Blitzkrieg
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La Lightning warcommonly known by his German name blitzkrieg (
^bl devoted to life (?·i)), it is the name that receives a military tactic that ends the development of a rapid and forceful campaign that culminates in a clear victory, thus avoiding the possibility of a total war and the wear it entails in terms of lives and resources. This is an attack tactic that consists of an initial bombing, followed by the use of mobile forces, attacking with speed and surprise to prevent the enemy from carrying out a coherent defense.
The basic principles of this tactic were developed in the 20th century by several nations from the interwar period, and it is known mainly for its adaptation by the Wehrmacht to the use of modern weapons and vehicles, and the consequent implementation in World War II as an effective method to avoid trench warfare and warfare on fixed fronts. From the second half of the xx century, the bombardment phase has been carried out mainly by air (although also artillery), followed by a rapid and forceful advance of ground units, as in the Six Day War. Since the element of surprise is crucial in a successful blitzkrieg, it involves the seizure of the initiative in the attack and usually in the campaign.
Etymology and modern meaning
Blitzkrieg is a German word that literally translates as “lightning war”, to refer to its rapid outcome. Rarely used in World War II, the word was rarely used in military publications, such as the Deutsche Wehr in 1935, in the context of an article that exposed how states with insufficient food and raw materials could win a war In 1938 it was used again in the Militär-Wochenblatt, where it was defined as a "strategic attack" carried out using armoured, air forces and airborne forces. In his book Blitzkrieg Legende, Karl-Heinz Frieser, who researched the origin of the word, points out that use of the word before the war was very rare and that it practically never entered official terminology during the war. war.
In the Anglo-Saxon world the term was made popular by a journalist from the American magazine Time, in his description of the invasion of Poland in 1939. Published on September 25, 1939, with the campaign in full development, the report of the journalist mentions:
“The battle front has been lost, and with it the illusion that had always existed on a battle front. In this there was no war of occupation, but a war of rapid penetration and annulment—Blitzkrieg, lightning war. The rapid columns of armoured tanks and trucks have plunged into Poland as the bombs rained from the sky announcing their arrival. They have cut off the communications, killed the animals, scattered the population, spread terror. Acting sometimes 50 km ahead of infantry and artillery, they have finished Polish defenses before they had time to organize. Then, as the infantry cleaned, they moved to attack again far behind what was known as the front.”
Historians and military experts have defined Blitzkrieg as the use of combined forces warfare and maneuver concepts, primarily developed in Germany during the interwar period and World War II, and later implemented in various wars throughout the xx century and at the beginning of the 21st century. From a strategic point of view, the idea is to achieve a rapid collapse of the adversary with a short campaign waged by a small and professional army. Operationally, such a goal is achieved by indirect means, such as mobility and surprise, leaving the adversary's plans impractical or irrelevant. To achieve this, combinations of armored formations, motorized infantry, engineers, artillery and fighter-bombers have been used.
Beyond blitzkrieg, the use of the word blitz became popular with reference to military operations that emphasize surprise, speed, and concentration. Even during World War II, the bombing raids on the city of London by the Luftwaffe became known as the Blitz. In the 1990s, American shock and awe theorists claimed that blitzkrieg was a subset of strategies they called "rapid dominance."
Besides the military field, there is also a modality of rapid chess called Blitzschach
First examples
The first practical examples of this concept, along with modern technology, were those established by the German Wehrmacht in the opening battles of World War II. While operations in Poland were fairly conventional, subsequent battles (particularly the invasions of France, the Netherlands, and early operations in the Soviet Union) were effective due to surprise penetrations, the enemy's general unpreparedness, and the inability to react quickly to German offensives. The victory of the German army against a technically superior and more numerous enemy in France led many analysts to believe that a new system of warfare had been invented.
The generally accepted definition of operations in the form of blitzkrieg includes the use of maneuver rather than attrition to defeat an opponent, and plotting operations using the concentration of combined forces of mobile resources in a central point, armor closely supported by mobile infantry, artillery and air support assets. These tactics necessitated the development of specialized support vehicles, new communication methods, new military tactics, and effective decentralization of the command structure.
In general terms, the blitzkrieg needed the formation of mechanized infantry, self-propelled artillery and engineering corps that could keep the equipment and the mobility of the tanks in good condition. German forces avoided direct combat in order to disrupt communications, decision-making, logistics, and lower enemy morale. In combat, blitzkrieg left the sluggish defending forces little choice other than to break into isolated pockets, which were encircled and subsequently destroyed by German infantry.
Interwar Period
Polish-Soviet War
The strategy was first applied during the Polish-Soviet War (1919-1920). The Polish Armed Forces were inferior to the Soviet ones. To move the troops, the strategy was used for the first time, which won the war and, consequently, Polish independence was prolonged by 19 years.
Reichswehr
The imminent development of blitzkrieg began with the German defeat in World War I. Shortly after the conflict, the Reichswehr created committees of veteran officers to assess 57 issues of the war. The reports of these committees shaped publications of doctrine and training that would become standard in World War II. The Reichswehr was influenced by his analysis of prewar German military thought, particularly its infiltration tactics and the maneuver warfare that dominated the Eastern Front.
German military history was heavily influenced by Carl von Clausewitz, Alfred von Schlieffen, and Helmuth von Moltke, who were supporters of maneuver, mass, and enveloping maneuver. His concepts were successfully applied in the Franco-Prussian War and in the attempted Schlieffen Plan. During the war these concepts were modified by the Reichswehr. His chief of staff, Hans von Seeckt, backed away from the doctrine, arguing that it focused too much on speed-based envelopment. Speed was surprising, and this allowed its exploitation if decisions were made quickly and mobility gave flexibility and speed. Von Seeckt advocated breakthroughs against the enemy center when it was more profitable than encirclements, or where encirclements were impractical.
Under von Seeckt's command, the modern update of the doctrinal system was called Bewegungskrieg (German for mobile warfare), and its tactical system called Auftragstaktik (German for mission-based tactics) was developed giving rise to the well-known blitzkrieg effect. In addition, he rejected the notion of mass that von Schlieffen and von Moltke had defended.
While the reserves occupied four-tenths of the German forces in the prewar campaigns, von Seeckt sought the creation of a small, professional volunteer military force supported by a defensive militia. In modern warfare, he argued that a small force was more capable of offensive action, quicker to prepare, and less expensive to equip with modern weapons. The Reichswehr was forced to adopt a small professional army due to the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles which limited the German army to a maximum of one hundred thousand soldiers.
The Bewegungskrieg needed a new command hierarchy that would allow military decisions to be made as close to the level of the military unit. This enabled units to react and implement decisions more quickly, which was a critical advantage and one of the main reasons for the success of the blitzkrieg.
The German leadership had also been criticized for failing to understand the technological advances of World War I, leaving main battle tank production as a low priority, and not conducting studies of the machine gun before the war. In response, the Germans German officers attended technical schools during the post-war reconstruction period.
Infiltration tactics, created by the German army during World War I, became the basis for subsequent tactics. The German infantry had evolved into small decentralized groups, which avoided resistance and tried to reach weak points and attack rear communications. It was aided by coordinated artillery and aerial bombardments, followed by larger ground forces with heavy weapons destroying points of resistance. These concepts formed the basis of the Wehrmacht's tactics during World War II.
The eastern front of the war did not get bogged down in trench warfare. The German and Russian armies fought a maneuver warfare over thousands of miles, giving German leaders unique experience that the Western Front did not have. Studies of operations in the East led to the conclusion that small coordinated forces possessed more combat capability than large uncoordinated forces.
Foreign influence
During this period, the main combatants of the war developed their own theories about mechanized forces, those of the Western Allies being substantially different from those of the Reichswehr. The British, French and American doctrines at the beginning of the First World War posed a role for armored cars reduced to the function of mere support for and subservient to infantry forces, with little focus on combined groups and the concentration of armored forces.. This had a decisive influence on the design of the Allied tank models in service: slow and heavy, with strong armor and weapons designed for supporting fire. The Germans would, on the contrary, have less armor and firepower in exchange for much greater speed and maneuverability, at least in the initial phases of the war and until the appearance of the heavier panzer models.
The early publications of the Reichswehr contained many translated articles from the Allied countries, although the more the doctrinal lines differed, the less interest they received from the German General Staff. The technical advances of foreign countries were, however, monitored and used in part by the Armaments Office. In general, external doctrines had little influence, with four possible exceptions: the Frenchman Charles de Gaulle, the Soviet Mikhail Tukhachevsky, and the British J.F.C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart.
De Gaulle, then a colonel in the French army, was a well-known advocate of concentrating armor and aircraft, a view scorned by his high command, but which some say influenced Heinz Guderian. In 1934, De Gaulle had written in his book L & # 39; armée de metier some theories where he defended the combined use of tanks and infantry in collaboration with aviation. Higher command in the French army rejected such ideas, but many extracts from de Gaulle's text were quoted verbatim as useful theory in German military manuals of the time.
Fuller and Liddell Hart are associated with the development of blitzkrieg by Guderian himself in his memoirs. At the suggestion of both, the British War Office allowed an Experimental Mechanized Force, formed on 1 May 1927, which was fully motorized and included self-propelled artillery and motorized engineers. His articles with the conclusions drawn were widely distributed in Germany, and Guderian himself was even in charge of translating them. Both authors were widely known to the pre-rearmament German officer corps (Erwin Rommel, for example, had original copies and some of Guderian's translations in his home). However, the Allies (and especially Britain) discarded those initial studies and fully adopted the doctrine of the chariot as infantry support.
There is no doubt, therefore, that Guderian and other German generals were the first to devise and put this doctrine into practice in a wide and successful range of scenarios during World War II. From the river crossings by the first combined forces and the exploitation of penetration during the advance into France in 1940 to the massive encirclement advances into the Soviet Union in 1942, the German military displayed mastery and innovation that enabled it to overcome its numerical inferiority. and stuff. In large part it is due to the determined work of Guderian as a tireless promoter of the armored weapon; His leadership was supported and encouraged by the Reichswehr General Staff, promoting both the design of the weapon and the improvement in its use through war games during the 1930s.
On the other hand, the Reichswehr and the Red Army collaborated in military exercises and tests in Kazan and Lipetsk in early 1926. During this period, the Red Army was developing the theory of Deep Operations, which would guide Red Army doctrine during World War II. Located within the Soviet Union, these two centers were used for aviation and armored vehicle testing up to battalion level, as well as hosting armored and airborne schools. These initial tests were carried out in secret on the territory of the Soviet Union as part of an exchange program through which the Germans sought to avoid the impositions of the Treaty of Versailles in matters of war research. Despite this, the Great Purge launched by Stalin in 1935 meant that many Soviet military leaders who advocated "war in depth" were arrested and later shot, with the consequent government ban on further studying war concepts whose authors had fallen out of favor with the regime. Ironically, it would be precisely the Soviets who would suffer the most from the technical mastery achieved by the German forces thanks to this covert initial collaboration.
Guderian in the Wehrmacht
Following Germany's military reforms in the 1920s, Heinz Guderian emerged as a strong supporter of mechanized forces. Within the Troop Transport Inspectorate, Guderian and his colleagues carry out theoretical and exercise work in the field. There was opposition from many officers who gave scoop to the infantry or simply doubted the usefulness of the armored. Among them was the Chief of Staff Ludwig Beck (1935-1938), who was wary that armored forces could be decisive. However, during his tenure, panzer divisions were created.
Guderian argued that the chariot was the decisive weapon of war. He stated in one of his writings that "if the chariots succeed, then victory is achieved." In an article directed at critics of armored warfare, Guderian wrote "until our critics can come up with a new and better method of conducting a successful ground attack other than indiscriminate killing, we will continue to hold to our belief that armored —properly employed, it goes without saying—they are now the best available means of ground attack.
Discussing the fastest rate at which the defenders could reinforce an area that the attackers had penetrated during World War I, Guderian wrote that "since the reserve forces will now be motorized, the creation of new defensive fronts is easier than it used to be; the possibilities of an offensive based on the cooperation of artillery and infantry are, consequently, easier than they were in the last war". He went on to say that "we believe that by attacking with armor we can achieve a higher rate of movement than has been possible up to now, and-perhaps even more importantly-we can maintain it once a gap opens up in front" In addition, Guderian called for the widespread use of radio to facilitate coordination and command.
The Panzertruppen and the Luftwaffe
The blitzkrieg would not be possible without the modification of Germany's standing army, which was limited by the Treaty of Versailles to 100,000 men, its air force disbanded, and the development of the prohibited tank. After becoming head of state, Adolf Hitler ignored these obligations.
A command of armored troops was created within the German Heer (Army), the Panzertruppen. The Luftwaffe, or Air Force, was reestablished, and development of fighter-bombers and doctrines began. Hitler was a strong supporter of this new strategy. He read Guderian's book Achtung! Panzer! and watched armored field exercises in Kummersdorf, where he commented "This is what I want: and this is what I'll get."
The Spanish Civil War
German volunteers first used armor on real battlefields during the Spanish Civil War in 1936. The armored corps consisted of Battalion 88, a force created with three companies of Panzer I tanks that functioned as a training cadre for the national army. The Luftwaffe fielded squadrons of fighters, dive bombers, and transports under the name of the Condor Legion.
Guderian said the tank deployment was "on too small a scale to allow accurate assessments. The real test for his "armoured idea" should wait until World War II. However, the German Air Force also provided volunteers to test tactics and aircraft in combat, including the first use of the Stuka.
Maneuver method
Schwerpunkt
The blitzkrieg always pursued decisive action. To this end, the theory of the Schwerpunkt or focal point was developed: it was the point of maximum effort. Panzer forces and the Luftwaffe were used only at this point of maximum effort whenever possible. Through local success at the Schwerpunkt, a small force achieved a break in the line and gained advantages by fighting in the enemy's rear. It was summarized by Guderian as Nicht kleckern, klotzen! ("Not tickling, hitting!" or "not bit by bit, but all at once").
To achieve a break in the front, the infantry, and less frequently, the armored forces themselves, would attack the enemy's defensive line, supported by artillery fire and shelling to create a gap in the enemy line through which the enemy would pass. totality of mechanized forces. The attacking force opens the flanks to increase security with distance. This moment of rupture has been labeled the "hinge," because the mechanized forces maneuvered inward and created leverage against the defending forces.
In this, the initial phase of the operation, the air forces attempted to gain air superiority over enemy forces by attacking ground-based aircraft, bombing their airfields, and attempting to destroy them in dogfights.
A final element was the use of airborne forces beyond enemy lines to disrupt enemy activities and seize important positions, as occurred at Eben Emael.
Paralysis
By opening a gap into enemy rear areas, German forces were attempting to paralyze the enemy's decision-making and implementation process. Moving faster than their opponents, the mechanized elements exploited this weakness and acted in anticipation of any contrary response. Guderían wrote that “success must be exploited relentlessly and with every ounce of strength available, even at night. The defeated enemy must not be calm.
A main point for this was the decision cycle. Every decision made by the Germans or the enemy forces needed time to gather information, make a decision, distribute orders among subordinates, and then implement the decision through action. Thanks to superior mobility and faster decision cycles, mechanized forces could take action in a situation before their opponents.
Direct control (Auftragstaktik) was a fast and flexible method of command. Instead of receiving an explicit order, a commander would be informed of his superior's intent and the role his unit would play within that concept. The exact method of execution would then be a matter for the commander to determine as best suited to the situation. The burden on staff was reduced to handing out and spreading along with orders more information about their own situation. In addition, promoting the initiative at all levels helped to put it into practice. Consequently, important decisions could be carried out quickly either verbally or with short written orders.
Kesselschlacht
The final phase of an operation is called the Kesselschlacht or battle of the cauldron or pocket. It consisted of a concentric attack on an encircled force. It was where most of the losses were inflicted on the enemy, especially with the capture of prisoners and weapons.
World War II Operations
Poland, 1939
Although the term blitzkrieg was coined during the 1939 invasion of Poland, historians generally maintain that German operations were more consistent with more traditional methods. The Wehrmacht's strategy was more in line with the Vernichtungsgedanke, focusing on envelopments to create pockets. The Panzer forces were deployed spread out among the three German concentrations without a strong emphasis on their independent use, being used to create or destroy pockets of Polish forces and capture strategic points to support the foot infantry that continued.
The Luftwaffe gained air superiority with a combination of superior technology and numbers. It is wrongly claimed that the Polish Air Force was destroyed early in the campaign while on the ground. Polish aircraft were moved to hidden airfields approximately 48 hours after the start of hostilities.
Understandings of operations in Poland have changed considerably since World War II. Many early postwar chronicles incorrectly attributed the German victory to "an enormous development in military technique that occurred between 1918 and 1940," incorrectly citing that "Germany, which translated theories into practice... calling the result Blitzkrieg". More recent histories identify German operations in Poland as relatively cautious and traditional. Matthew Cooper wrote:
"During the Polish campaign, the use of the machined units revealed the idea that they would be used only to facilitate progress and support infantry activities... Thus, any strategic exploitation of the armoured idea was dead. The paralysis of the command and breakage of the mood were not the final purpose of the German earth and air forces, and they were only products derived from the traditional manoeuvres of the rapid enveloping and the support activities of the Luftwaffe's steering artillery, both of which were intended to destroy the enemy. That's how it was. Vernichtungsgedanke of the Polish campaign”.
Cooper went on to say that the use of tanks "left much to be desired... Fear of enemy action against the flanks of the advance, fear that proved so disastrous of German chances on the Western Front in 1940 and in the Soviet Union in 1941, it was present from the beginning of the war". John Ellis stated that "there is considerable justice in Matthew Cooper's assertion that Panzer divisions did not have the kind of strategic mission that was characteristic of the authentic blitzkrieg of armored vehicles, and which were almost always subordinated to several infantry armies".
In fact, “while Western reports of the Polish campaign emphasized the shocking power of tank and Stuka attacks, they tended to underestimate the punishing effect of German artillery on Polish units. Mobile and available in significant numbers, the artillery destroyed as many units as the other branches of the Wehrmacht."
France, 1940
The invasion of France consisted of two phases: the Yellow Plan (Fall Gelb) and the Red Plan (Fall Rot). Fall Gelb began with a feint directed against the Netherlands and Belgium with two armored and paratrooper corps. Three days later the Panzergruppe von Kleist attacked through the Ardennes and achieved a break through the front with air support. The group moved quickly along the English Channel coast, taking over the British Expeditionary Force (British Expeditionary Force, BEF), the Belgian Army and some divisions of the French Army.
Motorized units initially advanced much further than the divisions that followed. When German mechanized forces met a counterattack at the Battle of Arras, British heavy tanks created a brief panic in the German High Command. Later, motorized forces were stopped at the gates of the port city of Dunkirk, which was being used to evacuate Allied forces. Hermann Göring had promised that his Luftwaffe would finish the job, but air operations did not stop the evacuation of most of the Allied troops, some 300,000 French and British, in an operation called Dynamo.
Plan Red began with XV Panzer Corps attacking towards Brest and XIV Panzer Corps attacking southeast of Paris, towards Lyon and XIX Panzer Corps completing the encirclement of the Maginot Line. The defending forces were too hard pressed to mount any sort of counterattack. French forces were continually ordered to form new lines of defense along the rivers, often finding that the German forces had already passed.
Eastern Front, 1941-45
The use of armored forces was crucial for both sides of the Eastern Front. Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, involved a number of front-breaking and encirclements by motorized forces. Their objective was to "destroy the Russian forces deployed in the West and prevent their flight into the open spaces of Russia". This was achieved with four Panzer armies that surrounded the surprised and disorganized Soviet forces, followed by foot infantry completing encirclements and routing trapped forces. The first year of the offensive on the Eastern Front can be considered the last successful blitzkrieg.
After failing to destroy the Soviets before the winter of 1941, the limits of German tactical superiority became apparent. Although the German invasion successfully conquered large areas of Soviet territory, the overall strategic effects were more limited. The Red Army was able to regroup beyond the main line of battle, eventually defeating the German forces for the first time in the Battle of Moscow. Added to this was the fact that German tactics were made difficult by the weather and because the combat front was moving further and further away from the industrial centers of Germany and such a feature had not been adequately foreseen.
In the summer of 1942, when Germany launched another offensive against the southern Soviet Union over Stalingrad and the Caucasus, the Soviets lost a significant amount of territory, only counterattacking once more during the winter. German successes were limited by Hitler's diversion of forces for the attack on Stalingrad and attempting to reach the Caucasus oil fields simultaneously instead of successively as had been envisaged in the original plan. The front was more overextended than ever and this made supply difficult. The Red Army, for its part, had a vast rearguard that allowed it to plan maneuvers and movements that the French or Poles could not attempt against the Wehrmacht.
Western Front, 1944-45
As the war progressed, the Allied armies began to use combined force formations and penetration-in-depth strategies that Germany had attempted to use in the early years of the war. Many Allied operations in the Western Desert and on the Eastern Front relied on massive concentrations of firepower to obtain breakouts by mobile armored units. These artillery-based tactics were also decisive in operations on the Western Front after Operation Overlord and both the Commonwealth and US armies developed flexible and strong systems using artillery support.
Following the Allied landings in Normandy, Germany made attempts to crush the landing force with armored attacks but failed due to lack of coordination and Allied air superiority. The most significant attempt to use deep operations in Normandy was at Mortain, which ended with the creation of the Falaise Pocket and the eventual destruction of the German forces in Normandy. Mortain's counterattack was launched against the Allied forces acting in Operation Cobra, the US XII Army Group. The German 7th Army attacked towards the shores of Saint-Lô, attempting to cut off the 3rd.er United States Army, commanded by George S. Patton in Operation Lüttich. It was unable to reach the break in the line against the defending infantry and, bogged down, was encircled and destroyed by XII Army Group.
The Allied offensive in central France, spearheaded by the armored units of Patton's III Army, used breakthrough and penetration techniques that were essentially identical to the "armor idea" of Guderian's prewar. Patton acknowledged that he had read Guderian and Rommel before the war, and his tactics shared his ideas of speed and attack.
The last German offensive on the Western Front, the Battle of the Bulge, dubbed Operation Wacht Am Rhein by the Germans, was an offensive launched towards the vital port of Antwerp in December 1944. Launched in bad weather against a weak Allied sector, it was a surprise and an initial success while Allied air forces were blocked by cloud cover. However, defensive pockets in key locations across the Ardennes, a shortage of useful roads, and a poor logistical plan caused delays for the Germans. Allied forces deployed on the flanks of the German penetration and Allied aviation were able to attack the armored columns again. While the strategy had been sound, the capacity of the German troops had been reduced to the point where the initial benefits could not be exploited.
Countermeasures and Limitations
The environment
The concepts associated with the denomination blitzkrieg, deep penetrations by armor, large encirclements and combined force attacks, had a significant dependence on terrain and weather conditions. Where there was no capacity for rapid movement, armor penetrations were often prevented or unsuccessful.
The terrain had to be ideally flat, firm, without natural obstacles or fortifications and interspersed with roads and railways. If instead it was hilly, wooded, swampy, or urban, the armored would be vulnerable to infantry in close combat and no chance to get out at full speed. Furthermore, units could be stopped by mud or snow. Artillery and air support also depended on the weather.
Air superiority
Allied air superiority became a significant impediment to German operations during the last years of the war. Early German successes enjoyed air superiority, close air support, and aerial reconnaissance. However, Allied fighter-bombers were feared for their tactical successes, so after Operation Overlord, German vehicle crews were reluctant to move en masse in daylight.
In fact, the last German blitzkrieg, the Battle of the Bulge, was planned to take place in bad weather and Allied aircraft on the ground. Under these conditions, it was difficult for German commanders to employ the "armor idea" to its intended potential.
Anti-Blitzkrieg Tactics
The Blitzkrieg was very effective against the static defense doctrines that most countries developed at the end of World War I. The first attempts to defeat the Blitzkrieg can be dated to the invasion of Poland in 1939, where Polish General Stanisław Maczek, commander of the 10th Motorized Cavalry Brigade, prepared a detailed report of the German tactics, their use, effectiveness and possible precautions for the French Army. However, the French personnel ignored this report, which was captured by the Germans, unopened.
During the Battle of France in 1940, de Gaulle's 4th Armored Division and elements of the British Expeditionary Force's Armored Brigade made attacks on the German flank, eventually pushing back the advancing armored columns during the battle. Battle of Arras. This may have been the reason for Hitler to order a halt to the German advance.
These attacks, combined with Maxime Weygand's hedgehog defence, became the main basis for responding to blitzkrieg in the future: deep deployment, allowing enemy forces bypass defensive concentrations, reliance on anti-tank artillery, use of the greatest force on the flanks of the enemy attack, followed by counterattacks at the base to destroy the enemy advance. Holding the flanks was essential to channeling the enemy attack, and artillery, properly employed, would inflict a greater number of casualties on the attackers.
While the Allied forces in 1940 lacked the experience to successfully develop such strategies, resulting in the capitulation of France with heavy losses, they were characteristic of later Allied operations. In the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army employed a combination of defense in great depth, extensive minefields, and tenacious defense on the flanks of the line break. In this way, they reduced the combat capability of the Germans even as the German forces advanced.
Logistics
Although effective in rapid-fire campaigns against Poland and France, Germany could not maintain blitzkrieg in the last years of the war. Blitzkrieg has the inherent danger of overextending its supply lines, and the strategy could be defeated by a determined enemy, willing to sacrifice territory long enough to regroup and rearm, as the Soviets did on the Eastern Front, the well-known strategy of giving up ground in exchange for gaining time.
The production of tanks and vehicles was a constant problem for Germany. In fact, by the end of the war, many panzer divisions had no more than a few dozen tanks. As the end of the war neared, Germany also ran into critical fuel and ammunition shortages due to Allied strategic bombing [citation needed]. Although the production of fighter planes continued, they could not fly due to lack of fuel. The fuel was sent to the Panzer divisions, which even then could not operate normally. Of the Tiger Is that were lost to the United States Army, nearly half were abandoned for lack of fuel.
Influence
The broadest influence of the blitzkrieg was within the Western Allied leadership of the war, some of whom took inspiration from the German proposal. US General Patton emphasized quick pursuit, the use of an armored spearhead to break through the front, and isolating and disrupting enemy forces before they fled. He also put into practice the idea attributed to cavalry leader Nathan Bedford Forrest to "get there fastest, with the most force."
Operations on subsequent conflicts
Six Day War
The blitzkrieg was in a way the tactic adopted (although not under this name) by the Israel Defense Forces in various conflicts, including during the Sinai war, although most notably in the War of the six days. Israel's strategy in these conflicts was to create flexible spearheads, with close air support. In order to deal with multiple armies on multiple fronts, the plan of attack was divided into phases, each focused on a specific front, in order to south to north, making a rapid and forceful advance, and then sending the remaining forces as control was gained, to provide support to the next.
An important aspect of blitzkrieg from the second half of the xx century is the use of modern fighter-bombers to achieve air superiority by bombing air bases and runways. This tactic had its greatest exponent in the Six Day War, when the air forces of Egypt and Jordan were practically destroyed, Israel achieving total air control, which would be crucial to be able to offer close air support to ground units.
As for ground tactics, it was about creating flexible spearheads to advance between relatively close enemy units, in order to conquer strategic points behind enemy lines, and then attack the enemy from various directions. The flexibility of this type of tactics also lay in the autonomy that the commanders in the field had to carry out operational decisions on their own and according to the development of the battle.
From a blitzkrieg point of view, the Six-Day War was exceptional in that it was fought primarily for defensive purposes, as defensive forces normally do not take the initiative, which is an essential part of a successful lightning campaign.
Gulf War
Many experts have defined the Allied invasion of Iraq-occupied Kuwait in 1991 as blitzkrieg.
In this case, too, the first phase consisted of an aerial bombardment, one of the most intensive in modern military history and with more modern and more capable aircraft, which included the launch of a total of 88,500 tons of bombs and more than 100,000 flights in Iraqi airspace. After the bombardments ceased, the entry of the land units led to a massive incursion and a series of intense combats, which would culminate in a ceasefire after barely one hundred hours of combat.
However, since the bombing phase had lasted 42 consecutive days, for some experts it cannot match the definition of blitzkrieg, despite a very rapid and forceful ground campaign that culminated in the recovery of Kuwait.