Chernobyl accident

The Chernobyl accident was a nuclear accident that occurred on April 26, 1986 at the Vladimir Ilich Lenin nuclear power plant located in northern Ukraine, which at the time belonged to the Soviet Union, 2.7 km from the city of Pripyat, 18 km from the city of Chernobyl and 17 km from the border with Belarus. It is considered the worst nuclear accident in history, and along with the Fukushima I nuclear accident in Japan in 2011, as the most serious on the International Nuclear Accident Scale (major accident, level 7). Likewise, it is usually included among the great environmental disasters of history.

The accident began during a safety test at an RBMK-type nuclear reactor. The test was a simulated power outage to help create a safety procedure to keep Reactor 4 cooling water circulating until backup electrical generators could provide power. Three such tests had been conducted since 1982, but had not provided a solution. On a fourth attempt, an unexpected 10-hour delay meant that an unready operational shift was on duty. The causes and development of the accident are controversial. There is a general consensus that since the previous day a test had been carried out that required reducing power, during which a series of imbalances occurred in reactor 4 of this nuclear power plant. These imbalances led to uncontrolled overheating of the nuclear reactor core and one or two successive explosions, followed by a fire spewing gases with high levels of radioactivity. The explosions blew off the lid of the 1,200 ton Reactor 4 and ejected large amounts of radioactive materials into the atmosphere, forming a radioactive cloud that spanned 162,000 km² spanning Europe and North America. The amount of uranium dioxide, boron carbide, europium oxide, erbium, zirconium alloys, and graphite ejected, radioactive or toxic materials, estimated to be about 500 times greater than that released by the atomic bomb dropped by the United States on Hiroshima in 1945, caused death of 31 people in the following two weeks and led the Government of the Soviet Union to urgently evacuate 116,000 people, causing an international alarm when radioactivity was detected in at least 13 countries of central and eastern Europe.

The reactor explosion killed two reactor operating personnel. A massive emergency operation was started to put out the fire, stabilize the reactor, and clean up the ejected core. In the disaster and in the immediate response, 134 people from the fire station were hospitalized with acute radiation syndrome due to the absorption of high doses of ionizing radiation. Of these 134 people, 28 died in the days or months afterward, and approximately 14 deaths suspected of radiation-induced cancer followed within the next 10 years. Major cleanup operations were carried out in the exclusion zone to deal with local fallout, and the exclusion zone was made permanent.

After the accident, a massive decontamination, containment, and mitigation process was initiated by approximately 600,000 people called liquidators in the areas surrounding the accident site. A 30 km radius area around the nuclear power plant known as an exclusion zone was isolated, which is still in effect. Only a small part of the liquidators were exposed to high levels of radioactivity. Two plant employees died as a direct result of the explosion and another 29 died in the three months that followed. About 1,000 people received large doses of radiation during the first day after the accident, 200,000 people received about 100 mSv, 20,000 about 250 mSv, and some 500 mSv. In total, 600,000 people received radiation doses from post-accident decontamination work. 5,000,000 people lived in contaminated areas and 400,000 in severely contaminated areas. Until today there are no conclusive studies on the real, and not theoretical, incidence of this accident in the mortality of the population.

After protracted negotiations with the Ukrainian government, the international community financed the costs of the plant's decommissioning, completed on December 15, 2000. A "sarcophagus" was built immediately after the accident, to cover the reactor and isolate the interior, which was degraded over time by various natural phenomena, and by the difficulties of building it in an environment of high radiation, for which reason it ran the risk of seriously degrading. In 2004, construction began on a new sarcophagus for the reactor. The rest of the plant's reactors are inactive.

In November 2016, thirty years after the tragedy, a new sarcophagus was inaugurated, dubbed the "new safe sarcophagus" (NSC), a mobile structure, the largest built to date in the world, in the form of an arch 110 meters high, 150 wide and 256 long and weighing more than 30,000 tons. It was built 180 meters from the reactor and then placed on top of it, moving it using a sophisticated rail system. It was built with characteristics that gave it an estimated durability of more than one hundred years. The final cost of the structure was 1,500 million euros, financed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), together with the collaboration of 28 countries that contributed 1,417 million euros, and built by the French company Novarka. The structure is equipped with remote-controlled cranes with the aim of dismantling the old structure.

The nuclear power plant

Panoramic view of the V.I. nuclear power plant. Lenin of Chernobyl in 2009, 23 years after the accident. To the right of the image is the reactor 4 and the sarcophagus that covers it.

The Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (Чернобыльская АЭС им. В.И.Ленина, V.I. Lenin Memorial Nuclear Power Plant) is located in Ukraine, 18 km northwest of the city of Chernobyl, 16 km from the Ukraine-Belarus border and 110 km north of the Ukrainian capital Kiev. The plant had four RBMK-1000 reactors with the capacity to produce 1,000 MW each. Between 1977 and 1983, the first four reactors were progressively started up; the accident thwarted the completion of two others that were under construction. The design of these reactors did not meet the safety requirements that were already imposed on all civilian nuclear reactors in the West at that time. The most important of these is that they lacked an adequate containment building, if they had one at all.. Chernobyl reactors 1 and 2 lacked containment buildings, while reactors 3 and 4 were inside so-called "upper biological shielding."

The core of the reactor was made up of an immense 1,700 t graphite cylinder, inside which 1,661 pressure-resistant cylindrical cavities housed 190 tons of uranium dioxide in the form of cylindrical bars, and inside the other 211 were found the boron control rods. High-pressure pure water circulated through these tubes which, when heated by the nuclear reaction, provided steam for the free-wheeling steam turbine. Among these fuel lines were 180 tubes, called "control rods" and made of graphite and boron, which helped control the chain reaction inside the reactor core by sliding.

The accident

In August 1986, a report sent to the International Atomic Energy Agency that explained the causes of the accident at the Chernobyl plant revealed that the team that operated at the plant on Saturday, April 26 of that year, proposed to carry out a test with the intention of increasing the safety of the reactor. To do this, they would need to find out how long the steam turbine would continue to generate electrical power after a loss of the reactor's main power supply. In the event of a power outage, emergency coolant pumps required a minimum of power to start up. running — to fill the gap between 60 and 75 seconds until the diesel generators started — and the plant technicians did not know if, once the inflow of steam was cut off, the inertia of the turbine could keep the pumps running during that period.

Prerequisites

Diagram of the operation of an RBMK reactor.

The conditions under which the test would take place had been agreed before the start of the day shift on April 25. The day shift employees had been briefed in advance and were familiar with the procedures. A special team of electrical engineers was present to test the new voltage regulation system. At 01:06 in the morning the programmed reduction of power began, reaching 50% of its capacity by the beginning of the day.

At this time, another regional power plant unexpectedly went offline, and the power grid controller in Kiev requested to halt the reduction in electricity production from Chernobyl as it needed to meet peak afternoon demand. The Chernobyl director consented and postponed the test. Despite this delay, preparations for the test that did not affect the power of the reactor continued to be carried out, including the deactivation of the emergency core cooling system, intended to provide water to the plant in the event of a loss of coolant.. Given the other events that unfolded, the influence the system might have had would have been very limited, but its disabling as a "routine" step is "an indication of the inherent lack of attention to security for this test." Also, had the reactor been shut down during the day, as planned, it is possible that more preparation would have taken place prior to the test.

At 23:04, the kyiv grid controller allowed power reduction to resume. The delay had serious consequences: the day shift employees had long since left, and the evening shift was preparing to leave as well. The night shift wouldn't take over until midnight. According to the original plan, the test would have been completed during the day and the night shift would only have had to monitor the carryover heat.

The night shift had very little time to run the experiment, and during the shift change the power was further reduced. Aleksandr Akimov was the head of the night shift and Leonid Toptunov was in charge of the reactor's operational regime.

The program called for a power reduction of reactor 4 to a level between 700 and 1,000 MW, which was reached at 00:05 on April 26. However, due to the natural production of xenon¹³⁵, a highly neutron-absorbing gas, power continued to decline even without operator action, a process known as "xenon poisoning".

With power above 500 MW, Toptunov mistakenly inserted the control rods too quickly. This combination of factors caused the power to drop to 30 MW, around 5% of what was stipulated as safe for the experiment. The control room staff decided to increase the power by deactivating the automatic system that moved the control rods and manually raising them to the stop. After several minutes, the power stabilized between 160 and 200 MW. The initial drop, coupled with running at a level below 200 MW, led to xenon poisoning. This prevented increased horsepower and to counter this, more control rods had to be removed.

Low power operation and the presence of xenon-135 were accompanied by instability in core temperature, coolant flow, and possibly by instability in neutron flux, triggering alarms. The control room received multiple emergency signals related to steam and water separator levels, feed water flow rate variations, and relief valves that had opened to divert excessive steam to a turbine condenser.. Between 00:35 and 00:45, alarms on thermohydraulic parameters were ignored, apparently with the aim of maintaining power level.

When the power level of 200 MW was finally achieved, preparation for the experiment resumed. As part of the plan, at 01:05 additional water pumps were activated, increasing the flow of water. The increase in the rate of flow of coolant through the reactor produced an increase in the temperature of the coolant at the inlet of the reactor core (the coolant no longer has enough time to release its heat in the turbine and cooling towers), which now it came closer to the boiling temperature of water, reducing the margin of safety.

The flow rate exceeded the allowable limit at 01:19, triggering a low vapor pressure alarm in the separators. Simultaneously, the additional water flow lowered the overall core temperature and reduced existing steam voids in the core and steam separators. Since water can weakly absorb neutrons—and the higher density of liquid water makes it a better absorber than steam—turning on the additional pumps further decreased the power of the reactor. The operators responded by turning off two of the circulating pumps to reduce the water feed rate to increase steam pressure, and manually removing even more control rods to maintain power.

All of these actions led to an extremely unstable reactor configuration. Of the 211 control rods the reactor had, nearly all were manually removed, all but 8 of the minimum 30 manually operated rods that were required to remain fully inserted to control the reactor even in the event of a coolant loss. Although the emergency shutdown could still be activated manually via the AZ-5 (Rapid Emergency Defense 5) button, the automatic system that could do the same had been disabled to maintain power level. These actions constituted serious violations of the Nuclear Safety Regulations of the Soviet Union. Also, the pumping of coolant into the reactor had been reduced, so any power excursion would boil the water, reducing its neutron absorption. The reactor was in an unstable configuration that was clearly outside the safe operating ranges established by the designers. If for whatever reason it went into supercritical, it would not be able to recover automatically.

Experiment and explosion

At 01:23:05 the experiment began. Four of the main circulation pumps (MBPs) were activated; during normal operation, six of the eight are typically on. The steam inlet to the turbines was cut off, leaving them to work by inertia. The diesel generators started and should have covered the power demand of the BCPs by 01:23:43. Meanwhile, power to the BCPs was to be supplied by the turbine generator. As the turbine generator's momentum diminished, however, so did the electricity directed to the pumps. The reduction in water flow rate resulted in increased formation of steam voids (bubbles) in the core.

Due to the positive void coefficient of the RBMK reactor at low reactor power levels, the reactor entered a positive feedback loop, where the formation of steam voids reduces the ability of liquid cooling water to absorb neutrons, which in turn increases the power of the reactor. This caused even more water to turn to steam, producing a further power increase. For almost the entire experiment, the automatic control system successfully counteracted this positive feedback, continually inserting control rods into the core to limit the power increase. However, this system had control of only 12 rods, with almost all of the others having been manually retracted. With the emergency systems shut down, the reactor experienced a power surge so extremely rapid that the operators failed to detect it in time.

At 01:23:40, the SKALA computer registered the initiation of a SCRAM (emergency shutdown) of the reactor, which would unintentionally trigger the explosion. SCRAM was started by pressing the AZ-5 button. This activated the drive mechanism on all control rods to fully insert them into the core, including manual control rods that had been injudiciously removed earlier. The reason why the AZ-5 button was pressed is not known, was this an emergency measure in response to rising temperatures or simply a routine method of shutting down the reactor after the experiment was over.

There is a view that the SCRAM may have been ordered in response to the rapid and unexpected increase in power, although there is no documented data to support this. Some have suggested that the button was never pressed, but that the signal was produced automatically by the emergency protection system (EPS); however, SKALA registered a clearly manual signal. Despite this, the question of when or even whether or not the AZ-5 was actually pushed has been the subject of debate. There are claims that the pressure was caused by the rapid acceleration of energy at the start, and allegations that the button was not pushed until the reactor began to self-destruct. However, others claim that this had occurred before and under calm conditions.

After pressing the AZ-5 button, the insertion of the control rods into the reactor core began. The insertion mechanism moves the bars at 0.4 m/s, so it would take 18-20 seconds to travel the 7 m height of the core. A bigger problem was that these were tipped with graphite, which initially displaced the neutron-absorbing coolant before introducing the neutron-absorbing boron material to slow the reaction. As a result, the SCRAM increased the reaction rate in the upper half of the core.

As the graphite came into contact with the core, a massive energy spike occurred and the core overheated, causing some of the rods to crack when they had been inserted about 2.5m. After three seconds, the power level was raised above 530 MW. According to some estimates, the reactor's power increased to around 30,000 MW, ten times normal output; the last reading on the control panel was 33,000 MW.

Loud noises were heard and then there was an explosion caused by the formation of a cloud of hydrogen^{[citation needed]} inside the core, which blew off the lid of 2000 t of the reactor, causing a fire in the plant and a gigantic release of fission products into the atmosphere.

The body of Valery Khodemchuk was left under the ruins of reactor 4.

Observers outside block 4 saw burning packages and sparks ejected from the reactor, some of them falling on the engine room roof, starting a fire. About 25% of the red-hot graphite and other superheated material was expelled from the fuel channels. Parts of the graphite blocks and fuel channels were outside the reactor building. As a result of the damage to the construction, the high temperature of the core created a flow of air through it, and the hot air ignited the graphite.

Sequence of facts that led to the explosion

Immediate reactions

Radiation

Memorial to engineer Valery Khodemchuk. Located in the nuclear power station Vladimir I. Lenin.

Minutes after the accident, all the military firefighters assigned to the plant were already on their way and prepared to control the disaster quickly. The flames affected several floors of reactor 4 and came dangerously close to the building where reactor 3 was located. The heroic behavior of the firefighters during the first three hours of the accident prevented the fire from spreading to the rest of the plant. Even so, they asked the kyiv fire brigade for help due to the magnitude of the catastrophe.

Three of the engineers involved from left to right: Anatoli Diátlov, Aleksandr Akímov and Leonid Toptunov.

Contrary to safety regulations, bitumen, a combustible material, had been used in the construction of the roofs of the reactor building and turbines. The ejected material caused at least five different fires on the roof of reactor 3, which was still in operation. It was imperative to extinguish them and protect the cooling systems. The head of the night shift, Yuri Bagdasarov, wanted to shut down the reactor, but the chief engineer, Nikolai Fomin, did not allow him. The operators were given gas masks and potassium iodide tablets and ordered to continue working. At 05:00, Bagdasarov decided on his own to shut down the reactor, leaving only those who operated the emergency cooling systems. Reactors 1 and 2 were shut down and placed on emergency cooldown at 01:13 and 02:13. on April 27, respectively.

Radiation levels in the most affected areas of the reactor building were estimated at 5.6 röntgens per second, which is equivalent to more than 20,000 röntgens per hour. A lethal dose is around 100 röntgens per hour, so in some areas workers without adequate protection received fatal doses in less than a minute.

However, a dosimeter capable of measuring up to 1000 R/s was buried in the rubble when part of the building collapsed, and another burned when it was ignited. All the remaining dosimeters had limits of 3.6 R/h, so the needle would get stuck at the maximum level. As a result, the employees could only determine that the radiation level was somewhere above 3.6 R/h, while in certain areas it was as high as 30,000 R/h. Due to the low and inaccurate readings, the head of the night shift, Aleksandr Akimov, assumed that the reactor was intact.

Evidence of graphite pieces and reactor fuel around the building was ignored, and readings from another dosimeter brought in around 04:30 were dismissed on the grounds that it was faulty. Akimov stayed with the other operators in the reactor building until morning trying to pump water into the reactor. None of them were wearing protective gear. Most, including Akimov, died of radiation poisoning within three weeks.

The first helicopter approach showed the magnitude of what happened. In the core, exposed to the atmosphere, the graphite burned red hot, while the fuel and other metals had turned into a glowing liquid mass. The temperature reached 2500 °C, and propelled the radioactive smoke in a stack effect to a considerable height.

Meanwhile, permanent radiation control was established at Pripyat, which by the afternoon of April 26 was about 600,000 times the natural background. On the other hand, at the base of the plant the readings yielded 2080 röntgens; It would take a human being fifteen minutes to absorb the lethal dose. Two days later, there were 18 seriously injured and 156 injured with significant radiation injuries. There was still no figure for the number of deaths, but in a nuclear accident the list of victims increases day after day until many years have passed.

Evacuation

At the same time, those responsible for the region began preparing to evacuate the city of Pripyat and a 10 km radius around the plant. This first massive evacuation began 36 hours after the accident and took three and a half hours to complete. The evacuation of Chernobyl and a radius of 30 km did not take place until May 2. By then there were already more than 1,000 affected by acute injuries caused by radiation.

Concrete structure called "sarcophagus", designed to contain the radioactive material of the reactor core, for a duration of 30 years.

Several Soviet Army helicopters prepared to drop a mixture of materials consisting of sand, clay, lead, dolomite, and boron onto the core. Boron, absorbing neutrons, would prevent a chain reaction from taking place. The lead was intended to contain gamma radiation, the dolomite would serve as a source of carbon dioxide that would smother the fire, and the sand and clay would hold the mixture together and homogeneous, preventing the release of particles. At the end of the missions the By May 13, 1,800 flights had been flown and some 5,000 t of materials had been dropped into the core. to the release of radionuclides.

Then the construction of a tunnel under the damaged reactor began with the initial objective of implementing a refrigeration system to cool the reactor. This tunnel, as well as a large part of the highly radioactive material cleaning tasks, was excavated by young people between the ages of 20 and 30, Soviet Army reservists. Finally, the cooling system was never installed and the tunnel was filled with concrete to strengthen the ground and prevent the core from sinking into the underground layers due to the weight of the thrown materials and touching the water from the underground deposits. The tunnel was completed in a month and four days, and the erection of a structure called a "sarcophagus" began, which would envelop the reactor and isolate it from the outside. The works lasted 206 days.

Evidence abroad of the USSR

The initial evidence that a serious release of radioactive material had occurred at Chernobyl did not come from the Soviet authorities, but from Sweden, where on April 27 radioactive particles were found on the clothes of workers at the Forsmark nuclear power plant (about 1,100 km from the Chernobyl plant). The Swedish researchers, after determining that there were no leaks at the Swedish plant, deduced that the radioactivity must have come from the border area between Ukraine and Belarus, given the prevailing winds in those days. Similar measurements were taking place in Finland and Germany, which allowed the rest of the world to partly know the extent of the disaster.

On the night of Monday, April 28, during the broadcast of the news program Vremya (Время) (of the official television station), the presenter read a brief statement:

An accident occurred at the Chernobyl power station and one of the reactors was damaged. Measures are being taken to eliminate the consequences of the accident. The affected people are being assisted. A government commission has been appointed.

The leaders of the Soviet Union had made a political decision not to give any further details. However, faced with the evidence, on May 14 General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev decided to read an extensive and belated but sincere report in which he recognized the magnitude of the terrible tragedy. However, the international press stated that the report given by the Soviet authorities minimized the magnitude of the accident and wished to cover up the possibilities of collateral and secondary effects that a nuclear catastrophe of this magnitude would throw the world, and which were beginning to be evident throughout the world. world, and especially in Europe.

Much of the graphic information we have about the disaster comes from the then Kiev-based photographer for the Novosti agency Igor Kostin, whose photos showed the accident in his first aerial photos, and later the radiation trail in the affected area. In them you can also see part of the treaty procedure to try to stop the disaster and how the liquidators carried out their work exposing themselves to high doses of radiation, the consequences of which Kostin himself had to face in his subsequent health.

Effects of the disaster

Soviet medals granted to liquidators.

Central medal detail, where the three radiation classes (alpha, gamma and beta) are represented along with a drop of blood.

The explosion caused the biggest catastrophe in the history of civilian exploitation of nuclear energy. 31 people died at the time of the accident, around 135,000 people had to be evacuated from the affected 155,000 km², with large areas remaining uninhabited for many years as another 215,000 people subsequently relocated. The radiation spread to most of Europe, remaining indices of radioactivity in nearby areas at dangerous levels for several days. The estimate of the radionuclides that were released into the atmosphere is around 3.5% of the material coming from the spent fuel (approximately six tons of fragmented fuel) and 100% of all the noble gases contained in the reactor. Of the most representative radioisotopes, the estimated release is 85 petabecquerels of cesium-137 and between 50 and 60% of the total inventory of ¹³¹I, that is, between 1600 and 1920 petabecquerels. These two are the most important radioisotopes from a radiological point of view, although the spill included others in smaller proportions, such as ⁹⁰Sr or ²³⁹Pu.

Immediate effects

The effects of radioactivity in Europe.

Two hundred people were immediately hospitalized, of whom 31 died (28 of them due to direct radiation exposure). Most were firefighters and rescue personnel who were involved in the work to control the accident. An estimated 135,000 people were evacuated from the area, including the around 50,000 inhabitants of Pripyat. For more information regarding the number of people affected, see the following sections.

The authorities had 2,700 buses, 15 boats, two trains and 300 trucks, added to around 9,000 people who had left in their private vehicles.

Evacuation was planned for about 50,000 people, but the actual number was lower because some had already left the city or gone elsewhere over the weekend. However, the authorities informed the population that there was no need to take anything with them, except documents and food for the trip, since they would return home "in three days". According to the official source of information, the vehicles of transportation were sufficient and evacuation was relatively easy.

The liquidators received large doses of radiation. According to Soviet estimates, between 300,000 and 600,000 liquidators worked on cleaning up the 30 km evacuation zone around the reactor, but part of them entered the zone two years after the accident.

Soviet authorities began evacuating the population in the vicinity of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant 36 hours after the accident. In May 1986, approximately one month after the accident, all the inhabitants who had lived within a radius of 30 km around the plant had been displaced. However, the radiation affected a much larger area than the evacuated area.

The contamination from Chernobyl did not spread evenly across adjacent regions, but was spread irregularly in the form of radioactive pockets (like flower petals), depending on weather conditions. Reports by Soviet and Western scientists indicate that Belarus received about 60% of the pollution that fell on the former Soviet Union. The TORCH 2006 report states that half of the volatiles were deposited outside Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. A large area of the Russian Federation south of Briansk was also contaminated, as were parts of northwestern Ukraine.

In Western Europe, various measures were taken in this regard, including restrictions on the importation of certain foods. A controversy arose in France when the Ministry of Agriculture denied in May 1986 that radioactive contamination had affected that country, contradicting data from the French Administration itself. The media quickly ridiculed the theory that the radioactive cloud had stopped at the borders of France.

Prior to the accident, the reactor contained some 190 tons of nuclear fuel. It is estimated that more than half of the radioactive iodine and one-third of the cesium contained in the reactor was released into the atmosphere; in total, around 3.5% of the fuel escaped into the environment. Due to the intense heat caused by the fire, the radioactive isotopes released from nuclear fuel rose into the atmosphere and were dispersed in it.

Areas of Europe contaminated in kBq/m2 with cesio-137
Country	37–185		185-555		555-1480		 1,480
	km2	% of the country	km2	% of the country	km2	% of the country	km2	% of the country
Russia Russia	49,800	0.29	5,700	0.03	2,100	0.01	300	0.002
BelarusBelarus	29,900	14.4	10,200	4.9	4,200	2.0	2,200	1.1
Ukraine Ukraine	37 200	6.2	3,200	0.53	900	0.15	600	0.1
Sweden Sweden	12,000	2.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
FinlandFinland	11,500	3.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
AustriaAustria	8,600	10.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Norway Norway	5,200	1.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
BulgariaBulgaria	4,800	4.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
SwitzerlandSwitzerland	1,300	3.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
GreeceGreece	1,200	0.91	-	-	-	-	-	-
SloveniaSlovenia	300	1.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
ItalyItaly	300	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
MoldovaMoldova	60	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
Totals	162,160 km2		19,100 km2		7,200 km2		3,100 km2

Long-Term Health Effects

Map showing cesio-137 contamination in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. In curios per m2 (1 curio are 37 gigabequerelios (GBq)).

Immediately after the accident, the greatest concern centered on radioactive iodine, with a half-life of eight days. As of 2011, concerns center on soil contamination with strontium-90 and cesium-137, with half-lives of about 30 years. The highest levels of cesium-137 are found in the superficial layers of the soil, where it is taken up by plants, insects and fungi, entering the food chain.

According to the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency report on Chernobyl, the following proportions of the core inventory were released.

• ¹³³Xe 100%,¹³¹I 50-60%,¹³⁴Cs 20-40%,¹³⁷Cs 20-40%,¹³²25-60%,⁸⁹Mr. 4-6%,⁹⁰Mr. 4-6%,¹⁴⁰Ba 4-6%,⁹⁵Zr 3.5%,⁹⁹Mo 3,5%,¹⁰³Ru 3.5%¹⁰⁶Ru 3.5%¹⁴¹Ce 3.5%,¹⁴⁴Ce 3.5%,²³⁹Np 3.5%,²³⁸Pu 3.5%,²³⁹Pu 3.5%,²⁴⁰Pu 3.5%,²⁴¹Pu 3.5%,²⁴²Cm 3.5%

Physical and chemical forms of exhaust include gases, aerosols, and ultimately solid fragmented fuel. There are no public reports on the contamination and its distribution throughout the territory of many of these parts scattered by the explosion of the nucleus.

Some people in the contaminated areas were exposed to large doses of radiation (up to 50 Gy) to the thyroid, due to the absorption of iodine-131, which is concentrated in that gland. The radioactive iodine would come from contaminated milk produced locally, and would have occurred particularly in children. Several studies show that the incidence of thyroid cancer in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia has risen enormously. However, some scientists think that most of the increase detected is due to the increase in controls. To date, no significant increase in leukemia has been detected in the general population. Some scientists fear that the radioactivity will affect local populations for several generations. It is believed that this radioactivity will not die out for another 300,000 years.

Dietary restrictions

House in an abandoned village in the surroundings of Prípiat, near Chernobyl.

Shortly after the accident several European countries instituted measures to limit the effect on human health of the contamination of fields and forests. Contaminated pastures were removed from the animals' feed and radiation levels in the milk were monitored. Restrictions were also placed on access to forest areas, on hunting, and on gathering firewood, berries, and mushrooms.

More than thirty years later, restrictions are still applied on the production, transport and consumption of food contaminated by radiation, especially by cesium-137, to prevent its entry into the food chain. In parts of Sweden and Finland there are restrictions on livestock, including reindeer, in natural environments. In certain regions of Germany, Austria, Italy, Sweden, Finland, Lithuania and Poland, levels of several thousand becquerels per kilogram of cesium-137 have been detected in game animals, including wild boar and deer, as well as in wild mushrooms, fruits of the forest and lacustrine carnivorous fish. In Germany, levels of 40,000 Bq/kg have been detected in wild boar meat. The average level is 6,800 Bq/kg, more than ten times the EU-imposed limit of 600 Bq/kg. The European Commission has stated that "restrictions on certain foods in some member states will have to be maintained for many years to come."^{[citation needed]}

In Great Britain, in accordance with the Food and Environment Protection Act 1985, Emergency Orders have been used since 1986 to impose restrictions on the transport and sale of sheep exceeding 100 Bq/kg. This safety limit was introduced in 1986 following the guidance of the Article 31 Expert Group of the European Commission. The area covered by these restrictions covered in 1986 almost 9,000 farms and more than four million head of sheep. As of 2006, they continue to affect 374 farms (750 km²) and 200,000 head of cattle.

In Norway, the Sami were affected by contaminated food, and were forced to change their diet to minimize the intake of radioactive elements. His reindeer were contaminated by eating lichens, which extract radioactive particles from the atmosphere along with other nutrients.

Flora and fauna

After the disaster, a four square kilometer area of pine trees in the vicinity of the reactor turned golden brown and died, acquiring the name "Red Forest". Within a radius of about 20 to 30 kilometers around the reactor there was an increase in the mortality of plants and animals, as well as losses in their reproductive capacity.

In the years since the disaster, wildlife has flourished in the human-abandoned exclusion zone. Belarus has already declared a nature reserve, and in Ukraine there is a similar proposal. Various species of wild animals and birds that had not been seen in the area before the disaster are now in abundance, due to the absence of humans in the area.

In a 1992-1993 study of game species in the area, up to 300,000 becquerels of cesium-137 were measured in one kilo of roe deer meat. This measure was taken during an anomalous period of high radioactivity possibly caused by falling contaminated pine needles. Concentrations of radioactive elements have since declined to an average value of 30,000 Bq in 1997 and 7,400 in 2000, levels that remain dangerous. In Belarus the maximum allowed limit of radioactive cesium in one kg of game meat is 500 Bq. In Ukraine it is 200 Bq for any type of meat.

Radioactive vehicles

The Chernobyl radioactive vehicles, as they are known, are abandoned inside the exclusion zone, some 25 km from the nuclear power plant. This area was named Rassokha and it functions as a graveyard for abandoned cars. In this place there are around 1,350 abandoned radioactive vehicles, including fire trucks, military trucks, armored vehicles and contaminated helicopters, all of them serving in different tasks to control fires (mainly in the nuclear power plant) or patrol the surroundings to prevent civilians from re-entering the exclusion zone.

Situation in 2002 of the city of Prípiat, where the workers of Chernobyl resided.

Controversy over casualty estimates

It is estimated that the majority of premature deaths caused by the Chernobyl accident are the result of cancers or other diseases induced by radiation for several decades after the event. A large population (some studies consider the entire population of Europe)) was subjected to relatively low radiation doses, increasing the risk of cancer in the entire population (according to the linear model with no threshold). It is impossible to attribute specific deaths to the accident, and many estimates indicate that the number of additional deaths will be too small. to be statistically detectable (for example, if one in 5,000 people died due to the accident, in a population of 400 million there would be 80,000 fatalities due to the accident, statistically undetectable). In addition, interpretations of the current health status of the exposed population are variable, so casualty estimates are always based on numerical models of radiation health effects. On the other hand, the effects of low-level radiation on human health are still not well known, so no model used is completely reliable (several authors even affirming that the effect of hormesis, evidenced in the action of other toxic elements, should also apply to radiation).

Given these factors, different studies on the effects of Chernobyl on health have reached very different conclusions, and are subject to political and scientific controversy. Some of the main studies are presented below.

Official list of direct deaths

The 31 people listed in the table below are those whose deaths the Soviet Union included in its official list, published in the second half of 1986, of victims directly attributable to the disaster.

• Valery Ilich Khodemchuk
  • Date and place of birth: March 24, 1951, Kiev, Ukrainian SSR
  • Place and date of his death: 26 April 1986, nuclear power station Vladimir Ilich Lenin, Ukrainian RSS
  • Cause of his death: trauma
  • Occupation: reactor pump engineer 4
  • Description: Khodemchuk was in the pump room, at the time of the explosion, did not give him time to leave, being crushed by a concrete wall and although they tried to communicate with him, it was in vain.
  • Official recognition: In 2008 he was awarded the Order of third-grade courage at the posthumous level in Ukraine.
• Aleksandr Fiodórovich Akímov
  • Date and place of birth: May 6, 1953, Novosibirsk, Russian RSFS
  • Place and date of death: 11 May 1986, Moscow, Russian RSFS
  • Cause of his death: Acute irradiation syndrome, burning in 100% of the body, received an estimated dose of 15 Grays (1500 rads)
  • Occupation: Head of Unit 4 night shift
  • Description: He was a reactor operator, in the control room controls at the time of the explosion; he received a lethal dose during attempts to restart the flow of power water to the reactor.
  • Official recognition: In 2008, he received the Order of the Third Degree to Value at the posthumous level in Ukraine.
• Anatoly Ivanovich Baranov
  • Date and place of birth: 13 June 1953, Tsyurupynsk, Ukrainian RSS
  • Place and date of death: 20 May 1986, Moscow, Russian RSFS
  • Cause of His Death: Acute irradiation syndrome
  • Occupation: Electrical Engineer
  • Description: He activated the Generators administered during emergencies, avoiding the spread of fire through the generator room.
  • Official recognition: Received the Order of the Third Degree to the Posthumous Value in Ukraine and the Order of the October Revolution in the Soviet Union.
• Vyacheslav Stepanovych Brazhnik
  • Date and place of birth: May 3, 1957, Atbasar, Kazakh RSS
  • Place and date of death: May 14, 1986, Moscow, Russian RSFS
  • Cause of His Death: Acute irradiation syndrome
  • Occupation: Senior turbine machinist operator.
  • Description: In the turbine room at the time of the explosion. He received a lethal dose (more than 1000 rads) during firefighting and stabilization of the turbine room, died in the Moscow hospital. Irradiated by a piece of fuel hosted in a near turbogenerator 7 transformer during manual opening of the turbine emergency oil drain valves.
  • Official recognition: Received the Order of the Third Degree to the Posthumous Value in Ukraine and the Order of the October Revolution in the Soviet Union.
• Viktor Mykhaylovych Degtyarenko
  • Date and place of birth: August 10, 1954, Rizan, Russian RSFS
  • Date and place of death: May 19, 1986, Moscow, Russian RSFS
  • Cause of His Death: Acute irradiation syndrome
  • Occupation: Reactor Operator
  • Description: He was near the bombs at the time of the explosion; his face was staggered by steam or hot water.
  • Official recognition: Received the Order of the Third Degree to the Posthumous Value in Ukraine and the Order of the October Revolution in the Soviet Union.
• Vasili Ivánovich Ignatenko
  • Date and place of birth: March 13, 1961, Sperizhie, Belarusian RSS
  • Date and place of death: May 13, 1986, Moscow, Russian RSFS
  • Cause of His Death: Acute irradiation syndrome
  • Occupancy: Squad Commander, 6th Paramilitary Fire Rescue Unit, Pripyat, Kiev
  • Description: Senior sergeant, helped extinguish fires on the third reactor roof and around the vent.
  • Official recognition: Hero of Ukraine with the Order of the Golden Star; Cross by the Corage and Order of the Red Flag in the Soviet Union.

Studies carried out on the effects of the Chernobyl accident

UNSCEAR Report 2008

A guide measures radiation levels near Chernobyl in 2011.

The report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) is considered the scientific consensus on the health effects of the Chernobyl accident. The report highlights that of the 600 workers present at dawn As of April 26, 134 received high doses (0.8-16 Gy) and experienced Acute Radiation Syndrome. 28 of them died in the first three months and another 19 died in the period 1987-2004 from various causes not necessarily associated with radiation exposure. Most of the 530,000 registered workers in recovery operations received doses between 0.02 Gy and 0.5 Gy between 1986 and 1990. This group is still at potential risk of late consequences such as cancer and other diseases, so Your health status will be closely monitored.

The doses received to the thyroid during the first months after the accident were particularly high in children and adolescents in Belarus, Ukraine and the other affected Soviet regions where they drank milk with high levels of radioactive iodine. As of 2005, more than 6,000 cases of thyroid cancer had been diagnosed in this group, and it is highly likely that a large proportion of these cancers are attributable to radioactive iodine ingestion. The increase in thyroid cancer incidence due to the accident is expected to continue for many more years, although the long-term increase is difficult to quantify precisely.

Apart from the dramatic increase in the incidence of thyroid cancer among those exposed at an early age, and some indication of an increase in leukemia and cataract incidence among workers, there is no clearly demonstrated increase in the incidence of solid cancers or leukemia due to radiation in exposed populations. There is also no evidence of other non-malignant disorders that are related to ionizing radiation. However, widespread psychological problems occurred due more to fear of radiation than to the effects of the low doses received.

AEN 2002 study

The Nuclear Energy Agency presented a study in 2002 indicating that after the Soviet Union's response to the Chernobyl accident, there were a total of 31 deaths, one due to an explosion, a second due to a thrombosis, one more due to burns and 28 due to radiation.

A total of 499 people were hospitalized, of which 237 had symptoms of having been significantly exposed to radiation, the 28 dead belonging to this last group.

The report cites two different studies in which the possible increase in the number of cancers in the future is estimated at between 0.004% and 0.01% with respect to the total number of cancers, among which would be those produced by tobacco, pollution and others.

It is also emphasized that the number of thyroid cancers among children increased significantly in Belarus and Ukraine due to the Chernobyl accident. In the period from 1986 to 1998, the number of cancers compared to the period from 1974 to 1986 had increased by 4,057 cases of thyroid cancer in children. Virtually all cases were in children born before the accident.

• Summary of the report (HTML) Archived on 22 August 2006 at Wayback Machine. (English)
• Full report (PDF) Archived on September 5, 2009 at Wayback Machine. (English)

Report of the Chernobyl Forum (2005)

In September 2005, the report of the Chernobyl Forum (in which the IAEA, the WHO and the governments of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine participate among others) estimated that the total number of victims due to the accident will rise to 4,000 (best estimate). This number includes the 31 workers who died in the accident, and the 15 children who died of thyroid cancer. They are all part of the 600,000 people who received the highest doses of radiation.

The full version of the WHO report, adopted by the UN and published in April 2006, includes the prediction of another 5,000 victims among another 6.8 million people who may have been affected, which would reach 9,000 cancer victims.

Among other criticisms, in 2006 Alex Rosen expressed doubts about the report, considering that the data was outdated and did not take into account more than the former Soviet republics. Another criticism expressed by anti-nuclear groups refers to the agreement that unites the WHO and the IAEA and that obliges the former to previously consult and agree on its reports related to its powers with the IAEA.

• WHO - Full report (PDF)
• WHO - Chernobyl’s Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts and Recommendations to the Governments of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine (PDF) (English)

TORCH Report 2006

This study (in English The Other Report on Chernobyl, "The Other Report on Chernobyl") was carried out in 2006 at the proposal of the European German Green Party.

It highlights that the Chernobyl Forum report only took into consideration areas with exposure greater than 40,000 Bq/m², while there are other countries where there is contamination with levels below that value (Turkey, Slovenia, Switzerland, Austria and Slovakia). It is indicated that 44% of Germany and 34% of the United Kingdom were also affected. It is also noted that a greater research effort is needed to assess thyroid cancer incidences in Europe, predicting 30,000 to 60,000 deaths from cancer alone due to the accident as well as an increase of between 18,000 and 66,000 cancer cases. of thyroid only in Belarus. According to this report, an average increase of 40% in solid tumors has been observed in Belarus. He also points out that the induction of cataracts and cardiovascular diseases are connected to the accident.

This report was reviewed in the Low-Level Radiation Campaign, where it was noted that ''it was a theoretical review of a small part of the evidence accumulated in the twenty years since the Chernobyl disaster'' "reveals consistent biases in ignoring or underestimating crucial developments in radiobiology", as well as ignoring a large body of evidence from Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.

2006 Greenpeace Report

In response to the Chernobyl Forum report, Greenpeace commissioned a report from a group, according to the organization, of 52 scientists from around the world. In this report it is estimated that about 270,000 cases of cancer will occur attributable to the fallout from Chernobyl, of which about 93,000 are likely to be fatal; but it is also claimed that "the most recently published figures indicate that in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine alone the accident could be responsible for an additional 200,000 deaths in the period between 1990 and 2004".

The compilation was compiled by Alexei Yablokov, a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and co-founder of Greenpeace Russia, including several articles originally published in Russian and later published in English under the title Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment in the Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences which later stated that "not even by publication does the Academy validate the claims made in the original Slavic-language publications cited in the translated articles. It is important to note that the translated volume has not been formally reviewed by the New York Academy of Sciences or anyone else." The journal omitted articles published in Russian under peer review and cited in its most articles in the media, websites and even without identification to justify their claims. Its methodology has been called into question and it has never been used as a reference for peer-reviewed academic publications. According to Richard Wakeford, "The tone of the book emphasizes the existence of an international conspiracy to hide the truth which leads to an uneasy feeling about the intentions of the authors".

AIMPGN Report April 2006

In April 2006, the German section of the AIMPGN produced a report that refuted a large part of the results of the other studies carried out. Among his claims is that between 50,000 and 100,000 liquidators have died as of 2006. That between 540,000 and 900,000 liquidators have been disabled. The study estimates the number of infant fatalities in Europe at approximately 5,000. According to the study, between 1,000 and 3,000 additional birth defects have been observed in Bavaria, Germany alone since Chernobyl. In Belarus alone, more than 10,000 people have suffered from thyroid cancer since the catastrophe. The number of thyroid cancer cases due to Chernobyl predicted for Europe (excluding the former Soviet Union) is between 10,000 and 20,000, among others.

Other studies and allegations

• The Ukrainian Minister of Health stated in 2006 that more than 2400 000 Ukrainians, including 428 000 children, suffer from health problems caused by the catastrophe. As the 2006 UN report points out, those displaced by the accident also suffer negative psychological effects from the accident.
• The study Radiation-Induced Cancer from Low-Dose Exposure (Cancer induced by low-dose radiation exposure) of the Committee for Nuclear Responsibility (Committee for Nuclear Responsibility) estimates that the Chernobyl accident will cause 475 368 fatal cancer victims.
• Another study shows an increase in the incidence of cancer in Sweden.
• There has also been a change in the relationship between sexes at birth in several European countries with the accident.
• Summary of the report Estimates of cancer in Europe due to Chernobyl's radioactive precipitationof the International Agency for Cancer Research, published in April 2006, states that cancer cases due to the accident are unlikely to be detected in national cancer statistics. The results of trend analysis in the time of cancer cases and mortality in Europe do not show, so far, an increase in cancer rates, apart from cases of thyroid cancer in the most contaminated regions, which can be attributed to Chernobyl radiation" However, although statistically undetectable, the Association estimates, based on the linear model without a threshold, that 16 000 cancer deaths due to the Chernobyl accident can be expected until 2065. Its estimates have very wide confidence intervals of 95%, between 6700 and 38 000 deaths.
• A study by the GSF (National Center for Environmental and Health Research) in Germany shows evidence of an increase in the number of birth defects in Germany and Finland from the accident

Comparisons with other accidents

The Chernobyl accident caused several dozen immediate deaths due to radiation poisoning. In addition to them, thousands of premature deaths are expected in the coming decades. In general, however, it is not possible to prove the origin of the cancer that causes a person's death, and it is very difficult to estimate long-term deaths due to Chernobyl. However, to understand the magnitude of the accident, it is possible to compare the effects produced by other disasters, such as:

• The failure of the Banqiao dam (Henan, China, 1975) caused at least 26 000 people to die because of flooding, and another 145 000 died due to the epidemics and subsequent famines.
• The Bhopal disaster (India, 1984), of which the BBC reported that it had caused the death of 3,000 people initially, and at least 15,000 died of subsequent diseases.
• The Great mist of London (United Kingdom, 1952), where medical services compiled statistics finding that the fog had killed 4000 people initially and in the months that another 8000 died.
• The MV Doña Paz disaster (Philippines, 1987). This oil product fire killed more than 4000 people.
• Johnstown flooding (Pensilvania, USA, 1889). 2209 dead.
• Fire of the Church of the Society, Santiago de Chile, 1863, between 2000 and 3000 dead, according to the source.
• Explosions of San Juanico in 1984 (State of Mexico, Mexico, 1984). 600 dead.

Humanitarian aid to the victims of Chernobyl

The Patriarch Cyril I of Moscow together with Víktor Yanukóvich, former President of Ukraine, and Dmitri Medvédev, former President of Russia, during a commemorative event in Chernobyl in 2011.

Upon learning about the accident, several nations offered immediate humanitarian aid to those affected, in addition to making promises of long-term humanitarian aid.

Since 1990, Cuba has maintained a relief program for the victims of this nuclear accident. Almost 24,000 patients from Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Moldova and Armenia, all of them affected by radioactive accidents, have already passed through the Tarará Pediatric Hospital, on the outskirts of Havana. Most of the patients are Ukrainian children affected by the disaster, with ailments ranging from post-traumatic stress disorder to cancer. About 67% of the children come from orphanages and schools for children without filial support. The social impact of the care provided is great, because these children do not have the economic possibilities to treat their illnesses. They are evaluated and receive all kinds of treatments, including bone marrow transplants for those with leukemia. In this program, the Ministry of Health of Ukraine pays for the children's trip to Cuba and all the rest of the financing of the program is provided by the Cuban Government.

The Galician NGO Asociación Ledicia Cativa temporarily shelters minors affected by Chernobyl radiation in families in the autonomous community of Galicia. The Castilian-Leonese NGO "Ven con Nosotros" It carries out similar work in the autonomous communities of Castilla y León, Madrid and Extremadura, Chernobyl Elkartea and Chernobileko Umeak in the Basque Country, Solidarity Rainbow in Navarra and Solidarity Families with the Belarusian People in Murcia.

The Chernobyl Children Project International was also created, and other countries such as Ireland or Canada also helped affected children.

Situation of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant since 1995

Operation and shutdown of the plant

Ukraine was in 1986 so dependent on the electricity generated by the Chernobyl power plant that the Soviet Union made the decision to continue producing electricity with non-damaged reactors. This decision was maintained after Ukraine gained independence. Of course, the authorities took several measures to modernize the plant and improve its security.

In December 1995, the G7 and Ukraine signed the so-called Ottawa memorandum, in which Ukraine expressed its willingness to close the plant. In return, the G7 and the EU agreed to help Ukraine obtain other sources of electricity, financing the completion of two new nuclear reactors at Khmelnitsky and Rivne and assisting in the construction of a gas and oil pipeline from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. In 2000, the European Commission committed €65 million to help Ukraine purchase electricity during the interim period (2000-2003) while new plants were being built.

The last operating reactor was shut down on December 15, 2000, in a ceremony in which Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma gave the order directly by teleconference.

New sarcophagus

The new Chernobil Reactor 4 sarcophagus in October 2017

The Chernobyl Reactor 4 next to the sarcophagus and the accident memorial in 2009.

Over time, the sarcophagus built around reactor 4 just after the accident has been degrading due to the effect of radiation, heat and corrosion generated by the materials contained, to the point of a serious risk of collapse of the structure, which could have dramatic consequences for the population and the environment.

New Chernobil plant reactor 4 sarcophagus

The cost of building a permanent protection that reduces the risk of contamination complying with all safety containment regulations was calculated in 1998 at 768 million euros. Ukraine, unable to obtain such funding in the short time available, requested international assistance. Various international conferences have since raised the necessary funds, despite the fact that the budget has been increasing significantly due to inflation.

In 2004, donors had deposited more than 700 million euros for its construction (in total by that date close to 1000 million euros had been donated for recovery projects), and since 2005 the preparatory work for the construction of a new sarcophagus. On September 23, 2007, the Ukrainian government signed a contract with the French consortium NOVARKA for its construction, which finally began in April 2012 and was scheduled to be completed in the summer of 2015. The construction of this sarcophagus is expected to in the form of an ark to avoid the problems of the escape of radioactive materials from Chernobyl for at least a hundred years. It is a gigantic steel structure in the shape of an oval arch 190 meters high and 200 meters wide that will completely cover the current structure of the reactor and fuel, as well as the radioactive waste materials that unleashed the tragedy in 1986. And it is that the damaged reactor still retains 95% of its original radioactive material, and exposure to the harsh weather conditions in the area threaten new leaks.

Ukraine has signed another contract with the American company Holtec to build a large warehouse that functions as a landfill to store the nuclear waste generated, for this purpose a high-activity waste storage center is being built at the plant itself.

The total cost of the "Execution Plan of the Protection System," of which the new sarcophagus is the most prominent element, is estimated at 2.15 billion euros. The cost of the new sarcophagus alone was estimated at 1.5 billion euros.

In November 2016, thirty years after the tragedy, a new sarcophagus was inaugurated, called the "New Safe Sarcophagus" (NSC), a mobile structure, the largest built to date in the world, in the form of an arch 110 meters high, 150 wide and 256 long and weighing more than 30,000 tons. It was built 180 meters from the reactor and then placed on top of it using a sophisticated rail system. It is estimated that it will last for more than a hundred years. The final cost of the structure was 1,500 million euros, financed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) together with the collaboration of 28 countries that contributed 1,417 million euros and built by the French company Novarka. The structure is equipped with remote-controlled cranes with the aim of dismantling the old structure.

The new structure will allow the sarcophagus to be dismantled and the radioactive material extracted. In 2023, the destruction of the old structure is expected to be completed, the most delicate task of the entire project since it involves working inside the reactor.

Ceiling collapse

On February 12, 2013, due to the weight of the snow, part of the roof of the structure fell onto the turbine section.

In popular culture

• In 1986, the popular Argentine rock band, Patricio Rey and his Ricota Redonditos, included, in the poem of the live version of the song Ji ji ji, from the album Oktubrereferences to the accident. His author, Carlos Indio Solari, does so from the creation of a fictional character (Olga Sudorova) who, inferred, is the victim of the immediate consequences of the sinister: "Olga Sudorova. The Vodka of Chernobyl! Poor Olga: believed”, the letter tells.
• In 1987, the following year of the accident, American Frederik Pohl published his novel Chernobyl, translated Spanish that same year by Rafael Marín, based on the actual facts of the catastrophe.
• In 1996, the Guatemalan singer-songwriter Ricardo Arjona in his song "The News" refers in one of his verses to this place.
• In 1997, Belarusian writer Svetlana Aleksiévich (later the Nobel Prize in Literature in 2015 for that work), published Voices of Chernobyl, a documentary-style book that collects testimonies from people affected directly and indirectly by the estrago.
• In 2007, the first STALKER, S.T.A.L.K.E.R., Shadow of Chernobyl, is released. The work, developed by GSC Game World, finds its inspiration in the incident of Chernobyl, in the Stalker (1979) film by Andréi Tarkovski and the novel Alien Pícnic (Пикник на очине) (1972) by Arkadi and Boris Strugatski, prior to the accident, mixing each of the premises and concepts to give rise to its own history. The video game runs in a wide area that includes both the plant of Chernobil, and the city of Pripyat and its surroundings.
• In 2011, the movie Transformers: the dark side of the moon, the Chernobyl accident was caused by a part of an Ark engine, starship in the 1960s, not by a human accident.
• In 2016, the film adaptation of Aleksiévich's book, led by Pol Cruchten, entitled "The Supplication (Voices from Chernobyl) appeared, a work that preserves the documentary style through the narration of testimonies of the survivors of the catastrophe.
• In 2019, the HBO channel issued a mini-series in five chapters entitled Chernobyl, reconstructing the events that occurred from the moment of the explosion, through the actions of two historical characters, Valeri Legásov and Borís Shcherbina. The first was a Soviet scientist who integrated the Chernobyl accident investigation committee, alerting from the very first moment on the extreme gravity of the matter and making technical decisions on the ground to contain the expansion of the atomic disaster. The second was a high-ranking Soviet political leader who was in charge of political decisions on the ground to contain the catastrophe. Both died in the next step, as a result of the accident. The third leading role of the series corresponds to a Belarusian scientist named Uliana Khomyuk, who did not exist as such, but who synthesizes the performance on the ground of many scientists, many of whom also died in the immediate years as a result of radiation. The role of firefighter Vasili Ignatenko also corresponds to a real person, who died as a result of radiation, whose memory is taken from the account of his wife.
• In 2021 the Russian film Chernobil was released, which has as protagonists the firefighters who came to the accident.