Agila II

Agila I (¿? – Mérida, March 18 to 31, 555) was elected king of the Visigoths of Hispania in 549 after the assassination of Teudiselo. His reign lasted until 555.

Biography

Access to the throne and first rebellions

Agila, of strictly Visigothic blood, ascended the throne at the end of 549, and from the following year fought against Córdoba, probably in rebellion, although Abadal believes that it had not yet fallen under Visigothic control (like a good part of Baetica). Isidoro de Sevilla narrates that the Visigothic king desecrated the Cordovan tomb of the martyr Acisclo, which he reproaches him for, and points out as an unusual fact within the traditional tolerance of the Arian kings with Catholicism. It is possible that it was this desecration that motivated the revolt. Isidore later attributes Agila's death to "the intervention of the saints".

The king lost the first battle, a son, the bulk of the army and the royal treasury, having to hastily retreat to Mérida, capital of the province of Lusitania. Taking advantage of the situation, a nobleman named Atanagildo rebelled (551), who established his residence in Seville, capital of the Bética province (or of the part of it dominated by the Visigoths). Although there is no proof of relations between the people of Cordoba and Atanagildo, it is very likely that there was a formal or tacit alliance, the terms of which can only be guessed at. The most general idea is that, despite everything, the first battles fought in the central months of the year were not favorable to the rebel, who at the end of the same year found himself forced to seek new allies.

Rival factions

It is likely that Atanagildo's supporters were members of the noble faction that had once supported Teudiselo, who was assassinated in Seville, and Agila headed the rival faction, although it is not unreasonable to think that Agila participated in the assassination of the previous king, and that the same ones who supported him in his day were later his rivals. The Visigothic succession was not regulated and when a king died without leaving children or without having solidly established his power, his supporters tried to have one of their own elected. If they succeeded, the situation remained stable, but if they did not, they were left in a precarious situation that could easily lead to rebellion.

Agila's failures could be due to a lack of unanimous or enthusiastic support from the part of the nobility that had previously supported Theudis and exalted Teudiselus. If Agila tried to punish this dubious nobility, he could not be surprised that a rebellion broke out and that the nobles placed one of their number at their head, which would be Atanagildo.

Hypothesis about the situation in 551

Agila's defeat in 550 against Córdoba was very serious. Defeat would encourage other rebellions. Furthermore, in all probability, the Basques returned to devastate the Ebro valley at the same time. Surely, the Cantabrians spread towards La Rioja. The Asturian tribes and the Astúrica district were to be independent. If, as suspected, Agila headed only one faction of the nobility, he must have had numerous enemies. Teudiselo and Teudis would symbolize the pangodo element, more open to external influences, while Agila would represent the Visigothic nationalist reaction. Therefore, it is probable that a rebellion had the support of the ancient Ostrogothic characters, who had opted for the Visigothic nationality. Atanagildo would be the man that these characters would choose to take him to the throne.

Byzantine intervention

According to Saint Isidore in his Historia Gothorum, Atanagildo requested help from the Byzantines, whose emperor Justinian decided to send an expedition under the command of Liberius, who had been Theodoric's prefect in Gaul Narbonense and who during his government in that province was the object of an assassination attempt by some Visigoths. However, it seems that the Gothic historian Jordanes suggests that it was not with Atanagildo that the Emperor Justinian allied himself with, but with the legitimate king Agila, or at least, it seems that this was the official version spread by imperial propaganda.

Jordanes's suggestion makes the course of events that follows more plausible. And in fact, Justinian had acted in two previous cases supporting the legitimate king and not the rebels: in 533 he intervened in Africa against the usurping prince Gelimer and in Italy he intervened against the usurping Theodatus. It is more logical to think that if Justinian wanted to intervene in Hispania, he would do so by supporting the legal party. If he had been willing to do it illegally, he wouldn't have needed a small rebellion to do it.

In the summer of 552 (June or July according to Stein), the Byzantines landed in the south or southeast of the peninsula with a small contingent, since the bulk of their forces were occupied in Italy. The Greek forces would advance in the direction of Seville from the landing point. Agila learned of the arrival of his alleged allies, he gathered his forces and also marched against Seville.

Based on Isidore's news, it is assumed that the Byzantine troops, few in number, headed to meet Atanagildo's forces (who were supposedly on the defensive) in Seville. At the same time, the Visigoths under the command of their king Agila marched south from Mérida (it is assumed, then, that Agila was ready to take the offensive, although after the defeat against Córdoba his weakness must have been evident and he encouraged rebellions).. The opposing forces fought a battle near the Betic capital, after which Agila had to withdraw (August or September 552).

Agila made no move until the Byzantine forces approached. Agila was on the defensive, surely waiting for the Byzantines who were his only hope. Atanagild, who already controlled at least two provinces, could have ended the war in 552, but surely he would have news of the imminent arrival of the Byzantines (news that Agila's agents would not stop spreading) and would not dare move his troops from safe areas so as not to leave their territories unguarded. When the Byzantines arrived, Agila came with his forces to take Atanagildo in a pincer. As the Byzantine contingent was very small and would have little interest in fighting (or probably just diverting the rebel forces in the Cartago Nova region), the burden of the battle fell on Agila, who, inferior to his rival, was defeated.. The Byzantines would fortify themselves in some cities that they had taken at the time of the landing or during their subsequent march.

Hypothesis regarding the Byzantine alliance

Assuming the defeat of Agila, their rivals already dominated Baetica and Carthaginense. The situation of the other two provinces (Tarraconense and Narbonense) could depend on the immediate course of military events, if they had not also opted for Atanagildo. Agila had no allies: the Cordovans had fought him; the francs had to remain neutral, or they were favorable to Atanagildo. Only the Swabians remain, who due to their situation do not seem to have been good allies. Thus Agila's only hope, despite the danger they posed, would be the Byzantines.

Supposing Atanagildo had been defeated, he would have withdrawn to Malaga with very few forces, or would have been practically completely defeated, having to take refuge in Córdoba, which would have been his ally, formally or tacitly. In this situation, with problematic help from the Swabians and Franks, and with Córdoba unable to take the offensive, even knowing the previous Byzantine actions in the Vandal Kingdom and the Ostrogothic Kingdom, and the not-so-distant disputes over Ceuta, he could have chosen for asking Byzantium for help in the last months of 451. If it is estimated that this was not the case, it is because various indications make us think that when the Byzantines arrived, Atanagildo dominated Baetic and Carthaginian: the battle was fought very soon near from Seville (to which King Agila went), and when the Greeks took Carthage Nova by force, some of its notable inhabitants had to flee. The fate of one of them is known, perhaps a dux, named Severiano (father of Leandro and Isidoro, future bishops of the Betic capital), who went to settle in Seville.

Both Atanagildo and Agila were able to make an offer in exchange for the help. The previous Byzantine interventions did not imply partial cessions of territories. It was about restoring legality, and only the disappearance of its representatives (Hilderico in Africa and Amalasunta in Italy) led to the conquest of the kingdoms. It has been thought that Justinian had received the promise of such delivery. But it is almost certain that this did not happen and that Justinian hoped, once again, to use internal disputes to take over the Visigothic Kingdom. In the hypothesis that religious concessions were offered, for Agila these did not seem probable, and the delivery of the Bética would have been a lesser evil preferable to other concessions.

Byzantine landing

Based on the account of San Isidoro, it would have to be supposed a Greek landing in Malaga, where the defeated Atanagildo was supposed to be (since his defeat in the campaign of 551). Together the Greek and rebel forces would advance towards Seville, the Byzantines being led by Liberio, prefect of the praetorium of Arles. But the situation described is not the most likely. Atanagildo was most likely in a position of strength. In such a situation, the landing, although it could also have taken place in Malaga (to advance from there to Seville, while Agila did the same from Mérida), it is more likely that it took place in Cartago Nova.

Byzantines in Malaga

The landing in Malaga, if it occurred at the initial moment, surely took place with the Byzantines as allies of Atanagildo. Málaga would form part of the eastern area (perhaps its last redoubt) and the Byzantine forces established themselves there, perhaps in agreement with the local count if, as seems likely, he was a supporter of Atanagildo or, with him, if he was in the city. In any case, if the landing took place in the city in agreement with Atanagildo and the local count, surely Byzantine soldiers would also remain in the city to watch over the ships and maintain supplies. The Visigothic forces from Málaga and from other places in favor of Atanagildo constituted his army and, consequently, there would be no Gothic forces left in Málaga. If the Byzantines turned it into a center of operations, it is logical that they were the ones who had control of the city, although they did not have legal sovereignty.

Always assuming that the Byzantines were allies of the rebel captain, it could also be the case that the city was already in the hands of Agila (which would have occupied most of the rebel territories), in which case the situation would not have changed, but the seizure would have occurred by force and not by mutual agreement.

But most likely the city was in the hands of Atanagildo and was occupied by the Byzantines at the service of Agila, perhaps through a column that left Cartago Nova and advanced to Malaga, while Agila attacked Seville. The capture would be by force, although the city had to be unguarded, since Atanagildo's army would have gone to Seville (it could also be a royal enclave and voluntarily open its doors to the Byzantines). Taken Málaga, the Byzantines ruled it as absolute owners.

The situation in Baetica and Cartaginesa

The situation in Baetica was uncertain; There is no record of Visigothic rule in Córdoba or in other cities, such as Granada (Iliberis), Écija (Astigi), Cabra (Egara) and Málaga (Malaca). Its domination by the Byzantines is also not recorded, except in Malaga, although such domination is not dated (but it must have been quite early, probably the same 552 or shortly after). It seems risky to deduce, as Abadal did, that the Visigothic domain had not yet extended through Baetica beyond to the west of the Guadalquivir and the area between Seville (Hispalis) and the Strait of Gibraltar, and at most to the coastal area between east and west. Carthaginian coast. Córdoba was at war against Agila in 550, although it was probably a rebellion, which is not known if it dated back to some time before but it seems likely that it was his attitude in Córdoba, before the tomb of the martyr Acisclo, that provoked the rebellion.. The resistance in Tarragona had not ceased until 506, that is to say, some forty-three years before, and if the submission of Baetica had not been completely accomplished before 507, for many years it would have been difficult to make conquests in the province (the best time would have been the reign of Teudis, who operated in the area of the Strait, but first the fights with the Byzantines in Africa and then the Frankish expedition could make it impossible). However, it is most probable that Baetica would have fully submitted to the Visigoths before 507, and that the rebellion in Córdoba would have occurred in or shortly before 550, due to a royal action in the same year or in the following years. previous. With Córdoba, all the surrounding areas would revolt, where the clergy, landowners, and Hispano-Roman notables—who undoubtedly led the revolt—had influence, and surely the mountainous areas of the Sierra Morena, where it was always difficult to establish effective control.

The province surely sided with Atanagildo. It was undoubtedly under complete Visigothic control and no rebellion is known to have taken place there, nor is it likely that its total or partial cession to Byzantium was planned.

New Carthage

The Visigoths ruled Cartago Nova, but there is no evidence that in 552 it was held by forces loyal to Atanagildo or Agila. However, it seems more likely that the city was in favor of Atanagildo. It is unknown on what date the Byzantines took the capital Carthage Nova, but in any case it could not have been after the summer of 555, a few months after the assassination of Agila in March of that year. Cartago Nova was taken by force, and many local notables had to leave the city. There is the case of the family of Leandro de Sevilla. Although it was a Catholic family, probably even of Greek origin on the mother's side and whose father had a high position, all of them did not hesitate to leave the city, they showed hostility to the Byzantines and settled in Seville, the center of Atanagildo's power.. All of the above seems to indicate that the Byzantines were allies of Agila and that the city was taken by force from Atanagildo's supporters.

Hypothesis regarding Seville

Accepting the alliance between Byzantium and Agila, Atanagildo's military situation had to be advantageous, dominating all of Baetica and Carthaginian. After creating a magnificent base in Cartago Nova, the Byzantines would advance along the coast (there was no road linking Cartago Nova and Malaga, although it could be reached by the road that led to Ilorcis —today Lorca—, Basti —today Baza — and Acci —Guadix—, and from there it returned to the coast in Urci —between Almería and Cartagena—, Murgi —west of Almería—, Turaniana —west of Almería and south of Murgi—, Abdera —west of Almería — and Malacca) while his ally the king attacked Seville, forced Atanagildo to dispose of his forces and the Visigoths massacred each other.

If, on the other hand, such an alliance is not accepted, Atanagildo must be assumed defeated and taking refuge in another city until he reunited with the forces of the Eastern Empire, with which he would march to Seville, held by forces loyal to Agila. When Seville was threatened or besieged (in July) by the combined forces of the rebels and the Greeks (in this situation, it is even possible to imagine that Seville was spontaneously taken or submitted to them), Agila had to call on his forces, which —concentrated in Mérida towards the end of August or the beginning of September—they advanced towards the capital of Bética. With Agila defeated, Seville would have no choice but to submit to Atanagildo, if he had not already done so. It is also very likely that Seville was a supporter of the rebel and that it was easy for Atanagildo's followers to seize power after the garrison loyal to Agila was isolated, arguments that are valid whether Seville's submission occurred before or after the king's defeat..

Two years of struggle

The fighting continued for two more years (553 and 554) without either side achieving any decisive victory. Surely the Greeks dedicated themselves to consolidating their power in Carthage Nova, Basti, Acci, Abdera, Malacca and the Strait area, making it impossible for Atanagildo to defeat his rival, but without achieving any decisive success that endangered the position of the rebel, whom a part of the Bética would remain loyal and it is possible that also a part of the Cartaginense.

Agila's Murder

Finally, Agila was assassinated in Mérida (March 555) and the Visigothic nobility recognized Atanagildo. It is very likely that Agila's murder occurred at the instigation of Byzantium. Indeed, the death of Byzantium's protégé had been Justinian's perfect excuse to conquer Africa and Italy. Agila's death and Atanagild's proclamation, no doubt by nobles manipulated by Byzantine agents, gave Justinian a convincing excuse to act on his own behalf, once his military effort in Italy was over (554).

It is difficult to assume, given the background and human nature, that Justinian had no part in Agila's death. For four years (551 to 554) a part of the Visigothic nobility was loyal to Agila, whom he supposes backed by his Byzantine allies. Instead, in March 555 he was murdered. The change, according to some authors, could have been the sudden occupation of Cartago Nova that motivated the change, but it seems probable that this city was occupied in the summer of 552, or in any case in the summer of 555, several months after the assassination..

A more plausible hypothesis is that Agila was assassinated at the instigation of Justinian or his Magister Militum on the peninsula on Justinian's orders. The nobles who assassinated the king ended up recognizing Atanagildo, which would indicate that the nationalist and anti-Byzantine party was gaining ground, or that the king's inability to defeat the rebel —despite Greek help— made it advisable to reconcile with Atanagildo and avoid confiscations and retaliation. Evidently, Atanagildo appeared as the usurper and even possibly as the instigator of the assassination of the king. Atanagildo had reasons, but it is difficult that he could hope to be recognized by the rival nobility, who are supposed to be of an opposite faction. On his part, Justinian also had reasons: blaming Atanagildo for the king's death, and when he disappeared, he was left with a free hand to act on his behalf against the Visigoths, who would still be divided. In addition, the war in Italy had practically ended, large forces were no longer needed to complete the conquest and the year 555 seemed perfect to begin the conquest of the Visigothic Kingdom. Finally, Justiniano had the means. If he had been an ally of Agila for three years, he would have controlled or bribed men at court and had (for the first time in several years) the military power necessary to initiate the conquest. Naturally, the Visigothic nobility loyal to Agila was surely unaware that the war in Italy was virtually over in 554.

A final hypothesis is that the assassination took place without Byzantine involvement. It is possible that the king's situation was not very good. Atanagildo would continue to increase supporters and win battles, the small Byzantine contingent not being of much help. In the winter of 554 to 555, the king was able to negotiate a new agreement with Justinian, which would imply, for example, the cession of Cartago Nova (in which case the Byzantines would only dominate Malaga and an indeterminate area of Baetica) or resignations unacceptable for the nobility. Once the agreement was accepted by Justinian, the news of such acceptance would arrive in March, when the nobility hostile to the Byzantine alliance or who wanted to save their properties and situation, who must already have been conspiring to act since the beginning of the contacts, decided to assassinate him..

After the murder of Agila (he was the fourth consecutive king murdered at the hands of his subjects), it is not surprising that Gregory of Tours commented, who on the occasion of the murder of Teudigiselo assured that the Goths had adopted the perverse habit of killing by the sword to the kings who did not please them, substituting them for any other of their liking (Gregory called such an attitude the "evil of the Goths" or morbus gothorum ).

Additional bibliography

• "Agila". ArtHistory Digital Magazine (Junta de Castilla y León). ISSN 1887-4398. Archived from the original on March 26, 2010. Consultation on 5 November 2009.

• portalmibax. «Arte Visigodo» (web). Archived from the original on December 8, 2008. Consultation on 5 November 2009.
• Fontaine, Jacques (2002). "5." Isidoro of Seville: genesis and originality of Hispanic culture in times of the Visigoths (Volumen 197 de Essayos). Encounter. p. 464. ISBN 9788474906530.
• Orlandis, José (2006). «3». History of the Spanish Visigodo Kingdom. Editions Rialp. p. 464. ISBN 9788432134692. (breakable link available on the Internet Archive; see history, first version and last).