Beagle 2

The Beagle 2 is a space probe, which is part of the Mars Express mission of the European Space Agency. It was to land on the planet Mars on December 25, 2003. It was transported by the Mars Express probe, launched on June 2, 2003, from which it separated on December 19 of that same year. After many unsuccessful attempts to establish communication with the probe, it was officially declared lost on February 6, 2004. On January 16, 2015, its position on the planet's surface was found using images taken by the HIRISE camera on NASA's Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter (MRO).

Origin

The Beagle 2 probe was conceived and built by British university students led by Professor Colin Pillinger of the Open University. The objectives of Beagle 2 were to search for signs of life on Mars, determine the chemical and geological composition of the landing site, and study the Martian climate. Its name refers to the ship HMS Beagle on which Charles Darwin made his voyage, which revolutionized human knowledge of life on Earth. In the words of Professor Pillinger:

The HMS Beagle led to the discovery of the secret of life on Earth - will it be possible for the Beagle 2 to do the same in Mars?

The landing site was selected at coordinates 10.6°N, 270°W, in Isidis Planitia, a large sedimentary basin straddling the highlands and northern plains of Mars. The lander was designed to operate for 180 days, although it was considered possible to operate for a full Martian year (687 Earth days).

Mission progress

Beagle 2 successfully separated from Mars Express on December 19, 2003 at 8:31 UTC. Beagle 2 was scheduled to enter the Martian atmosphere at 2:47 UTC on December 25, 2003 at a speed of 20,000 km/h. In a first phase, friction would slow down the probe in its free fall; approximately 1 km from the surface, when the speed had reduced to 1,600 km/h, parachutes would open and finally airbags would inflate to cushion the impact with the Martian surface. The landing was scheduled to conclude at 2:54 UTC. Once on the surface, the airbags would deflate and the probe, shaped like a pocket watch, would open, deploying its photovoltaic panels and robotic arm.

At 5:30 UTC the NASA Mars Odyssey satellite would fly over the landing zone, this being the first opportunity to make contact with Beagle 2. The various attempts made to try to contact the Beagle 2 probe failed. Contact from Earth was then attempted from the Jodrell Bank Observatory (UK), with the same result. Between January and February 2004 there were several attempts to establish communication through the Mars Express, which were also unsuccessful. Despite all the attempts, there was no confirmation of the landing on the Martian surface and the mission was considered lost.

Lander Design

The lander was shaped like a pocket watch, with a height of 230 mm. The central base contained the communications antenna, the other base contained electronic equipment, wiring, robotic arm, environmental sensors, absorber, and the rest was 4 solar panels. The mass separately was 68.8 kg, and the lander 33.2 kg, of which 11.4 kg were instruments scientists.

Thermal control used a carbon fiber shell to absorb heat to the probe by means of 1 to 40 °C, insulating because the equipment is keep one on top of the other. Several layers wrapped the equipment throughout. the probe.

Communications with the probe used a 437 transponder and 401 MHz, using a UHF antenna in the central part of the probe for the communication with the Mars Express spacecraft. The transmission speed is 2.8 and 128 kbit/s and the data was sent daily between 0.5 and 5 GB.

Electricity was obtained by four deployable solar panels with gallium arsenide cells. The four solar panels were unfolded from the center of the ship. Its total surface is 1m. Electricity It was stored in a Li-Ion battery with a capacity of 160 Wh. The probe needed 87 W to operate.

The electronics were for probe control. The software was used to the functions, and administration of the probe and its operation. A 32-bit processor was used for data management and control on board. The data was stored in an internal memory of 1.28 Gb for later transmission.

The scientific instruments were: A pair of stereoscopic cameras, a Mössbauer spectrometer, an X-ray spectrometer, a drill, a microscope, a mass spectrometer, and a UV, temperature, wind, pressure, and dust sensor. The optical instruments were in a robotic arm and environmental ones in different parts of the probe.

ESA/UK Investigation Report and Loss Hypothesis

On February 11, 2004, the UK government and the European Space Agency announced the start of an investigation to try to determine the causes of the failure of the Beagle 2 mission and draw the lessons relevant to the experience. The commission of inquiry would follow normal ESA procedures and report to the ESA Director General and UK Science Minister Lord Sainsbury.

This commission of investigation, made up of people not directly involved in the Beagle 2 mission, did not find a single cause of mission failure, but did find several factors that increased its risk:

Programmatic factors

• Have treated Beagle 2 as a scientific instrument rather than a complex and innovative spacecraft.
• Lack of funds guaranteed for development in the initial phases.
• The abandonment of the project by the company Martin Baker Aircraft (MBA), designers of the entry, descent and landing system.
• Lack of an appropriate management organization with experience.
• Lack of adequate margins for risk management and mitigation.

Technical factors

• Lack of robustness in the design of the airbags and insufficient evidence programme.
• Risk of collision between the probe cover and the main parachute.
• Possible rebound of the sound-airbag set within the main parachute.
• Possible premature release of the airbags of the probe.

The commission of inquiry presented in its report a list of 19 recommendations, of which the following can be highlighted:

• Missions must be under the responsibility of an agency with sufficient resources and capacities to manage it. The orbital descent/satellite module should be managed uniquely.
• Critical scientific burdens for the success of the mission or with high public impact should be formally and in depth assessed by the ESA executive before being accepted.
• Planetary missions should be designed with sufficient margins, and not initiated without adequate financial and temporary resources.
• Planetary input missions should incorporate a minimum telemetry for critical phases.
• Perform appropriate tests for down and landing technologies, including specific missions to do so.
• Improving technology airbags and parachute, making better use of the experience that the US already has. America and Russia.

A recent hypothesis put forward by a team of Australian scientists suggests that the probe was lost due to miscalculations upon entry into the Martian atmosphere, which caused it to spin uncontrollably. [1]

The end of the mystery

On January 12, 2015, it was reported that the lander may have been found.

Image captured by MRO showing Beagle 2

Second image showing the Beagle 2 and its possible parachute.

On Friday, January 16, 2015, NASA reported that the probe had been found by the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter, and that three images captured by this probe showed the lander with its solar panels partially deployed. MRO data confirms that the "Beagle 2" it landed six kilometers from the intended point of landing.