Battle of Celaya

The Battle of Celaya is the name of a series of decisive military encounters for the Mexican Revolution, between the Division of the North, headed by Pancho Villa, against the Constitutionalist troops under the command of General Álvaro Obregón, which took place from April 6 to 15, 1915, in the vicinity of Celaya, Guanajuato. Villa concentrated his army in Irapuato and Obregón his in Celaya, from where he planned his strategy to wait for the impulsive Villa. The first phase of the confrontations occurred on April 6 and 7, 1915, in which Obregón knew how to defend his position against the attacks of the Villistas. They had to retreat to Salamanca, from where they planned the counterattack. The decisive phase began on April 10, when Obregón knew how to take advantage of the weaknesses in Villa's strategy. On April 15, victory fell to Obregón's troops, after which Villa was forced to retreat to León, Guanajuato. After this battle, there were others between the same sides in Trinidad, León, Santa Ana del Conde and Aguascalientes, but Villa would no longer operate at the head of the Northern Division. It was in the battle of León that Obregón, who would be president from 1920 to 1924, would lose an arm. However, this would later cause him to be known as the Manco de Celaya, often confusing the data, since the two battles were close.

After the fall of the military government of Victoriano Huerta in August 1914, victorious revolutionaries divided into two large factions, with different national projects, which led them to face each other on the battlefields when they could not reach an agreement. Since December 1914, in various parts of the Republic, the civil war raged with renewed vigor. The contending factions, Pancho Villa's conventionists and Álvaro Obregón's constitutionalists, had balanced forces and this situation was maintained during the first battles, until in the spring of 1915, when Obregón went with his soldiers to the center of the country, threatening to break communications between the different fronts defended by the conventionists.

Beginnings of the battle

On March 7, 1915, the first confrontation between constitutionalists and conventionists took place at Estación Peón, where Major General Eugenio Martínez (sent by General Álvaro Obregón from Mexico City as an extreme vanguard to start the historic confrontation against the bulk of Pancho Villa's army) was attacked by the Villista cavalry under the command of Generals Agustín Estrada, Canuto Reyes and Joaquín de la Peña, who retreated to Querétaro in order to distance the constitutionalists as far as possible from the conventionalist positions. The triumph, despite the numerical superiority and efforts made by all these generals, finally corresponded to General Eugenio Martínez, who took control of the area and reported the success of this important first battle, thus opening the way for the continuation of the advance. obregonista. Two weeks later, General Obregón arrived at Estación Cazadero, where General Alfredo Elizondo, from Michoacán, joined him. Pancho Villa, learning of Obregón's proximity, hastily left Torreón to go to Irapuato and defeat him once and for all, despite the advice of General Felipe Ángeles. On his part, General Obregón occupied Irapuato on March 31 and Celaya on April 4, the same day that Pancho Villa arrived in Irapuato. Both were prepared to have several battles that would be decisive for the history of the Mexican Revolution.

The Villista army was superior at that time to the Constitutionalist one: numerically it had approximately 22,000 men, who of course had high morale, a product of the constant victories of General Villa; They owned a large part of the Republic, the north being their main territory, and they had a brilliant political and military record; its armament was very good and the ammunition was sufficient; Villa's artillery was abundant and commanded by ex-federal officers who set an example of experience and confidence to their soldiers, and the cavalry had become legendary for its violent charges. On the constitutionalist side there were barely 11,000 men, well armed and with enough ammunition; Fortunately, they had a defensive factor in their favor: Venustiano Carranza's command and political actions with the United States. They had good generals and the undeniable ability and cunning of General Obregón.

The fighting began almost immediately when both knew the proximity of their forces. On April 5, Alejo González and Alfredo Elizondo captured Acámbaro, while another constitutionalist column under the command of Generals Gonzalo Novoa and Porfirio González received the instruction to destroy the San Luis highway in Empalme González. In turn, General Obregón remained in Celaya, while General Fortunato Maycotte's vanguard marched to El Guaje, some 18 kilometers to the north, a disproportionate distance for a vanguard. It was very dangerous to disperse the cavalry so exaggeratedly, but Obregón wanted to "disorient the enemy."

First Battle of Celaya

On April 5, Pancho Villa went to review his troops in Salamanca. The next day, he decided to put an end to General Álvaro Obregón once and for all and began his advance with three columns: to the north, the cavalry, under the command of General Agustín Estrada; in the center the infantry, made up of the brigades of generals José Herón González, former student of the Military College, Dionisio Triana, Bracamontes and San Román; to the south another cavalry, commanded by General Abel B. Serratos; To the rear of the center marched the artillery. A few hours later a furious combat broke out: the villistas collided with the brigade of General Fortunato Maycotte in El Guaje. Seeing the desperate situation, Maycotte informed General Obregón, who ordered his immediate reinforcement, first sending General Manuel Laveaga with 1,500 men, and then going personally. Obregón arrived at Guaje only to verify the defeat of his troops; Despite this, and with great presence of mind, together with Maycotte, he managed to get the troops to withdraw in good order, preventing it from becoming a rout. The constitutionalist casualties rose to eight hundred men among dead, wounded and dispersed. Taking advantage of the victory at El Guaje, the Villista troops impetuously continued their attack on Celaya. There they made the first of their tactical errors, since they did not modify their attack device or wait for the necessary support from their artillery. General Álvaro Obregón had ordered General Benjamín Hill, second commander of the Army of Operations and commander of the Infantry, to proceed to analyze the terrain and properly position the troops. This was done, so that, when appearing in front of the constitutionalist positions, the Villistas found themselves facing a wall of fire. The crash was very violent; However, by the last hours of that day, the 6th Villista impetus decreased thanks to the effective coordination of rifle and machine gun fire and artillery support. At the beginning of the night the last attacks were carried out: supported by the bulk of the artillery, which wasted projectiles in night fire, the Villistas were able to withdraw to their original positions. Despite this, Obregón's reports to Venustiano Carranza were worse than pessimistic. Beyond the dark omens, General Álvaro Obregón reacted and stopped thinking about the withdrawal; in return, he ordered Generals Alfredo Elizondo, Alejo González, and Porfirio González to quickly march to Celaya as reinforcements. Alejo González's brigade was hit at the Hacienda de Cacalote, returning immediately; Porfirio González's did not arrive in time to take part in the battle on April 7. In the early hours of that day the situation seemed to improve for the constitutionalists, since the brigades of Generals Elizondo and Porfirio González had arrived. General Grajales, in the analysis, writes to General Álvaro Obregón something encouraging for the constitutionalist forces: «The device planned for the attack the following day (April 7) implicitly carries the germ of defeat. In the distribution of their forces there is no idea of maneuver, no intention of obtaining superiority in a certain sector or direction, not even the desire to form a general reserve. The action will be simultaneous and above all in front.

At dawn on the 7th, the Villista attack began, which little by little increased in intensity: the cavalry charges followed one another without interruption, leaving many corpses on the field; the artillery fired on Celaya led by colonels José M. Jurado and José Saavedra and the cavalry by colonel Pedro González. At nine in the morning there was a crisis in the constitutionalist camp: the 5th, 9th, and 17th battalions. and 22nd had used up their ammunition and began to leave the line of fire; At that time, General Álvaro Obregón ordered General Cesáreo Castro to send troops to close the gap, a request that he satisfied by sending General Jesús Novoa with his brigade. While General Obregón personally activated the re-ammunition, he came up with a ruse that today could be called a psychological warfare action, when he ordered a young bugler from the 9th Battalion to blow “target”, which created confusion in Villa's troops. At that time there was another confusion, General Maximiliano Kloss, commander of the Constitutionalist artillery, faced with despair in combat during a Villista charge, hastily ordered the withdrawal of his pieces, a decision that motivated General Álvaro Obregón to order his firing squad, although later things were clarified and that measure was not reached. Meanwhile, and realizing this situation, Pancho Villa ordered a general attack. The Villistas started the attack again, but once again they were contained. By then the moral and material wear of the Villista attackers was evident. During that day they gave more than forty cavalry charges, having been repulsed in all of them. Immediately afterwards the Constitutionalists went on the offensive. The cavalry commanded by Generals Cesáreo Castro, Maycotte, González and Novoa acted resolutely, carrying out a double encirclement of the enemy. General González attacked from the north, reaching the location of the Villista trains that were beginning to flee. The existence of irrigation canals prevented the cavalry from consummating their action. Hours later, Villista's first defeat had taken place. The Constitutionalist cavalry still pursued the defeated some 20 kilometers, stopping at dusk in Crespo and El Guaje; the infantry did so in the surroundings of Celaya. The casualties were due to the constitutionalists: four chiefs, 27 officers and 527 dead troops; wounded were five chiefs, 20 officers (Diodoto Ramírez among them) and 340 troops; Villista casualties were 1,800 dead, including Generals Agustín Estrada and Francisco Natera, 3,000 wounded and 500 prisoners, as well as a large amount of material and cattle. The decimated Villa supporters withdrew to Salamanca in order to reorganize, receive reinforcements, heal their wounds and above all prepare their new operation. The first battle of Celaya had ended with a notable victory for General Álvaro Obregón, but the fight was not over, as Pancho Villa did not give up so easily.

Second Battle of Celaya

After the first battle, the forces of General Álvaro Obregón were suitably reinforced, as the first Oriente Division arrived with three cavalry regiments, an infantry battalion and a section of machine guns; two fractions of the Gavira Brigade; fractions of the Novoa Brigade; two “Red Battalions” of workers and the entire Brigade of General Joaquín Amaro Domínguez with his “rayados”. With these reinforcements, the strength of the Army of Operations rose to 15,000 heavily armed men, of which 8,000 were cavalry, with thirteen pieces of artillery and more than 100 machine guns. On the 12th, an ammunition convoy arrived under the command of General Antonio Norzagaray, with which this aspect was solved for the constitutionalists.

For his part, Pancho Villa was also reinforced: he was joined by the brigades of Generals José I. Prieto, José Ruiz and César Moya; infantry and artillery troops from Jalisco under the command of Generals Francisco Carrera Torres and Pánfilo Natera García, as well as large consignments of ammunition sent from Ciudad Juárez by his brother, General Hipólito Villa.

On the 13th, as Pancho Villa had said in a letter he sent to General Álvaro Obregón, the second battle began. On the constitutionalist side, everything was ready: they had made the most of the land, which, as it was full of ditches and constructions, was going to serve as a magnificent obstacle for the Villista cavalry, which advanced in two groups, one to the north and the other to the south. of the railway; the infantry transported by train landed at Estación Crespo, eight kilometers from Celaya, and the artillery marched to the rear of the infantry. General Álvaro Obregón again took the defensive, maintaining a large reserve. The battle began in the afternoon, with light shooting and reconnaissance actions. An hour later the combat had become general, mainly in the sector of the 2nd Brigade of General Francisco Manzo. The Constitutionalist artillery opened fire, which was answered by Villista, starting an artillery duel. Shortly after, the entire front was fought. The tactics followed by the Villistas were the same as in the previous battle: furious frontal attacks, violent cavalry charges that crashed before the fire of the Constitutionalist infantry. Álvaro Obregón's strategy was close to failing, because the constant artillery fire generated a great shortage of ammunition in the face of the Villista attacks. Venustiano Carranza, understanding the desperate situation of those who were fighting, quickly sent a train with ammunition. On the 14th, the Villista attack was a repetition of the previous ones: the cavalries were looking for the vulnerable place that would allow them to break. Undoubtedly, the pressure suffered by the Constitutionalist troops was very harsh, but General Obregón knew that at this rate of battle, the Villista troops would soon be exhausted. In the early morning of the 15th, General Obregón consulted with his subordinate commanders about the state of his troops, to find out if they were able to hold their positions in order to start their offensive in the early hours of that day, through a double surrounding movement of his cavalry. The grouping of his cavalry on the north side was formed by General Cesáreo Castro, although General Fortunato Maycotte took command due to Cesáreo's illness, plus the cavalry of General Dionisio Triana. The southern sector was made up of the brigades of General Joaquín Amaro Domínguez and Antúnez, plus the Jaimes and Gavira cavalry brigades. Thus, the constitutionalist troops went on the offensive, for which the enemy was taken off balance by surprise; Obregón himself was marching at the center of the attacking force. Immediately the battle became general: the villistas, although disconcerted, defended themselves valiantly, but they were displaced from the Crespo Station to the Hacienda de Las Trojes, to the north; In the center, the Constitutionalist troops had made the Villistas retreat faster, leaving only the nucleus of Las Trojes isolated, which possibly due to lack of information was clinging to its lost position. By noon the battle was decided in favor of constitutionalism: Villista's defeat was very clear and the symptoms that precede a disorderly withdrawal were already noticeable. At nightfall, with the fall of the last Villistas in Las Trojes who fought to the last man, Villa's defeat was consummated.