Battle of the Caudine Forks
The battle of the Caudine Forks (Latin: Furculae Caudinae) was a military confrontation fought in 321 BC. C., in the framework of the second Samnite war, between the armies of the Roman Republic and the Samnites with a victory for the latter. The defeat left a deep mark on Roman memory, being remembered as equivalent to Alia and the later one at Cannae.
Background
In 343 B.C. C., the first war between Samnites and Romans ended, with victory for the latter and the commitment of the former to remain neutral in the constant wars between the Republic and its neighbors. However, in 327 a. C., the conflict restarted but after five years they were again defeated, having to deliver their leader, Brutulo Papio (who committed suicide), with all his personal wealth; Despite these concessions, Rome refused to recognize them as socii.
In 321 B.C. In BC, the Romans chose the consuls Spurius Postumius Albinus and Titus Veturius Calvin, while the Samnites appointed a new leader, Gaius Pontius, son of Herenius Pontius. When the Roman ambassadors appeared to discuss terms of surrender, Gaius delivered a fiery speech before the council of his people.
After this, Gaius assumed command of the army, secretly moving to camp at Caudius. He then sent ten soldiers disguised as shepherds to Calatia, where they were encamped, pretending to graze cattle, where they joined other groups from locals who informed the consuls that the Samnite army was in Apulia on its way to Lucera, a city whose capture was imminent. The Samnites had spread the rumor and the shepherds confirmed it. There was no doubt that the Romans would help their allies and would never let the Samnites take over Apulia.
Confronting forces
According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the Romans numbered 40,000 fighters among their ranks. Appian increases the figure to 50,000. Modern estimates, on the other hand, reduce that number as ancient figures are considered exaggerated. J Rickard talks about 27,000 soldiers. Based on the fact that a legion at the time had to have approximately 4,500 troops and that each consul would have two legions under his command, to which the allied forces would have to be added. Paolo Sommella, who cites previous estimates by Johannes Kromayer, further reduces more than 12,000 or 15,000. Flavio and Ferrucio Russo agree with him. Amadeo Maiuri says that it must have been less than 16,000. Francesco Daniele admits a maximum of 30,000. Finally, Gaetano De Sanctis estimates 18,000 or 36,000.
There is no data on the Samnite forces.
Location
Description of Livio
There were two roads to Lucera: the first was long but through open country and safer, following the coast of the Adriatic Sea; the second was shorter, through the Caudine Gallows, a place between two narrow mountain passes, surrounded by deep ravines and forested hills and ridges on either side. Only in the middle was a plain covered with grasses through which the road passed, to get there one had to cross a first gorge and to advance the second. There is no agreement among modern scholars about how reliable Titus Livy's description is. It is not excluded that he deviates from reality for propaganda or literary reasons, or due to lack of information, and that his description is a stereotype.
Arienzo
The most frequent proposal among historians is the valley located between Arienzo, Forchia and Arpaia, a place through which the Appian Way passed and which, being a valley surrounded by mountains and with gorges to the east and west, fits the ancient description. Possibly the battlefield extended as far as Santa Maria a Vico. Furthermore, the place name Forchia is attested from the IX< century and is similar to the Roman word Forca, "Gallows", used to refer to the eastern entrance (Arpaia) and also to the western entrance (Cervino). Historians of the centuries XVIII and XIX They say that there was a church called Santa Maria del Giogo, where the Roman defeat supposedly occurred. Another point in their favor are some ruins of medieval origin on the Arpaia mountains, which could have been built on the praesidium Samnite mentioned by Titus Livy. Furthermore, the Roman chronicler implies that the valley of the ambush was uninhabited at the time, which appears to be based on archaeological evidence.
However, several historians have questioned this position. The site lacks abundant water sources and the western entrance is too wide and the hills in that sector are too low, too low to prevent a Roman army from escaping. Proponents of this theory say that the topography has changed over two millennia. There is evidence that the valley may have been marshy in the Middle Ages, and there are remains of a Roman aqueduct at Forchia. The outflow of water on the west side would have leveled the terrain and expanded the pass. It is possible that the topographical change was the work of man.
Some critics have countered that these changes are too radical for the past time. Furthermore, the terrain is considered too small to contain four Roman legions. The municipalities of Arpaia and Forchia have disputed over which of them would have occurred. the battle. Finally, the latter won the right to represent the event on his municipal shield.
Caudina Valley
The Caudina Valley, now Nell'accezione, is an esplanade to the east of Arpaia, to the north is Mount Taburno, to the south is Partenio, and to the east and west are minor hills. It is also located at the Via Apia pass and inside it was Caudio. Its western exit was the Sferracavallo Gorge. This thesis has been defended by several scholars. Unlike the previous option, this valley was much larger, enough to contain a large army.
However, it has several minor exits that would have allowed the Romans to escape and differs from Livy's account. Also that the Arpaia pass is easy to overcome and difficult to block and that the heights are too low for a surveillance post can be installed. In addition, the great width of the valley allows a pitched battle that according to Roman sources did not happen. According to some scholars, the defeat at Sferracavallo could only have happened if there was a battle. Others believe that the Romans could easily send messages of help to Capua there. Also, according to Apiano, Gaius went to negotiate with the Romans. in a chariot, unnecessary if the Roman army was in the same valley as Caudius, it should have been much further away.
Gola dell'Isclero
The Isclero River crosses the Caudino Valley from east to west until it emerges near Moiano through a ravine to the north of the Strait of Arpaia. The gorge opens west to a mountainous area where Sant'Agata de' goti. The river continues on its way until it joins the Volturno. Said gorge was identified as the place of the trap by the geographer Filippo Cluverio, however, later scholars deny it. First, because Cluverio was unaware of the existence of Calatia and confused it with Caiatia (Caiazzo). For this reason, he misinterpreted the passage of the Via Apia and believed that Caudio was where Airola, a town near the ravine, is located. It must be taken into account that there is frequent confusion in the sources between Calatia and Caiatia, which makes reappear the theory sporadically.
After Cluverio's death, a necropolis was discovered between Sant'Agata and Mount Taburno, which made it possible to identify the Samnite stronghold of Saticula at the entrance to the gorge. Because of this, it is believed that the legions would never have passed through it, especially if there were safer and shorter options nearby. The gorge has plenty of water available, but lacks a flat interior and could hardly have had enough space the camp of a Roman army. However, Roman authors who passed through the area such as Horace, are silent on whether or not it was the site of the battle.
Historian Heinrich Nissen had a theory that the Romans were trapped in the Caudino Valley, but entered through the Isclero Gorge.
Plana di Prata
A plain located between Mount Taburno to the south and Camposauro to the north, rich in springs and meadows. A sheep path opens from Frasso Telesino to the west (where the Feriole gorge is), crosses the plateau and descends to the east, where the villages of Cautano and Tocco Caudio (in the Scura valley) are located. In the 19th century this theory was put forward, which was taken up by Major Michele Di Cerbo in 1949: a flight over the area led him to conclude that it was the site of the battle. Both gorges are very narrow, although the western one is occasionally considered narrower than the eastern one.
Amateur archeology writer Massimo Cavalluzzo and military historian Flavio Russo point out that the Romans, knowing that they would never be able to avoid the Samnites on their march, decided to follow the least obvious route to reach Lucera from Calatia. They probably believed that if they marched along the Via Appia there would be a battle and they could avoid it if they went by Frasso Telesino. Since the Feriole and Scura gorges are much narrower than in the other options, it is much easier for the Samnites to block them with rubble. In addition, both gorges have notable remains of Samnite walls, which may have been the praesidium. There are also remains of weapons, such as spherical stones indicating a catapult.
The main criticism is that it would seem that it would be too difficult for a Roman army to scale the Feriole Gorge and take the long way around.
Battle
Trap
The Roman column crossed the first gorge and the plain until it reached the second mountain pass. However, they found it blocked with a barricade of large rocks and logs, then they saw the outposts of the Samnites. The Romans wanted to withdraw through the first pass, but found it also blocked and with warriors on the heights. Without order, the Romans stood numb, stupefied and dazed, looking at each other without speaking or moving for a long time until they saw the consuls pitch their tents. The legionaries began to build a camp near a water source without waiting for orders., somewhat useless in their situation, but in order not to make matters worse they did it. Meanwhile, the Samnites began to insult them and mock the uselessness of their work. The consuls were depressed and bewildered, so they did not call a council of war. but his officers rallied around him anyway.
When night came, instead of consulting the fortune tellers about what to do, the soldiers began to wail and that's where the various tempers arose. Some encouraged breaking the barricades, climbing the mountains and reaching any path in the forest by the sword, recalling that for thirty years they had consistently beaten the Samnites on all types of terrain. Others replied that no one knew where they were or how. climb the mountains where his enemies were: “Armed and unarmed, brave and cowardly, we are all equally trapped and conquered. The enemy will not even offer us the chance of an honorable death by the sword. He now advised that they all be executed ».
Herenio's Advice
Indifferent to all food and rest, the Romans talked all night in this way. Meanwhile, the Samnites wrote to Herenius seeking advice. The old man had retired from politics for many years, but his mind remained clear. The messenger asked for his opinion, Herenius told him that they should let all the Romans leave unharmed. The advice was rejected and the messenger sent back asking for a new answer, which was to execute them all. Due to the contradiction, Gaius believed that his father's mental capacities were beginning to fail, but he yielded to the wishes of his officers and invited the old man to a court martial.
Elder Herenius immediately complied and rode by wagon to his son's camp. Upon arrival he explained his answers: he considered that both were the best way to proceed, the first would establish a lasting friendship with a very powerful people by showing such exceptional kindness. Instead, the second would set the war back several generations, as it would take the Romans a long time to recover from the loss of two armies. There was no third option, but his son and the other officers proposed a middle way, dismissing them unharmed but humiliating them as required by the law of war, so Herenio replied:
That's just the policy that neither seeks friends nor frees from enemies. Once you let the men live you've exasperated with an ignominious deal you'll discover your mistake. The Romans are a nation that does not know how to silence in the face of defeat. Whatever the misfortune of this present, extreme burns in their souls will irritate them there forever, and will not allow them to rest until they have been paid many times.
Negotiation
No plan was approved and Herenius returned home. In the Roman camp, after several failed attempts to get out of the trap, they began to see themselves without food. This forced them to send ambassadors to request a peace agreement or challenge them to battle. Gaius replied that the war was over, that they were already trapped and defeated, and demanded that they surrender their weapons and pass under the yoke, keeping only their tunics. They were also to evacuate Samnium and withdraw all their colonies from the region, which would become a foederati governed by their own laws. These conditions were presented to the consuls, warning that if any rejected them there would be no more. peace proposals.
When the conditions were known, there was a universal cry of anguish among the soldiers. After a long silence, the consuls could not speak before such a humiliating and necessary capitulation. Then the prominent legate Lucius Lentulus reminded the officers that when the Senones besieged the Capitol his father was the only one who advised against paying them gold to withdraw, since not all the Roman forces were on the hill and had the space to go out and try to win when the indolent Gauls let down their guard. If they had the same possibility, I would advise doing the same. Although dying for the homeland is glorious, But all the legions of Rome were trapped there, if they died, who would defend their city. They would be a defenseless country, unlike the invasion of the senones where they still had armies in other parts. There was all their power, if to save their country they required to suffer an ignominious surrender they had to do it: "true affection for our country demands that we preserve it, if necessary, both for our misfortune as for our death". He then told the consuls: "Go, consuls, surrender your weapons in ransom for that State that your ancestors ransomed with gold!"
The consuls went to Gaius, who insisted on signing a treaty. However, they refused because that was only possible with the permission of the Roman people and after celebrating the appropriate rites. For this reason, the Caudio convention was reached, not a treaty as such. The officers (consuls, quaestors, tribunes and legates) swore by Jupiter to respect the agreement. The Samnites demanded the delivery of 600 horsemen as hostages who would pay with their lives if the agreement was not respected. Then a time was established to send the hostages and the unarmed army to that would pass under the yoke. When the consuls returned to the camp with those terms, discouragement reigned again and some men wanted to attack them, blaming them for the disaster. They also lamented that they did not have guides who knew the terrain, because of this they fell into the trap. their arms and armor, which they should surrender, imagining future humiliation, the eyes and taunts of the Samnites: "They [the Romans] alone, they said, had been defeated without receiving a single wound, nor using a single weapon, not fight a single battle, they had not been allowed to draw the sword or face the enemy; they had been given courage and strength in vain."
Surrender
When the moment of shame came, they were ordered to leave their weapons and armor and leave with only their tunics on, starting with the equites who would be hostages. The lictors and consuls were then stripped of their paludamentum. The Roman soldiers refused to look at such an act and looked away.
Subsequently, the consuls were the first to pass half-naked under the yoke, then the officers and finally the legionaries one by one. The Samnites began to taunt them and point their swords at them, leading some Romans to become openly indignant, reason for which they were wounded and some even executed. Tito Livio says that the most difficult thing for the legionnaires to resist were the looks of their enemies. After the humiliation they began their march defeated. They were able to reach Capua before nightfall, but they did not know how their allies would receive them and they were so ashamed to find themselves devoid of almost all clothing, that they camped by the side of the road.
Consequences
Return home
Initially received with disdain by the locals, their plight elicited compassion and they sent their own insignia to the commanders and weapons, clothing, horses and supplies to the soldiers. Thus they ended up entering the city, being happily received and with all the hospitality they deserved as allies, but nothing made them feel happier.
Such was their shame that they shunned the conversations and the presence of the locals. The next morning some young noblemen were commissioned to accompany them to the border of Campania, maintaining a sepulchral silence until they reached Rome. On their return, the commanders went to the Senate to answer the questions of the older senators, while their legionaries entered with bowed heads and without returning salutes. Livy concludes: "The Samnites had won not only a glorious victory but also durable; they had not only captured Rome as the Gauls had done before them, but, what was an even more warlike feat, they had captured Roman courage and toughness."
Roman reaction
While the entire Senate lamented upon hearing the report, Ofilio Calavio, a noble and old senator, began to speak, he told them that now there was only silence due to shame, one that would soon arouse cries for revenge. Therefore, that capitulation to Caudius would soon cause a bitterer memory for the Samnites than for the Romans. Each time they meet again, each side will use their courage and the Samnites will never enjoy another Caudine Fork.
The first information the senators had received was that the army was blocked, after it capitulated. As soon as they learned that their soldiers were trapped, they made preparations to relieve them, but upon learning that they had surrendered, all action was abandoned. Without formal order, the city staged a public mourning: the public business of the Forum ceased, the surrounding booths were closed, and the senators shed their purple-striped robes and their gold rings. The people were upset, not only with the commanders who signed the capitulation, but also with the innocent soldiers; they said they would not admit them into the city. However, when they arrived with such a pitiful appearance, all the Romans felt mercy for their compatriots, they saw them enter as if they were prisoners and not those who returned to their home.
The defeated entered at night and for days did not appear in the Forum or any other public place, the consuls did the same and the Senate stripped them of their command. Quintus Fabio Ambusto was appointed and Publius Elio Paeto as dictator and magister equitum respectively, but it was irregular and they were replaced by Marco Emilio Papo and Lucio Valerio Flaco, but not even they could hold the elections because the citizens were furious with all the magistrates of the year. An interregnum should have been appointed in charge of Quinto Fabio Máximo and Marco Valerio Corvo. Finally, the prestigious generals Fifth Publilio Philo and Lucio Papirio Cursor were elected as new consuls.
Long term
According to Livy, Rome achieved several victories in 320 and 319 BC. forcing the Samnites to seek a peace settlement, achieving a two-year truce, but historian E. T. Salmon argues that nothing must be an invention of Roman historiography and any truce was probably a direct consequence of the Caudine Forks Hostilities resumed in 316 BC. C., when the Romans began to invade Apulia, which would force the Samnites to intervene.
Dionysus says the Romans would get revenge on Gaius. After a defeat they forced him and his followers under the yoke.
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