setting a few barrels ablaze without causing casualties. The next day, US Army units in Los Angeles were seized with hysteria and fired their anti-aircraft guns into the sky. The noise startled some artillery units that also fired their guns, some 1430 charges. Although this episode was later mockingly called the Battle of Los Angeles, in those days it only contributed to increasing the hysteria of the population.

On March 2, DeWitt established Military Exclusion Area 1, which covered western Washington, Oregon, California, and the southern half of Arizona. Military Exclusion Area 2 occupied the rest of the mentioned states. DeWitt was unable to immediately begin the evacuation because he realized that it was not considered a crime for a civilian to refuse to comply with a military order. Stimson solved the problem by proposing a law that sentenced any civilian who disobeyed a military officer in a military area to one year in prison and a $5,000 fine. On March 9, the law was introduced before Congress, only one Republican senator opposed it, and no one voted against the law. On March 21, the law was signed into law by Roosevelt, and DeWitt finally got the green light to begin the forced evacuation of the Nisei.

On March 31, 1942, Zone 1 was declared off limits to anyone of Japanese descent. Resident Japanese or Japanese descendants were immediately ordered to prepare to depart, their final destination not being specified and their luggage limited to a carry-on bag. Although 7 out of 10 ethnic Japanese affected by the measure were born in the United States, the order made no distinction between natives and foreigners.

Included in the forced removal was Alaska, which, like Hawaii, was an incorporated territory of the United States located in the far northwestern part of the continental United States. Unlike the rest of the West Coast, Alaska was not subject to any exclusion zones due to its small Japanese population. However, the Western Defense Command announced in April 1942 that all Japanese and Americans of Japanese descent were to leave the territory for internment camps. By the end of the month, more than 200 Japanese residents, regardless of citizenship, were exiled from Alaska, most of them ending up at the Minidoka War Relocation Center in southern Idaho.

Setting the fields

Initially it was thought of forcing ethnic Japanese to live in selected areas in the interior of the country, but the inhabitants of these areas protested against the measure and it was decided to intern the prisoners in camps specially created for this purpose.

Then, the ethnic Japanese, some 110,000, were forced to sell their homes and businesses in eight days, although in some parts this time was reduced to four days or extended to two weeks. Upon learning of this measure, hostile buyers appeared, purchasing the Japanese possessions at very low prices. In those days, ethnic Japanese owned 0.02% of the arable land on the West Coast, but their land values, on average, were seven times the regional average. When one affected by the measure was denied a few extra days to harvest his crop, he destroyed it. He was immediately arrested on charges of sabotage; this was the largest reported case of Japanese sabotage in the United States during the war.

Many Japanese placed their possessions in warehouses, hoping to reclaim them after the war, but in the meantime they were vandalized and stolen. Some rented them, but the occupants later refused to pay the rent. Some plantation owners discovered after the war that their workers had sold the land to others. Many who decided not to sell their properties discovered at the end of the war that their houses had been occupied or that the State had expropriated them for not having paid taxes.

Once the time for preparation was over, the ethnic Japanese were taken to assembly centers on trains or buses, guarded by armed guards. In most cases, these centers were racetracks, and the evacuees had to sleep in the stables.

At the end of May 1942, the evacuees were settled in fields surrounded by barbed wire. These camps were called 'relocation centers', but the living conditions there were slightly better than those in the concentration camps.

In the camps, each family was given plaques with an engraved number for each member, which were used to identify themselves.

One internment camp was Crystal City, Texas, where Japanese, Japanese-Latinos, and Germans were housed, among others. In this camp, the internees received pleasant treatment from the US authorities. On the other hand, the Tule Lake field was under a more severe regime; it was reserved for Japanese descendants and their families who were suspected of espionage, treason, or disloyalty, as well as for community leaders such as priests or teachers. Other families were brought to Tula Lake by applying to be repatriated to Japan. In this camp there were some pro-Japanese demonstrations in the course of the war.

The phrase shikata ga nai (which could be translated as "nothing can be done about it") was often used to sum up the resignation of families interned in their helplessness in the face of the conditions of internment, according to say Jeanne Wakatsuki Houston and James D. Houston in the memoir Farewell to Manzanar (1972).

Dissolution

By early 1943, DeWitt no longer had credibility in the War Department and was relieved of command at Western Command. In his final report, DeWitt asserted that the forced evacuation of the Japanese to the camps had been necessary, as he claimed to have received hundreds of reports of light appearances on the coast and radio transmissions of unknown origin. Hoover mocked DeWitt's Military Intelligence Division, as he displayed "hysteria and lack of judgment."

It was not until the spring of 1944 that the War Department recommended the dissolution of the camps to President Roosevelt. However, because Roosevelt was seeking re-election that year, the decision was postponed.

Thus, at the first cabinet meeting after Roosevelt's re-election, it was decided to release all evacuees who had proven loyal. But this decision took a year to fully carry out. Upon departure, the evacuees received a train ticket and $25.

The last camp to be closed was Tule Lake on March 20, 1946.

Postwar

The US government offered compensation to the victims beginning in 1951, but would apologize only in 1988, stating that the concentration of prisoners was due to "racial prejudice, war hysteria and inadequate political leadership& #3. 4;. President Ronald Reagan also signed an act, where he offered 20,000 dollars to the surviving victims, which would be paid until 1991.

During the war, many Japanese-Americans lost all their possessions, as their savings were seized by the government as "enemy property. It is estimated that about $400 million was lost in this way, but in the postwar period, the government returned only $40 million. However, these returns occurred many years after the attack on Pearl Harbor. In the case of the clients of the Yokohama Specie Bank, an American bank of Japanese origin, the depositors did not receive their savings until 1969, when the Supreme Court ruled in their favor, specifying that the return should be made without interest and at the pre-war exchange rate..

One of the most decorated units during the war was the 442nd Regimental Fighter Team, made up of Japanese-Americans. In all, he received seven Presidential Unit Citations, one Medal of Honor, 47 Distinguished Service Crosses, 350 Silver Stars, 850 Bronze Stars, and more than 3,600 Purple Hearts. Despite this, in some cases it is possible that the family of a soldier was in one of the camps.

Latin American Cooperation

The United States entered into agreements with almost all the countries of Latin America (with the exception of Argentina, Paraguay, and Chile)^{[citation required]}, for them to apply their own programs of internment or send their citizens of Japanese origin to camps in the United States and Panama. Some of these people were only of Japanese descent and had never been to Japan. The agreements affected 2,264 people from Peru (1,800), which represented 10% of its Japanese population in Peruvian territory. In smaller numbers were Japanese envoys from countries such as Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico ^{[citation required]}, Puerto Rico, Nicaragua, Panama and Venezuela. They were initially taken to concentration camps in the US and Panama, and from there some 860 were sent to Japan as part of an exchange. At the end of the war, 900 were deported to Japan, 360 were subject to conditional orders of deportation, 300 remained in the United States, and 200 returned to Latin American countries. Only about 79 of the total of 1,800 citizens received authorization to return to Peru. Despite pressure from the United States, the Paraguayan government of General Morinigo did not take any action against Japanese citizens in its territory, even though several Japanese residents of Paraguay or their descendants left to enlist in the Imperial Japanese Army.

Terminology debate

The exact designation of the fields is the subject of discussion among sources and historians; official references designate them as "internment camps". Proponents of the measure prefer the name relocation camps; others speak of them as detention camps or concentration camps.

Defenders of the term relocation camps argue that this was the official name; that the camps were not prisons; and that almost a quarter of the residents received permission to settle outside the camps, although they were denied access to the exclusion area on the west coast of the United States unless exceptionally endorsed by a responsible non-Japanese family or a government agency.

Those who criticize the official name argue that it is a euphemism that does not adequately describe the real nature of these camps: fenced perimeters, surveillance by armed guards and an isolated location, outside the population area. Cases have been documented in which guards shot inmates trying to cross the fences. The conditions correspond to what is generally understood as a concentration camp, although the conditions were not exactly the same as those of the Konzentrationslager of Nazi Germany or concentration camps British in South Africa during the Second Boer War.

The Commission on the Confinement and Relocation of Civilians during the war created by the United States Congress explained, in a 1983 report on the denial of justice, its decision to call them relocation camps with these words:

The Commission has generally maintained the terms and phrases as they were used then, in an effort to adequately reflect the context of the time and avoid the confusion and controversy that a new terminology could cause. We leave the reader to decide for himself to what extent the rhetoric of the time confirms the observation of George Orwell: In our time, the political discourse usually consists of the defense of the undefensible... Thus the political language is full of euphemisms, demands of principles and dark vagueness.

Most current historians use the expression internment camps as they consider it relatively neutral.