Battle of Carabobo (1821)
The battle of Carabobo or Cerro de La Mona was one of the main military actions of the Venezuelan War of Independence within the framework of the Wars of Independence Hispanoamericanas that took place in the Campo de Carabobo on June 24, 1821, by the revolutionary army against the Spanish royal army. This battle was decisive in the liberation of Caracas on June 29.
Background
The uprising and rebellion of Rafael Riego in Andalusia in 1820, disintegrated and dispersed the expeditionary troops assembled for the Great Expedition, with it the threat of Spanish invasion of the Río de la Plata and Venezuela disappeared, and consequently in said regions royalist resistance crumbles. The new government of the Liberal Triennium sent commissioners to agree to peace with the revolutionaries. But after the terms of the armistice of April 28, 1821, without reaching any agreement, both sides began a mobilization of their forces.
The loyalists of the King had a display that made fighting in detail favorable, defeating the patriotic divisions of Gran Colombia one at a time. The Gran Colombianos, on the other hand, needed to concentrate their troops in order to get a single decisive battle. Republican General Mariano Montilla, in command of three thousand men, placed Cartagena de Indias under siege between July 14, 1820 and October 10, 1821 (during the armistice there was a ceasefire) and occupied Riohacha and Maracaibo (what which led to the end of the truce). Bolívar himself commanded 5,000 soldiers stationed in Barinas and Páez marched towards him with 4,000 reinforcements. Bermúdez for his part was advancing towards Caracas with 2,000 from the East. Finally, the New Granadan army was in charge of operations in the Magdalena Valley. La Torre, on the other hand, had 9,000 soldiers distributed along the entire Venezuelan and New Granadan Caribbean coast in different garrisons but with their communications interrupted since the revolution in Maracaibo that led to that city passing to republican power. More than two years before (1818) his forces numbered 18,000 combatants, but due to the continuous defeats against the independentistas they had fallen by half. Bolívar and Instead, his armies totaled 20,000 men compared to the nearly eight thousand that were a few years earlier.
The patriot concentration was held in the city of San Carlos, where the armies of Bolívar, part of Páez and the division of General Rafael Urdaneta attended. In total, more than 10,000 men. La Torre had between 5,000 and 6,300. The Army of the East, led by José Francisco Bermúdez, carried out a diversionary maneuver advancing on Caracas, La Guaira and the Valles de Aragua that forced La Torre to send some two infantry battalions and a cavalry squadron to Barquisimeto against him to recover the positions and secure his rear, about a thousand combatants. Bolívar's army advanced from San Carlos to Tinaco covered by the advance guard of Colonel José Laurencio Silva, who took the royalist positions in Tinaquillo. On the 20th, the Gran Colombian army crossed the Tinaco River and on the 23rd Bolívar reviewed his forces in the Taguanes savannah.
Preparation of the royalist army
Prior to the combat, Miguel de la Torre distributed his forces in such a way as to cover the San Carlos road to the west, and the El Pao road to the south. The first defensive line was entrusted to the First Division led by Lieutenant Colonel Tomás García, which was organized into three main battalions. The Valencey battalion in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Andrés Riesco, occupied the southern part of the road; To their right was the Hostalrich battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Illas, in a marching column behind the previous ones. In addition to this, two artillery pieces were placed on a small height, in front of the line formed by the Valancey and the Barbastro. The position corresponding to the El Pao road was occupied by the Vanguard Division led by Brigadier Francisco Tomás Morales, who had two main battalions and one reserve battalion. First, the Infante light battalion took up positions, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Simón Sicilia; and immediately behind this unit was the Príncipe's light battalion. The reserve was made up of the second Burgos battalion, under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Joaquín Dalmar, who had four cavalry regiments. As for the headquarters, it was established near the Burgos battalion.
On June 15, 1821, Bolívar reorganized his army into three divisions. The first, in charge of José Antonio Páez, and made up of the Bravos de Apure battalions (under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Torres) and the English mercenaries grouped in the Cazadores Británicos battalion (under the command of English Colonel Thomas Ildeston Farriar); in addition to 7 cavalry regiments. The second, commanded by Major General Manuel Cedeño, and made up of the Tiradores (Polish Lieutenant Colonel Ludwig Flegel) and Vargas (Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Gravete from New Granada) battalions, plus a cavalry squadron. The third, under the command of Colonel Ambrosio Plaza and made up of 4 battalions: The Rifles under the command of Irish Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Sandes, Colombian Grenadiers under the command of Colonel Francisco de Paula Vélez from New Granada, Vencedor de Boyacá led by German Colonel Johann von Uslar and the Anzoátegui State, commanded by Colonel José María Arguidegui; completed all this by a regiment of cavalry,
Order of Battle
| Battle order | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Patriots | Realists | ||
.svg) Commander-in-Chief
 Simón Bolívar Chief of Staff
Units and Commanders First DivisionGeneral José Antonio Páez
Second DivisionGeneral Manuel Cedeño Division
Third DivisionColonel Ambrosio Plaza
| _-_Common_Version_of_the_Colours.svg) Commander-in-Chief
 Miguel de la Torre Units and Commanders General SquadronLieutenant Colonel Jacinto Perera Vanguard Division (Function); Brigadier Francisco Tomás Morales
First DivisionLieutenant Colonel Tomas García
Fifth DivisionColonel José María Herrera
| ||
Forces present in combat
Nineteenth-century calculations about the forces present in Carabobo tend to be very favorable to one side or the other, varying greatly among themselves. However, everyone recognizes the numerical superiority of the independentistas. Alison's gives 4,001 for La Torre and 8,000 for Bolívar, of the latter 1,200 were members of the British Legion and 3,000 of the llanera cavalry commanded by Páez. Mosquera estimates the Gran Colombian army at 9,000 or 10,000 men but Mulhall lowers it to 7,500. Even Karl Marx acknowledges the numerical superiority of Greater Columbia: 1,500 royalist cavalry and 2,500 infantry against 3,000 cavalry and 6,000 patriotic infantry (1,100 British). For his part, Dromundo raised the number of royalist infantry to 3,500 although he retained the number of cavalry. The same does López.
Modern estimates, however, disagree with these figures. Zamora speaks of only 4,300 royalists and 6,500 Republicans. Regarding the latter figure, he agrees with Bushnell's, 2,500 cavalry and 4,000 infantry. López speaks of 4,000 infantry and 2,300 cavalry. Sinclair estimates the revolutionary army at 10,000 combatants, 3,000 horsemen and the rest infantry. De Armas Chitty gives figures very similar to those of Marx regarding the royalist troops: 2,566 infantry, 1,651 horsemen and 62 artillerymen with 2 cannons. Francisco Javier Yanes estimated 5,000 infantry and cavalry men at the royalist soldiers in the plain of Carabobo.
Battle
Deployment and first maneuvers
In the early hours of June 24, from the heights of Cerro Buenavista, Simón Bolívar reconnoitred the position of the royalists on his white horse Palomo and came to the conclusion that it was impregnable from the front and from the rear. south. Consequently, he ordered the divisions to change their march to the right and head for the royalist right flank, which was in the open; that is to say, Bolívar conceived a maneuver tending to overwhelm the enemy left wing, an operation carried out by the divisions of Páez and Cedeño, while the division of Plaza continued on the road towards the center of the attack position of the compatriots under the command of Bolivar.
Flanking the 1st. Burgos division and counterattack
When La Torre realized the maneuver, he ordered the Burgos battalion to march north to occupy the height towards the Braves de Apure, head of the first division, which, after crossing the Carabobo stream, tried to climb the slope that would take him to the flat part of the savannah. The Burgos counterattack was so violent that the Braves de Apure had to retreat twice. The situation changed when a unit that was following him, the British Hunters battalion, clashed and forced him to retreat. In this action, the British Battalion displayed great courage and sangfroid, enduring each of the royal army's charges, losing their commander Tomás Farriar and 17 of his senior officers, but allowing the "Bravos de Apure" 34;, led by Páez, reorganize and counterattack effectively.
The right flank of the royal army retreats
To stop the withdrawal of the royalist units that the Republican operation had produced, La Torre sent the Príncipe, Barbastro and Infante battalions, those who managed to hold the line of combat, but only for a short time, since the bulk of the cavalry of the first division of the patriot army entered from the north of the savannah. In order to face this new attack, La Torre ordered the Fernando VII's Hussars to charge against the rebel cavalry, but this unit withdrew after firing their carbines.
Finally, attacked from the front by the infantry and from the right by the cavalry, the battalions loyal to the King opted for withdrawal. As a last resort, La Torre ordered the Lanceros del Rey regiment to attack the Gran Colombian cavalry, but this unit not only disobeyed the order, but also fled before the onslaught of Bolívar's forces. As the battle entered its final phase, the 1st of Valencey formed a square and began to withdraw, the rebels began a tenacious pursuit of the royal army, which was carried out as far as Valencia and will continue until arriving safely to Puerto Cabello. Of the 4,279 troops who participated in the battle of Carabobo, the royalists lost two senior officers, 120 junior officers, and 2,786 soldiers.
Consequences
The Battle of Carabobo was the most important action for the independence of Venezuela. Despite the fact that the war would continue until 1823, due to the fact that some remnants of the royalist forces managed to escape from the battlefield and would launch several campaigns against the west of the country, known as the "Campaña de Occidente"; the power of the Spaniards in Venezuela was liquidated and this allowed Bolívar to start the Campaigns of the South while his subordinates finished the fight in Venezuela.
The last pockets of royalist resistance fell in subsequent campaigns, Cumaná in the east was taken shortly after, on October 16 of the same year. While Francisco Tomás Morales managed to take refuge in Puerto Cabello with 2,000 survivors from Carabobo (plus 1,000 men from the local garrison), he soon gathered more than 5,200 men recapturing Maracaibo and Coro on September 7 and December 3, 1822, respectively. After the royalist defeats in Cumarebo, in the naval battle of Lake Maracaibo on July 24, 1823, and the siege proposed by General Páez in Puerto Cabello, the royalist situation became untenable and they had to evacuate the square on November 8, 1823. Two days later, the castle of San Felipe was taken, thus ending the war of independence in Venezuela after more than thirteen years.