Battle of Araure
The Battle of Araure was a military confrontation fought on December 5, 1813, during the Venezuelan War of Independence, between the patriotic forces led by Captain General Simón Bolívar and the royalist forces led by by Colonel José Ceballos and Colonel José Antonio Yáñez, ending with a victory of the former.
Background
Previous situation
After the Admirable campaign of 1813, the royalist colonel José Ceballos entrenched himself in Coro, Captain General Juan Manuel de Cajigal y Martínez took refuge in Puerto Cabello, a fortress under siege, and Colonel José took refuge in the basin of the Apure River. Antonio Yáñez formed a militia of llaneros, bandits and runaway slaves dedicated to herding and cattle rustling for landowners. As the Spanish diplomat Julio Albi de la Cuesta indicated, the Spanish only preserved the coastal strip between Maracaibo and Puerto Cabello, but the situation did not It was desperate, since it included the city of Maracaibo, the formidable fortress of Puerto Cabello, and the faithful Coro. Furthermore, they had the support of the provinces of Guayana and Santa Marta, and in the Llanos they began to organize an uprising favorable to the monarchy.
The Liberator Simón Bolívar, instead of immediately marching on the weakened monarchical bastions, headed to Caracas to form his government together with Brigadier General Santiago Mariño, both of whom dominated central-western and eastern Venezuela, but many of their garrisons or flying parties could not defend a population that had to seek refuge in the forests or join the royalist guerrillas. In 1813 the determined patriots had to be 5% of the population, counting on the sympathy of another quarter or third of the population. total, especially among the aristocracy, but they would soon exhaust their material and moral resources in an endless, increasingly bitter war that they lost. On the other hand, the royalists had the sympathy of perhaps 80%, although only an eighth or sixth of the population were true monarchists. Deep down, the majority was neutral and joined the group that best guaranteed order or that put the most pressure on them. When the active patriots were in charge, 90 or 95% of Venezuelans supported the process in action or omission, hoping for peaceful independence and considering Spain condemned to French conquest. When the financial ruin caused by the administrative inexperience and ideological dogmatism of the Republicans was felt, the people stopped supporting them.
Social war
The mobilization of pardos began when José Félix Ribas, Francisco de Miranda, Simón Bolívar, Francisco Antonio Paúl, Miguel Peña, Ramón García de Sena, Antonio Muñoz Tebar and other exalted patriots used their slaves and tenants as a shock force to defend their interests. But it was the royalists who made a greater effort to gain their support and form militias in the Llanos. Black freedmen and slaves had an eternal desire to kill whites and mestizos and take their property and women. Meanwhile, the Indians, very mixed with the mestizos, sought to stay out of the conflict as much as the rest of the populace, but due to the activism of their parish priests they felt inclined towards realism.
At that time the war became fierce. The royalist Zuazola paid one peso for each patriot's ear that his men brought, going so far as to send crates full to Cumaná, where the local Catalans celebrated. The patriot Arismendi had all the prisoners he captured beheaded in Margarita, including the governor, Colonel Pascual Martínez. His co-religionist Piar shows no mercy in Maturín and leaves the bodies of his enemies to the scavenging birds. Canarians and peninsular people suffered repression and loss of their property at the hands of the rebels, the only thing they did was resist while waiting for the arrival of Spanish troops to reconquer the country. With nothing to lose, officers of this origin encouraged and tolerated the looting carried out by their troops.
Division among the royalists
In 1813 Venezuela lacked a true government. After the reconquest of Captain General Domingo de Monteverde, the country was divided between Colonel Antonio Tiscar (lord in Barinas and Apure), Colonel José Ceballos (Coro), Colonel Francisco María de Oberto y Faría (Trujillo), Colonel Ramón Correa (Maracaibo and Mérida) and Colonel Julián Izquierdo (plains of Portuguesa and Cojedes). Consider Guayana, Maracaibo, Coro and the Llanos as the bastions of loyalty to the king.
From the Admirable campaign until Pablo Morillo's landing, the Venezuelan territory was fragmented between different leaders who formed their own groups, proclaimed themselves leaders and acted on their own, sometimes uniting. Many included criminals eager to plunder. At the same time, criminal gangs without sides proliferated.
The captain general's authority over them was relative and to ensure his hegemony, Monteverde had to ask the Regency Council for help. As an example of the degree of anarchy, in 1814 Boves ignored the authority of the legitimate captain general, Juan Manuel de Cajigal and Martínez, joined by the leaders who wanted to. Previously, Monteverde had unknown his superior, Fernando Miyares, and Colonel Yáñez never recognized any superior leader.
José Tomás Boves, José Antonio Yáñez, Francisco Tomás Morales, Francisco Rosete, Eusebio Antoñanzas, José Antonio Puy, Francisco Javier de Cervériz and Antonio Zuazola stand out among the royalist leaders who put Indians, slaves, llaneros and pardos in arms.
Anarchy on the Republican side
On the republican side the situation was not better: Santiago Mariño challenged the authority of Simón Bolívar, José Félix Ribas and Juan Bautista Arismendi to Mariño or José Francisco Bermúdez and Manuel Piar to Ribas. Unlike 1811, when the First Republic had a single federal government, in August 1813 the "State of Venezuela" or the "American Confederation of Venezuela" had re-emerged but divided into the State of the Center-West (provinces of Caracas, Barinas, Mérida and Trujillo) and that of the East (Barcelona, Cumaná, Margarita and Guayana). Each one was governed by a "Supreme Chief" with dictatorial powers. In addition, they had different political projects. If the eastern wanted to create its own State in its domains, the western intended to unite all of Venezuela under its command, for which it had support from New Granada. Upon assuming office as General in Chief, the Liberator appointed three secretaries to support him in the tasks of government and administration: Rafael Diego Mérida (Interior and Justice), Antonio Muñoz Tébar (Treasury and Foreign Relations) and Colonel Colonel Tomás Montilla (War and Navy). The capital of his government was Caracas.
The division was accentuated when the Second Republic died and autonomous guerrillas were formed in the plains of Orinoco, Apure or Casanare, Margarita Island and Trujillo. To restart the war, in 1817, form a central State and a centralized government in Angostura Bolívar had to obtain the loyalty of Santiago Mariño, José Antonio Páez, Manuel Piar, Manuel Cedeño, José Gregorio Monagas, Pedro Zaraza, Juan Bautista Arismendi, Juan Nepomuceno Moreno, Ramón Nonato Pérez, Andrés Rojas, José de Jesús Barreto and Francisco Colmenares (successor of Vicente de La Torre y Abreu).
Campaign
Ceballos Campaign
On September 14, 1813, the Granada regiment commanded by Colonel Carlos Manuel Salomón arrived in Puerto Cabello, who decided to advance alone on Valencia to distract Bolívar, who wanted to attack Barinas, allowing the Corian and Apureño royalists to meet Araure to defeat him, then they would recruit more men and finish off Mariño. He marched to Guacara with 1,200 peninsulars and 3 cannons, but in the Vigirima valley he found the strong defensive positions of division general José Félix Ribas. He attacked without success for two days, but on November 25 he had to return to Puerto Cabello, leaving half of his forces and all of his artillery in the field.
In the words of the Caucano historian Vejarano Segura, "In the province of Coro, the inhospitable coast and the ferocious nursery that ended with Miranda and the first Republic, the anti-republican reaction was continuous and growing." He decided to go to Barquisimeto to join Colonel José Antonio Yáñez, chief of the llaneros of Apure. Seconded by Colonel Miguel Correa, he left Coro on September 22 with 351 infantry and 23 officers. He passed through Siquisique, where they were joined. The guerrillas of the priest Andrés Torrellas and Lieutenant Colonel Juan de los Reyes Vargas, following the Tocuyo River, are joined by the horsemen of Colonel Pedro Luis Inchauspe, the guerrillas of Colonel Francisco Oberto and the dispersed of the defeated units of the leader Manuel Cañas. The 1,000 guerrillas of Torrellas and Reyes Vargas had just been defeated by the 600 soldiers of the Caracas battalion and the Húsares de Línea squadron, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ramón García de Sena, in Cerritos Blancos on September 13. On November 10, he defeated the 1,200 infantry and more than 200 cavalry of Bolívar's division in Tierrita Blanca, near Barquisimeto. The next day he entered Barquisimeto followed by 2,000 combatants. Colonel Ceballos assumed personal command of the cavalry while leaving his second, Colonel Oberto, in charge of the artillery and infantry.
Yáñez campaign
In July 1813, Bolívar appointed Colonel Manuel Antonio Pulido as governor of Barinas in an attempt at reconciliation with the federalists. At that time, the royalists were taking refuge in San Fernando de Apure with 1,100 men. As the former governor of the area, Antonio Tiscar y Pedrosa, had been defeated, they were led by Colonel Yáñez, who had popular support thanks to the missionaries and with weapons and supplies sent from Guayana.
Finally, Yáñez left San Fernando with 1,000 faithful, highlighting the Sagunto and Numancia battalions, formed by Creole infantrymen with officers from Guayana. Along the way they were joined by guerrillas from Guasdualito and Quintero, who cut the throats of every patriot they caught and looted. Two other guerrillas joined them, massacring the inhabitants of Pedraza and Guanarito.
They soon managed to isolate the garrisons of Achaguas and Barinas; the first fell on September 29, and the second was evacuated by Pulido on November 2. The patriotic colonel was also followed by Colonel Pedro Briceño Pumar (father of Brigadier General Pedro Briceño Méndez), numerous families, including some royalists, who feared the bloodthirsty fame of the llaneros, and a contingent of 600 cavalry and 400 infantry. In their retreat they were constantly attacked and Bolívar, occupied with others fronts, he could not help them. On November 11 they arrived at Guanare, which they found abandoned except for mutilated corpses, having to continue through Ospino, Araure and San Carlos; In the first of these the royalists had executed more than 100 patriots on October 31.
Previous moves
Upon learning that Yáñez was leaving Ospino and crossing the Acarigua River, Ceballos entered the valleys of Sarare. Finally, on December 3, both armies unite in Araure after massacring the patriots of the town. The royalist guerrilla Carlos Blanco prevented the patriots from knowing their movements. His plan was to continue on San Carlos, then Valencia and finish in Caracas.
The Liberator left for San Carlos on November 27. On the afternoon of November 30, Bolívar reviewed his soldiers and the next day he began the road to Barquisimeto. However, on December 3, after After capturing and interrogating some guerrillas near Onoto, he learned of the union of Yáñez and Ceballos in Sarare, deciding to go to Araure, camping in Camoruco, where he left the schoolchildren and two squads of the Agricultores corps to ensure their withdrawal to San Carlos, since there was the royalist guerrilla of Carlos Blanco. He then crosses the Cojedes River and arrives at Agua Blanca. The following afternoon he arrives in Araure, where he sends two squads to watch from La Galera hill, to the west of the town, while he camps to the east. The patriots begin to concentrate their forces despite the guerrillas and bad roads..
Facing forces
Original sources and studies by Lecuna and Rivas Vicuña
Estimates on the size of the fighting forces are usually based on the data provided by Urdaneta in his Memoirs, where he states of the patriot army: «All this brought together towards a force of 2000 infantry and close to 1000 horses, which was divided into four divisions", also giving the organization of the host. Finally, he states that there were no reserves and that the fate of the Venezuelan Republic was at stake on that battlefield.
The Venezuelan historian Vicente Lecuna was critical of traditional estimates. In his opinion, Bolívar had concentrated at great speed all the forces at his disposal, about 5,000 men distributed equally between foot and horse soldiers. Regarding the monarchists, Ceballos and Yáñez added 7,000 combatants, but mainly cavalry. The Chilean historian Francisco Rivas Vicuña carries out an in-depth analysis of the data provided by Urdaneta and Bolívar himself. Based on Lecuna, he maintains that Urdaneta's figures are too low and that Urdaneta "perhaps only counted the available veterans and that number has been copied by some historians." However, he admits that it coincides with the data provided by Bolívar later. from Virigima:
"Between I have given my provisions so that the troops coming from Caracas will continue to the city of San Carlos, where united to the army of the West, already increased to three thousand men more than less, will attack Ceballos and march quickly over Coro and the province of Barinas. I'm going to San Carlos tomorrow to run these operations. The good disposition of our troops makes me hopefully that within eight days I will be able to be back to the city of Valencia, leaving the campaign of the West finished, so to speak. For my part, I invite VSS to deal with the interesting object of agreeing to the government of Venezuela, which I have done so much. I am willing to settle for my part as soon as possible with the wise views of General Mariño, and I can assure VSS. that no pretension of mine will strike the one that we agree on the form of the Supreme Administration."
These 3,000 patriotic soldiers concentrated in San Carlos that Bolívar mentions do not count the 700 reinforcements that General José Félix Ribas brought from Caracas, nor the 1,000 soldiers (400 infantry and 600 cavalry) who accompanied Pulido from Barinas nor the 1000 troops of the Barlovento battalion that Campo Elías brought from Calabozo. In total, there would be 5700 places, but if one considers that Pulido was accompanied by a large number of civilians and many were able to be recruited, the figure could well be rounded to reach 6,000 combatants, the largest army assembled by the independentistas to date. This last estimate coincides better with the data that Lecuna collected: "the figure of 5,000 men in that Yáñez fixes Bolívar's cash; José Domingo Díaz makes it rise to 6,000 soldiers.
As for the monarchists, Urdaneta only provides that between Araure and San Carlos there were more than 1,000 monarchist guerrillas who cut communications and would prevent any retreat in case of defeat for the independentists. However, Bolívar provides more data:
"The various relations of the prisoners, later compared by Colonel Villapol, Commander of the right wing, produce according to that the number of the enemies passed from 3700 men, of which 1400 were of cavalry, when we assured in Bulletin No. 25 that it was only 3500 for the reports received before in the same Villa de Araure. They were superior in the number and qualities of their cavalry; we, may be said, had no artillery, except two pedreros, when the enemy served ten pieces in the plain, the more than four calibers. Before the defeat of our vanguard we were superior in the infantry; but having taken all the rifles of it, and armed with them to their ardents*, we entered the general action with a lower infantry."
* Soldiers armed with spikes or spears [Editor's note].
There is also a bulletin written by the Minister of War, Colonel Tomás Montilla: «[…] we learned that the enemy, numbering more than 3,500 men with ten pieces of artillery, was located nearby; His position was at the entrance to the mountain of the Acarigua River; resting its wings on two forests, and covering the front by a lake that prevented the attack of our infantry from that side.
In a letter from Francisco de la Hoz the following count of the royalist forces is given a month after the battle:
In the jurisdiction of Coro there are 2,200 armed men whose commander, by necessity, must be Mr. Colonel Solomon; in S. Felipe, 500 in command of N. Millet; in the province of Barinas Lieutenant Colonel D. José Yáñez with 1,500 well disciplined; and in Calavozo Captain D. Tomás Bobes with 2,000 men, the most cavalry; this whole troop is from the country, except for the six hundred of the Granada Regiment in Coro. But since they do not have the most communication and there is no head to direct these forces, but the respective commanders, they work each to their arbitrary and the enemies will beat them by division, with superior forces [sic].
Rivas Vicuña, based on Lecuna's writings, believes that Yáñez arrived in Barinas with 3,000 men, 2,500 from his base in Apure and 500 from the Montoneras incorporated along the way. On his march to Guanare he continued to add guerrillas, who could not have been less than 1,500. In this way, he contributed 4,500 soldiers to the royalist army. Instead, Ceballos advanced victoriously from Barquisimeto, adding to the 2,000 troops he had in Tierrita Blanca new recruits in the valleys of El Tocuyo, whose inhabitants sympathized with the royalist cause and Torrellas and Reyes Vargas had a lot of influence. However, as it advanced very quickly there could not have been too many, perhaps only 500. Thus, it contributed about 2,500 followers to the combined effort. Rivas Vicuña states: «The minimum of the royalist army concentrated in Araure by virtue of these data, cannot have been less than 6,000 combatants and a higher figure, very close to 7,000, can be considered very probable.
The Venezuelan chronicler and supporter of the Spanish monarchy, José Domingo Díaz, affirms that all the forces gathered by Bolívar in the battle totaled 6,000 men, a number much higher than the 1,500 he had weeks before in Vigirima, including the 500 students. Caracas. Regarding the previous battle in Tierrita Blanca, it states that Ceballos defeated 2,500 revolutionaries with 1,700 men, of which only 100 were Europeans, causing 700 deaths and a greater number of prisoners. The veteran of the battle, colonel José de Austria stated that the monarchical army had more than 5,000 men supported by 10 pieces of artillery. The Venezuelan journalist and historian Francisco Javier Yanes in his work published in 1821, Documented account of the main events that occurred in Venezuela, he states: "The Republican army barely reached 5,000 men." Regarding his enemies he says: "At the beginning of December, the forces of Yañes had joined those of Ceballos, who formed an army, perhaps the most respectable and numerous that until then had been seen in Venezuela, as it consisted of 7,000 men of all weapons, ten pieces of heavy-caliber artillery, with their corresponding equipment and very well served." The English soldier Guillermo Miller, who joined the armies patriots in 1817, mentions that between the battles of Las Trincheras and Araure, "the Spanish general Cevallos [sic] had time to take four thousand recruits from the province of Coro, which had always expressed itself against the cause of independence »
Other estimates
The Venezuelan soldier and pedagogue Feliciano Montenegro Colón maintained that "The total strength of the destroyed [royalist] body reached 2,700 men and that of the victor [patriot] to 2,800." Among the monarchical units was the Granada regiment, which was almost destroyed on that occasion. His compatriot, the historian Rafael María Baralt affirms that Bolívar commanded 1,200 infantrymen of the Aragua< battalions in Tierrita Blanca. /i>, Caracas and Farmers and barely 200 cavalry with 2 cannons, suffering 1000 dead and wounded at the hands of Ceballos, who had 2000 infantry, 500 cavalry and 9 cannons. The author also mentions that Salomón had 1,200 men ready to join Ceballos, as did Yáñez, who does not mention the size of his forces. The patriots managed to increase to 2,000 infantry and cavalry in Vigirima, including 500 students and 200 cavalrymen from the Agricultores corps, and thanks to the 1,000 men brought by Campo Elías de Calabozo and the numerous efforts made, they rose to 5,000 or a little less in the battle. On the other hand, the Colombian historian José Manuel Restrepo maintains that the royalists numbered 3,500, including 1,400 horsemen, in addition to the 1,700 men of Colonel Salomón, who had tried to join them with 800 infantry, 200 cavalry and 2 4-pounder and 2 mountain cannons, but was defeated in Vigirima, a victory that was key because it is considered that if all these forces had united, Bolívar would probably have been defeated. The independentists would have numbered 3,000, according to the data provided by Urdaneta, including a strong division from Campo Elías and about 500 men from Barinas. The Venezuelan priest and historian, José Félix Blanco, estimates the number of Western troops at the beginning at 6,000. from 1814.
We traveled slightly the military cadre of the Republic in January [of 1814], and the points his troops occupied, so that there was accuracy in comparisons. The garrison of the province of Barinas under Lieutenant Colonel García de Sena consisted of 250 riflemen from the Battalion Vencedor de Araure, under the orders of his commander José Rodríguez and 550 horses. The division of the West, led by General Urdaneta, consisted of the three battalions called Barlovento, Valencia and Guayra, of just over 400 squares each, commanded by their commanders, N. Linares, Manuel Gogorza and Domingo Mesa; and of a squadron of mui dragons mismounted at the command of their commander Rudecindo Canclon. The garrison with which Colonel Juan Escalona defended Valencia Square was 150 men, among veterans, militias and peasants. The Port-Cabello line was held by the more than brave Granada Luciano D'Eluyar with 300 infants. The division of Lieutenant Colonel Campo Elías in Villa de Cura was in mere formation; he only had the brazen body of the glorious name 5. of the Unionunder his former head F. Yepes; the new creation hunter, after the destruction of the primitive Valerous. in Araure, which was organized by his son Manrique; and a cavalry all collecticia: his total 3000 men. In Caracas, the brigade of Colonel Leandro Palacios was also organized, consisting mostly of delicate young people, up to 500 infantry and the Farmers’ squadron, which did not reach 200. Maximum combatants, 6000. Out of the way. always. desired and very begged army of the East, always. it was then held on the other side of the river Unare, a dividing line between those provinces and that of Caracas, until, by force of supplications of the Libertador, written even with the blood of our battlefieldsHe had to move for this time in aid!
The Argentine politician and historian Bartolomé Miter affirms that Colonel Ceballos had left Coro with barely 350 followers, with the plan of joining his forces with those of Colonel Salomón in Puerto Cabello and those of Yáñez in Barinas. The first He had 1,700 soldiers, but instead of converging forces he decided to march with 800 infantry from Granada, 200 cavalry and 4 mountain and light cannons against Valencia, being defeated in Vigirima, losing his artillery and having to return to Puerto Cabello. On the other hand, Yáñez was able to join Ceballos, who on his march added reinforcements until he had 500 infantry, 300 cavalry and a stonemason in Tierrita Blanca, at which time he crossed the mountain range and entered the valleys of Caracas until reaching Araure.. There he was joined by the 1,500 llaneros that Yáñez brought. Together they formed a disciplined army of 3,500 men and 10 pieces of artillery. On the other hand, regarding the patriots, he states that initially Urdaneta operated with 800 men who later rose to 1,300 due to the reinforcements brought by the Liberator, but when they were defeated in Tierrita Blanca They suffered 350 deaths and the capture of 400 prisoners, 2 cannons, 3 flags and 700 rifles. This forced Bolívar to add the victorious forces of Vigirima to his army, a battalion made up of 500 university students from Caracas and 200 cavalry recruited in the surroundings, and 1,500 men from Calabozo brought by Campo Elías (leaving the city's garrison reduced to 1,000 seats). Thanks to these efforts he was able to leave San Carlos on December 1 with 3,000 combatants to seek battle.
The Chilean historian Francisco Antonio Encina states that in Tierrita Blanca the Liberator had 1,100 infantry and 200 cavalry with 2 4-pound cannons, losing 1,000 men dead, wounded, prisoners and dispersed. Bolívar managed to recover, putting together a force of 2,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry if Urdaneta is used as a reference, apart from another 2,000 men who were in the surrounding area waiting to obtain a weapon to join the army and served as reserves. On the other side, Ceballos would have 700 infantry, 300 cavalry and 50 artillerymen with 9 light pieces. In Araure they would have grown to 3,700 thanks to Yáñez. The Venezuelan historian and military man Andrés Pacheco Miranda estimated that Ceballos had 5,000 men, of which 3,700 were line forces, compared to the 3000 that Bolívar had.
The Venezuelan soldier Eleazar López Contreras believed that the revolutionaries numbered 3,900 infantry: 1,000 from the Barlovento battalion, 600 from the Valerosos Cazadores, 600 from the unnamed i>, 500 of Villapol's troops and with respect to the Barinas, Valencia and La Guaira battalions there would be 400 each. Regarding their cavalry, there would be 900 horsemen distributed as follows: 400 in the Barinense cavalry, 200 in Figueredo's, 150 in the Soberbios Dragones escorts and for the Schools squadrons, Farmers and Piñango farmers 50 each. In total 4,800 men with some artillery, of which a substantial part must have been from Caracas.
Regarding his adversaries, López Contreras estimates them at 5,200 troops with 10 cannons. Regarding the infantry, there would be 600 in Correa's battalion, 800 in Ramos, Torrellas and Quintero's corps, 300 in Inchauspe's, 800 in the Sagunto regiment and 600 in the Numancia battalion. . As for the cavalry, 600 cavalrymen from Yáñez, 600 from Puy and 300 brought from El Tocuyo.
The Spaniards José Semprún and Alfonso Bullón de Mendoza believe that the royalists numbered 3,700 men recruited from the battalions of Granada, Sagunto and Numancia and the regulated militias of Coro. While their rivals would be 5,000, counting 2,000 veteran infantry, 1,000 cavalry and a reserve of 2,000 militiamen and unarmed auxiliaries. The historian Jorge Ricardo Vejarano Segura stated that in Coro "an already respectable army corps of 2,000 men was organized that under the command of Ceballos" who "intended to thoroughly attack the interior of the country" taking advantage of the fact that "Bolívar is no longer able to go out to fight" and was immobilized in his headquarters in Valencia. His "spearhead" was the "somatén" of Reyes Vargas and Torrellas, "those who made Monteverde victorious" and at that time they were dedicated to "walking at night, raiding roads, destroying garrisons."
The French historian Clément Thibaud, based on Lecuna y Blanco, estimates 5,000 to 6,000 operational troops for the Western patriot army. Modern historians point out that Bolívar's army, that is, that of Western Venezuela, could well add 8,000 to 10,000 men organized into 10 battalions, 25 companies of artillerymen, sappers and hunters and 6 squadrons of hussars and lancers. However, the sick and wounded and the great dispersion they suffered must be discounted because they must protect an extensive territory, so only a part could meet in a pitched battle, although this number could well be considered exaggerated. This It was due to the numerous threats they faced, which also forced Bolívar and Mariño to keep their armies separated.
Since its founding, the Republic had created numerous infantry militia battalions for its defense. These units disappeared with the victory of Monteverde, but were rebuilt during or after the Admirable campaign, specifically seven infantry battalions were reorganized by Bolívar upon entering Caracas. Thibaud points out that the names of the units, especially the battalions, were not random. They tended to be eponyms in honor of the cities or regions where the troops had been recruited and whose honor they defended, since for the people of the time their personal identity was more linked to the region or ethnic group in which they were born, not to the nationality they proclaimed. the revolutionaries. Thus, for example, Bolívar and his Western army had battalions named in honor of the cities of Caracas, La Guaira, La Victoria and Valencia, all in the province of Caracas, which had two-thirds of the Venezuelan population. and contributed three-fifths of the soldiers. As for the Valerosos Cazadores battalion, created by the Liberator in July 1813 in Barinas with recruits from the current states of Portuguesa and Barinas and initially commanded by the Commander Luis Santinelli. Regarding the Barlovento battalion, it was named in honor of the eponym of the regions located east of Caracas, where the majority of the population was slaves, when it was founded in 1810. For Lastly, the unnamed battalion was a unit created by the Liberator with the remains of the Caracas, Aragua and Agricultores battalions that were They had dispersed the defeated in Tierrita Blanca. Since they had performed so poorly in battle, the Liberator had punished them with that name and the absence of a flag until they had conquered it with their courage.
Order of battle
According to López Contreras and Rivas Vicuña, the units involved in the battle were the following:
| Battle order | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Royal Army | Patriot Army | ||
_-_Common_Version_of_the_Colours.svg) Commander-in-Chief
Infantry
Cavalry
|  Commander-in-Chief
Infantry
Cavalry
| ||
Battle
Start of the day
The Republicans arranged their infantry in four brigades or columns: the first column, marching as the vanguard, included Manrique's Valerosos Cazadores battalion and Pulido's troops; the second column of the unnamed battalion of Colonel Florencio Palacios and the Valencia of Colonel Manuel Gogorza Lechuga formed the center; The third column was formed by the Vigirima troops under Villapol and the La Guaira battalion was in the rear; and the fourth column: the Barlovento battalion of Campo Elías remained as a reserve.
The royalists took defensive positions, they controlled the town of Araure, located on a gently sloping hillside with the mountain range located behind them and in front the plain of the same name, located between the nascent rivers Cojedes and Turen and which rises up to reaching a point called La Galera, they supported their left flank on the banks of the Acarigua River and their right flank in a dense forest. On both wings there was the cavalry, a little forward of the center, formed by the infantry and artillery. The latter had two batteries a little forward but protected by riflemen. Its area of the savanna had some bushes, which made it easy to hide its movements. From La Galera another large, higher plain extends to the plains of the Acarigua River. General Daniel Florencio O'Leary, quoting Briceño Méndez, states about the night before the battle: «Thus in the silence of the night [the royalist army] withdrew and, evacuating Araure, went to position itself in a a muddy lagoon that covered the front of his infantry and a forest that covered his back and which also served to hide his cavalry against our fires.
Destruction of the Valiant Hunters
At dawn on December 5, 500 soldiers from Manrique's Valerosos Cazadores battalion were exploring La Galera, although others speak of 600 or 700. places; They were supported by 200 cavalry. Their lookouts had announced to them that enemies were hiding in the area, so they were ordered to find out if it was in the upper reaches of the Acarigua and if necessary they should fix it in the sector. They advanced until they met the royalist line on the banks of the Acarigua, at which point it became obvious that they had ventured too far into unknown territory and the battalion was attacked by the royalist cavalry squadrons and artillery batteries, all of whom were dispersed or killed. infantry and most of their cavalrymen. More than a thousand royalist cavalrymen participated in this action, in which only seven or eight officers of the battalion, including their commander, were saved thanks to their good horses. The Patriots had lost their best infantry.
500 rifles were captured and used to arm some royalist "hastarians", that is, soldiers who only carried spears. Brigadier General Rafael Urdaneta led Villapol's column when climbing La Galera but he only managed to save those dispersed, specifically the horsemen of the vanguard. However, the royalists did not take advantage of their initial success and held their positions because Ceballos was not a bold commander and allowed Bolívar to organize the rest of his army.
Attack on La Galera
The revolutionaries were forced to involve the veterans of Mosquiteros and Virigima, the unnamed battalion, which was famous for being made up of dispersed individuals with little discipline, and their cavalry, made up mainly of militias and where only the Superb Dragons of Caracas by Ribas Dávila were reliable. They had time to organize themselves where the Valerous Hunters had been annihilated and then the rearguard and the reserve joined them, all under the command of General Urdaneta, who was the Second Chief and Major General. The cavalry, except for the Superb Dragoons, were under the command of Colonel Briceño Pumar. Bolívar walked along the line addressing the soldiers with "those words of fire with which he knew how to inflame the chests of the warriors, and exalt the noble feelings of patriotism." The result: "In such a dangerous situation, General Bolívar knew how to inspire confidence and enthusiasm in his troops with a vehement speech" according to Briceño Méndez.
After the first encounter, the patriots attacked La Galera with three columns formed in a closed line and supported by 4 pieces of light artillery in the center: they were in charge of Villapol (right), Campo Elías (left) and Palacios (center). The cavalry remained in reserve or on the wings, with the mission of defending the flanks or charging en masse on the enemy, depending on how events developed. On the right There were the horsemen from Barinas and Caracas (Colonel Briceño Pumar and Captain Ortiz), on the left those from Calabozo and San Carlos (Lieutenant Colonel Juan Landaeta and Commander Teodoro Figueredo) and in reserve the Soberbios Dragones and Ospino's squadron, nicknamed Lancers or Húsares. The reserve units had orders to kill anyone who tried to retreat, they served as escort to Bolívar and They formed the third line with the park and the General Staff.
The bodies formed under enemy artillery fire and then marched in perfect order, stopping when the ranks became disordered and continuing with a lighter step. The two revolutionary lines advanced until they were within gun range, at which point in which they were ordered to return fire, which the infantry held intensely, making the royalists give in and slow down their rifle fire in just five to ten minutes and managing to maintain order. Meanwhile, the captains' cavalry groups Nicolás Briceño and Mateo Salcedo managed to assault and capture two cannons that covered the enemy wings, allowing the infantry to continue advancing and push back the monarchical center. In effect, Urdaneta had ordered to continue pressing the center and left of the line monarchist, putting Ceballos in retreat. However, part of the royalist center and right had managed to resist, so Bolívar had ordered his infantry to be charged with bayonets. Colonel Palacios' unnamed battalion, armed mainly with lances, They charged against the enemy center, demonstrating a lot of order and courage, which was imitated by the other battalions with their bayonets. The hand-to-hand fight was fierce but the monarchists ended up defeated.
Torrente gives a different version, in which after destroying the Valerocious Hunters and with victory almost certain, "suddenly disorder was introduced into our ranks" and Coro's division was dispersed..
Seeing that his infantry was defeated, Yáñez decided to counterattack at the head of his horsemen. So with his left wing he tried to surround the right of the revolutionary infantry and attack their rear. Bolívar's cavalry was Barinas and charged with vigor, but began to give ground, since she was all "collective", that is, militia, and novice, she did not know how to maneuver and was about to be massacred while still in battle formation, giving up a little land. At those moments, Bolívar went with his third line or reserve, the Soberbios Dragones and Ospino's squadron, he encouraged them and in front of them advanced parallel to the battle line and charged against a flank of Apure's royalist cavalry, destroying them and putting them in disarray, causing the first llanero horsemen to receive the impact to turn their faces and disorder those who came behind. Thus, the Barinas cavalry, freed from pressure, returned to the charge under the command of Urdaneta. The massacred Apureño horsemen dispersed and fled, leaving the infantry abandoned, whose line was already broken, allowing the destruction of the army., who closed ranks and retreated as best he could under the command of his leaders. The battle, not counting the destruction of the Valerosos Cazadores battalion, had lasted 7 hours. At 1:00 p.m. everything was over.
Yáñez, who had been inactive for most of the battle, after a few minutes of the clash, which was very violent, fled with the survivors. According to Lecuna, 300 royalist cavalry and 3 pieces of artillery died. They were captured at that time. Instead, Urdaneta's Memories state that more than 500 llaneros were speared. Spanish officers blamed the defeat on that cavalry, accusing them of being lazy and cowardly. After being chased for 30 km, Yáñez tried to reorganize after crossing the Acarigua River and tried to hold on to the Guache savanna with the remaining horsemen from his right wing. However, they were reached by a platoon of Salcedo's cavalry and the hunters of the Barlovento battalion of Campo Elías. There was a fight but he gave way when he saw more pro-independence units coming out of the nearby forests that were coming in pursuit of him. The Indians who had supported the defeated were also destroyed within the Acarigua forest. Meanwhile, Rivas Dávila's cavalry was sent against the fugitive Ceballos.
Many royalist infantry soldiers hid among the bushes and trees near the Acarigua while their cavalry dispersed in various directions during the afternoon. In addition, in the savanna where the battle took place there was a fire where many wounded died, started by the heels of the cannons; Some royalist leaders blamed their fleeing cavalry, but it was never known who started it. That same afternoon, the Caracas battalions (Colonel Villapol) and the Barlovento were ordered to march. (Lieutenant Colonel Andrés Linares) to capture Vicente Becerra, Yáñez's second, who had fled to San Felipe, taking Barquisimeto on December 8.
Consequences
Casualties
Bolívar himself gives the highest figures on the number of defeated, captured or dispersed, speaking of 3000. In his Memoirs, Urdaneta states: «There were not only 500 dead of the enemy on this memorable day, as a writer of recent days has said; Well, as eyewitnesses we can assure that there were more than 1000; and that the entire Spanish military train, far superior to ours." He also adds: "The loss of these [patriots] was small during the battle, since it did not exceed 24 dead, not including the hunters lost before." According to Restrepo, 500 royalists died in the battle, including the second chief Miguel Correa and other high officers. 300 prisoners were captured (not counting the 600 executed in Aparimiento), 10 cannons, 1000 rifles, ammunition and 5 flags; The captured war material gave much-needed supplies to the winning army. Montenegro Columbus supports the figures of dead, prisoners and captured cannons, but speaks of 4 flags, 30,000 ammunition, 6 sacks of money and 19 loads of supplies. Miter accepts everything. Restrepo's calculation. Baralt states that 1,000 enemies died (not counting those shot in Aparión) and the entire park; The patriot casualties, not counting the Valerous Hunters, were insignificant. The historian Acisclo Valdivieso Montaño speaks of 1000 dead and 800 prisoners. Esteves González repeats Restrepo's numbers, except that he adds the bags of silver registered by Montenegro Colón.
The division of Colonel Villapol that was intended to help the battlefield that was covered with corpses, artillery, gears, etc., collected ten cannons of bronze of different calibers, 19 loads of bolts, 30 000 rounds of rifles, six bags of silver with nine thousand pesos, several loads of steel, spears and supplies, 40 boxes of war, 500 cartridges, more than 1000 Numance300 prisoners.
From Austria he states that no prisoners were taken, while O'Leary writes that those of American origin were recruited, who were the majority of the monarchical troops, which caused the Liberator distress. The latter wrote a proclamation on December 7 at his San Carlos headquarters, exhorting his compatriots to & # 34; deceived & # 34; to allow his brothers to be massacred and offering them forgiveness if within a month they surrendered to any independence camp.
According to Miter, it was the first battle won in person by Bolívar, who was a very untactical general who depended on the momentum of the masses and the courage of his soldiers. That is why his favorite tactic was to make some rifle charges and then order an attack with bayonets to break the enemy lines, as he did in Araure.
Pursuit
On the following morning, December 6, Bolívar decided to reward the unnamed battalion for its brave actions and named it Vencedores de Araure. He then marched with the majority of his army (except for one division in charge of Villapol) in pursuit of Ceballos and Yáñez until Aparimiento de la Corteza, where the monarchical headquarters was. On that little-frequented road, 600 enemy infantry were captured, including many peninsular and Canary Islanders, some of them forgiven before, who were executed without mercy even though they had surrendered without a fight. Among those shot was Quintero and everything was done following the "norms" of the war to the death. Some tried to hide in the trees but were shot dead. Colonel José de Austria participated in the massacre and justified it in this way: "The cruelties committed in Barinas, Guanare, Barquisimeto, Puerto Cabello, where the blood of the patriots was poured in torrents, a considerable number of prisoners were executed there."
No truce was given to the enemy and Bolívar reorganized the army before returning to Caracas; Urdaneta took a division in Aparimiento to follow Guanare. Meanwhile, Urdaneta, in command of the Vencedores de Araure< battalion /i>, Briceño Pumar's cavalry and the Soberbios Dragones advance towards Barinas, reaching Guanare, but without reaching the enemies. Subsequently, Lieutenant Colonel Ramón García de Sena continued with heading to Barinas with a battalion and a squadron, about 800 men, and commissioned Commander Rodríguez with 300 men to attack some Indians who supported Yáñez before reaching Barinas. While the rest of the division stayed with Urdaneta, who arrived in Barquisimeto at the end of December following the route of El Tocuyo and took over as head of the area in the West, that is, from San Carlos to the borders with Nueva Granada and with the mission of pacifying Barinas and Apure to continue towards Coro, a province that was believed to have no army. García de Sena sent Colonel Palacios to capture San Fernando de Apure, but he failed at the beginning of January of the following year. For his part, the Liberator arrived in Valencia, where he dedicated himself to organizing operations in the central Llanos, then he laid siege to Puerto Cabello without success and finally returned to Caracas, where he accounted for his actions before a popular assembly that named him Supreme Head of Government with extraordinary powers. Finally, Campo Elías was sent to Calabozo.
Ceballos managed to flee to Nutrias, where he embarked with several officers to Guayana, appearing in Coro several months later accompanied by Captain General Cajigal to assemble a new army. Yáñez fled through Guanare to Nutrias with 200 to 300 men, taking refuge in San Fernando de Apure. Yáñez's General Staff managed to flee to Coro and Barquisimeto. The 800 infantrymen who managed to gather in El Tocuyo and Siquisique were left without a leader.
For its part, the Granada regiment withdrew with many difficulties to Coro, being reduced to 400 to 750 places.
No Name
The day after the battle, in Aparimiento, Bolívar recognized the courage of the unnamed battalion by giving it a captured flag, that of the Numancia battalion. With the words: «Soldiers: Your courage Yesterday on the battlefield he won a name for your body, and even in the middle of the fire, when I saw you triumph, I proclaimed him the Victorious Battalion of Araure. You have taken from the enemy flags that were once victorious; It has earned the famous invincible call of Numancia. Carry soldiers, this victorious flag of the Republic! » A hymn was also created in honor of the Liberator:
Glory to the Bolivar hero!
Glory to the Liberator!
Out of a terrible horse,
Araure's winner.
New threats
Lecuna points out that Bolívar knew how to defeat the enemy, focusing his troops on the main threat at each moment and fighting on his terms in Araure and San Mateo, in the first where he took the offensive while in the second where he took Boves to a combat where he was entrenched.
The victory prolonged the survival of the Second Republic for a few months. Had they been defeated, the patriots would have seen the fall of their capital to the royalists because they had no reserves. It also returned control of the revolutionaries to the revolutionaries. Western Plains because it allowed Urdaneta to reconquer Barinas and leave García de Sena as governor (the Catalan Puy had abandoned the city without a fight to take refuge in San Fernando) and leave the Venezuelan West almost pacified just when Mariño had controlled the East. Without However, the destruction of the royalist armies of Apure and Coro meant nothing to the monarchical leaders in the rest of the country. While the patriotic plans focused on occupying Coro, the negotiations to join forces between Bolívar and Mariño failed, each one more interested in finishing off the royalists who remained in his territory. The Liberator paused waiting for Mariño's help, as he needed the powerful eastern cavalry to confront the llaneros. This inaction made the victories in the West sterile, allowing the Llanero leaders to recover. In a few months the monarchists of Apure and Coro would return to the offensive; the eastern and western armies would not coordinate their efforts until the battle of Carabobo. In addition, He could not pay his troops and since he lacked popular support he could not replace casualties with the same ease as his enemies. Desertions began to weaken his forces and his levies were a failure, after Araure he planned to recruit 10,000 12,000 men but in practice only 1,500 were enlisted.
At that time, a new danger threatened the properties of aristocratic families in the Aragua Valley, a rich region between Valencia and Caracas: the army of Lieutenant Colonel José Tomás Boves.
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