Battle of Kursk
The Battle of Kursk was a major armed confrontation that took place between July and August 1943 in the homonymous region of the Soviet Union during World War II. Following the plan established in what was dubbed Operation Citadel, the German army troops unleashed a last effort on the eastern front against the Red Army of the Soviet Union. To do this, they concentrated the bulk of their armored forces and their most modern weapons in the area, all under the command of some of their most prestigious generals.
The Germans hoped to weaken Soviet offensive potential by the summer of 1943 by cutting off the forces they anticipated would be in the Kursk pocket. The pocket or salient was 250 kilometers long from north to south and 160 kilometers from east to west. The plan called for an envelopment of a pair of pincers traversing the northern and southern flanks of the salient. Hitler believed that a victory here would bolster German strength and enhance their standing with their allies, who were considering withdrawing from the war. Large numbers of Soviet prisoners were also expected to be captured to be used as slave labor in the German armaments industry.
The Soviet government had prior knowledge of German intentions, provided by the Soviet intelligence services Red Orchestra, an international spy network deployed throughout Nazi-occupied Europe, including in the OKH or German Army High Command, which made it easier for the Soviets to anticipate the attack several months on the neck of the Kursk pocket. To this end, the Soviets built an iron defense of great depths designed to wear down the German armored spearhead, combined with a million anti-tank and anti-personnel mines planted along the 250 km Kursk salient and behind a series of points. Anti-tank forts, as well as a line of fortifications and artillery firing zones, which extended approximately 300 km behind the front. It was the largest defensive belt ever built, on land the size of Belgium. The delay in the offensive was due to the shipment of new German weapons to the front, mainly the new Panther tank, but also more of the Tiger heavy tank and Ferdinand self-propelled guns. This gave the Red Army time to build a robust defense.
The operation is considered one of the largest battles between humans and armored vehicles in a small sector of territory, involving around three million soldiers, more than 8,200 tanks combat and assault guns, and some 5,600 aircraft. It was the last strategic offensive the Germans could launch on the Eastern Front. After two weeks of fighting, the operation reached a stalemate, due to Walter Model's 9th Army being unable to advance further, Kutuzov's subsequent Soviet counter-offensive north of Kursk, coupled with that, the constant attacks Soviet forces south of the salient at the Battle of Prokhorovka convinced Adolf Hitler to call off the operation. The heavy losses of men and tanks suffered by Germany ensured that the Soviet Red Army took the strategic initiative for the remainder of the war.
The Battle of Kursk was the first time in World War II that a German strategic offensive was halted before it could break through enemy defenses and penetrate the front line. The maximum depth of the German advance was 8 to 12 kilometers in the north and 35 kilometers in the south. Although the Red Army had been successful in winter offensives before, their counteroffensives after the German attack on Kursk were their first summer strategic offensives of the war.
Background
As the Battle of Stalingrad slowly drew to a conclusion, the Red Army moved into a general offensive in the south, pressing the exhausted German forces that had survived the winter. By January 1943, a gap 100 to 180 miles wide had opened between Army Group B and Army Group Don, and the advancing Soviet armies threatened to cut off all German forces south of the Don River, including Army Group A operating in the Caucasus. Army Group Center also came under significant pressure. Kursk fell to the Soviets on February 8, 1943, and Rostov fell on February 14. The Soviet Briansk, Western, and newly created Central Fronts prepared for an offensive that saw Army Group Center encircle between Briansk and the Soviets. and Smolensk. By February 1943, the southern sector of the German front was in strategic crisis.
Since December 1942, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein had been strongly requesting "unrestricted operational freedom" to allow him to use his forces in a fluid manner. On February 6, 1943, Manstein met Hitler at the headquarters in Rastenburg to discuss the proposals he had previously sent. He received an approval from Hitler for a counteroffensive against advancing Soviet forces in the Donbass region.On February 12, 1943, the remaining German forces were reorganized. To the south, Army Group Don was renamed Army Group South and placed under Manstein's command. Directly to the north, Army Group B was disbanded, with its forces and areas of responsibility divided between Army Group South and Army Group Center. Manstein inherited responsibility for the massive breach in the German lines. On February 18, Hitler arrived at the headquarters of Army Group South in Zaporizhia, hours before the Soviets were to liberate Kharkiv and had to be hastily evacuated on the 19th.
As soon as he was given freedom of action, Manstein attempted to use his forces to conduct a series of counterattacks on the flanks of the Soviet armored formations, with the goal of destroying them while retaking Kharkiv and Kursk. II Panzer Corps of the SS had arrived from France in January 1943, refitted and almost entirely. Armored units of the 1st Panzer Army of Army Group A had withdrawn from the Caucasus and further strengthened Manstein's forces.
The operation was hastily prepared and did not receive a name. Later known as the Third Battle of Kharkov, it began on February 21, when General Hoth's 4th Panzer Army launched a counterattack. German forces cut off the Soviet mobile spearheads and continued the northward journey, retaking Kharkiv on March 15 and Belgorod on March 18. A Soviet offensive launched on February 25 by the Central Front against Army Group Center had to be abandoned on 7 March to allow the attacking formations to withdraw and redeploy to the south to counter the threat of advancing German forces under Manstein. The exhaustion of the Wehrmacht and Red Army, along with the loss of mobility due to the start of the spring rasputitsa, led to a cessation of operations for both sides in mid-March. The counteroffensive left a salient that extended into the German area of control, centered on the city of Kursk.
German plan and preparation
The heavy losses suffered by the German Army since the opening of Operation Barbarossa had led to a shortage of infantry and artillery. Units totaled 470,000 men of small strength. For the Wehrmacht to launch an offensive in 1943, the burden of the offensive, both attacking Soviet defenses and holding ground on the flanks of the advance, would have to be borne primarily by panzer divisions. In view of Army Group South's exposed position, Manstein proposed that his forces they should take the strategic defensive. He anticipated that a Soviet offensive would attempt to cut off and destroy Army Group South by a move across the Donets River to the Dnieper. In February, he proposed waiting for this offensive to develop and then carrying out a series of counterattacks on the exposed Soviet flanks. Hitler, concerned about the political implications of taking a defensive stance, and concerned about holding Donbass, rejected this plan. On 10 March, Manstein presented an alternative plan whereby German forces would engage the Kursk pocket with a swift offensive beginning as soon as the rasputitsa spring had subsided.
On March 13, Hitler signed Operational Order No. 5, which authorized several offensives, including one against the Kursk pocket. As the last Soviet resistance in Kharkiv petered out, Manstein tried to persuade Günther von Kluge, commander of Army Group Center, to immediately attack the Central Front, which was defending the north face of the salient. Kluge refused, deeming his forces too weak to launch such an attack. Further Axis advances were blocked by Soviet forces that had been shifted from the Central Front to the area north of Belgorod. In mid-April, in Amid bad weather and with German forces exhausted and in need of readjustments, the Operational Order No. 5 offensives were postponed.
On April 15, Hitler issued Operational Order No. 6, which called for the Kursk offensive operation, called Zitadelle ("Citadel"), to begin on or shortly after May 3. The directive was drafted by Kurt Zeitzler, the OKH chief of staff. For the offensive to be successful, it was considered essential to attack before the Soviets had a chance to prepare extensive defenses or launch an offensive of their own. Some military historians they have described the operation using the phrase "blitzkrieg" (blitzkrieg); other military historians do not use the term in their works on the battle.
Operation Citadel required a double encirclement, directed at Kursk, to encircle the five-army Soviet defenders and seal it off. Army Group Center would provide General Walter Model's 9th Army to form the pincers of the north. It would cut through the north face of the pocket, driving south into the hills east of Kursk, securing the railway line from the Soviet attack. Army Group South would commit 4th Panzer Army, under Hermann Hoth, and the Kempf Army Detachment, under Werner Kempf, to drill into the south face of the pocket. This force would drive north to meet 9th Army east of Kursk. Von Manstein's main attack was to be made by Hoth's 4th Panzer Army, spearheaded by II SS Panzer Corps under directed by Paul Hausser. The XLVIII Panzer Corps, commanded by Otto von Knobelsdorff, would advance on the left, while Army Detachment Kempf would advance on the right. The 8th Army, under the command of Walter Weiss, would contain the western part of the salient.
On April 27, Model met with Hitler to review and express concern about reconnaissance information showing the Red Army building very strong positions on the shoulders of the salient and withdrawing its mobile forces from the area west of Kursk. He argued that the longer the preparation phase was, the less the operation could be justified. He recommended abandoning Operation Citadel entirely, allowing the army to either wait and defeat the next Soviet offensive, or radically revise the Citadel plan. Although by mid-April Manstein had considered Citadel profitable, in May he shared Model's misgivings. He stated that the best course of action would be for the German forces to seize the strategic and ceded defensive position to allow the advance Soviet forces to spread out and allow the German panzer forces to counter-attack in the type of fluid mobile battle in which they excelled. Convinced that the Red Army would make its main effort against Army Group South, he proposed to keep the left wing of the group of soldiers strong while moving the right wing towards the Dnieper River, in stages, and then a counter-attack against the flank of the advance. of the Red Army. The counteroffensive would continue until the Sea of Azov was reached and the Soviet forces eliminated. Hitler rejected this idea; he didn't want to give up so much ground, even temporarily.
Hitler called his senior officers and advisers to Munich for a meeting on May 4. Hitler spoke for about 45 minutes about the reasons for postponing the attack, essentially reiterating Model's arguments. Several options for comment were presented: go on the offensive immediately with forces at hand, further delaying the offensive to await the arrival of new and better tanks, radically revise the operation or cancel it altogether. Manstein advocated an early attack, but requested two additional infantry divisions, to which Hitler replied that none were available. Kluge spoke strongly against postponement and discounted Model's reconnaissance materials. Albert Speer, the Minister of Armaments and War Production, spoke about the difficulties in rebuilding armored formations and the limitations of German industry to replace losses. General Heinz Guderian argued forcefully against the operation, stating that "the attack would be futile". The conference ended without Hitler making a decision, but Citadel was not aborted. Three days later, the OKW, Hitler's conduit for controlling the military, postponed the release date of Citadel to June 12.
After this meeting, Guderian went on to express concern about an operation that would likely degrade the panzer forces he had been trying to rebuild. He considered the offensive, as planned, a misuse of panzer forces, since it violated two of the three principles he had established as essential elements for a successful panzer attack. In his opinion, the limited German resources in men and materiel should be conserved, as they would be necessary for the pending defense of Western Europe. In a meeting with Hitler on May 10, he asked:
Is it really necessary to attack Kursk, and even East this same year? You think someone knows where Kursk is? The whole world doesn't care if we capture Kursk or not. What is the reason why it forces us to attack this year in Kursk, or even more, in the Eastern Front?
Hitler replied: "I know. Thinking about it makes me sick to my stomach. Guderian concluded: 'In that case, your reaction to the problem is the correct one. Leave him alone".
Despite reservations, Hitler remained committed to the offensive. He and the OKW, early in the preparatory phase, had hoped that the offensive would revitalize German strategic fortunes in the east. As the challenges offered by the Citadel increased, he increasingly focused on the new weapons he believed to be the key to victory: primarily the Panther tank, but also the Elefant tank destroyer and a greater number of Tiger heavy tanks. the operation to await their arrival. Receiving reports of powerful Soviet concentrations behind the Kursk area, Hitler further delayed the offensive to allow more equipment to reach the front.
With pessimism for Ciudadela increasing with each delay, in June Alfred Jodl, the OKW chief of staff, instructed the armed forces propaganda office to describe the upcoming operation as a limited counteroffensive. Due to concerns of an Allied landing in southern France or Italy and delays in deliveries of the new tanks, Hitler postponed again, this time until 20 June. Zeitzler was deeply concerned about the delays, but still supported the offensive. On June 17 and 18, following a discussion in which OKW operations staff suggested abandoning the offensive, Hitler postponed the operation until June 3. July. Finally, on July 1, Hitler announced July 5 as the launch date for the offensive.
A three-month lull descended on the Eastern Front as the Soviets prepared their defenses and the Germans tried to build up their forces. The Germans used this period for specialized training of their assault troops. All units underwent training and combat rehearsals. The Waffen-SS had built a full-scale duplicate Soviet strongpoint which was used to practice the techniques to neutralize such positions. The panzer divisions received replacement men and equipment and attempted to rebuild strength. German forces to be used in the offensive included 12 panzer divisions and 5 panzergrenadier divisions, four of which had larger tank forces than their neighboring panzer divisions. However, the force was markedly deficient in infantry divisions, which were essential for holding the ground and securing the flanks. When the Germans went on the offensive, their force numbered some 777,000 men, 2,451 tanks and guns. assault (70 percent of German armored forces on the Eastern Front) and 7,417 guns and mortars.
Soviet plan and preparation
In 1943 an offensive by the Soviet Central, Bryansk and Western Fronts against Army Group Center was abandoned shortly after it began in early March, when Army Group South threatened the southern flank of the Central Front. Soviet intelligence received information about observed German troop concentrations in Orel and Kharkov, as well as details of a German offensive in the Kursk sector through the Lucy spy network in Switzerland. The Soviets verified intelligence through their spy in Britain, John Cairncross, at the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park, who sent decryptions clandestinely directly to Moscow. Cairncross also provided intelligence Soviet identifications of Luftwaffe airfields in the region. Soviet politician Anastas Mikoyan wrote that on March 27, 1943, Comrade Joseph Stalin notified him of a possible German attack in the Kursk sector. Stalin and some officers Superiors were eager to attack first once the rasputitsa was over, but several key officers, including Deputy Supreme Commander Georgi Zhúkov, recommended a strategic defensive before going on the offensive. In a letter to Stavka and Stalin, on April 8, Zhukov wrote:
In the first phase, the enemy, gathering its best forces, including 13-15 tank divisions and with the support of a large number of planes, will attack Kursk with its Kromskom-Orel group of the northeast and its Belgorod-Járkov group from the southeast... I believe it is not advisable for our forces to go on an offensive in the near future to prevent the enemy. It would be better to make the enemy run out of our defenses, and to knock down their tanks and then, raising new reserves, to move on to the general offensive that would eventually end its main force.
Stalin consulted with his front-line commanders and senior staff officers from April 12 to 15, 1943. In the end, he and the Stavka agreed that the Germans would probably target Kursk. Stalin believed that the decision to defend would give the Germans the initiative, but Zhukov replied that the Germans would be caught in a trap where their armor power would be destroyed, thus creating the conditions for a major Soviet counteroffensive. They decided to meet the enemy attack by preparing defensive positions to wear down the German groupings before launching their own offensive. Preparation of the defenses and fortifications began in late April and continued until the German attack in early July. The two-month delay between the German decision to attack the Kursk salient and his execution gave the Red Army enough time to prepare thoroughly.
The Voronezh Front, commanded by Nikolai Vatutin, was tasked with defending the southern face of the salient. The Central Front, commanded by Konstantin Rokossovsky, defended the north face. Standing in reserve was the Steppe Front, commanded by Ivan Konev. By February 1943, the Central Front had been rebuilt from the Don Front, which had been part of the northern pincer of Operation Uranus and had been responsible for the destruction of the 6th Army at Stalingrad.
The Central and Voronezh Fronts each built three main defensive belts in their sectors, each subdivided into several fortification zones. The Soviets employed the labor of more than 300,000 civilians. Fortifying each belt was an interconnected network of minefields, barbed wire fences, anti-tank ditches, deep infantry entrenchments, anti-tank obstacles, armored vehicles, and fortified machine gun nests. Behind the three main defensive belts were three more prepared belts. as backup positions; the former was not fully occupied or heavily fortified, and the latter two, though sufficiently fortified, were unoccupied with the exception of a small area in the immediate vicinity of Kursk. The combined depth of the three main defensive zones was about 40 kilometres. The six defensive belts on either side of Kursk were 130–150 kilometers deep. If the Germans managed to breach these defenses, they would still be faced by additional defensive belts to the east, held by the Steppe Front. These brought the total depth of the defenses to almost 300 kilometers.
The Voronezh and Central Fronts dug 4,200 kilometers and 5,000 kilometers of trenches respectively, arranged in a crisscross pattern to facilitate movement. The Soviets built more than 686 bridges and approximately 2,000 kilometers of roads in the pocket. Red Army combat laid 503,663 anti-tank mines and 439,348 anti-personnel mines, with the highest concentration in the first main defensive belt. Minefields in Kursk reached densities of 1,700 anti-personnel mines and 1,500 anti-tank mines per kilometer, approximately four times the density used in the defense of Moscow. For example, the 6th Guards Army of the Voronezh Front, stretched for almost 40 miles of front and was protected by 69,688 anti-tank and 64,430 anti-personnel mines in its first defensive belt with 20,200 anti-tank and 9,097 anti-personnel mines in its second defensive belt. In addition, mobile obstacle detachments will They were tasked with laying more mines directly in the path of advancing enemy armored formations. These units, consisting of two division-level combat engineer mine platoons and one combat engineer company typically equipped with 500– 700 mines at corps level, functioned as anti-tank reserves at all command levels.
In a letter dated April 8, Zhukov warned that the Germans would attack the salient with a strong armored force:
We can expect the enemy to rely more on this year's offensive operations in their tank and air force divisions, as their infantry seems to be much less prepared for offensive operations than last year... In view of this threat, it must reinforce the counter-carrying defenses of the Central and Voronezh fronts, and assemble as soon as possible.
Almost all artillery, including howitzers, guns, anti-aircraft, and rockets, provided anti-tank defense. Buried tanks and self-propelled guns further strengthened anti-tank defenses. Anti-tank forces were incorporated at all command levels, primarily as anti-tank strongpoints, with the majority concentrated on possible routes of attack and the remainder spread widely elsewhere. Each anti-tank strongpoint typically consisted of four to six anti-tank guns, six to nine anti-tank rifles and five to seven heavy and light machine guns. They were supported by mobile obstacle detachments, as well as infantry with automatic firearms. Independent tank and self-propelled gun brigades and regiments were tasked with cooperating with the infantry during counter-attacks.
Soviet preparations also included increased activity by Soviet partisans, who attacked German lines of supply and communications. The attacks were mostly behind Army Group North and Army Group Center. In June By 1943, partisans operating in the occupied area behind Army Group Center destroyed 298 locomotives, 1,222 railway cars and 44 bridges, and 1,092 partisan attacks on the railways were recorded in the Kursk sector. These attacks delayed the buildup of German supplies and equipment, and required the diversion of German troops to suppress the partisans, delaying their training for the offensive. Partisan headquarters coordinated many of these attacks. In June, the Soviet Air Forces (VVS) flew over 800 night sorties to resupply partisan groups operating behind Army Group Center. The VVS also provided communication and sometimes even daytime air assistance for major operations. partisans.
Special training was given to the Soviet infantry manning the defenses, to help them overcome the phobia of tanks that had been evident since the start of the German invasion. Soldiers were herded into trenches and tanks were driven overhead until all signs of fear disappeared. This training exercise was colloquially referred to by the soldiers as "ironing". In combat, the soldiers would surge into the midst of the attacking infantry to separate them from the armored vehicles leading the attack. Separate armored vehicles, now vulnerable to infantry armed with antitank rifles, demolition charges, and Molotov cocktails, could be damaged or destroyed at point blank range. These types of attacks were mostly effective against Elefant tank destroyers, which lacked machine guns like secondary weaponry. Soldiers were also promised financial rewards for each tank destroyed, and the People's Commissariat of Defense provided 1,000 rubles for tanks destroyed.
The Soviets employed maskirovka ("military deception") to mask defensive positions and troop dispositions and to conceal the movement of men and materiel. This included camouflage of gun emplacements, the construction of fake airfields, guns, and depots, the generation of false radio transmissions, and the spread of rumors among front-line Soviet troops and the civilian population in German-controlled areas. The movement of forces and supplies to and from the bag was carried out only at night. Ammunition depots were carefully hidden to blend in with the landscape. Radio broadcasting was restricted and campfires were prohibited. Command posts were concealed and transportation in and around them was prohibited.
According to a Soviet General Staff report, 29 of the 35 main Luftwaffe raids against Soviet airfields in the Kursk sector in June 1943 were against dummy airfields. According to historian Antony Beevor, instead, aviation Soviet armor apparently succeeded in destroying over 500 Luftwaffe aircraft on the ground. Soviet deception efforts were so successful that German estimates published in mid-June put the total Soviet armored force at 1,500 tanks. The result was not only a large underestimation of Soviet strength, but also a misperception of Soviet strategic intentions.
The main tank in the Soviet catalog was the T-34 medium tank, on which the Red Army tried to concentrate production. In addition they also contained large quantities of the T-70 light tank. For example, the 5th Guards Tank Army contained approximately 270 T-70s and 500 T-34s. In the pocket itself, the Soviets collected a large number of tanks obtained through the Lend-Lease program. These included the US-built M3 Lee, as well as the UK-built Churchill, Matilda II and Valentine. However, the T-34 made up the bulk of Soviet tanks. Not including the deeper reserves organized under the Steppe Front, the Soviets amassed around 1.3 million men, 3,600 main battle tanks, 20,000 guns of artillery and 2,792 aircraft to defend the highlights. This represented 26 percent of the Red Army's total manpower, 26 percent of its mortars and artillery, 35 percent of its aircraft, and 46 percent of its hundred of their cars.
Battle for Air Superiority
In 1943, the Luftwaffe's strength on the Eastern Front began to weaken after Stalingrad and the diversion of resources to North Africa. Luftwaffe forces on the East became further depleted, as units of combat aircraft were transferred to Germany to defend against escalating Allied bombing raids. By the end of June, only 38.7% of total Luftwaffe aircraft remained in the east. In 1943, the Luftwaffe could still achieve superiority local air force by concentrating its forces. Most of the German aircraft that became available on the Eastern Front were destined for Citadel. The Luftwaffe's objective remained unchanged. The priority of the German air fleets was to gain air superiority, then isolate the battlefield from enemy reinforcements, and finally, once the critical point in the ground battle had been reached, provide close air support.
The changing forces between the two opponents led the Luftwaffe to make operational changes for the battle. Previous offensive campaigns had started with Luftwaffe attacks against opposing airfields to achieve air superiority. At this point in the war, the Red Army's equipment reserves were extensive, and Luftwaffe commanders realized that the aircraft could be easily replaced, rendering such attacks futile. Therefore, this mission was abandoned. Furthermore, previous campaigns had made use of medium bombers flying well behind the front line to block the arrival of reinforcements. This mission, however, was rarely attempted during Operation Citadel.
The Luftwaffe command understood that their support would be crucial to the success of Operation Citadel, but problems with supply shortages hampered their preparations. Partisan activity, particularly behind Army Group Center, reduced the resupply rate and reduced the Luftwaffe's ability to accumulate essential reserves of gasoline, diesel, lubricants, engines, spare parts, ammunition and, unlike units of the The Red Army had no reserves of aircraft it could use to replace aircraft damaged in the course of the operation. Fuel was the most significant limiting factor. To help amass supplies for Citadel support, the Luftwaffe greatly reduced their operations during the last week of June. Despite this conservation of resources, the Luftwaffe did not have the resources to sustain an intensive air effort for more than a few days after the operation began.
For Citadel, the Luftwaffe limited its operations to direct support of forces on the ground. In this mission, the Luftwaffe continued to make use of the Junkers Ju 87, the famous "Stuka". A further development of this aircraft was the "Bordkanone" of 37 mm caliber, one of which could be hung under each wing of the Stuka inside a weapons container. Half of the Stuka groups assigned to support Ciudadela were equipped with these Kanonenvogel (literally "bird-cannon") aircraft. The air groups were also strengthened by the recent arrival of the Henschel Hs 129, with its 30 mm MK 103 gun and the F-subtype ground attack (jabo) version of the Focke-Wulf Fw 190.
In the months leading up to the battle, Luftflotte 6 supporting Army Group Center noted a marked increase in the strength of the opposing VVS formations. The VVS formations encountered showed better training, and were flying upgraded aircraft with greater aggressiveness and skill than the Luftwaffe had seen before. The introduction of the Yakovlev Yak-9 and Lavochkin La-5 fighters offered Soviet pilots almost on a par with the Luftwaffe in terms of equipment. In addition, a large number of ground attack aircraft, such as the Ilyushin Il-2 "Shturmovik" and the Pe-2, were also available. The Soviet Air Force also sent large numbers of aircraft supplied through the Lend-Lease program. Huge stockpiles of supplies and ample reserves of replacement aircraft meant that the Red Army and VVS formations could conduct an extended campaign without diminishing the intensity of their effort.
Contending forces
Germans
For the operation, the Germans used four armies together with a large part of the total armored force of the Eastern Front. On July 1, Army Group Center's 9th Army, on the north side of the salient, had 335,000 men (223,000 combat soldiers); in the south, Army Group South's 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment 'Kempf' had 223,907 men (149,271 combat soldiers) and 100,000–108,000 men (66,000 combat soldiers) respectively. The 2nd Army, which held the western side of the salient, had an estimated strength of 110,000 men. In total, the German forces had a total contingent of 777,000 men, of whom 438,271 were combat forces. They also had 180,000 men in reserve. Army Group South was equipped with more armored vehicles, infantry, and artillery than 9th Army: While 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment "Kempf" they had 1,377 tanks and assault guns, 9th Army had 988 tanks and assault guns.
German industry produced 2,816 tanks and self-propelled guns between April and June, of which 156 were Panzer VI Tigers and 484 Panzer V Panthers. A total of 259 Panther tanks, some 211 Tiger and 90 Ferdinand tanks were used at Kursk.
The arrival of two new Panzer battalions (51 and 52, with 200 Panthers), arrived on June 30 and July 1, delayed the offensive; they joined the Großdeutschland Division in the XLVIII Army Corps of Panzer Group South. Both units had little time to reconnoiter and orient themselves to the terrain they were in, which was a violation of Panzerwaffe methods, considered essential for the proper use of tanks. Although led by experienced panzer commanders, many of the tank crews were new recruits and had little time to familiarize themselves with their new tanks, let alone train together to function as a unit. The two battalions came directly from the training ground and had no combat experience. In addition, the requirement to maintain radio silence until the start of the attack meant that both units had little training in radio procedures at the level of the military. battalion. In addition, the new Panzers continued to experience problems with their transmissions and proved mechanically unreliable. By the morning of 5 July, the units had lost 16 Panzers to mechanical breakdown, leaving only 184 available for the offensive launch.
July and August 1943 saw the highest German ammunition expenditure on the Eastern Front up to that time, with 236,915 tons consumed in July and 254,648 in August. The previous peak had been 160,645 tons in September 1942.
Soviet
The Red Army used two fronts (Army Group) for the defense of Kursk, and created a third front behind the battle area which was kept as a reserve. The Central and Voronezh Fronts fielded 12 armies, numbering 711,575 men (510,983 combat soldiers) and 625,591 men (446,236 combat soldiers) respectively. In reserve, the Steppe Front had an additional 573,195 men (449,133). Thus, the total size of the Soviet force was 1,910,361 men, with 1,426,352 actual combat soldiers.
The Soviet armored force included 4,869 tanks (including 205 KV-1 heavy tanks) and 259 self-propelled guns (including 25 SU-152, 56 SU-122 and 67 SU-76). Soviet tanks at Kursk were light tanks, but in some units this proportion was considerably higher. Of the 3,600 tanks on the Central and Voronezh fronts in July 1943, 1,061 were light tanks such as the T-60 and T-70. With very thin armor and a small caliber gun, they could not effectively engage the frontal armor of German medium and heavy tanks.
The most capable Soviet tank at Kursk was the T-34. The original version was armed with a 76.2mm cannon, the weapon with which it fought the Panzer IVs, but the frontal armor of the Tiger and Panther was essentially impenetrable to this weapon. Only the SU-122 and SU-152 self-propelled guns were capable of destroying the Tiger at close range, but the 88mm gun. The Tiger I was more effective at long range and there were very few SU-122s and SU-152s at Kursk.
Comparison of forces
Operation Citadel
| Operation Ciudadela | Men | Tanks | Arms | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Soviet | Ratio | Germans | Soviet | Ratio | Germans | Soviet | Ratio | Germans | ||
| Frieser | 1 426 352 | 2.8:1 | 518 271 | 4938 | 2:1 | 2465 | 31 415 | 4:1 | 7417 | |
| Glantz | 1 910 361 | 2.5:1 | 780 900 | 5128 | 1.7:1 | 2928 | ||||
| ||||||||||
Offensive phase of the Red Army
| Offensive phase of the Red Army | Men | Tanks | Arms | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Soviet | Ratio | Germans | Soviet | Ratio | Germans | Soviet | Ratio | Germans | ||
| Frieser | 1 987 463 | 3.2:1 | 625 271 | 8200 | 3:1 | 2699 | 47 416 | 5:1 | 9467 | |
| Glantz | 2 500 000 | 2.7:1 | 940 900 | 7360 | 2.3:1 | 3253 | ||||
| ||||||||||
Preliminary actions
Fighting began on the south face of the salient on the afternoon of 4 July 1943, when German infantry launched attacks to seize high positions for artillery observation posts before the main assault. During these attacks, the they captured several Red Army command and observation posts along the first main defense belt. By 16:00, elements of the "Großdeutschland" Panzergrenadier Division, 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions had taken the village of Butovo and proceeded to capture Gertsovka before midnight. At 22:30, Vatutin ordered 600 guns, mortars and Katyusha rocket launchers from the Voronezh Front to shell forward German positions, particularly those of II SS Panzer Corps.
To the north, at the Central Front headquarters, came reports of the anticipated German offensive. At around 02:00 on July 5, Zhukov ordered the pre-emptive artillery barrage to begin. The hope was to disorganize the German forces massing for the attack, but the result was less than expected. The bombardment delayed the German formations, but failed to disrupt their schedule or inflict substantial losses. The Germans began their own artillery barrage at about 05:00, which lasted 80 minutes on the north face and 50 minutes on the south face. After the barrage, ground forces attacked, aided by close air support provided by the Luftwaffe.
In the early morning of July 5, the VVS launched a major raid against German airfields, hoping to destroy the Luftwaffe on the ground. This effort failed, and Red Army air units suffered considerable losses. On 5 July, the VVS lost 176 aircraft, compared to 26 aircraft lost by the Luftwaffe. Losses of the VVS 16th Air Army operating on the north face were lighter than those suffered by the 2nd Air Army. The Luftwaffe was able to gain and maintain air superiority over the south face until 10–11 July, when the VVS began to gain lift, but control of the skies over the north face was evenly contested until on 7 July the VVS began to gain air superiority, which it held for the remainder of the operation.
Operation along the north face
Model's main attack was launched by XLVII Panzer Corps, supported by 45 Tigers of the attached 505th Heavy Tank Battalion. Covering their On the left flank was the XLI Panzer Corps, with an attached regiment of 83 Ferdinand tank destroyers. On the right flank, the XLVI Panzer Corps at this time consisted of four infantry divisions with only 9 tanks and 31 assault guns. On the left of the XLI Panzer Corps was the XXIII Army Corps, which consisted of the reinforced 78th Assault Infantry Division and two regular infantry divisions. Although the corps contained no tanks, it did have 62 assault guns. Opposing the 9th Army was the Central Front, deployed in three heavily fortified defensive belts.
German initial breakthrough
Model opted to make his initial attacks using infantry divisions reinforced with assault guns and heavy tanks, and supported by artillery and the Luftwaffe. In doing so, he tried to keep the armored strength of his Panzer divisions to be used for exploitation once the Red Army defenses were breached. Once a breakthrough had been achieved, the Panzer forces advanced towards Kursk. Jan Möschen, a senior member of Model's staff, later commented that Model expected a breakthrough on the second day. If there were to be a breakthrough, the slightest delay in bringing up the Panzer divisions would give the Red Army time to react. His corps commanders thought it an extremely unlikely breakthrough.
Following a preliminary bombardment and counter-attacks by the Red Army, the 9th Army began its attack at 05:30 on 5 July. Nine infantry divisions and one Panzer division, with attached assault guns, heavy tanks and tank destroyers, advanced. Two companies of Tiger I tanks were attached to the 6th Infantry Division and were the largest grouping of Tiger Is employed that day. Facing them were the 13th and 70th Armies of the Central Front.
The 20th Panzer and 6th Infantry Divisions of the XLVII Panzer Corps led the advance of the XLVII Panzer Corps. Behind them followed the two remaining panzer divisions, ready to exploit any advance. Heavily mined terrain and the fortified positions of the 15th Rifle Division delayed the advance. By 08:00, safe paths had been cleared through the minefield. That morning, information obtained from prisoner interrogation identified a weakness on the boundary of the 15th and 81st Rifle Divisions caused by preliminary German bombardment. The Tiger Is were redeployed and attacked towards that area. The Red Army formations countered with a force of around 90 T-34s. In the resulting three-hour battle, the Red Army armored units lost 42 tanks while the Germans lost two Tiger Is and another five pinned down to track damage. While the Red Army counter-attack was defeated and the battle was broken. defensive 1st Belt, the fighting delayed the Germans long enough for the remainder of 13th Army's 29th Rifle Corps (initially deployed behind 1st Belt) to advance and seal the breach. Army minefields Red were covered by artillery fire, making efforts to break roads through the fields difficult and costly. The Goliath and Borgward IV remote-controlled demolition vehicles had limited success clearing mines. Of the 45 Ferdinand of Panzerjäger Heavy Battalion 653 sent into the battle, all but 12 of them were pinned down by mine damage before 17:00. Most of these were repaired and returned to service, but recovery of these very large vehicles was difficult.
On the first day, the XLVII Panzer Corps penetrated 9.7 km into the Red Army defenses before coming to a halt, and the XLI Panzer Corps reached the small, heavily fortified town of Ponyri, in the second defensive belt, which controlled the roads and railways leading south to Kursk. On the first day the Germans penetrated 8 to 9.7 km into the Red Army lines for the loss of 1,287 men killed and missing and another 5,921 wounded.
Soviet Counterattack
Rokossovsky ordered the 17th Guards and 18th Guards Rifle Corps with the 2nd Tank Army and 19th Tank Corps, backed by close air support, to counterattack the 9th. º German Army the next day, on July 6. However, due to poor coordination, only the 16th Tank Corps of the 2nd Tank Army began the counterattack in the early morning of July 6 after the preparatory artillery barrage. The 16th Tank Corps, fielding some 200 tanks, attacked the XLVII Panzer Corps and ran into the Tiger I tanks of the 505th Tank Battalion. Heavy Tanks, which knocked out 69 tanks and forced the rest to withdraw to the 17th Guards Rifle Corps of the 13th Army. Later that morning, the XLVII Panzer Corps responded with its own attack against the 17th Guards Rifle Corps entrenched around the village of Olkhovatka in the second defensive belt. The attack began with an artillery barrage and was spearheaded by 24 Tiger Is of the 505th Heavy Tank Battalion, but failed to break the Red Army defense at Olkhovatka, and the Germans suffered heavy casualties. Olkhovatka was in a high ground offering a clear view of much of the front line. At 18:30, the 19th Tank Corps linked up with the 17th Guards Rifle Corps further reinforcing the resistance. Rokossovsky also decided to bury most of the remaining tanks to minimize their exposure. Ponyri, defended by the 307th Rifle Division of the 29th Rifle Corps, was also attacked in concert on 6 July by the German 292nd divisions. 1st and 86th, 78th Assault Infantry and 9th Panzer Division, but the Germans were unable to drive the defenders out of the heavily fortified town.
Ponyri and Olkhovatka
Over the next three days, from 7 to 10 July, Model concentrated the Ninth Army effort on Ponyri and Olkhovatka, which both sides viewed as vital positions. In response, Rokossovsky drew forces from other parts of the front towards these sectors. The Germans attacked Ponyri on 7 July and captured half the town after heavy house-to-house fighting. A Soviet counter-attack the next morning forced the Germans to withdraw, and a series of counter-attacks ensued by both sides with control of the city being exchanged several times over the next few days. By July 10, the Germans had secured most of the city, but Soviet counterattacks continued. The back-and-forth battles for Ponyri and nearby Hill 253.5 were battles of attrition, with heavy casualties on both sides.. Troops called it "mini-Stalingrad". The 9th Army's war diary described the heavy fighting as a "new type of mobile attrition battle". German attacks on Olkhovatka and the nearby village of Teploe failed. penetrate Soviet defenses; including a powerful concerted attack on 10 July by approximately 300 German tanks and assault guns from the 2nd, 4th and 20th Panzer Divisions, supported by all available Luftwaffe aircraft on the north face.
A meeting between Kluge, Model, Joachim Lemelsen and Josef Harpe was held at the XLVII Panzer Corps headquarters on 9 July. It became clear to German commanders that 9th Army lacked the strength to make a breakthrough, and their Soviet counterparts had also realized this, but Kluge wished to keep up the pressure on the Soviets to aid the southern offensive.
While the operation on the northern side of the salient began with an attack front 45 kilometers wide, by July 6 it had narrowed to 40 kilometers wide. The next day the attack frontage was reduced to 15 kilometers wide and on 8 and 9 July penetrations of only 2 kilometers wide occurred. By July 10, the Soviets had completely halted the German advance.
On July 12, the Soviets launched Operation Kutuzov, their counteroffensive against the Orel salient, which threatened the flank and rear of Model's Ninth Army. The 12th Panzer Division, hitherto held in reserve and scheduled to commit to the northern side of the Kursk salient, along with the 36th Motorized Infantry, the 18th Panzer Division and the 20th Panzer Division were redeployed. to face the Soviet spearheads.
Operation along the south face
At about 4:00 on July 5, the German attack began with a preliminary bombardment. Manstein's main attack was launched by Hoth's 4th Panzer Army, which was organized into densely concentrated spearheads. Opposing the 4th Panzer Army was the Soviet 6th Guards Army, which was composed by the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps and the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps. The Soviets had built three heavily fortified defensive belts to slow down and weaken the attacking armored forces. had provided excellent intelligence, the Voronezh Front headquarters had still not been able to identify the exact spot where the Germans would place their offensive weight.
German initial breakthrough
XLVIII Panzer Corps
The panzergrenadier division Großdeutschland, commanded by Walter Hörnlein, was the strongest single division in the 4th Panzer Army. It was supported on its flanks by the 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions. The Panzer IIIs and Panzer IVs of the Großdeutschland had been supplemented by a company of 15 Tiger Is, which were used to spearhead the attack. At dawn on 5 July, Großdeutschland, backed by heavy artillery support, advanced on a two-mile front on the 67th Guards Rifle Division of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps. the Guard. The Panzerfüsilier Regiment, advancing on the left wing, bogged down in a minefield and subsequently 36 Panzers were pinned down. The stranded regiment was subjected to a barrage of Soviet artillery and anti-tank fire, inflicting heavy casualties. The engineers moved in and cleared paths through the minefield, but suffered casualties in the process. The combination of fierce resistance, minefields, thick mud, and mechanical breakdowns took its toll. With the roads clear, the regiment resumed its advance towards Gertsovka. In the ensuing battle, heavy casualties were suffered, including the regiment commander, Colonel Kassnitz. Due to the fighting and the swampy terrain to the south of the village, surrounding the Berezovyy stream, the regiment once again became bogged down.
The Großdeutschland panzergrenadier regiment, advancing on the right wing, pushed through the village of Butovo. The tanks were deployed in an arrow formation to minimize the effects of the Soviet defense Pakfront, with Tiger Is in front and Panzer IIIs, IVs and assault guns deploying to the flanks and rear. They were followed by infantry and combat engineers. Attempts by the VVS to impede the advance were repulsed by the Luftwaffe.
The 3rd Panzer Division, advancing on the left flank of the Großdeutschland, made good progress and by the end of the day had captured Gertsovka and reached Mikhailovka. The 167th Division The Infantry, on the right flank of the 11th Panzer Division, also made sufficient progress, reaching Tirechnoe late in the day. By the end of July 5, a wedge had been created in the first belt of the Soviet defenses.
II SS Panzer Corps
To the east, during the night of July 4-5, SS combat engineers had infiltrated no man's land and cleared paths through Soviet minefields. At dawn on the 5th On July 17, the three divisions of II SS Panzer Corps—1st SS Leibstandarte Division Adolf Hitler, 2nd SS Das Reich Panzergrenadier Division, and 3rd SS Totenkopf Division—attacked the 52nd Rifle Division. of Guards of the 6th Guards Army. The main assault was led by a spearhead of 42 Tiger Is, but in total 494 main battle tanks and assault guns attacked on a twelve kilometer front. Totenkopf, the strongest of the three divisions, advanced towards Gremuchhi and selected the right flank. The 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division advanced on the left flank towards Bykovka. The 2nd SS Panzer Division advanced between the two formations in the center. Following closely behind the tanks were infantry and combat engineers, advancing to break down obstacles and clear trenches. Furthermore, the advance was well supported by the Luftwaffe, which greatly helped in breaking through Soviet strongholds and artillery positions.
By 09:00, II SS Panzer Corps had broken through the Soviet 1st Defense Belt along its entire front. While investigating the positions between the 1st and 2nd Soviet Defense Belts, at 13:00, the vanguard of the 2nd SS Panzer Division was attacked by two T-34 tanks, which were destroyed. Forty new Soviet tanks soon engaged the division. The 1.er Guards Tank Army clashed with the 2nd Panzer Division of the SS in a four-hour battle, which caused the withdrawal of the Soviet tanks. However, the battle had bought enough time for units of the Soviet 23rd Guards Rifle Corps, housed in the second Soviet belt, to prepare and reinforce with additional anti-tank guns. In the early afternoon, the The 2nd SS Panzer Division had reached the minefields that marked the outer perimeter of the Soviet second defense belt. The 1st SS Division had secured Bykovka at 16:10. He then advanced towards the second defense belt at Yakovlevo, but his attempts to break through were repulsed. By the end of the day, the 1st SS Division had suffered 97 killed, 522 wounded and 17 missing, and lost some 30 tanks. Together with the 2nd SS Panzer Division, it had driven a wedge into the 6th's defenses. º Army of the Guard.
The 3rd SS Panzer Division was advancing slowly. They succeeded in isolating the 155th Guards Regiment, of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division (of the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps), from the rest of their main division, but attempted to sweep the regiment east towards the flank of the The neighboring 375th Rifle Division (of 23rd Guards Rifle Corps) had failed when the regiment was reinforced by the 96th Tank Brigade. Hausser, the commander of II SS Panzer Corps, requested help from III Panzer Corps to his right, but the Panzer Corps had no units to spare. By the end of the day the 3rd SS Division had made very limited progress due in part to a tributary of the Donets River. The lack of progress undermined the advance made by its sister divisions and exposed the corps' right flank to Soviet forces. Temperatures reaching over 30 degrees Celsius and frequent thunderstorms made fighting conditions difficult.
The 6th Guards Army, which faced the attack of the XLVIII Panzer Korps and the II SS Panzer Korps, was reinforced with tanks from the 1st Tank Army, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 5th Guards Tank Corps. The 51st and 90th Guards Rifle Divisions moved up to the vicinity of Pokrovka (not Prókrovka, 40 kilometers northeast), in the path of the 1st SS Panzer Division. The 93rd Guards Rifle Division was deployed further back, along the road leading from Pokrovka to Prokhorovka.
Kempf Army Detachment
Facing Army Detachment Kempf, made up of III Panzer Corps and Raus Corps (commanded by Erhard Raus), was the 7th Guards Army, entrenched on the high ground on the eastern bank of the northern Donets. The two German corps were tasked with crossing the river, breaking through 7th Guards Army and covering the right flank of 4th Panzer Army. The 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion, equipped with 45 Tiger Is, was also attached to III Panzer Corps, with a company of 15 Tigers attached to each of the corps' three Panzer divisions.
At the Mikhailovka bridgehead, south of Belgorod, eight infantry battalions of the 6th Panzer Division crossed the river under heavy Soviet bombardment. Part of a company of Tiger I of 503 Heavy Tank Battalion was able to cross before the bridge was destroyed. The remainder of the 6th Panzer Division was unable to cross further south due to a traffic jam at the crossing, and remained in the western bank of the river throughout the day. Those units of the division that had crossed the river attacked Stary Gorod, but were unable to break through due to poorly cleared minefields and heavy resistance.
South of the 6th Panzer Division, the 19th Panzer Division crossed the river, but was delayed by mines, advancing 8 kilometers by the end of the day. The Luftwaffe shelled the bridgehead in a friendly fire incident, wounding the commander of the 6th Panzer Division, Walther von Hünersdorff, and Hermann von Oppeln-Bronikowski of the 19th Panzer Division. Further south, the infantry and the tanks of the 7th Panzer Division crossed the river. A new bridge had to be built specifically for the Tiger Is, causing further delays. Despite a poor start, the 7th Panzer Division finally broke into the first belt of the Soviet defense and advanced between Razumnoe and Krutoi Log, advancing 10 kilometers, the furthest Kempf during the day.
Operating south of the 7th Panzer Division were the 106th Infantry Division and the 320th Infantry Division of Corps Raus. The two formations attacked on a 32 kilometer front without armor. The advance started well, with the river being crossed and a rapid advance against the 72nd Guards Rifle Division. Corps Raus took the village of Maslovo Pristani, penetrating the first line of defense of the Red Army. A Soviet counterattack supported by about 40 tanks was defeated, aided by artillery and anti-aircraft batteries. Having suffered two thousand casualties since morning and still facing considerable resistance from Soviet forces, the corps took shelter for the night.
Slowing down Kempf's progress gave Red Army forces time to prepare their second defense belt to meet the German attack on 6 July. The 7th Guards Army, which had absorbed the attack of III Panzer Corps and 'Raus' Corps, was reinforced with two rifle divisions from the reserve. The 15th Guards Rifle Division moved into the second defense belt, in the path of III Panzer Corps.
Development of the battle
By the afternoon of July 6, the Voronezh Front had committed all its reserves, except for three rifle divisions under 69th Army; however, it was unable to decisively contain 4th Panzer Army. The XLVIII Panzer Corps along the Oboyan axis, where the 3rd defensive belt was almost totally unoccupied, now had only the Red Army's 2nd defensive belt which blocked it from breaking into the unfortified Soviet rear. This forced the Stavka to commit its strategic reserves to reinforce the Voronezh Front: the 5th Guards Army and 5th Guards Tank Army, both from the Front. of the Steppe, as well as the 2nd Tank Corps of the Southwestern Front. Ivan Konev opposed this piecemeal early commitment of the strategic reserve, but a personal call from Stalin silenced his grievances. Furthermore, on 7 April On July 7, Zhukov ordered the 17th Air Army, the air fleet serving the Southwestern Front, to support the 2nd Air Army in service to the Voronezh Front. On 7 July, the 5th Air Army Guard tanks began to av set off towards Prokhorovka. The commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov, described the trip:
At noon, the dust rose in thick clouds and settled in a solid layer on bushes, cereal fields, tanks and trucks. The dark red disk of the sun was barely visible. Combat cars, self-propelled cannons, artillery tractors, armoured personnel transport and trucks advanced in an endless flow. The soldiers' faces were dark with dust and exhaust gases. He was intolerably hot. The soldiers were tortured by thirst and their shirts, wet by sweat, glued to their bodies.
The 10th Tank Corps, later subordinated to the 5th Guards Army, went ahead of the rest of the army, reaching Prokhorovka on the night of 7 July and the 2nd Tank Corps reaching Korocha, 40 km southeast of Prokhorovka, on the morning of 8 July. Vatutin ordered a powerful counterattack by the 5th Guards, 2nd Guards, 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, in all fields of 593 tanks and self-propelled guns and supported by most of the Front's available air power, whose objective was to defeat the II SS Panzer Corps and thereby expose the right flank of the XLVIII Panzer Corps. Simultaneously, the 6th Tank Corps was to attack the XLVIII Panzer Corps and prevent it from breaking through into the free Soviet rear. Although intended to be concerted, the counterattack turned out to be a series of partial attacks due to poor coordination. The attack by the 10th Tank Corps began at dawn on 8 July, but was met by antitank fire from the 2nd Tank Corps. and 3rd SS Division, losing most of their forces. Later that morning, the attack by the 5th Guards Tank Corps was repulsed by the 3rd SS Division. The 2nd Tank Corps joined in the afternoon and was also repulsed. The 2nd Guards Tank Corps, masked by the forest surrounding the village of Gostishchevo, 16 km north of Belgorod, with its presence unknown to II SS Panzer Corps, advanced on 167th Infantry Division. But it was detected by German aerial reconnaissance just before the attack materialized, and was then decimated by German ground-attack aircraft armed with MK 103 anti-tank guns and at least 50 tanks destroyed. This marked the first time in military history that an attacking tank formation had been defeated by air power alone. Although a fiasco, the Soviet counterattack managed to slow the advance of II SS Panzer Corps throughout the day.
By the end of July 8, II SS-Panzer Corps had advanced about 29 kilometers from the start of Ciudadela and had broken through the first and second defensive belts. However, the slow progress of the XLVIII Panzer Corps made for Hoth to shift elements of II SS-Panzer Corps to the west to help XLVIII Panzer Corps regain its momentum. On July 10, the entire effort of the corps returned to its own forward progress. The direction of their advance now changed from Oboyan to the north to the north-east, towards Prókhorovka. Hoth had discussed this move with Manstein since early May, and it was part of the 4th Panzer Army's plan from the beginning of the offensive. By then, however, the Soviets had switched reserve formations on their way. The defensive positions were held by the 2nd Tank Corps, reinforced by the 9th Guards Airborne Division and the 301st Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment, both from the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps.
Although the German advance into the south was slower than planned, it was faster than the Soviets expected. On July 9, the first German units reached the Psel River. The next day the 1st German infantry crossed the river. Despite the deep defensive system and minefields, German tank losses remained lower than those of the Soviets. At this point, Hoth diverted Oboyan's II SS Panzer Corps to attack northeast in the direction of Prokhorovka. The main concern of Manstein and Hausser was the inability of Army Detachment Kempf to advance and protect the eastern flank of II SS Panzer Corps. On July 11, that detachment finally made a breakthrough. In a surprise attack at night, the 6th Panzer Division seized a bridge over the Donets. Once across, Breith did his best to push troops and vehicles across the river from the south. The connection with the II SS Panzer Corps allowed the Soviet 69th Army to become surrounded.
Battle of Prokhorovka
Throughout July 10 and 11, II SS Panzer Corps continued its attack towards Prokhorovka, reaching within 3 kilometers of the settlement on the night of July 11. That same night, Hausser gave orders for the attack will continue the next day. The plan was for the 3rd SS Panzer Division to drive northeast until it reached the Karteschewka-Prókhorovka road. Once there, he was to attack the southeast at Prókhorovka from the flanks and rear. The 1st and 2nd SS Panzer Divisions were to wait until the 3rd had destabilized the Soviet positions; once underway, the 1st would attack the main Soviet defenses dug into the slopes to the southwest. On their right, the 2nd was to advance east, then turn south away from Prokhorovka, to envelop the lines opposing III Panzer Corps' advance and force a gap. During the night of 11 July, Rotmistrov moved his 5th Guards Tank Army to an assembly area just behind Prokhorovka, in preparation for a massive attack the next day. At 05:45, the Leibstandarte headquarters i> began receiving reports of the sound of tank engines as the Soviets moved into their assembly areas. The Soviet artillery and Katyusha regiments redeployed in preparation for the counterattack.
Around 08:00, a Soviet artillery barrage began. At 08:30, Rotmistrov radioed to his tankers: "Steel, steel, steel!", the order to begin the attack. Heading down the western slopes, before Prokhorovka, concentrated armor from five tank brigades of the Soviet 18th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army arrived. Soviet tanks advanced down the corridor, carrying infantrymen of the 9th Airborne Division of the Guards on the tanks. To the north and east, the 3rd SS Panzer Division was occupied by the Soviet 33rd Guards Rifle Corps. Tasked with outflanking the Soviet defenses around Prokhorovka, the unit first had to repulse a series of attacks before they could go on the offensive. The bulk of the division's tank losses occurred in the late afternoon as it advanced through minefields against well-concealed Soviet anti-tank guns. Although the 3rd SS managed to reach the Karteschewka-Prókhorovka road, its hold was weak and it cost the division half its tanks. Most of the German tank losses suffered at Prokhorovka occurred here. To the south, the Soviet 18th and 29th Tank Corps had been thrown back by the 1st SS Panzer Division. The 2nd SS Panzer Division also repelled attacks by the 2nd Tank Corps and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. The Luftwaffe's local air superiority over the battlefield also contributed to the losses. Soviet units, in part because the VVS was directed against German units on the flanks of II SS Panzer Corps. By the end of the day, the Soviets had returned to their starting positions.
Neither the 5th Guards Tank Army nor the II SS Panzer Corps achieved their objectives. Although the Soviet counterattack failed with heavy losses, returning them to the defensive, they did enough to stop a German advance.
End of Operation Citadel
On the afternoon of July 13, Hitler summoned Marshals Kluge and Manstein, in charge of Operation Citadel, to his headquarters in Wolfsschanze, in East Prussia. He stated his intention to suspend the operation, since on July 9 1st Army could not advance further north of the salient, combined with the subsequent Soviet Operation Kutuzov counteroffensive towards Orel on 12 July threatening the rear of General Walter Model's 9th Army north of Kursk, constant attacks Soviet troops at Prokhorovka, south of the salient, and the Allied invasion of Sicily on the night of 9/10 July, in which Hitler declared "the cowardice of the Italians opens the way for the enemy to the fortress of Europe from the south», led to suggest the end of the offensive, Von Kluge agreed, since he was aware that the Soviets had started a massive offensive against his sector and insisted on withdrawing to the previous positions, instead, vonmanste in was very disappointed and pleaded for the continuation of the battle. Pointing out that it was first necessary to defeat the Soviet troops on the Kursk ledge, otherwise a threatening situation would arise not only in Donbass but also near Kursk. He proposed to advance from the south to Kursk and then turn west, force the Soviet troops in the Kursk salient to fight with an inverted front and crush them. At the same time, Kempf's group was to attack in an easterly direction, as well as through simultaneous actions together with 4th Army to destroy the enemy at the junction of two formations. Hitler rejected the plan, but Manstein insisted: he argued that his forces were about to make a breakthrough in their southern sector. As he saw it, with his III Panzer Corps about to link up with II SS-Panzer Corps at Prokhorovka, and with XXIV Panzer Corps available as their operational reserve, they would be halting the offensive just as victory was at hand. hand. Hitler agreed, he only granted the authorization to continue the campaign seeking to wear down the Soviet operational defenses and thus prevent a next enemy offensive, and not a continuation of the battle.
After the meeting with Hitler, Manstein hastily put together the plans for Operation Roland, disobeying orders, and knowing that he only had a few days to carry out the operation before losing the II SS-Panzer Corps due to redistribution. Fighting began with a brief artillery barrage, Das Reich's 4th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment Der Führer advanced onto the high ground southwest of Pravorot, dislodging the remnants of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps of the town of Belenikhino after violent house-to-house fighting. and hand-to-hand fighting, while Das Reich's 2nd SS-Panzer Regiment fought off a series of counter-attacks and forced Red Army units to retreat east to a new line. Vatutin ordered the 10th Guards Mechanized Brigade of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps to reinforce that line. The 7th Panzer Division of III Panzer Corps was encircling the Soviet units and contacted Das Reich, but Trufanov, commanding the Soviet forces in the breach, was aware of the threat and made a fighting withdrawal., avoiding the German encirclement and establishing new defensive lines. By July 15, the II SS Panzer Corps and the "Kempf" Detachment manage to link up south of Prókhorovka. The link failed to catch up with the retreating Soviet forces, although they did abandon a substantial number of their anti-tank weapons. Operation Roland did not produce a decisive result for the German side, and Totenkopf began to withdraw from his positions north of Psel, following orders issued late on 15 July, when II SS Panzer Corps assumed a defensive position along its entire front line. 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf anticipated the order and began to attack. execute it on the evening of 16 July. In the early afternoon of 17 July, Operation Roland ended with an order for II SS Panzer Corps to begin withdrawing from the Prokhorovka sector back to Belgorod. Those The orders were never carried out, because that day Soviet counterattacks began in the south of the salient and further south between the Mius and Donets rivers against the southern wing of Army Group South, pressing to 6th Army and 1st Panzer Army. II SS Corps would still have to make a bloody counterattack to stop the Soviet onslaught. Despite everything, in the opinion of General von Manstein a final effort would win the battle, this time he was totally wrong, the situation was already untenable. to create reserves by shortening the front in view of the fierce Soviet offensives. On 26 July, the II SS Panzer Corps was ordered to move to the Rome region, but only one SS corps was transferred, the tankless Leibstandarte and other heavy weapons, despite Hitler's decision, while the other two, Das Reich and Totenkop, remained on the Eastern Front to face new Soviet offensives. The strength of the Soviet reserve formations had been greatly underestimated. by German intelligence, and the Red Army soon went on the offensive. In his postwar memoirs, Verlorene Siege ("Lost Victories"), Manstein was highly critical of Hitler's decision to cancel the op ration at the climax of the tactical battle. The veracity of Manstein's claims of a close victory is debatable. The extent of the Soviet reserves was much larger than he believed. These reserves were used to re-equip the 5th Guards Tank Army, which launched Operation Rumyantsev a couple of weeks later. The result was a battle of attrition for the Germans, who were poorly prepared and had few chances of winning.
During Operation Citadel, Luftwaffe units in the area had 27,221 sorties with 193 combat losses (a loss rate of 0.709% per sortie). Soviet units from 5 July to 8 July flew 11,235 sorties with combat losses of 556 aircraft (4.95% per sortie). The Germans were destroying Soviet armor and aircraft at a ratio of 1:1. 6. Despite the performance of the German unit, the Wehrmacht now lacked strategic reserves. In the fall of 1943, only 25% of the Luftwaffe's fighters were on the Eastern Front, due to fierce American and British air raids on Italy and Germany.
Soviet offensive operation in Kursk
During the defensive preparations in the months leading up to Citadel, the Soviets also planned and prepared counter-offensive operations that would be launched after the German offensive had halted.
Operation Kutuzov in the South
Soviet offensive operations for the summer of 1943 were planned to begin after the Kursk offensive had dissipated the strength of the German forces. As the German drive in the north waned, the Soviets launched Operation Kutuzov on July 12 against Army Group Center in the Orel pocket, directly north of the Kursk salient. The Briansk Front, under the command of Markian Popov, attacked the eastern face of the Orel Pocket, while the Western Front, under Vasily Sokolovsky, attacked from the north. The Western Front assault was led by the 11th Guards Army, under the command of Lieutenant General Hovhannes Bagramyan, and was supported by the 1.er and 5th Tank Corps. The Soviet spearheads suffered heavy casualties, but pushed them back and in some areas achieved significant penetrations. These pushes endangered German supply routes and threatened 9th Army with encirclement. With this threat, 9th Army was forced to go fully on the defensive.
The slightly stretched 2nd Panzer Army opposed this Soviet force. German commanders had been wary of such an attack and forces quickly withdrew from the Kursk offensive to engage the Soviet offensive.
Operation Kutuzov reduced the Orel pocket and inflicted substantial losses on the German army, paving the way for the liberation of Smolensk. Soviet losses were heavy, but they were replaced. The offensive allowed the Soviets to seize the strategic initiative, which they retained for the remainder of the war.
Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev to the south
Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev was the main Soviet offensive for 1943. Its objective was to destroy the 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf, and cut off the southern portion of Army Group South After the heavy losses suffered by the Voronezh Front during Operation Citadel, the Soviets needed time to regroup and readjust, delaying the start of the offensive until 3 August. The diversionary attacks, launched two weeks earlier across the Donets and Mius rivers in Donbass, drew the attention of the German reserves and reduced the defensive forces that would face the main blow. The offensive was initiated by the Voronezh Front and the Steppe fronts against the northern wing of Army Group South. They drove through the German positions, making wide and deep penetrations. By August 5, the Soviets had liberated Belgorod.
By August 12, the outskirts of Kharkiv had been hit. The Soviet advance was finally halted by a counterattack by the 2nd and 3rd SS Panzer Divisions. In the tank battles that followed, the Soviet armies suffered heavy armor losses. After this setback, the Soviets focused on Kharkov. After heavy fighting the city was liberated on August 23. The Germans refer to this battle as the Fourth Battle of Kharkov, while the Soviets refer to it as the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation.
Results
The campaign was a strategic Soviet success. For the first time, a major German offensive had been halted before achieving a breakthrough. The Germans, despite using technologically advanced armor than in previous years, were unable to break through the deep Soviet defenses and were surprised by the significant operational reserves of the Red Army. This result changed the pattern of operations on the Eastern Front, with the Soviet Union gaining the operational initiative. The Soviet victory was costly, with the Red Army losing considerably more men and materiel than the German Army. However, the Soviet Union's greater industrial potential and manpower pool allowed them to absorb and replace these losses, without affecting their overall strategic strength. Guderian wrote:
With the failure of Ciudadela we have suffered a decisive defeat. The armoured, reformed and re-equipped formations with so much effort had lost much in both men and teams and would now be unemployed for a long time. It was problematic if they could be rehabilitated in time to defend the Eastern Front... It is not necessary to say that [the Soviets] exploited their victory to the maximum. There would be no more periods of silence in the Eastern Front. From now on, the enemy was in undisputed possession of the initiative.
With the victory, the initiative passed firmly to the Red Army. For the remainder of the war, the Germans were limited to reacting to Soviet advances, and were never able to regain the initiative or launch a major offensive on the Eastern Front. The Western Allied landings in Italy opened a new front, further diverting the resources and attention from Germany.
Although the location, plan of attack, and timing were determined by Hitler, he blamed the defeat on his General Staff. Unlike Stalin, who gave his commanding generals the freedom to make important command decisions, Hitler's interference in German military affairs steadily increased, while his attention to the political aspects of the war diminished. true for Stalin; Throughout the Kursk campaign, he trusted his commanders' judgment, and as his decisions led to success on the battlefield, he increased his confidence in his military judgment. Stalin withdrew from operational planning, rarely overruling military decisions, which resulted in the Red Army gaining more freedom of action during the course of the war.
Deaths and injuries
The casualties suffered by the two combatants are difficult to determine, due to several factors. With regard to the Germans, the equipment losses were complicated by the fact that they made determined efforts to recover and repair the tanks. For example, tanks disabled one day often turned up a day or two later repaired. German personnel losses are clouded by a lack of access to German unit records, which were seized late in the war. Many were transferred to the United States National Archives and were not available until 1978, while others were taken by the Soviet Union, which refused to confirm their existence.
Soviet Casualties
Russian military historian Grigoriy Krivosheyev, who based his data on Soviet archives, is considered by historian David Glantz to be the most reliable source for Soviet casualty figures. His data is supported by German historian Karl-Heinz Frieser. The German historian Roman Töppel disagrees. Consulting army and unit files, he writes that Krivosheyev's figures for Soviet losses at Kursk are 40% underestimates. Krivosheyev put total Soviet losses during the German offensive at 177,877 casualties. The Central Front suffered 15 casualties. 336 irrecoverable casualties and 18,561 medical casualties, for a total of 33,897 casualties. The Voronezh Front suffered 27,542 irrecoverable casualties and 46,350 medical casualties, for a total of 73,892. The Steppe Front suffered 27,452 irrecoverable casualties and 42,606 medical casualties, for a total of 70,085.
During the two Soviet offensives, total casualties amounted to 685,456 men. During Operation Kutuzov, Soviet losses amounted to 112,529 irrecoverable casualties and 317,361 medical casualties, for a total loss of 429,890 men. The Western Front reported 25,585 irrecoverable casualties and 76,856 medical casualties. The Briansk Front suffered 39,173 irrecoverable casualties and 123,234 medical casualties. The Central Front lost 47,771 irrecoverable casualties and 117,271 medical casualties. Soviet losses during Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev totaled 255,566 men, with 71,611 recorded as irrecoverable casualties and 183,955 as medical casualties. The Voronezh Front lost 48,339 irrecoverable casualties and 108,954 medical casualties, for a total of 157,293. The Steppe Front lost 23,272 irrecoverable casualties and 75,001 medical casualties, for a total of 98,273.
Soviet equipment losses during the German offensive reached 1,614 main battle tanks and self-propelled guns destroyed or damaged out of 3,925 vehicles engaged in the battle. Soviet losses were approximately three times greater than German losses. During Operation Kutuzov, 2,349 main battle tanks and self-propelled guns were lost out of an initial force of 2,308; A loss of more than 100 percent. During Polkovodets Rumyantsev, 1,864 main battle tanks and self-propelled guns were lost out of 2,439 employees. The loss ratio suffered by the Soviets was approximately 5:1 in favor of the German military. However, the large stockpiles of Soviet equipment and their high rate of tank production allowed Soviet tank armies to soon replace equipment. lost and maintain their fighting strength. The Red Army repaired many of its damaged tanks; many Soviet tanks were rebuilt up to four times to keep them in the fight. Soviet tank strength returned to 2,750 tanks on 3 August due to repair of damaged vehicles.
According to historian Christer Bergström, Soviet Air Force losses during the German offensive amounted to 677 aircraft on the northern flank and 439 on the southern flank. Total casualties are uncertain. Bergström's research indicates that total Soviet air losses between 12 July and 18 August, during the German offensive and Operation Kutuzov counteroffensive, were 1,104.
German Casualties
Karl-Heinz Frieser, who reviewed the German archive record, estimated that 54,182 casualties were suffered during Operation Citadel. Of these, 9,036 died, 1,960 were reported missing, and 43,159 were injured. 9th Army suffered 23,345 casualties, while Army Group South suffered 30,837 casualties. Throughout the Soviet offensives 111,114 casualties were suffered. Confronting Operation Kutuzov, 14,215 men were killed, 11,300 were reported missing (presumed dead or captured), and 60,549 wounded. During Polkovodets Rumyantsev, 25,068 casualties were incurred, including 8,933 killed and missing. Total casualties from the three battles were around 50,000 killed or missing and 134,000 wounded (according to German military medical data).
During Operation Citadel, 252 to 323 tanks and assault guns were destroyed. By July 5, when the Battle of Kursk began, there were only 184 operational Panthers. Within two days, this was reduced to 40. On July 17, 1943, after Hitler ordered a halt to the German offensive, Heinz Guderian sent in the following preliminary assessment of the Panthers:
Because of the enemy's action and mechanical failures, the combat force quickly sank during the first days. By the afternoon of July 10, there were only 10 Panther operatives on the front line. Twenty-five Panthers were lost as total punishments (23 were beaten and burned and two were burned during the approach march). 100 Panther needed repair (56 were damaged by blows and mines and 44 by mechanical breakdown). 60 percent of mechanical breakdowns could be easily repaired. Approximately 40 Panther had already been repaired and were on their way to the front. The repair service had not yet recovered about 25... On the night of July 11, 38 Panther were operational, 31 were total cancellations and 131 needed repair. A slow increase in the combat force is observable. The large amount of losses for blows (81 Panther until July 10th) attests to the hard struggle.
By July 16, Army Group South claimed to have lost 161 main battle tanks and 14 assault guns. As of 14 July, 9th Army reported a total loss of 41 tanks and 17 assault guns. These losses break down to 109 Panzer IV, 42 Panther, 38 Panzer III, 31 assault guns, 19 Elefant, 10 Tiger I, and three flamethrower tanks. Before the Germans finished their offensive on Kursk, the Soviets began their counteroffensive and they managed to push the Germans into a steady retreat. Thus, a report dated August 11, 1943, showed that the total number of cancellations on Panther increased to 156, with only 9 running. The German Army was forced to withdraw in combat and increasingly lost its tanks in combat, as well as from abandoning and destroying damaged vehicles. Across the Eastern Front, 50 Tiger I tanks were lost during July and August, with some 240 damaged.. Most of these occurred during his offensive on Kursk. Between 600 and 1,612 tanks and assault guns were damaged in the period from 5 July to 18 July.
The total number of German tanks and assault guns destroyed during July and August on the entire Eastern Front amounts to 1,331. Of these, Frieser estimates that 760 were destroyed during the Battle of Kursk. Beevor writes that "the Red Army it had lost five armored vehicles for every German tank destroyed".
Frieser reports losses to the Luftwaffe at 524 aircraft, with 159 lost during the German offensive, 218 destroyed during Operation Kutuzov, and 147 more lost during Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev. Reviewing reports from Luftwaffe Quartermaster Bergström presents different numbers. Between July 5 and 31, Bergström reports 681 aircraft lost or damaged (335 for Fliegerkorps VIII and 346 for Luftflotte 6) with a total of 420 written off (192 for Fliegerkorps VIII and 229 of Luftflotte 6).
For the German historian Rüdiger Overmans, in July and August 1943, the Germans lost 130,429 dead and missing. However, according to Soviet data, from July 5 to September 5, 1943, some 420,000 Germans were killed and disappeared (3.2 times more than Overmans' data) and some 38,600 people were taken prisoner. Russian; Samsonov A.M. he estimated German casualties, from 5 July to 5 September at 500,000 total losses.
Consequences
The failure of Operation Roland, combined with the immediate prior strategic failures at Kursk and Prokhorovka, effectively sealed the fate of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front. From then on, the Germans would always fight on the defensive and would never mount large-scale offensives again for the rest of the war.
Pop Culture
- Liberation (in Russian): Osvobozhdenie), is a series of films directed by Yuri Ózerov and written by Yuri Bondarev and Oscar Kurganov. The films narrate the liberation of Soviet territory focused on five major campaigns of the Eastern Front, among which is the battle of Kursk.
- «Panzerkampf» is a song by the Swedish group power metal Sabaton. It is inspired by the clashes of cars that occurred during the operation Ciudadela.
- In the work Errante Garden, of Domingo Alberto Vital Díaz, the protagonist (Maurice Reynauld) knows a German fighter, who claims he fought in the battle of Kursk.
- In the novel Central Europe, by William T. Vollman, there is a chapter dedicated to Operation Citadel that takes place during the battle of Kursk.
Further reading
- Battistelli, Pier Paolo (2013) [2008]. Panzer Divisions: The Eastern Front 1941-43. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1472800022.
- Glantz, David M. (1990). The Role of Intelligence in Soviet Military Strategy in World War II. New, CA: Presidio Press. ISBN 0-89141-380-4.
- Hill, Alexander (2017), The Red Army and the Second World War, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-1-1070-2079-5..
- Hinley, Sir Harry (1996). «The Influence of ULTRA in the Second World War». cl.cam.ac.uk. Archived from the original on 22 June 2011. Consultation on 13 June 2013.
- Jukes, Geoffrey (1979). Kursk. Meeting of Armored Forces. Madrid: San Martín S.L. ISBN 84-7140-006-5.
- Keegan, John, ed. (2006). Atlas of World War II. London: Collins. ISBN 0-00-721465-0.
- Lozano, Alvaro (2007). Kursk, the Decisive Battle. Barcelona: Malabar S.L. ISBN 84-96803-03-1.
- Ormeño Chicano, Javier (2005). The Battle of Kursk: the German armoured media. Madrid: Almena. ISBN 84-96170-22-5.
- Pinkus, Oscar (2005). The war aims and strategies of Adolf Hitler. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland. ISBN 9780786420544.
- Töppel, Roman (2001). Die Offensive gegen Kursk 1943 – Legenden, Mythen, Propaganda (MA Thesis) (in German). Dresden: Technical University.
- Weingartner, James (1991). Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler: A Military History, 1933–45. Nashville: Battery Press. p. 81.
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