Axiology

Axiology (from the Greek άξιος 'valuable' and λόγος 'knowledge'), philosophy of values or axiological philosophy is the branch of philosophy that studies the nature of values and value judgments. It includes questions about the nature and classification of values and about what kinds of things have value. The term was first used by Paul Lapie in 1902 and later by Eduard von Hartmann in 1908.

It is intimately connected to several other philosophical fields that depend crucially on the notion of value, such as ethics, aesthetics, or the philosophy of religion. It is also closely related to value theory and metaethics.

The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value is fundamental to axiology: something is intrinsically valuable if it is good in or by itself. It is generally held that intrinsic value depends on certain characteristics of the valuable entity. For example, an experience can be said to be intrinsically valuable by virtue of being pleasant. Extrinsic value, on the other hand, is attributed to things that are valuable only as a means to other things.

The substantive theories of value try to determine which entities have intrinsic value. Monistic theories hold that there is only one type of intrinsic value. The paradigmatic example of monistic theories is hedonism, the thesis that only pleasure has intrinsic value. Pluralist theories, on the other hand, hold that there are several different types of intrinsic value, for example, virtue, knowledge, friendship, etc. Value pluralists are faced with the problem of explaining whether or how different types of value can be compared when making rational decisions. Some philosophers claim that values do not exist at the most fundamental level of reality. One such view holds that a value statement about something simply expresses the speaker's approval or disapproval of this thing. This position is opposed by value realists.

History

Explicit reflection on values, however, predates the notion of axiology and can be traced back to David Hume, who was concerned primarily with moral and aesthetic values and elaborated an anti-metaphysical, nominalist theory of values. However, Hume's theory defines values as principles of moral and aesthetic judgments, a vision that will be criticized by Friedrich Nietzsche and his genealogical conception of values, according to which not only aesthetic and moral judgments depend on values, but also even scientific truths and everyday observations respond to certain values and ways of assessing (Voluntaristic Irrationalism, close to Arthur Schopenhauer, and contrary to the Enlightenment promoted by Immanuel Kant). Before them, in order of importance would be the philosophy of Kant, who would locate the possibility of an Ethics in the foundation of the Subject and Substantial Reason (and not in the mere instrumental rationality of calculation in the style of Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism). For Kant there can only be ethics if there is Freedom, a condition of the necessary Autonomy, in the face of the imposed Heteronomy.^{[citation required]}

Thus for Kant, -contrary to the conservative Hume-, the World of Necessity is the World of Physics, that is, Newton's World of Mechanics (Kant was a physicist before he was a professor of philosophy). Kant, a critical reader of Hume, rescues Newton's Physics, but elaborates a Theory of the Subject as the ultimate Foundation of his philosophical system (& # 34; Gründ & # 34;, in German), an idea later developed by J.G. Fichte and later by G.W.F. Hegel. For the purposes of an Ethics, it is not his beloved Newtonian Physics that Kant needs here, but the Regulatory Ideas of a (Substantial) Reason, which uses Understanding (categories of instrumental reason to build scientific knowledge) and Sensitivity (the empirical, the sensible experience). Thus Kant reconciles scientific and philosophical Reason with the possibility of practical Emancipation (political and ethical). The great values in Kant will no longer be fossilized in the old Metaphysics, of religious inspiration, but in the Enlightenment and its emancipatory and rational values, and would be part of the World of Reason and its Regulating Ideas.^{[ citation required]}

On the other hand and from a different discursive matrix, Marx from the Critique of Political Economy develops a critique of value, which goes beyond the critique of the usual mystification between use value and exchange value. Thus, Marx develops a critique of the economic concept of value to largely support his socio-economic critiques and analysis. Certainly the price is not the value, but the reading of this social critique is neither religious nor moralistic, nor metaphysical, but with scientific-social pretensions. Of course, Marxist criticism, although it starts from philosophical elements, goes beyond them, because it is located from the socio-historical elements that allow it. Marx and then Marxism (in its different discursive developments), propose(s) a theory and a praxis, which starts from his theory of history (usually known as Historical Materialism, in its different variants), as well as from his sociological conception. which starts from a modern theory of the "class struggle", to explain the different hegemonies and forms of domination, in the different concrete historical formations and in the more general modes of production. (For example: the Slave Mode of Production, the Feudal Mode of Production, the Asian Mode of Production, the Despotic-Tributary Mode of Production, the Capitalist Mode of Production, the Bureaucratic Mode of Production, the Socialist Mode of Production, etc. The discursive contribution Marx's fundamental critique of the modern phenomenon of the alienation of the vast majority of the world's population under the capitalist world-system was his critique of the "commodity fetishism", through which the "form-merchandise"permeates all the main human daily life.^{[citation required]}

Before and since there was a human economic surplus, there are commercial relationships. But it is with capitalism as the hegemonic mode of production and above all with industrial capitalism, and certainly with the current financial capitalism, that human relations in a general way are conditioned by the commodity-form. This means that the vast majority of current social values have a mercantilist origin. Thus, the human being, whose work is the social origin of all wealth, is separated from this genealogy, from this social genesis, and ends up being worth less than his production, which is the merchandise. These collective cultural operations are sometimes done very subtly and taking advantage of collective unconscious elements (review Freud and the contributions of Psychoanalysis here), since the human being is devoted to the reproduction of his immediate life, through his alienated work, therefore, cannot know the structural origin of their collective alienation. Thus, the solution would not only be ethical and discursive, but theoretical and political in practice, so that he can transform his current alienated social condition. ^{[citation needed ]}

Contemporary Axiology

Contemporary axiology not only tries to address positive values, but also negative (or anti-values), analyzing the principles that allow us to consider that something is or is not valuable, and considering the foundations of such a judgment. The investigation of a theory of values has found a special application in ethics and aesthetics, fields where the concept of value has a specific relevance. Some philosophers such as the Germans Heinrich Rickert or Max Scheler have made different proposals to develop an adequate hierarchy of values. In this sense, one can speak of an «axiological ethics», which was developed mainly by Scheler himself and Nicolai Hartmann. From an ethical point of view, axiology is one of the two main foundations of ethics along with deontology.^{[citation required]}

Intrinsic value

Traditionally, philosophers held that an entity has intrinsic value if it is good in or of itself. intrinsic value is contrasted with extrinsic or instrumental value, which is attributed to things that are valuable only as a means to something else. For example, tools such as cars or Microwaves are extrinsically valuable by virtue of the function they perform, while the well-being they cause is intrinsically valuable, according to hedonism. The same entity can be valuable in different ways: some entities have intrinsic and extrinsic values at the same time. Extrinsic values can form chains, in which one entity is extrinsically valuable because it is a means to another entity that is extrinsically valuable. It is commonly held that these chains must end somewhere and that the end point can only be intrinsically valuable. The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic values is important in understanding various disagreements within axiology. Different substantive theories of value often agree on whether something, for example knowledge, is valuable, but disagree on whether the value in question is intrinsic or extrinsic.

The traditional conception of intrinsic value presented above has been criticized in contemporary philosophy on the grounds that it combines several different notions that are best discussed separately. One such contrast is between intrinsic values and finals. In a narrower conception, an intrinsic value is a value that an entity has by virtue of its intrinsic properties. For example, assuming that the phenomenal aspect of a pleasant experience is an intrinsic property, we could say that the experience is intrinsically valuable because of this intrinsic property. An entity with ultimate value, on the other hand, is valuable. By herself. It is generally accepted that there is a conceptual difference between intrinsic values and ultimate values. For example, it can be said that the experience of pleasure is intrinsically valuable on the one hand, and ultimately valuable on the other. But it has been disputed whether there are any real things into which these types of values can be separated. Proposed candidates for carriers of non-intrinsic ultimate value include unique or rare items (for example, a stamp) or historically significant items (for example, the quill Abraham Lincoln used to sign the Emancipation Proclamation). rare and has-been-used-by-someone are extrinsic properties that may be responsible for their bearers having final value, that is, that they are valuable by themselves.

Some philosophers have questioned whether extrinsic values should be considered values at all and not as mere indications of values. One reason to entertain this idea is that adding or removing extrinsically valuable things does not affect the value of the set if all things intrinsically valuables remain constant. For example, the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake had a negative extrinsic value due to all the damage it caused. But arguably the world would not have been a better place if exactly the same damage had been caused without the quake.

Ontological status of values

In axiology, it is often important to distinguish between the entity that is valuable and the characteristics by virtue of which it is valuable. For example, an experience may be said to be valuable by virtue of being pleasant. This distinction is particularly relevant for intrinsic values, since it is often held that an entity's intrinsic value supersedes its intrinsic characteristics. This means that the entity could not have a different intrinsic value unless it had different intrinsic characteristics..

Substantive theories of value focus on the characteristics by virtue of which something has intrinsic value. Popular candidates for these characteristics include pleasure, virtue, and knowledge. Another issue concerns the nature of value-carrying entities. The main approaches to this question can be divided into the Kantian tradition, which considers that concrete things such as people are value carriers, and the Moorean tradition, which holds that only states of things ( states of affairs) have value. This difference is important when determining whether a value is extrinsic or intrinsic to an entity. Some philosophers hold that objects like Napoleon's hat are valuable because of their association with extraordinary people. From a Kantian perspective, this value must be extrinsic, since it is based on the extrinsic property of having been carried by an extraordinary person. But from a Moorean perspective, it may be intrinsic, as it is not carried by the hat, but by a state of affairs involving both the hat and Napoleon.

The above discussion of the ontological categories of values and value carriers assumes some form of realism: that there really are things of value. But difficulties in reaching a consensus among experts in value-related fields such as ethics, aesthetics, or politics and considerations of naturalism have led several philosophers to doubt this assumption. The ensuing dispute among cognitivists< /i> and non-cognitivists generally remains at the level of value statements or attitudes, either in relation to all values or specifically in relation to ethical values. Cognitivists claim that value statements are truth-apt (truth-apt), that is, they are either true or false, which is denied by non-cognitivists.. Most cognitivists are value realists: they believe that values are part of reality. The error theory, as originally articulated by J. L. Mackie, is an exception. Error theorists hold that all value claims are false and therefore fit for truth, because the world lacks value features that would be necessary to make them true. Non-cognitivists, in contrast, go one step further. further and deny that value claims are apt for truth. This position implies the difficulty of explaining how value claims can be meaningful despite lacking a truth value. This challenge can be met in different ways. Emotivists, following A. J. Ayer, claim that value statements only express the emotions of the speaker and are intended to influence the listener's actions. Prescriptivism, developed by R. M. Hare, interprets statements as of value as imperatives or commands. Simon Blackburn's quasi-realism asserts that value statements project emotional attitudes as if they were real properties.

Objective and subjective perspective

According to the traditional conception, values can be relatively objective or subjective. Examples of objective values include good, truth or beauty, these being purposes themselves. On the other hand, subjective values are considered when they represent a means to reach an end (in most cases characterized by a personal desire). Furthermore, the values can be fixed (permanent) or dynamic (changing). Values can also be differentiated based on their importance and can be conceptualized in terms of a hierarchy, in which case some will rank higher than others.^{[citation needed]}

The fundamental problem that develops from the very origins of axiology, towards the end of the XIX century, is that of the objectivity or subjectivity of the totality of the values. Max Scheler will sit in the first of the two positions. Subjectivism will oppose this approach from the start. And he will understand —in the old way of Protagoras— that what is strictly human is the measure of all things, of what is worth and what is not worth, and of the same scale of values, without support in external reality. Alfred Jules Yesterday, in Language, Truth and Logic, his early work, leaves value judgments out of the question, since they do not comply with the principle of empirical verification. In this way, the ethical and the aesthetic are nothing more than "expressions" of the spiritual life of the subject. Not a verifiable grasp of the external world.^{[citation needed]}

Monism and pluralism

Substantive theories of value try to determine which entities have intrinsic value. A traditional dispute in this field is between monistic and pluralistic theories. Monistic theories maintain that there is only one type of intrinsic value. The paradigmatic example of monistic theories is hedonism, the thesis that only pleasure has intrinsic value. Pluralist theories, on the other hand, hold that there are several different types of intrinsic value. W. D. Ross, for example, maintains that pleasure is only one type of intrinsic value in addition to other types, such as knowledge. It is important note that this disagreement only concerns intrinsic value, not value in general. So hedonists may be happy to concede that knowledge is valuable, but only extrinsically, since knowledge can be useful to cause pleasure and avoid pain.

Various arguments have been suggested in the monism-pluralism dispute. Common sense seems to favor value pluralism: values are attributed to a wide range of different things, such as happiness, freedom, friendship, etc., without any obvious common characteristics underlying these values. To defend value monism is to question the reliability of common sense for technical matters such as the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value. This strategy is followed by J. J. C. Smart, who maintains that there is a psychological bias to confuse stable extrinsic values with intrinsic values. Value pluralists have often attempted to provide exhaustive lists of all types of value, but different theorists have suggested very long lists. different. These lists appear to be arbitrary selections, unless clear criteria can be provided as to why all and only these items are included. But if a criterion were found, then such a theory would cease to be pluralistic. This dilemma suggests that pluralism is explanatory inadequate.

A closely related issue to the monism-pluralism debate is the problem of incommensurability: the question of whether there are incommensurable values. Two values are incommensurable if there is no fact that one is better or as good as the other: there is no common scale of values on which they can be compared. According to Joseph Raz, career choices between vastly different paths, for example whether to become a lawyer or a clarinetist, are cases where incommensurable values are involved. Value pluralists often claim that values belonging to different types are incommensurable. each. Value monists, on the other hand, tend to deny that there are incommensurable values. This question is particularly relevant to ethics. If the different options available to the agent incorporate incommensurable values, then there seems to be no rational way to determine what should be done, since there is no fact about which option is better. Pervasive incommensurability would threaten to undermine the practical relevance of ethics and rational choice.

Other concepts and distinctions

Many evaluative terms are found in everyday language, often with several different meanings. It is important for philosophers to distinguish these different meanings to avoid misunderstandings. One of these distinctions is between a predicative sense and an attributive sense of good and evil. In the attributive sense, an entity is good. in relation to a certain type. For example, it is possible that a person with a clear voice is a good singer, or a knife with a dull edge is a bad knife. But this still leaves open whether the entity in question is good or bad in an unconditional or predicative sense. For example, a person may be a bad murderer, but being bad as a murderer is not bad in a predicative sense. Axiology is often concerned with the predicative sense of goodness. But some philosophers deny that such a sense exists, and therefore Therefore, they maintain that all values are relative to a type.

A second important distinction is that between being good for one person and being good for the world. Being good for one person i>, or prudential value, has to do with the well-being of this person. But what is good for one person may be bad for another person. For example, having a dry summer may be good for the hiker because of the pleasant hiking conditions, but bad for the farmer whose crop is dying from lack of water. In such cases, the question arises as to what is good for the world or quintessentially good. Utilitarians can solve this problem by defining the good for the world as the sum of the good for each person.

Philosophers often distinguish between evaluative concepts (such as good or bad) and deontic concepts (such as right, fitting, ought). The former belong to axiology proper and express what is worth or has value, while the latter belong to ethics (and related fields) and express what should be done. Philosophers have tried to provide a unified account of these two fields, since they seem to be closely related. Consequentialists view evaluative concepts as fundamental and define deontic concepts in terms of evaluative concepts. fitting-attitude theories, on the other hand, try to reduce evaluative concepts to deontic concepts. i> is an ethical theory that holds that, given a certain set of possible actions, we should take the action that has the best overall consequences. Therefore, what we should do is defined in evaluative terms: anything that leads to the consequences with the highest value. proper attitude theories are axiological theories that define the value of something in terms of the attitude that it would be proper to have towards that thing, for example, that it would be good find a cure for cancer because it would be a suitable object of desire. These accounts are based on the deontic notion that some of our attitudes towards the world are adequate or correct to define what is good.

Relationship with science

From Nietzsche's point of view, however, there is no essential difference between what the traditional conception calls «value judgments» and scientific judgments, since both are based on valuations that have been configured historically and that they constitute by themselves the specific ways of interpreting and living. Likewise, there is no essential difference between judging and acting, since both consist of the deployment of certain forces that by definition are forces that assess and whose movement also depends on previous assessments.^{[citation required< /i>]}

Within philosophical thought there is a central point that is how we want to become in the future, in a better state. In order to move from a current state to a better state, it is necessary to first understand that to make improvements we have to base them on certain key points. In thought we have always called them philosophical or existential axiology, that is, values, which are those based on action that can lead us to a better state tomorrow; this is because values give meaning and coherence to our actions.^{[citation needed]}

The nature of value sparks debate among scientists from different disciplines. It is a complex problem that requires a philosophical specification. Axiology is the science that studies values and these have a philosophical connotation. In the article, the background of axiology is briefly exposed and various interpretations of the concept of value are presented, analyzing these from the perspective of Marxist philosophy. The dialectical-materialist response to value is highlighted, stating that this is a social phenomenon, that it has significance in the context of the subject-object relationship and that it expresses the needs and interests of humans or of all of nature.^{[ citation required]}