Battle of Arica
The battle of Arica, also known as the assault and capture of the Morro de Arica, took place on June 7, 1880 and was the last major military confrontation in the Tacna and Arica Campaign, during the War of the Pacific (1879-1884).
After the battles of Los Angeles and Tacna, the battle for the port of Arica confronted the Peruvian forces under the command of Colonel Francisco Bolognesi who remained in the city, isolated by land and without hinterland, with two Chilean columns under the command of Colonel Pedro Lagos. The attackers managed to overcome the minefields, forts, rifles and Peruvian artillery and occupy the city. The Peruvian monitor Manco Cápac was sunk by her crew after the defeat of her ground forces.
The fall of Arica meant for Peru the destruction of its professional army, the loss of its naval base and southernmost land base of operations. For Bolivia it meant the closure of its natural outlet to the Pacific.
After this event, the Lynch expedition took place, whose objective was to demonstrate to the Peruvian government the futility of its resistance, and the Arica Conference, which, under the auspices of the United States government, sought an agreement that would put end to war; however, its failure gave way to the continuation of the conflict.
Background
After the Battle of Alto de la Alianza, the Chilean expeditionary army needed an adequate port for its supplies, as well as eliminating any source of resistance. For this, it prepared the capture of the port of Arica, a deep roadstead and protected from the winds from the south by Morro de Arica and Isla del Alacrán plus a railway connection to Tacna and supply of agricultural products from the valleys of Azapa and Lluta. The most important thing was its function as a supply point for the forces that controlled the Peruvian-Bolivian communications hub that was the Tacna-Arica region.
The Peruvian forces stationed in Arequipa had not been mobilized due to disorganization, lack of a previously established hierarchy, lack of a transport service, and lack of supplies. Manuel Segundo Leiva Velasco eventually assumed command of about 3,000 men and headed south. On the day of the battle of Tacna, Leiva was in Torata and continued until he reached Locumba on May 30. That day he received news from Arica, which still had communication by submarine cable with central Peru, of Francisco Bolognesi's decision to resist and that he was requesting his support from the north.
Leiva did not attend but instead returned from Locumba to Arequipa, where he arrived on June 13.
According to Jorge Basadre, Bolognesi hoped to receive support from Arequipa, but both Lizardo Montero and Pedro Alejandrino del Solar claimed that they had tried to convey to him the order to destroy the forts and withdraw to the north, but it did not reach the port. In this way, the Peruvian forces in Arica were isolated by land and blockaded by sea.
The assault on Morro de Arica was planned by General Manuel Baquedano, was led by Colonel Pedro Lagos Marchant and the defense was commanded by Colonel Francisco Bolognesi. The final phase took place in just 55 minutes.
Forces in combat
In the Chilean case, Baquedano decided to seize Arica using the Tacna Reserve, made up of the Buin 1st Line, 3rd and 4th Line Regiments, adding the Lautaro Regiment, the Bulnes Battalion, 2 Carabineros Squadrons from Yungay, 2 squadrons of cazadores a caballo and 4 artillery batteries.
The Chilean infantry was armed with Comblain and Gras rifles recalibrated to the Comblain bullet, in such a way that they used the same cartridge, while the Chilean cavalry used Winchester Model 1866 carbines, Remington carbines and sabres.
All Peruvian forces were armed with Chassepot rifles, which used paper cartridges and locked up after 50 to 100 shots. The exception was the Artesanos de Tacna No. 29, armed with Peabody-Martini rifles, and the Granaderos de Tacna No. 31, armed with Remington rifles.
Preliminary movements
The military chief of Arica assumed that the attack would come from the north and ordered to mine the surroundings and fortify the positions that faced the north of the city, under the direction of the engineer Teodoro Elmore. For the mine network, there was an electricity generating device in the hill, as well as an electrical device near the hospital.[citation required]
Sunday, May 30
On the 30th, Baquedano ordered the Yungay Carabineros to reconnoitre the road to Arica, especially the state of the railway line. The Carabineros returned the next day with good news.
Tuesday, June 1
On Tuesday, an advance party made up of Yungay Police No. 2 and Cazadores a Caballo, under the command of Commander Rafael Vargas, came out to the Azufre River (Lluta). They were received by a discharge which forced them to retire and spend the night in the pampa. Later that same day, the first locomotive with Chilean troops left for the Lluta Valley to organize the camp.
Wednesday 2
At dawn on Wednesday the 2nd, Vargas resumed his exploration, and as he approached the river bed, two mines exploded on the road on the riverbed. At the same time two men were seen escaping, one on horseback and the other on foot, who were taken prisoner. They were the engineer Teodoro Elmore, and his assistant Miguel Arenas, who had placed a mine in the place, and had in their possession the plans for the others that were to explode in different places. These mines were connected with electrical cables that were blown up from the Arica Hospital. This caused indignation among the soldiers, and the intervention of engineer Orrego, Pedro Lagos' assistant, prevented them from being shot on the spot.
In the afternoon of the same day, Wednesday, the Chilean forces began to arrive by rail, occupying Chacalluta and the Azapa valley. Camped on the north bank of the Río Azufre, the detachments made contact with the fleet that was still blockading Iquique. The railway line, which had been partially disabled by the allies, was repaired by Chilean pontooners and more cavalry was sent to the area.
Thursday 3
Throughout the day and night of June 4, the Chileans located the field artillery in charge of Majors Salvo, Frías and Montoya. For that day, the regiments Buin, 3rd Line, 4th Line, Lautaro plus the Bulnes battalion units, Carabineros de Yungay, Cazadores a Caballo and 4 artillery batteries. On the night of June 4, the Chilean batteries were installed on the hills east of Morro de Arica.
Friday the 4th
At 12:30 the supplies finish arriving. Baquedano and Velásquez initially thought that since the enemy positions were mined, it was not worth losing people in an attack and the order was given to bombard them, believing that this would be enough for them to surrender., without achieving it.
Saturday 5
On June 5, at 7:00 AM, Baquedano sent the Chilean emissary Juan José de la Cruz Salvo, who appeared before Bolognesi in Arica to demand the surrender in front of the superior number of attackers. The following dialogue ensued:
- Bolognesi: I hear you.
- Salvo: Sir, the General in Chief of the Chilean Army, eager to avoid a useless bloodshed, after having defeated in Tacna the bulk of the Allied Army, sends me to ask for the surrender of this square, whose resources in men, supplies and ammunition we know.
- Bolognesi: I have sacred duties to fulfill and I will fulfill them until I burn the last cartridge.
- Salvo: Then my mission is accomplished.
Bolognesi consulted his decision with his officers in front of Salvo; the surrender proposal was rejected. This event occurred in the so-called Casa de la Respuesta in Arica. The fifteen officers who accompanied Colonel Francisco Bolognesi on June 5, 1880 were José Joaquín Inclán, Justo Arias y Aragüez, Marcelino Varela, Alfonso Ugarte, Juan Guillermo Moore Ruiz, Manuel J. La Torre, Ramón Zavala, Francisco Cornejo, Benigno Cornejo, Francisco Chocano, Mariano Bustamante, Juan Pablo Ayllón, Roque Sáenz Peña (Argentine) and José Sánchez Lagomarsino.
At 9:00 AM, after Major Salvo returned from speaking with Bolognesi, the Chilean artillery located in Chacalluta and Azapa began firing on the Peruvian defenses of the Northern and Eastern Batteries. The confrontation between the Chilean artillery and the Peruvian batteries lasted until 1:00 p.m. without obtaining results for both sides.
At 16:30 Pachecho de Céspedes arrived in Arica to deliver a message to Bolognesi ordering them to withdraw to the north after disabling the cannons, but he cannot deliver it. Indeed, Rear Admiral Lizardo Montero, in his memoirs on the Battle of Arica, confirmed that he sent Colonel (Cuban) Pacheco De Céspedes with a message for Bolognesi, in which he ordered: "Destroy the cannons and whatever elements are in Arica and save the men that you have there to move that Army to Moquegua and unite them with Colonel Leiva”, however that message would never be received.
Sunday 6
On June 6 at noon, the Chilean bombardment began from the land batteries, as well as from the sea by the ships Loa, Covadonga, Magallanes and Cochrane. The Peruvian defenses used the Northern Batteries, the Morro Batteries, the Eastern Batteries, and the BAP Manco Cápac monitor guns. At 16:00 the fighting ceased.
The Cochrane was hit by a Voruz cannon from the nose batteries, just as a muzzle-loading cannon was being loaded with a bag of gunpowder, which made it explode, causing 27 injuries, of whom 7 later died. The Covadonga received two hits and was towed away by the Magallanes.
It is important to highlight the figure of Commander Juan Guillermo Moore (former captain of the Independencia Frigate) as in charge of the Morro batteries.
The Peruvian battery San José attacked, without results, the Lautaro regiment and a company of the Buin 1st Line regiment, which he had come to the wreck of the Wateree from the North practicing reconnaissance. This movement made Colonel Bolognesi believe that the Chilean attack would come from that sector and he reinforced it by sending the 8th Division under the command of Alfonso Ugarte.
The Peruvian shots were: Baterías del Morro, 40; Northern Batteries, 21; Eastern Batteries, 5; and monitor Manco Cápac, 5, totaling 71. The Chilean shots were: land artillery, 186; Cochrane, 19; Magellan, 28; Covadonga, 27; and Loa, 12, totaling 272.
On the afternoon of June 6, Chilean Colonel Pedro Lagos sent the Peruvian engineer Teodoro Elmore, who was a prisoner, to speak with Colonel Bolognesi and ask him to surrender. Bolognesi gave him the same answer that he had previously given to de La Cruz Salvo: "We will resist until the last cartridge". Elmore returned to the Chilean camp at 11:00 p.m.
In the afternoon, Lagos had everything agreed upon and ready his troops for the attack: the 4th Line regiment would attack the East battery, the 3rd Line would do the same with the Ciudadela battery, both batteries on the Eastern front. Once these two positions were taken, both regiments would wait for the Buin 1st Line regiment that was marching in the rear, so that together they would attack the nose plateau. The Lautaro would attack the forts San José, Santa Rosa and Dos de Mayo, on the northern front. The artillery had to cooperate from their positions on the eastern heights and the Bulnes battalion had to protect it. The cavalry had the mission of guarding the passes through which the Peruvians could withdraw. The movements of the Chilean forces towards the eastern batteries began at 05:00.
Lagos began his movement at 7:00 p.m. on Sunday, ordering Regiments No. 1, 3, and 4 of the Line to come down from the eastern heights of the Azapa Valley and advance obliquely to the west to camp behind Cerro Sombrero. The 3rd Line in front of Fort Ciudadela, the 4th Line in front of Fort del Este, and behind the Buin as a reserve. The Bulnes Battalion was located in a position close to the Artillery, as its protection, and the Cavalry was ordered to keep the camp fires lit, in order to deceive the adversary.
Fight on the Northern Batteries
The Lautaro regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Orozimbo Barbosa, began its march south along the coast at 03:00 AM from Chacayuta. At 06:00 AM he received the first shots from Fort San José and from the Manco Capac cannons. The Northern Batteries were defended by 96 artillerymen under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ayllón. These batteries and the monitor Manco Cápac opened fire on the Lautaro, which, however, continued advancing and fired back. The combat immediately became general and the Lautaro launched itself against the San José, Dos de Mayo and Santa Rosa redoubts, assaulting them with bayonet. Peruvian resistance on this front was not very energetic as its defenders stopped firing and withdrew to the nose, but not before blowing up the San José, 2 de Mayo and Santa Rosa.
Assault on Morro
Combat in the Citadel and East batteries
At 5:30 in the morning of June 7, the combat began in the sector of the eastern batteries, when everything was still dark.
The deployment of the 3rd Line was sighted by the sentinels of the Ciudadela battery at 6:00 a.m., the fires breaking even before ordering it by the commanders. On the way, two mines were detonated but they caused little damage and barely stopped the advance of the 3rd Line under the orders of its 2nd chief, Lieutenant Colonel José Antonio Gutiérrez, who assumed command of his regiment during combat. When the first wave of attackers arrived, after a hail of bullets, the defending forces managed to contain them through a coordinated movement of rifle fire, exploding mines and bayonets. A second wave was ordered on the Peruvian positions. The reduced defending forces were finally crushed by the Chileans who entered the battery by the hundreds. Chilean second lieutenant José Ignacio López captured the Peruvian flag. In the fight, almost all the defenders died, including Colonel Justo Arias y Aragüez, head of the Granaderos de Tacna battalion; Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Cornejo, head of the Cazadores de Piérola battalion; Sergeant Major Felipe Antonio de Zela, 2nd Chief of the Granaderos de Tacna; Sergeant Major Genaro Vizcarra, 2nd Chief of the Cazadores de Piérola, among others. Peruvian Corporal Alfredo Maldonado, 16, blew up the battery's magazine and in the explosion killed him, the few wounded survivors around him, and several Chileans—among the latter, one of the three officers who raised the flag—who they had entered the Citadel battery.
While this was happening, from fort East the 4th Line was seen approaching, headed by the 1st.er battalion of this regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Juan José San Martín and the 2nd battalion under the command of Major Luis Solo Zaldívar. Half the Artisans of Tacna battalion was ordered to open fire and the other half battalion faced them. Colonel José Joaquín Inclán, general commander of the Peruvian 7th Division, and Lieutenant Colonel Ricardo O'Donovan, Chief of Staff of the 7th Division, died in the fight in the battery, while Colonel Marcelino was wounded. Varela, head of the Artisans of Tacna battalion. This time the defense had time and achieved an orderly withdrawal towards Cerro Gordo.
Combat in the Morro Gordo Redoubt
The 3rd and 4th Line regiments having seized the Este and Ciudadela forts i>, they did not stop their advance to wait for the Buin 1st Line regiment as planned. This was due to the fact that in the ranks of the 4th Line a shout was heard that said: To Morro boys!, which would have made the troops forget the order received and rushed towards the nose. The Buin followed a little behind them, but would not be able to participate in the actions.
When the assault on the Eastern batteries began, Bolognesi realized that the attack would not be from the north but from the east and ordered the 8th Peruvian division to head for El Morro. On Morro Gordo hill they regrouped with part of the Artisans of Tacna battalion and resisted the Chilean attack, mainly from the 4th Line. The artillerymen of the low battery of the nose fired on the Chilean forces that were in the East batteries, bombs and cans of shrapnel. Half a battalion of Iquique Nº 33 and another half battalion of Tarapacá Nº 23 also remained in Cerro Gordo trying to resist the Chilean attack while the rest went up to El Morro.
Fight at El Morro Redoubt
In the nose, Colonel Bolognesi tried to blow up the mines on the top, but the mechanism did not work. The gunners of the low nose battery withdrew to the top, blowing up one of their guns. Once at the top of El Morro, the attackers, enraged by the use of mines that they considered unfair forms of combat, unleashed a ferocious attack without giving quarter to the defenders and that could only be contained with difficulty by Chilean officers. It was at that moment of the fight in El Morro that killed Lieutenant Colonel Ramón Zavala, head of the Tarapacá No. 23 battalion, and Lieutenant Colonel Benigno Cornejo, second in command of that battalion, leaving Lieutenant Colonel Roque wounded in the arm Saenz Pena. Later, when the Peruvian officers and chiefs were assembled, Colonel Francisco Bolognesi, commanding general of Arica, and Captain Juan Guillermo Moore, commander of the Morro batteries, died. The Peruvians managed to blow up two Parrott cannons from the Morro batteries and Sergeant Major Armando Blondel died on the pole.
Finally, the 4th line took the hill at 7:30 —where its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Juan José San Martín, died— and the Chilean flag was raised by the captain of the 4th row, Ricardo Silva Arriagada.
The final phase of the assault was carried out in 55 minutes, that is, considering from the capture of the Morro Gordo Redoubt at 07:00 AM, and the complete completion of the battle at the El Morro Redoubt at 07:55 AM.
Alliance and Manco Cápac
The frigate captain José Luis Sánchez Lagomarsino, upon seeing the Chilean flag hoisted on the nose, scuttled the monitor Manco Cápac near the island of Alacrán to prevent it from falling into Chilean hands; the ship finished sinking at 8:00 a.m. and its crew was captured by the Chilean squadron.
The Alianza torpedo boat broke through the blockade and managed to escape to the north. The launch was pursued by the Chilean vessels Cochrane and Loa , until the launch's crew beached her vessel and blew it up at Cabo Picata in the afternoon. The next day, the crew members were captured near Moquegua.
Execution of prisoners in Arica
In the midst of the initial chaos of the occupation of Arica, Chilean soldiers who came down from El Morro shot Peruvian prisoners at the gates of the city church (field hospital during the combat). This could only be contained when the forces Lautaro and Bulnes entered the city and put order.
Casualties
William Sater estimates Peruvian casualties at between 700 and 900 dead, 354 wounded, and 1,300 prisoners. The Chileans suffered 120 dead and 354 wounded.
Likewise, more than 300 corpses of Peruvian combatants were thrown into the sea from the top of the hill, which remained decomposing for days without being buried with the danger of spreading diseases.
Consequences and analysis
The Chilean warships did not participate in the battle, according to Ekdahl, the elevation of Morro and the way of assaulting prevented the use of their cannons.
Neither could the Chilean cavalry take part in the battle.
Ekdahl admires Bolognesi and his officers for the steadfastness and resolve with which they fought.
The Chileans captured 1,200 rifles of different systems and 13 cannons: a 250-lb Vavasseur, two 100-lb Parrotts, seven 68-lb Voruz, and a 12-lb bronze cannon, which was not used in the military actions.
On June 7, Flag Day is celebrated in Peru and the Day of the Glories of the Infantry in Chile, and it has been a holiday in the Region of Arica and Parinacota since 2013.